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This dissertation provides an anarchist account of news media power and 
interactions between news media and social movement actors, by drawing on anarchist 
thought and practice, as well as theoretical traditions such as libertarian Marxism, critical 
media studies, science and technology studies, and social movement studies in sociology. 
Notable features of anarchist media theory include: a critique of communications 
technology and corruptions of information power; a critique of mass news media’s 
corporate hierarchical structure; and a premium placed on communications practices and 
media that enable non-hierarchical forms of communication, as well as on widespread 
participation in the process of meaning making. This qualitative theory building and 
research, which addresses a glaring gap in anarchist literature about media, is rooted 
firmly in anarchism’s rejection of authority and oppression, its commitment to liberty and 
autonomy, and its understanding of prefigurative politics as a form of direct action.  
Anarchism also brings its ethical-political commitments to bear on 
communications research, by challenging the administrative/critical researcher binary, 
questioning state-centric research perspectives, and calling on scholars to engage in 
activist research that could benefit activists and social movement actors. In addition, 
 ix 
anarchism provides a theoretical basis for assessing established critical media theories 
according to their strategic or tactical implications for activists and other social 
movement actors, not simply according to how well these theoretical perspectives capture 
or explain different aspects of social-political reality. Moreover, unlike classical or 
orthodox Marxist theoretical perspectives, anarchism rejects vanguardism—the strategic 
principle that a small but dedicated group of class-conscious revolutionaries bear primary 
responsibility for fomenting social change—as well as the belief that capturing state 
power is indispensable to social transformation. An anarchist account of news media and 
media-movement interactions thus problematizes critical media theories such as framing, 
hegemony, and political economy, which proffer state-centric analyses and strategic 
implications. 
Besides promoting theoretical arguments, this study features an original research 
component consisting of in-depth, ethnographic interviews with activists based in Austin, 
Texas. The findings from this exploratory interview research suggest that some of the 
major theoretical arguments contained in this dissertation accurately reflect how some 
anarchists think about news media. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Lines of Inquiry 
This dissertation attempts to show what anarchist thought and practice “bring to 
the table,” so to speak, in a scholarly, activist examination of critical communications 
theories, media research practices, social movement tactics and strategy, and 
contemporary activists’ beliefs about news media. Broad in scope, it addresses questions 
which have gnawed at me over the past several years, first as an activist media maker 
involved in diverse left-progressive groups and causes, then later as a communications 
graduate student working at a “tier 1” research university. As a work of activist 
scholarship, this study aims to present ideas of possible interest to those who participate 
in oppositional movements and causes. As a work of academic scholarship, it focuses 
attention on undertheorized aspects of the interrelationships among mainstream news 
media, activist and/or alternative media, and oppositional groups and social movements.  
Indicative of the settings in which its chapters incubated, two wellsprings of 
theory and research ground this work: critical communications studies and anarchism. 
Although their concerns overlap to some extent, the former is mainly a product of 
institutionally embedded, subsidized professional researchers, whereas the latter 
represents an organic expression of revolutionary, anti-authoritarian thought and practice. 
With a foot in both worlds, this raises a hard question: Should one study anarchist groups, 
practices, and theory by using an established critical communications paradigm, or would 
it be better to examine media-movement interactions and critical media theories through 
the optic of anarchist thought and practice? In other words, which body of ideas—critical 
communications theory or anarchism—ought to frame or situate this study? 
Of course, neither approach is “correct” in any meaningful sense; they simply 
interpret one another in divergent ways. Applying critical media theories—such as 
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political economy, cultural hegemony, critical race theory, and feminism—to study the 
communicative activity of anarchists may shine light on tactics and strategies that could 
benefit other dissidents and activists. This research approach would be similar to 
Charlotte Ryan’s (1991), for example, whose book Prime Time Activism usefully 
connects academic media theories to their implications for activist strategy. However, I 
chose to frame this study within anarchism, and have endeavored to craft anarchistic 
arguments about news media, for three reasons. First, theorizing about news media from 
an anarchist point of view helps to fill a gap in anarchist literature about one of society’s 
major political institutions. Second, although anarchists are few in number, their ideas 
resonate widely within left-progressive and anti-authoritarian/anti-capitalist circles. 
Applying anarchist insights about power and liberation to news media—or any other 
important dimension of social-political life—can help to extend anarchism’s influence. 
Third, examining media through an anarchist lens arguably is more interesting to activists 
and dissidents than are efforts to bend or recast anarchism in order to assimilate it into 
existing academic frameworks, which various strands of “post-anarchism” attempt (e.g., 
Call 2002; May 1994; Newman 2001; Rousselle & Evren 2011). In any case, this study is 
better viewed as an anarchist work on media power, media-movement interactions, and 
related matters, rather than as a communications work on anarchism or anarchists. 
Of course, the terms ‘anarchy’, ‘anarchist’, and ‘anarchism’ are contentious, even 
among readers familiar with radical political movements. Briefly, by anarchism I mean a 
revolutionary anti-authoritarian, anti-capitalist political theory, culture, and movement, 
which rejects all forms of domination and values freedom and equality in every sphere of 
human activity. Anarchism encompasses several different tendencies, including anarcho-
communism, anarcho-syndicalism, mutualism, collectivism, anarcha-feminism, 
primitivism, individualist anarchism, and dozens of other schools of thought (Gordon 
 3 
2006; 2008; Guérin 1970; 1980/2005; Marshall 1992/2010). But it is also much more 
than this, as anarchism is notable for its diversity and resistance to ideological closure. It 
is as much a body of specific ideas and practices as it is a spirit or attitude about how 
people should live and approach questions dealing with economic, cultural, and/or social-
political transformation. As Paul Rabin (1988), writing for the British anarchist quarterly 
The Raven, observes: 
Anarchism has manifested itself in a variety of organisations and theories. But 
anarchy itself is not a specific theory or form of organisation. It is a spirit which 
can find expression, to a greater or lesser extent, in theories and organisations. 
Anarchy is not complete or consistent or definite. 
To analyse anarchy is necessarily to inflict injury upon it. Anarchy can not be 
captured in any formulation. Anarchy is metaphysically primitive. The substance 
of anarchy can only be understood intuitively. The form which this understanding 
takes is as a distinction between those forms of human life which support anarchy 
and those which are hostile to it (pp. 323-4). 
Taking Rabin’s comments to heart, I must emphasize that the view of anarchism 
presented in this work is my own, and might be described as “anarchism without 
adjectives,” even though it draws inspiration from writers who represent different 
tendencies within the anarchist tradition. Idiosyncrasy is unavoidable when writers tackle 
the subject of anarchism, but anarchist writers can inform readers of their personal biases. 
My views are a product of long involvement in radical left groups and causes, working 
alongside anarchists, Marxists, and progressives from various backgrounds, immersing 
myself in hundreds of books and articles about anarchists and their ideas, and allowing 
new information, experience, and reflection to reshape my views – all the while as 
someone whose political core is anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian. I must also reiterate 
that this dissertation does not focus primarily on the activities and writings of anarchist 
groups and activists. Rather, it strives to explore how the ideas of this particular political 
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tradition can provide insight into critical media theories and activist strategies, as well as 
highlight related concerns of significance to leftists, progressives, and radical anti-
capitalists. In other words, this dissertation is concerned with what anarchist ideas and 
practices, but not necessarily anarchist activists, groups, and movements, can tell us about 
news media power and media-movement interactions.  
 
THEORY BUILDING APPROACH 
Academic works on journalism and media often proceed formulaically, moving 
step-by-step through introductions and literature reviews, theoretical considerations, 
research questions or hypotheses, and methodological breakdowns, before finally 
presenting and discussing research findings. Indeed, the process has become so 
standardized that several writers offer detailed, step-by-step instructions on how to 
produce and publish academic communications research (e.g., Alexander & Potter 2001; 
Belcher 2009; Knapp & Daly 2014; Poindexter & McCombs 2000). This approach is the 
norm for contemporary Western social science scholarship, which purports to apply 
scientific methods in pursuit of neatly packaged, objective truths. Against this tradition 
and in the spirit of anarchism, this study adopts a qualitatively untidy, non-objective, non-
linear, anti-elite, purposely political approach. 
Unlike most other qualitative studies, in which researchers begin with theoretical 
frameworks in order to build upon, verify, or challenge established perspectives, this 
dissertation is not preoccupied with testing or applying anarchist media theory. Instead, 
its main concern is to show how anarchist media theory could be constructed, as well as 
demonstrate how an anarchist account of news media differs from other, established 
critical media perspectives and research approaches. To do so, it provides an account of 
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anarchism and anarchist principles, and then brings these to bear on academic literature in 
order to reframe important issues in journalism and mass communications research from 
an anarchist perspective. 
This approach may unsettle readers with prevailing expectations for journalism 
and communications research, who perhaps view this dissertation’s theory building 
project as something like an extended literature review. There are important 
counterpoints to be raised here. First, this work develops a series of interrelated, 
expressly political arguments about news media power, media-movement interactions, 
and the study thereof; this is not the same thing as a literature review. This dissertation 
has commonalities with grounded theory approaches, which seek to discover theoretical 
concepts inductively, as opposed to verifying preexisting ones (Charmaz 2014; Corbin & 
Strauss 2008; Glaser & Strauss 1967; Martin 2010). Indeed, there are notable cases where 
mainstream scholars adopt an inductive approach, by reimagining or recasting the 
secondary literature in a specific field in order to construct or promote frameworks, 
models, or theoretical arguments that can be used to stimulate further research and 
inquiry. To take one example, among journalism and media scholars, Pamela Shoemaker 
and Stephen Reese’s (1996; 2014) book Mediating the Message, which draws on a huge 
body of theoretical academic literature in order to construct a hierarchical model of 
influences on news media content, stands out as an important work of media sociology. 
Second, within anarchist studies specifically, this basic methodological approach 
is not unusual. For instance, anarchist sociologists Dana Williams and Jeff Shantz (2014) 
bring anarchism to bear on sociology in a similar fashion, by interrogating key 
sociological concepts from an anarchist perspective. David Graeber (2004) takes a similar 
approach in his seminal Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology. According to activist 
scholar Brian Martin (2010), inductive theory building approaches are often conducive to 
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constructing models and frameworks that could benefit activists and other social 
movement actors. This study is informed by the work of these anarchist scholars. Third, 
simply put, this dissertation’s inductive theory building approach arguably is the best way 
to address its main research question: What might an anarchist theory of news media look 
like? To begin answering this, this study pursues six interrelated lines of inquiry, 
sketched below. 
 
LINE 1: ANARCHIST THEORIZING ABOUT NEWS MEDIA 
As intimated above, the first line of inquiry concerns how anarchist ideas and 
practices may be brought to be bear on academic scholarship about news media and 
activists or social movement actors. The terms ‘mainstream (news) media’ and 
‘alternative news media’ are culturally contingent, moving targets, because media that 
appear as alternative, activist, or radical in one context might appear as mainstream or 
tame in another (Atton 2002). Until very recently, scholars such as John Downing (1984; 
2001, pp. viii-ix) treated the split between alternative and mainstream as a binary with 
little to no middle ground. However, as Chris Atton (2002) argues, it is useful to 
conceptualize news media institutions as featuring different degrees of alterity according 
to different aspects of their products (content; form; reprographic innovations) and 
processes (distributive use; transformed social relations, roles, and responsibilities; 
transformed communication processes) (p. 27). Rather than promoting a purist vision, 
such as writers who argue that alternative media must be anti-corporate or non-
hierarchical (e.g., Albert 1997), Atton’s approach takes into account the hybridity and 
“mixed radicalism” of alternative media (p. 29). 
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The term ‘news media’ can refer either to news content itself or the producers of 
such content. Thus, the term ‘mainstream news media’ as it appears in this study refers to 
news content produced by mainstream news organizations. But it also refers to news 
media companies themselves, which are typically privately owned and organized as 
hierarchical corporations. Mainstream news media control the largest distribution 
channels and are staffed by reporters, editors, and other workers (such as computer techs, 
delivery drivers, printers, lawyers, and advertising staff), many of whom consider 
themselves to be professionals, who produce and disseminate news media products such 
as newspapers, magazines, televised broadcasts, and web content (Herman & Chomsky 
1988/2002; Shoemaker & Reese 1996; 2014). Mainstream news media include prestige 
news organizations such as Time Magazine, the New York Times, the Washington Post, 
CNN, and CBS News, but also include local TV news stations and newspapers such as 
the Austin American-Statesman (Chomsky 1997; Gans 1979). 
On the other hand, the terms ‘alternative news media’ and ‘activist (news) media’ 
are notoriously hard to pin down, which leads some writers to conclude that there can be 
no meaningful definition of these terms (Abel 1997). Because I could not anticipate how 
my interview subjects will employ terms (see Chapters 6 and 7), and because this study 
focuses mainly on activist uses of news media rather than definitional disputes among 
alternative media scholars, I propose to treat these terms broadly. Atton’s conception of 
mixed alterity suggests that certain forms of digital and social media—in particular, 
websites such as Twitter and Facebook, which are controlled by giant corporations but 
enable activist communication—can sometimes occupy a middle ground between 
mainstream and alternative conceptions. 
Unlike Marxism—a theoretical cornerstone of critical communications studies—
which is replete with economic formulae, technical jargon, and other hallmarks of “high” 
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theory created by philosophers, scientists, economists, and other academics, anarchist 
ideas and principles exemplify or lend themselves to creating “low” theory, i.e., “critical 
thought indifferent to the institutional forms of the academy or the art world” (Wark 
2011, p. 3). Low theory offers explanations for different features of social-political 
reality, but does not build totalizing frameworks or worldviews. Thus, for our purposes, 
rather than presenting an anarchist theory of news media power and media-movement 
interactions, it is more accurate to say that this dissertation tries to show how anarchist 
theorizing about these topics might proceed. This conception of low theory is what I have 
in mind when I write that the main goal of this dissertation is to construct or promote an 
anarchist media theory or an anarchist account of news media power and/or media-
movement interactions. 
Anarchism may be diverse, but its different schools share many principles in 
common, including a rejection of different forms of authority and domination, a defense 
of freedom and autonomy, and an emphasis on prefigurative politics and direct action. 
Awareness and exposition of these principles may enable one to theorize about the 
informational power of news media and communications technologies along lines 
consistent with anarchist thought and practice. Another important aspect of this is 
theorizing about cultural production along anarchist lines. 
In addition, anarchism is notable for its critique of other ideas and political 
philosophies, especially of what might be called Orthodox Marxism, which includes 
classical Marxism but also Leninism, Trotskyism, and related schools of thought. For this 
reason, this study also seeks to show how anarchist ideas apply to established, high 
theoretical Marxist accounts of news media power, such as the media hegemony thesis, 
as well as more mainstream academic accounts, such as framing and political economy. 
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LINE 2: THE FACE OF ACTIVIST RESEARCH 
Anarchist academics face several obstacles, in part because critical and radical 
scholars alike deride the low theory of anarchism as naïve or theoretically 
underdeveloped as compared with the high theory of Marxism. Moreover, anarchists 
themselves are often hostile to academics and intellectuals, who they perceive as career-
driven or vanguardist rather than as genuinely committed to working within or alongside 
popular struggles and social movements (e.g., Gelderloos 2010b). As a result, anarchist 
ideas have received practically zero attention in the academy, an outcome that many 
anarchists and other radicals in the streets strongly prefer. This work examines this 
tension as well as anarchism’s relationship to intellectuals, academics, and the academy, 
in order to understand the roots of its exclusion from most academic communications 
inquiry. 
This line of inquiry also focuses attention on how anarchists and other radicals in 
the academy might approach the task of actually doing radical communications research, 
given that the university system poses profound ethical-political and epistemological 
dilemmas for would-be activist researchers.* Even though journalism scholars know more 
about the functions, goals, and content of journalism and news media than most activists, 
they have not added significantly to the conversation about media as it relates to 
movement strategy (Frey & Carragee 2007). Stephen Reese (1999) argues that journalism 
schools have been pressured to abandon their academic ethos in favor of supporting the 
news industry largely by vocational training. However, the problem runs deeper and can 
be linked to the political economy of journalism research and education: how J-Schools 
                                                 
* These same concerns have motivated activist scholars and graduate students to produce their own journals 
and hold their own conferences. For example, the University of Texas at Austin hosts Abriendo Brecha, an 
annual conference dedicated to activist scholarship, defined by conference organizers as “research and 
creative intellectual work in alignment with communities, organizations, movements, and networks 
working for social and economic justice.” See http://ddce.utexas.edu/abriendobrecha/ for more information. 
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operate and scholars’ obligation to produce content that prepares them for upward 
mobility and recognition. These motivations lead to a need to critically examine how 
journalism and communications scholarship is produced, validated, and shared. 
 
LINE 3: ASSESSING THE “PROBLEM OF THE MEDIA” 
The third line of inquiry concerns mass news media’s adversarial functions, i.e., 
the various means by which the mainstream media threaten democracy or suppress 
activists and social movement actors. Among activists, academics, and other informed 
critics of news media, historically there does not appear to be widespread agreement on 
what, exactly, constitutes the “problem of the (mainstream news) media” (Altschull 1995; 
Breed 1955; Gans 1979; Gitlin 1980; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Kaufman 2003; 
McChesney 1999; 2004; Parenti 1986; 1992; Sinclair 1919/2002; Schiller 1969/1992; 
1973; Shoemaker & Reese 1996; Tuchman 1978). Although many critics agree that 
corporate influence factors into perceptions of adversarial press performance, the issue is 
more complex than this. In addition to pinpointing the corrupting influences of 
corporatism, racism, and sexism, left-progressive activists offer multiple, frequently 
contradictory criticisms of the mass news media, such as that mainstream news is not 
objective or possibly too objective, or that news media are too liberal or too conservative. 
More research is needed to uncover how contemporary activists actually view news 
media as adversaries to causes and movements. 
At the root of competing dissident claims lie different theoretical perspectives, 
which vary widely in their accounts of news media power, influences on content, media 
effects on audiences, and how the mainstream press undermine or activate possibilities 
for resistance. For example, accounts of media hegemony posit that the mass news media 
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exert a powerful influence on audiences (Gitlin 1980; Gramsci 1971), whereas the 
propaganda model developed by Ed Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988/2002) says 
nothing about news media’s effects, even though many dissidents and activists assume it 
does (Herman 1996). In addition, it appears that relatively few activists give serious 
consideration to academics’ responses to critical media theories. Although radicals may 
have valid reasons for not taking academic criticisms too seriously, this can weaken 
creative thinking on these issues. 
These considerations suggest that although left-progressive activists appreciate in 
a general sense the problem of the media, they perhaps lack a deeper appreciation of the 
body of theory in which the left’s criticisms are rooted. By attempting to cast light on 
some of these issues, my intent is not to argue that one perspective is correct or more 
useful than others. Rather, my approach is similar to that of Uri Gordon (2008), an Israeli 
anarchist, who writes in his study of contemporary anarchism that he is “not so much 
interested in finding answers as in pinning down some of the relevant questions that lie at 
the bottom of endless and recurring debates, to explain their background, to map and 
disentangle them” (p. 7; emphasis in original).  
 
LINE 4: CLARIFYING AND ASSESSING STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 
The fourth line of inquiry concerns how activists make sense of news media’s 
roles as a site of struggle and as tools and resources they can use to further their causes. 
Radicals often speak of praxis, which refers to the interrelation of action and reflection 
on ideas and theories. Praxis is where theoretical rubber meets the road of practice: action 
and reflection inform and shape one another in a dialectical relationship. The problem of 
the media points to the fact that activist praxis related to these issues has some murky 
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elements. Although critical and radical media theories have implications for activist 
strategy, they often do a poor job of spelling these out. A major goal of this dissertation is 
to articulate some of the strategic implications raised by hegemony, political economy, 
and framing accounts of media power, and to assess these theories and their implications 
from an anarchist perspective. 
In addition, radical and critical accounts of news media identify different roles 
that news media play vis-à-vis social movements and activism. In particular, radical 
activist accounts frame news media as a site of struggle, an opponent that activists and 
movements contend with, and a tool or resource that activists seek to use or exploit. This 
study maps these conceptions, in order to help clarify how they promote (or fail to 
promote) different strategic ideas. Once again, in examining these issues it is not my 
intent to offer prescriptions regarding specific strategies; rather, the point is to lay some 
groundwork for further radical inquiry and reflection. 
 
LINE 5: DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES AND ACTIVISTS’ OPTIONS 
Of the important books written by leftists and progressives about news media 
(e.g., Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Lakoff 2004; McChesney 1999; 2004; Ryan 1991; 
Salzman 2003), few explore the ways in which theory might encourage the use of new 
digital technologies to widen the field of options available to activists and enable more 
interaction. Today’s media environment differs significantly from that of forty, twenty, or 
even ten years ago. It is no longer clear, for instance, that activists should attract prime 
time news coverage to have their messages heard. New digital technologies present more 
options for organizing, reaching audiences, and allowing engaged readers to speedily 
share information distributed by activists and organizers (Cleaver 1995; 2000; 
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McCaughey & Ayers 2003). In fact, in light of these options, traditional mainstream 
media may in some instances be irrelevant to the audiences of activists and organizers.  
The internet contributes to the decline of mainstream news media while allowing 
alternative media to expand (Gillmor 2004; McChesney & Nichols 2010); in 2010, more 
Americans received their news from the web than they did from newspapers (Pew 2011). 
Globalization has stimulated a proliferation in ethnically oriented television, radio, 
newspapers, and websites, long scorned by the mainstream news media, which now reach 
approximately 60 million Americans (Allen 2009; González & Torres 2011; Matsaganis, 
Katz, & Ball-Rokeach 2011). Meanwhile movement-created media and social media have 
become important tools for activists, raising questions about new civic crises created by 
digital technologies, “slacktivism” (a portmanteau of ‘slacker’ and ‘activism’), and 
whether organizers now operate in a kind of disconnected bubble (Morozov 2011; Pariser 
2011; Smucker 2011). For example, popular social networking websites like Twitter and 
Facebook have made it very easy for activists to circulate information, but arguably 
divert time and resources away from more traditional forms of activism, such as door-to-
door to organizing (Gladwell 2010). 
Activist circulation of news content via social media such as Facebook, Tumblr, 
and Twitter also raises many of the same issues that activists confront in their criticisms 
of the mainstream press, such as the corporate structure of these media and their roles as 
gatekeepers. For instance, the social networking site Facebook has been known to delete 
profiles and posts by activists and groups involved a wide range of left-progressive 
causes, including banking reform, Palestine solidarity efforts, and animal rights activism. 
Thus a tension exists between the fact that activists are critical of mainstream news 
media, yet they share and circulate information on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, 
and YouTube (Thorson et al. 2013; Youmans & York 2012), which by any reasonable 
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definition are corporate media giants. Activists also express concern over social media 
companies’ policies of handing over users’ personal information to law enforcement 
agencies. This study aims to explore how contemporary activists think through these and 
related issues.  
 
LINE 6: ALTERNATIVE AND MAINSTREAM MEDIA INTERACTIONS 
To a lesser extent, this dissertation also works to theorize about overlooked 
aspects of the ternary (threefold) relationship among mainstream media, activist or 
alternative media, and social movements. Journalism and media scholars who study these 
topics typically focus on the relationship between movements and alternative media, or 
on how mainstream media depicts or portrays movements. Many of these studies orient 
themselves toward the state and mainstream news organizations, though, by treating these 
institutions as principal actors while downplaying activists and newsworkers’ agency. It 
is telling that mainstream political communications research in the United States, such as 
studies of framing and agenda-setting, does not typically consider the communicative 
activity or tactics and strategies of non-state actors. For instance, Martin (2004) examines 
how mainstream news media framed important labor struggles in the 1990s without 
exploring how or whether union organizers tried to influence coverage. Research 
approaches such as this treat activists as passive rather than active participants in the 
process of making meaning. 
In addition, very little has been published about the intermedia relationship 
between alternative/activist media and mainstream media. The results of a national 
survey study show that reporters and editors working within mainstream media tend to 
ignore alternative media and ethnic publications – especially publications critical of 
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mainstream coverage, which stifles journalistic curiosity and undermines newsroom 
diversity (De Uriarte 2003, pp. 77-78). But this is only one of the many ways in which 
alternative and mainstream media interrelate. To date, no one has promoted theory that 
connects and explores the workings of all three—mainstream media, activist or 
alternative media, and social movements. A framework that draws attention to these 
interrelationships might also energize civic activists. 
 
ROADMAP 
When taken together, the answers suggested by these lines of inquiry offer 
something which approaches an anarchist account of news media and media-movement 
interactions. There are multiple ways in which one might pursue these questions. What 
follows is this study’s approach: 
Chapter 2 frames the dissertation by examining anarchism’s theoretical content 
and applying anarchist ideas to an analysis of news media power. It describes key 
principles at the heart of contemporary anarchist thought and practice, as well as 
speculates about why no other study articulates an anarchist account of news media. It 
then sketches an anarchist critique of informational power and technology before 
bringing anarchism to bear on news media. A concluding section sketches implications of 
this critique. 
Unlike Marxists, who decades ago cemented their status as serious critical 
scholars, anarchists today occupy few places in the academy. Over the past two decades 
they made more inroads, but as Jeff Shantz (2001) observes, this activity has not been 
matched by critical reflection on the limitations of anarchist engagement with the 
institutions of higher learning. Specifically, anarchists and other radical academics have 
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not paid sufficient attention to the tension between themselves and activists outside the 
academy. For that reason, Chapter 3 examines four key sources of friction between 
academic researchers and radical anti-capitalists. These are: a distinction between 
scholars and radical intellectuals; the class position of academic researchers; the 
relationship between power and expertise; and academia’s troubling influence on 
scholarship and scholars, who occupy a privileged space in knowledge production. 
This last concern is the focus of this chapter, which examines key features of 
administrative and critical research orientations, with the goal of carving out the contours 
of a radical research orientation as an alternative to both. The point of this exposition is 
not to reexamine or reignite turf wars between defenders of administrative and critical 
research approaches. Rather, the point is to illuminate a researcher ethos that tries to 
address some of the ethical-political and epistemological dilemmas that anarchists and 
other radicals urge academics to consider before entering the field. This examination 
shows how academia’s intellectual-institutional setting influences research, while 
presenting the reader with a conception of activist research which informs this 
dissertation—a role which in the past decade gained some academic recognition. In a 
sense, it serves as a prelude to this study’s theory and methods chapters. As Stanley 
Deetz (1992) observes, “As researchers, we must provide the necessary insight for good 
social choices, but we cannot do that without examining the democratic foundations of 
our own research. Neither natural nor causal or evolutionary modes of transformation can 
redeem us from the inevitability of continued theoretical choices and our moral 
responsibility to make good choices. … It is not in our theory and judgments that we 
begin, but in our pretheoretical understandings and prejudices” (pp. 65-6). 
Chapter 4 describes three conceptions of news media vis-à-vis social movements 
and activism, which appear throughout radical activist discourse on media-movement 
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interactions. These roles are media as site of struggle, media as adversary, and media as 
tools or resources that activists and their opponents can use or exploit. In examining the 
news media as a site of struggle, I present an anarchist critique of Habermas’s idea of the 
public sphere. Chapter 4 provides necessary context for theoretical arguments I develop 
in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 5 examines theoretical traditions that left-progressive and radical anti-
capitalist activists often draw on to explain how hierarchies and multiple realities of 
oppression influence or manifest in news media. These include media hegemony, 
political economy, and framing. This chapter describes strategic conceptions implied by 
these theories, as well as critiques these theoretical accounts from the perspective of 
anarchism.  
In addition to developing theoretical arguments rooted in anarchism, this 
dissertation also seeks to understand how radicals and progressives actually think about 
media as it relates to their activism and organizing efforts. To gain insight into these 
matters, I conducted a series of ethnographic, in-depth interviews with 16 different left-
progressive and radical anti-capitalist activists based in Austin, Texas. From these 
interviewees, five anarchists were selected for closer examination. Chapter 6 describes 
the methodological aspects of this original research, including the dilemmas involved 
with seeking approval for research from Institutional Review Boards. Chapter 7 reviews 
findings from these in-depth interviews. Chapter 8 offers conclusions and suggestions for 
further research.  
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Chapter 2: Anarchism, Information Power, and Technology 
Many different ideas inform and animate the organizers, activists, groups, and 
movements that challenge oppressive regimes based on white supremacy, patriarchy, 
heteronormativity*, capitalism and corporatism, political authoritarianism, colonialism, 
anthropocentricism, and the pillaging of the planet and its resources. Ranging from 
reformist to revolutionary, mainstream to marginal, they reflect a great breadth and 
complexity of thought that characterizes all oppositional movements. 
In the United States, the animating ideas with the widest influence are those 
which reflect longstanding national mythologies and ingrained cultural mores. For 
instance, immigrants’ rights groups and mainstream labor unions such as the AFL-CIO 
often invoke Americans’ deep abiding belief in the American Dream in their campaigns 
to gain support, recruit new members, and raise funds. Similarly, by defining patriotism 
as loyalty to democratic principles, and war as a threat to those principles, many antiwar 
activists argue that dissent and peace efforts are in fact patriotic. This argument draws 
inspiration from colonial dissenters, as well as a long tradition of free speech battles to 
uphold the first amendment (Ivie 2007; Rabban 1997; Woehrle, Coy, & Maney 2008). 
Religious faith, too, has long been a critical influence on movement building in the 
United States, giving inspiration to the abolition, temperance, and moral reform 
movements of the 19
th
 century, the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Plowshares Movement of the 1980s, and contemporary struggles to abolish the death 
penalty, give asylum to undocumented immigrants, and protect the ecology (Guzder 
2011; Young 2006). Patriotic and religious messages resonate with many activists and 
ordinary Americans—conservatives, liberals, and progressives alike—because these are 
                                                 
* Heteronormativity, often linked with homophobia, refers to the belief that all humans are either male or 
female and that heterosexuality is “normal,” preferred, or (ethically, biologically, etc.) appropriate. 
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deeply embedded cultural schemas (Hirshberg 1993; Young 2006). According to Gallup 
(2013; 2014a; 2015) data, a large majority of adults in the United States say they are 
proud to be American, and more than half “believe that religion can answer all or most of 
today’s problems.”  
But activists and movements also embrace ideas that are frequently 
misunderstood, maligned, or considered unpopular by outside observers. Indeed, even 
within social movements, activists struggle with concepts such as Marxism, feminism, 
anarchism, and other perspectives on society’s underlying power dynamics. Radical 
perspectives are a hard sell; they jar with commonly held beliefs about race, gender, 
kinship, governance, culture, and how societies function, shattering these conceptions and 
laying bare previously unnoticed forms of oppression, social control, and stratification. 
They also come with jargon and historical baggage, such as longstanding tensions 
between Marxists and anarchists, which can create uneasy alliances within movements.*  
Radicals themselves can be off-putting, too, especially those with forceful personalities. 
As veteran organizer Cynthia Kaufman (2003) observes, “In meetings as well as written 
materials, newcomers encounter people who use information and political jargon as a 
weapon to gain social status and intimidate others” (p. 2). 
It is easy to see why many activists—newcomers and veterans alike—tune out 
radical perspectives and personalities while hitching their political projects to mainstream 
ideas. However, radical ideas have long informed leftwing and progressive struggles in 
                                                 
* Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm (1973/2001) suggests that tensions between anarchists and Marxists 
have eased considerably since the early 20
th
 century, when the Comintern-dominated Second International 
excluded anarchists from its ranks (pp. 67-83). More recently, anarchists and Marxists have collaborated on 
insurgent political projects such as the Love and Rage Revolutionary Anarchist Federation (Filippo 2003). 
Moreover, in cities and states with small left bases, it is not uncommon for anarchists, Marxists, and other 
left-progressive activists to make compromises in order to unify around local political projects. For a recent 
attempt at anarchist-Marxist synthesis, see Staughton Lynd and Andrej Grubacic’s (2008) Wobblies and 
Zapatistas. 
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the United States (Buhle 1983/2013; McCarthy & McMillian 2003; Zinn 1980/2003; 
Zinn & Arnove 2014). Arguably they have been indispensable to dissidents, activists, and 
movement builders, helping to crystalize analyses of social problems, as well as 
movement goals and strategies for social transformation (e.g., Albert et al. 1986; 
Kaufman 2003; Team Colors Collective 2010). Radical ideas, in other words, pay huge 
dividends to those who would draw lessons from them. Without becoming too dogmatic, 
activists would do well to give serious consideration to these ideas and reflect on their 
implications. 
Within the field of critical communications scholarship, most radical analyses of 
news media and media-movement interactions are anchored in theoretical perspectives 
such as Marxism, feminism, post-colonial studies, poststructuralism, and critical race 
theory. Yet comparatively anarchism, a radical political perspective with a long 
intellectual tradition, has only barely been explored. To that end, this chapter seeks to 
carve out space for anarchism within the field. In the first section below, I initiate 
unfamiliar readers by examining anarchism’s origins as a revolutionary socialist 
movement, early anarchist thought and practice, and anarchism’s influence on workers’ 
struggles in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. The second section covers contemporary 
anarchism: its influence on present-day activism and organizing, as well as anarchist 
principles that are relevant for theorizing about information, technology, news media, 
media-movement interactions, and the ways in which these interrelate. The third section 
offers explanations for the near-absence of scholarly activist research on anarchism’s 
relationship to news media. The fourth section examines the relationships between 
anarchism, informational power, and technology. The fifth section brings these 
considerations to bear on news media and sketches some implications for activists and 
movements. 
 21 
ORIGINS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ANARCHIST TRADITION 
Few words in the English language are misused more often than ‘anarchy’, 
‘anarchist’, and ‘anarchism’. These have multiple connotations, owing to their histories 
as scare words; anarchists’ conflicts with Marxists and other left groups; and the 
character of the anarchist movement itself, which as a broad revolutionary tradition 
encompasses multiple disputing tendencies (Guérin 1970; 1980/2005; Joll 1979; McKay 
2008; Marshall 1992/2010). Popular conceptions of anarchism commonly associate it 
with chaos, violence, nihilism, and disobedience (Guérin 1970, p. 11; Marshall 
1992/2010, p. ix), which poses a challenge for researchers who both identify as anarchists 
and wish for their ideas to be taken seriously by non-anarchists.* Building towards an 
anarchist account of news media and media-movement interactions requires clearing 
away some of this fog. 
Some writers conceptualize anarchism as a blanket anti-statism with roots in 
ancient civilizations such as the Greeks and Chinese (e.g., Eltzbacher 1900/1960; Graham 
2005; 2009; Marshall 1992/2010), or as an historical tendency for humans to seek out, 
challenge, and dismantle oppressive power structures and hierarchies (e.g., Chomsky 
1970/2005; 2005; Nettlau 1932/1996; Rocker 1938/2004).† Sympathetic accounts of 
anarchism as a timeless struggle against oppression are ahistorical, however, and the sole 
criterion of anti-statism does not clearly delineate anarchism from other schools of 
                                                 
* Chomsky (1995/2005) argues that misrepresentations of anarchism “will exist as long as concentrations 
of power engender a kind of commissar class to defend them. Since they are usually not very bright, or are 
bright enough to know that they'd better avoid the arena of fact and argument, they'll turn to 
misrepresentation, vilification, and other devices that are available to those who know that they'll be 
protected by the various means available to the powerful. We should understand why this occurs, and 
unravel it as best we can. That’s part of the project of liberation—of ourselves and others, or more 
reasonably, of people working together to achieve these aims” (p. 180). 
† For instance, the opening words to Max Nettlau’s (1932/1996) A Short History of Anarchism are, “The 
history of anarchist ideas is inseparable from the history of all progressive developments and aspirations 
towards liberty” (p. 1). Nettlau was a German historian and anarchist who devoted most of his life to the 
anarchist movement in Europe. 
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thought, such as Marxism and radical economic liberalism, which also profess opposition 
to the state (Schmidt & Van der Walt 2009, pp. 17-18).* The origins of anarchism are 
more recent than antiquity: It first emerged as a revolutionary working class, anti-
capitalist movement and a radical left-wing alternative to Marxism in the 1860s and 
1870s. Its earliest exponents and pioneers were Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1840/1994; 
1847/1888; 1851/1923; 1863/1979; 2011), Mikhail Bakunin (1873/1990; 1882/1970; 
1953; 1980; 1992), and Peter Kropotkin (1885/1992; 1898/1994; 1899/1989; 1902/1990; 
1906/1990; 1993; 1995). Bakunin and Kropotkin in particular were key figures in 
developing and promulgating anarchist ideas (Schmidt & Van der Walt 2009), throwing 
themselves into workers and peasants’ struggles throughout Europe and Russia 
(Kropotkin 1899/1989; Leier 2006; Joll 1979; Woodcock & Avakumovic 1950/1971). 
Like Marxists, anarchists saw themselves as socialists or communists, meaning 
they advocated popular control over the economy and workers’ control and/or socialized 
ownership of the means of production. Unlike Marxists, who believed state power could 
be wielded to achieve this social transformation, anarchists were hostile to the idea that 
revolutionaries could use the state as a vehicle for transitioning from capitalism to a 
stateless, classless society (Guérin 1970; Schmidt & Van der Walt 2009). However, it is a 
mistake to characterize classical anarchism as the belief that the state is, in some sense, 
the root of all oppression or evil, because this purges it of its anti-capitalist or socialist 
content (Schmidt & Van der Walt 2009, p. 15). 
                                                 
* Published in 2009 to positive reviews, Michael Schmidt and Lucien van der Walt’s book Black Flame: 
The Revolutionary Class Politics of Anarchism and Syndicalism drew controversy after Schmidt was 
described as a white supremacist by individuals who provided documented evidence to support the 
allegations. As a result, Oakland, California-based publisher AK Press pulled the book. Although I consider 
the evidence against Schmidt to be pretty damning, I cite the book for its scholarship and the work of co-
author Lucien van der Walt, with whom I have corresponded—and in respect for the First Amendment and 
academic integrity. 
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Instead of Marx’s socialism from above, anarchists believed in revolutionary 
socialism from below: voluntary associations among autonomous production associations 
and communes, self-managed and federated upwards, that would replace the state and 
capitalism in all their functions, or at least those functions worth preserving (Bakunin 
1953; 1980; 1992; Guérin 1971; Kropotkin 1898/1994; 1902/1990; 1906/1990; Proudhon 
1863/1979; Rocker 1938/2004; Schmidt & Van der Walt 2009). Because anarchists 
were—and continue to be—both anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian, the phrase 
‘libertarian socialism’ is frequently used as an umbrella term for anarchism and its fellow 
travelers, such as situationism, autonomism, libertarian Marxism, and participatory 
economics (e.g., Albert 2003; Brinton 2004; Castoriadis 1988; 1993; Cleaver 1979; 
Debord 1967/1970; Negri 1984/1991; Pannekoek 1948/2003).* Anarchists and other 
libertarian socialists commonly refer to followers of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and 
Mao as authoritarian socialists or state socialists (Chomsky 1970/2005; 2005; Guérin 
1970; Prichard, Kinna, Pinta, & Berry 2012). Instead of societies governed by coercion 
and force, anarchists envision a world based on principles such as liberty, solidarity, 
mutual aid, and voluntary association (Bakunin 1953; 1980; 1992; Guérin 1970; 
Kropotkin 1898/1994; 1902/1990; 1906/1990; McKay 2008). 
In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, anarchists were a vibrant, influential force 
in peasant and workers’ struggles around the world (Graham 2005; 2009; Marshall 
1992/2010; Schmidt & Van der Walt 2005). In Europe, anarchist agitation reached a 
zenith in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), when millions of revolutionary syndicalists 
and anarchists collectivized agrarian areas in Andalusia, as well as major industrial 
                                                 
* It bears mentioning that some contemporary anarchists—in particular, those who describe themselves as 
nihilist, anti-organizational, autonomist, or post-Left—reject the libertarian socialist label because although 
they oppose capitalism and the state, they also view the left’s historical emphasis on socialism as a 
bankrupt political project. 
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centers in Catalonia, before the Fascist army of Francisco Franco crushed their 
revolutionary efforts (Bookchin 1994; Brenan 1943/1990; Casas 1986; Chomsky 
1967/2003; Dolgoff 1974; Jackson 1965; Orwell 1952). In the United States, anarchists 
and syndicalists fought for the 8-hour work day, established colonies and experimental 
schools, and agitated against militarism and for expansive free speech rights (Avrich 
1980; 1984; 1995; Dubofsky 1969; Rabban 1997). 
The politically motivated arrests, trial, and executions of four anarchists in 
Chicago following the Haymarket affair of 1886 drew many radicals to the cause of 
anarchism, including future luminaries Emma Goldman, Alexander Berkman, and 
Voltairine de Cleyre (Avrich 1984, pp. 433-4; Goldman 1931/1970, pp. 8-10). However, 
the anarchist movement in the United States declined as it gained a violent reputation. 
Berkman’s attempted assassination of industrialist Henry Clay Frick in 1892, Leon 
Czolgosz’s assassination of President William McKinley in 1901, and the murder 
convictions of Sacco and Vanzetti in 1921 all damaged anarchism’s reputation in the 
public eye (Berkman 1912/1999; Goldman 1931/1970; Marshall 1992/2010). Many 
anarchists joined the Industrial Workers of the World after it was founded in 1905, and 
by the 1920s, a broad section of the American Left turned to Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
for political guidance and inspiration. But by World War II, the anarchist movement had 
virtually disappeared from the American scene (Bell 1952/1996, pp. 106-9; Dubofsky 
1969; Marshall 1992/2010, pp. 499-503).  
After anarchism faded from view in the early 20
th
 century, torchbearers such as 
Murray Bookchin, Sam Dolgoff, Paul Goodman, Howard Ehrlich, and Dwight 
Macdonald kept its ideas alive in journals and books in the decades that followed. Due to 
the influence of these and other writers, anarchist ideas survived in the United States: 
They saw a brief resurgence in the counterculture of the 1960s and 1970s, and anarchistic 
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groups such as Movement for a New Society left an impression on the left-progressive 
social movements of the 1980s (Cornell 2011; Marshall 1992/2010, pp. 539-558). It was 
not until the 1990s, however, that anarchism in the United States gained a new lease on 
life, with the advent of the anti-/alter-globalization movement* (Epstein 2001; Marshall 
1992/2010, pp. 697-9).  
 
CONTEMPORARY ANARCHISM 
For most of the 20
th
 century, the revolutionary left—both globally and within the 
United States—stood in the shadows of Bolshevism and Soviet-style Communism. When 
the Soviet Union finally dissolved in 1991, it signaled a major blow to Marxism-
Leninism and spurred efforts to revitalize anarchism, which emerged as a prominent 
alternative vision of revolutionary social organization.† Throughout the 1990s, many 
radical activists at the center of the alter-globalization and anti-corporate movements 
identified as anarchists or embraced anarchist values and strategies (Epstein 2001). For 
instance, in 1999, Direct Action Network, a confederation of anarchist and anti-
authoritarian groups and organizations, played a major role in coordinating the massive 
protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle (Ney 2002). Prior to that, the 
Zapatista uprising of 1994 aroused critical but revolutionary solidarity from anarchists 
around the world, who drew important lessons from these communities in struggle (Day 
1998a; Lynd & Grubacic 2008).‡ Although it is difficult to say that anarchists constitute a 
                                                 
* The term ‘anti-globalization’ unfairly paints alter-globalization activists as Luddites, isolationists, or 
opponents of change or progress. The term ‘alter-globalization’ captures the movement’s true aims: 
Although these activists oppose capitalist globalization, they generally support forms of  “globalization 
from below.” 
† Even within the USSR, anarchists found renewed energy as the Soviet system collapsed. See Ruff (1991) 
for more. 
‡ The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, or EZLN) is 
revolutionary political community based in Chiapas, the southernmost state in Mexico. 
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national or global movement, anarchism exerts an important influence on contemporary 
leftwing, progressive, and anti-capitalist struggles around the world. Even groups and 
activists that do not identify as anarchist often exhibit an anarchist ethos or sensibility 
(Day 2005; Epstein 2001; Gordon 2008; Marshall 1992/2010). 
On a global level, leftists have not responded to the collapse of Soviet-style 
planned economies and the spread of neoliberalism by articulating a coherent, radical, 
popular alternative to state socialism and corporate capitalism, despite widespread 
resistance to both (Schmidt & Van der Walt 2005, pp. 9-14). Against this backdrop, 
anarchist ideas are especially relevant, because they animate countless social justice 
struggles. According to Gordon (2008), “Far from the end of history predicted in 1989 
[by neoconservative Francis Fukuyama], the circulation and spread of anarchist struggles 
and politics – largely in advanced capitalist countries – has been a vital force behind 
resistance to neoliberalism and the Permanent War” (p. 2). As a leading historian of 
anarchism observes, “Indeed, in many ways the soul of the [alter-globalization] 
movement is anarchist” (Marshall 1992/2010; p. 697). 
Despite drawing on classical anarchist thought for inspiration, “Contemporary 
anarchism is only in small part a direct continuation of the nineteenth- and twentieth-
century anarchist movements …. Instead, the roots of today’s anarchist networks can be 
found in the processes of intersection and fusion among radical social movements since 
the 1960s, whose paths have never been overtly anarchist” (Gordon 2008, p. 5). Gordon 
(2006) writes: 
[Contemporary anarchism] represents the revival of anarchist politics over the 
past decade in the intersection of several other movements, including radical 
ecology, feminism, black and indigenous liberation, anti-nuclear movements and, 
most recently, resistance to neoliberal capitalism and the “global permanent war”. 
Because of its hybrid genealogy, anarchism in the age of globalisation is a very 
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fluid and diverse movement, evolving in a rapidly-shifting landscape of social 
contention (p. 9; emphasis in original). 
Contemporary anarchism is a complex thing: It represents simultaneously a social 
movement, a political culture, and a collection of ideas (Epstein 2001; Gordon 2006; 
2008). Rather than focusing on anarchism as a political movement, this dissertation is 
concerned with how anarchist ideas can be brought to bear on issues surrounding 
activism, news media, technology, and information. I argue that the following, mutually-
reinforcing principles, which lie at the core of contemporary anarchist thought and 
practice, are especially relevant for developing an anarchist account of news media. 
 
Rejection of Oppression, Authority, and Hierarchy 
Today’s anarchists have broader agendas than their Old Left* counterparts. Even 
though anarchists throughout history opposed race- and gender-based forms of 
oppression as well as capitalism and political authoritarianism (Guérin 1970; McKay 
2008; Marshall 1992/2010; Schmidt & Van der Walt 2005), contemporary anarchism is 
more sensitive to different forms of social control, inequity, and oppression (Gordon 
2006; 2008). In addition to opposing the state and capitalism, most anarchists also reject 
all or most of the following: white supremacy and racism, patriarchy and sexism, 
consumerism, landlordism, slavery, colonialism, nationalism, patriotism, organized 
religion, compulsory schooling, xenophobia, heteronormativity, homophobia, 
transphobia, ageism†, ableism‡, speciesism§, elitism, discrimination based on a person’s 
                                                 
* The term “Old Left” refers to the constellation of unions and labor-oriented movements, organizations, 
and political parties (such as the Socialist Party and the Communist Party) that were active in the United 
States from the late 19
th
 century to the mid-20
th
 century. 
† Ageism refers to discrimination based on age. 
‡ Ableism refers to discrimination based on physical ability. 
§ Speciesism, or human supremacy, refers to discrimination on the basis of species membership. 
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appearance, intelligence, health, or genetic makeup, and domination by humans of the 
environment and non-human animals.  
Many anarchists also reject the argument, commonly associated with classical and 
Orthodox Marxism, that the forces of production and the relations of production serve as 
the economic “base” upon which a social “superstructure” rests (e.g., Althusser 
1971/2008; Marx 1859/1970). On this view, for instance, oppression of women and 
people of color is a function of, or in some sense reducible to, class oppression. 
Contemporary Marxist-Leninists sometimes refer to this as “special oppression,” but 
most anarchists and anarchist-inspired writers contend that gender- and race-based forms 
of oppression are irreducible, not functions of capitalist oppression. Generally speaking, 
anarchism is much better at recognizing that there are “multiple realities of oppression,” 
to borrow a phrase from John Downing (2001, p. 13), which influence, texture, or color 
one another (Albert et al. 1986; Albert 2006a; Downing 2001; Gordon 2006; 2008; 
McKay 2008). According to Gordon (2006; 2008), anarchism has moved from resistance 
to capitalism and the state to a generalized opposition to all forms of domination in 
society (p. 30).  He writes: “Regimes of domination are the overarching context that 
anarchists see as conditioning people’s socialization and background assumptions about 
social norms, explaining why people fall into certain patterns of behavior and have 
expectations that contribute to the perpetuation of dominatory relations” (p. 33; emphasis 
in original). 
For example, the problem of racism in the United States does not begin and end 
with the attitudes and actions of racist individuals. Rather, expressions of racism are 
symptomatic of an institutional arrangement, white supremacy, which gives whites 
political, economic, and social power over people of color. Likewise, sexism and 
homophobia are not simply matters of personal prejudice. Rather, we live in a 
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heteronormative, patriarchal society wherein males exert power over females and 
LGBTQ and transsexual folk are routinely stigmatized and denied privileges that 
heterosexual and cisgendered persons enjoy. From an anarchist perspective it is 
wrongheaded to speak of anti-white racism or anti-male sexism, as many conservatives 
and even some liberals do, because racism and sexism are products of centuries of legal, 
economic, and social policies that were consciously crafted to preserve and extend the 
power of white, heterosexual males. The anarchist critique of power in all its forms is 
central to understanding contemporary radical activism, which Richard Day (2005) 
defines as “conscious attempts to alter, impede, destroy or construct alternatives to 
dominant structures, processes, practices and identities” (p. 4). These struggles aim for 
the root of social problems, seeking “to address not just the content of current modes of 
domination and exploitation, but also the forms that give rise to them” (ibid.; emphasis in 
original). 
Anarchism also rejects illegitimate forms of authority, meaning a “social 
relationship based on status and power derived from a hierarchical position, not on 
individual ability,” as well as hierarchy, meaning “the institutionalization of authority 
within a society” (McKay 2008, pp. 122-3).* Put another way, hierarchies are 
organizational systems and structures in which groups or individuals are subordinate to 
other groups or individuals above them in the hierarchy. Those at the top of hierarchies 
benefit from having more control over decision making and resource allocation than 
those at the bottom. Anarchism rejects organizational hierarchies, such as the distribution 
                                                 
* Anarchists do recognize legitimate forms of authority and force, such as a parent’s right (indeed, 
obligation) to prevent a child from crossing the street without supervision. Citing the German philosopher 
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1852/1993), Chomsky and other anarchists frequently observe that the use of 
force and coercion—and not its absence—demands justification. Powerful states, however, rarely are able 
to provide justification for their coercive actions. 
 30 
of power internal to a corporation or government, as well as social stratification, i.e., the 
separation of people into different castes or classes. 
 
Liberty as Sacrosanct 
Anarchists oppose and attack oppression, authority, and hierarchy because they 
value liberty and autonomy. Anarchism holds that liberty is sacrosanct—“the highest 
good” (ibid., p. 33)—because it “is the precondition for the maximum development of 
one’s individual potential, which is also a social product and can be achieved only in and 
through community. A healthy, free community will produce free individuals, who in 
turn will shape the community and enrich the social relationships between the people of 
whom it is composed” (McKay 2008, p. 28). According to Emma Goldman (1917/1969), 
“Anarchism stands for a social order based on the free grouping of individuals for the 
purpose of producing real social wealth; an order that will guarantee to every human 
being free access to the earth and full enjoyment of the necessities of life, according to 
individual desires, tastes, and inclinations” (p. 62). 
This dispels two important myths about anarchism: First, it is not the case that 
anarchists believe people should have freedom to do whatever they please, such as rape 
or commit murder. Anarchism rejects this notion of “absolute liberty,” because it 
endangers the liberty and rights of others. For similar reasons, anarchism opposes modern 
Libertarianism and so-called anarcho-capitalism, because it views capitalism as a threat 
to liberty. Indeed, in most countries the term “libertarian” is understood to mean anarchist 
or libertarian socialist; it is mainly in the United States that the term has come to be 
associated with proponents of no-government capitalism. Second, anarchism rejects 
chaos and disorder, since liberty cannot exist without society and organization. 
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Anarchists are not opposed to organization and structure per se; they reject coercive 
organization based on oppression, authority, and hierarchy (McKay 2008, pp. 28-31). 
 
Autonomy and Human Nature 
Anarchism views human nature optimistically, positing that people are naturally 
intelligent, creative, and cooperative when freed from behavior-warping regimes of 
authority and domination. “All people deserve the freedom to organize and define 
themselves on their own terms,” writes anarchist activist Peter Gelderloos (2010a, p. 3). 
Anarchists believe people should manage their own affairs individually or collectively, 
undisturbed by coercive actors, and be supported in their efforts to develop the skills 
necessary to do so (Martin 2015). 
This study employs the word ‘autonomy’ to capture this fundamental anarchist 
principle* and three closely-related ideas: 1) Human nature entails an “instinct for 
freedom,” to quote Chomsky paraphrasing Bakunin, which refers to “the need to create, 
to inquire, to think, to act, to organize [one’s] own life in association with others and to 
make decisions about [one’s] life without having to bend to anyone else” (Voll 1998); 2) 
people are not “sheep,” i.e.,  they experience and recognize systems of oppression—or 
can learn to do so, through political self-education—and in fact rebel against these 
constantly (McKay 2008, pp. 136-9; Zinn 1980/2003), as evidenced, for instance, by 
widespread quiet resistance to authority and domination† (e.g., Scott 1985; 1990; 2009; 
                                                 
* It should be noted that he term ‘autonomy’ has mixed meanings among anarchists. For instance, in a well-
known polemical essay, Murray Bookchin (1995) critiques and dismisses autonomy as a perceived 
alternative to social freedom. In the view of anarchism presented in this dissertation, autonomy and 
freedom go hand in hand. 
† Quiet resistance includes “such acts as foot-dragging, dissimulations, false compliance, feigned 
ignorance, desertion, pilfering, smuggling, poaching, arson, slander, sabotage, surreptitious assault and 
murder, anonymous threats, and so on. These techniques, for the most part quite prosaic, are the ordinary 
means of class struggle” (Scott 1985, p. 33). John Holloway (2010), an autonomist, argues that social 
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Sprouse 1992); and 3) liberation is possible, not illusory, but the emancipation of 
oppressed peoples must be carried out by those peoples, not by elected officials or 
revolutionary vanguards (Guérin 1970; Kerl, Wetzel, & Lamb 2010; McKay 2008, pp. 
34-6). To quote Gelderloos (2010a) again, “Freedom cannot be given; it must be taken” 
(p. 4). 
In the social sciences, structure refers to patterns or conditions which limit 
people’s choices and opportunities, whereas agency refers to people’s capacity to think 
and act for themselves. Anarchist views of power tend to emphasize the primacy of 
agency over structure in shaping human behavior and conditions for social-political 
transformation. 
 
Prefigurative Politics and Direct Action 
Anarchism embraces prefigurative politics, or the principle that activists and 
oppositional movements should model their strategies, organizations, and aspects of their 
daily life on the values and principles they would base society in. Put another way, 
prefigurative politics is the principle that radicals should live the changes they wish to see 
in this world (Martin 2010, p. 33). This is reflected, for instance, in anarchism’s 
commitment to horizontalism, collective organization, workers’ self-management, non-
hierarchical organizational structures, and inclusive decision-making processes (Cornell 
2010; Gelderloos 2010a; Gordon 2006; 2008). It is perhaps useful to think of anarchism’s 
aspirations—such as freedom, solidarity, and self-organization—as its methods rather 
than its goals. According to Gordon (2006), 
                                                                                                                                                 
movements, by building upon such acts of rebellion, should create, deepen, and link these ‘cracks’ in the 
capitalist system. 
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What anarchist ideological expression overwhelmingly lacks, on the other hand, 
are detailed prognostic statements on a desired future society. This does not mean 
that anarchism is merely destructive, but that its constructive aspects are expected 
to be articulated in the present-tense experimentation of prefigurative politics – 
not as an a-priori position. This lends anarchism a strongly open-ended 
dimension, whereby it eschews any notion of a “post-revolutionary resting point” 
(p. 11; italics in original). 
Anarchism’s emphasis on prefigurative politics suggests that revolutionary social 
changes are always underway, because people are constantly “building a new world in 
the shell of the old.” The late Colin Ward (1973/1982) wrote that 
[A]n anarchist society, a society which organizes itself without authority, is 
always in existence, like a seed beneath the snow, buried under the weight of the 
state and its bureaucracy, capitalism and its waste, privilege and its injustices, 
nationalism and its suicidal loyalties, religious differences and their superstitious 
separatism (p. 18). 
Revolution on this view is an unending, open-ended process of political, social, 
cultural, and economic transformation, in which oppression and hierarchy are not 
smashed in a single moment, but rather erode over years and decades until eventually 
they are “lost in the shuffle,” so to speak. For anarchism, there is no period “after the 
revolution.” Because revolutionary transformation is an open-ended question, anarchism 
stresses that humans will need to embrace diversity and experiment indefinitely with 
various social, political, and economic forms, rather than commit to a detailed blueprint 
for a future society (Chomsky 2005; Gordon 2008; Rocker 1938/2004, pp. 15-7). The 
idea that “we make the road by walking” (Horton & Freire 1990) is not a new one within 
anarchist thought. During the Spanish Civil War, the anarcho-syndicalist Rudolf Rocker 
(1938/2004) wrote: 
Anarchism is no patent solution for all human problems, no Utopia of a perfect 
social order, as it has so often been called, since on principle it rejects all absolute 
schemes and concepts. It does not believe in any absolute truth, or in definite final 
goals in human development, but in an unlimited perfectibility of social 
arrangements and human living conditions, which are always straining after 
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higher forms of expression, and to which for this reason one can assign no 
definite terminus nor set any fixed goal (p. 15). 
Gordon (2008) argues that, because anarchists live the changes they wish to see, 
anarchism’s prefigurative politics are a form of constructive direct action (pp. 34-40). 
The term ‘direct action’ refers to activist strategies and tactics, often confrontational in 
nature, that aim to immediately effect change and force improvements, bypassing official 
political channels such as electoral politics and the legal system, which practitioners of 
direct action consider to be inefficient and ineffective (De Cleyre 1912/2004; Gordon 
2008; Graeber 2009; Libcom undated). Direct action can be either violent or non-violent, 
legal or illegal; examples include but are not limited to: boycotts, strikes, refusal to work, 
sit-ins and occupations, hacktivism, theft and shoplifting, public feedings, dumpster 
diving, creating media, graffiti, wheatpasting, assassinations, blockades, sabotage, 
property destruction, and other acts of law breaking. 
Anarchism’s emphasis on direct action also entails a rejection of the efficacy of 
electoral politics as well as Marxism-Leninism’s belief in vanguardism, i.e., the idea that 
close-knit groups of dedicated revolutionaries should form political parties or socialist 
organizations that will drive revolutionary activity by spreading Marxist ideas and 
drawing more and more members of the working class into revolutionary parties or 
organizations (Lenin 1902/1969). Lenin believed that the working class was incapable of 
moving beyond “trade union consciousness” without the aid of a radical intelligentsia 
who could bring “socialist consciousness” to the working class from without.* Against 
                                                 
* In Lenin’s (1902/1969) words, “The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by 
its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness, i.e., the conviction that it is necessary to 
combine in unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour 
legislation, etc. The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic 
theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social 
status, the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois 
intelligentsia” (pp. 31-2).  
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this view, anarchists and other libertarian socialists argue that people can emancipate 
themselves and reclaim control over their lives only by their own actions, not those of 
elected representatives or vanguard groups. 
 
WHY IS THERE NO ANARCHIST THEORY OF NEWS MEDIA? 
Arguably, fragments of an anarchist news media theory already exist—as do 
fragments of anarchist theories of anthropology, sociology, economics, and political 
science (Graeber 2004; Purkis 2004; Shantz & Williams 2014). Yet few writers address, 
with a distinctly anarchist optic or “squint” (Scott 2012), the lines of inquiry concerning 
mainstream news media, alternative media, and activism or movement building, on which 
this dissertation centers. This is odd, given that historically many anarchists developed 
skills as bookbinders, publishers, printers, typesetters, writers, and editors in connection 
with their political activities. Moreover, prominent anarchist newspapers and journals 
such as Mother Earth, Liberty, Freedom, The Blast, The Alarm, Golos Truda, Freie 
Arbeiter Stimme, Freiheit, the Arbeiter-Zeitung, and others served as important organs for 
radical dissent and working class self-organization (Becker 1987; Bekken 1995; 
Buchstein 1974; Cobb-Reilly 1988; Kessler 1984; Roediger & Rosemont 1986; 
Streitmatter 2001). As press historian Rodger Streitmatter (2001) observes, “Because 
anarchism was such a radical notion, supporters never expected the mainstream press to 
discuss it with any degree of fairness. So one of the first steps the founders of the 
Anarchist Movement took was to establish their own press to articulate their unique 
ideology” (pp. 115-116). Contemporary anarchists who find themselves similarly 
excluded from the mainstream press continue to keep anarchist ideas alive by publishing 
thousands of zines, journals, newspapers, books, and websites every year. Nevertheless, 
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the chief difficulty in theorizing about news media and media-movement interactions 
along anarchist lines is the dearth of established work in this area. 
There are important reasons for this vacuum. First, although it is certainly true 
that writers with ties to anarchist publications and causes critique or theorize about news 
media (e.g., Albert 1997; Goodman 1995; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Atton 2002), 
in their criticisms of mainstream news media, anarchists and other leftists tend to rehash 
the political economy critique advanced by writers such as Ed Herman, Noam Chomsky, 
and Robert McChesney (e.g., Chomsky 1989; 2001b; Herman 1982; 1992; 1995; 1996; 
Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; McChesney 2000; 2004; 2008a; McChesney & Nichols 
2010). For instance, it is notable that the Anarchist FAQ—an accessible, popular 
introduction to anarchist ideas and arguments—provides a summary of Herman and 
Chomsky’s (1988/2002) propaganda model in its overview of the anarchist critique of 
mainstream media.* This is understandable, given the rich, historical tradition of radical 
press criticism in the United States (McChesney & Scott 2004; Reynolds & Hicks 2012), 
and the fact that commercial news media have long depicted anarchists and other leftists 
unfavorably.  
Arguably, though, anarchists’ focus on political economy issues overlooks 
opportunities to continue theory development along anarchist lines, by exploring, for 
example, such themes as autonomy and prefigurative politics, i.e., modes of organization 
that reflect the kinds of changes in power relations that radical anti-capitalists envision. 
The political economy critique also leads anarchists to forego opportunities to develop, 
deepen, and promote alternative analyses, namely those which explore other realities of 
oppressions, such as patriarchy and white supremacy, and other forms of power, such as 
                                                 
* The complete text of the AFAQ appears both online and in print (McKay 2008), and enjoys a wide 
audience among English-speaking anarchists in Europe and North America. See 
http://www.infoshop.org/AnAnarchistFAQ 
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the informational power and the influence of communications technologies. This 
oversight is perplexing, given that contemporary anarchism provides a firm basis for a 
more originally “anarchistic” approach to thinking about news media and power. 
Second, although some scholars incorporate anarchist ideas into their research, 
they do not write about news media, explicitly, through the lens of anarchist thought and 
practice. For example, both John Downing (2001) and Chris Atton (2002) reference 
anarchist ideas in their important studies of alternative media, but neither advances an 
anarchist theory of alternative media per se.  
Third, anarchism has always had an uneasy relationship with the academy. 
Although students do encounter anarchist ideas in classrooms, anarchist graduate students 
are often subtly encouraged to drop their ethical-political commitments, such as through 
admonitions that anarchism’s analytical power pales in comparison to Marxism’s, or that 
anarchism simply has no place within serious academic scholarship. Even radical faculty 
members rarely take anarchist ideas seriously, erecting “a wall of silence surrounding 
anarchist criticisms of the state and forms of domination that extend beyond the human 
world” (Shannon & Armaline 2010, p. 421). Although anarchist projects and ideas have 
exploded in popularity outside the academy over the past two decades, the increased 
influence of anarchist ideas “has found almost no reflection in the academy” (Graeber 
2004, p. 2). Jeff Shantz (2007-2008) argues that Graeber overstates the problem, by 
overlooking notable anarchist scholars in departments of sociology and anthropology, 
including Graeber himself. Recently published volumes of anarchist scholarship indicate, 
too, that “anarchist studies” increasingly is becoming a reputable researchable area 
(Amster et al. 2009; Purkis & Bowen 2004; Shukaitis & Graeber 2007). Given the 
professional preparation requirements, however, there are not many anarchists in 
journalism schools or colleges of communication. 
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Fourth, according to Graeber (2004), academics tend to gravitate toward the 
“High Theory” of Marxism rather than the practice-oriented ideas of anarchism, which 
represents more of an “attitude” toward social relations than an established body of 
theory. As Graeber observes, “Marxism has tended to be a theoretical or analytical 
discourse about revolutionary strategy,” whereas “Anarchism has tended to be an ethical 
discourse about revolutionary practice” (p. 6). There are no compelling reasons why 
anarchism should be against theory, though, because anarchists need intellectual tools to 
further their revolutionary project of building a stateless, classless society (ibid., p. 7). 
Rather than aiming to create High Theory, “what anarchism needs is what might be 
called Low Theory: a way of grappling with those real, immediate questions that emerge 
from a transformative project” (p. 9). Generally speaking, though, career-minded 
academics find Low Theory unappealing, because research based in High Theory has a 
better chance of being published. 
Fifth, anarchists have done very little to link anti-capitalists’ penetrating 
criticisms of contemporary mainstream news media with compelling visions of 
alternative media systems, news ecologies, and/or journalistic practice. For example, if 
prevailing conceptions of journalistic objectivity are suspect, what codes of conduct 
should replace them? How would journalists be trained in a post-capitalist society? 
Which news beats would be covered? How would news organizations be structured (and 
subsidized, if necessary)? With rare exceptions (e.g., Albert 2006a), anarchists and other 
libertarian socialists have not explored these and other issues. In fact, this sort of 
agnosticism is characteristic of anarchists, who often argue that post-capitalist societies 
will need to experiment with new forms of social organization in order to discover which 
ones are best suited. As anarchist sociologist Stevphen Shukaitis (2004) observes, 
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Anarchists on the whole have not articulated any sort of coherent alternative 
vision of what a society not based on capitalism and the state might look like. We 
have produced copious amounts of political, economic, and social critiques – but 
a comparatively smaller amount of work has focused on developing alternatives 
to what we’re critiquing. Least of all has there been any clearly sketched out 
version of how a liberatory economy might function. … It’s one thing to say that 
we want a world where people manage their own lives, the environment isn’t 
destroyed … but it’s another to start talking about what such might actually look 
like. And starting to actually create forms of cooperative practice, to re-envision 
utopian thinking as lived reality, is another (p. 5). 
This is not to say, of course, that critical communications scholarship does not 
contain insights that could be incorporated into an anarchist account of news media, or 
which may be viewed as compatible with such an account. In fact, important works by 
scholars such as Atton (2002), Downing (2001), and Herman and Chomsky (1988/2002) 
undeniably have an anarchist bent to them. 
Finally, anarchist ideas meet with resistance in the academy because anarchism is 
a revolutionary worldview that advocates replacing the state, capitalism, and other 
systems of domination with noncoercive social relations, a proposal that most academics 
consider dangerous or far-fetched. As Beth Hartung (1983) observes, 
To suggest that the State in modern industrial societies is less than benignly 
neutral is hardly startling. But to suggest that the State and other forms of 
imposed authority be replaced by a decentralized system of community-based 
cooperatives, as do contemporary anarchists, undermines the dominant mode of 
political organization and the number of vested interests within it. A socio-
political theory which purports to be a scheme for social transformation invites 
charges of idealism and naiveté (p. 83). 
Any suggestion that systems of domination should be overthrown will be met 
with opposition, because it is widely assumed that social order cannot be maintained 
without structural inequalities and hierarchies. Extending Hartung’s view to academic 
scholarship, anarchist sociologists Dana Williams and Jeff Shantz (2011) observe: 
The idea that the state is the means to social order, even to the extent that it can be 
equated with social order, has made it very difficult for non-statist visions of 
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social order to be heard. Indeed such visions are most likely to be branded utopian 
and dismissed out of hand. Significantly this is true even from the perspective of 
many on the political left. This privileging of the state or statist order and the 
equation of anarchy with disorder has conditioned the reception of anarchism 
within social sciences (p. 11). 
Faced with this vacuum, there is no general consensus among anarchists about 
where one might draw inspiration toward theory building along lines consonant with 
anarchist values, ideas, and practices. In fact, this question has divided anarchists, leading 
for instance to the dissolution of the Love and Rage Revolutionary Anarchist Federation* 
in 1998 (Filippo 2003). One camp insists that anarchism’s history and body of ideas are 
sufficient sources of inspiration, that its mistakes occur within an otherwise compelling 
liberatory vision, and that anarchism as a political movement can address most of its 
pressing questions about theory and strategy “from within” its body of history and ideas. 
A second camp rejects as naïve the idea that anarchism can answer all major theoretical 
problems from within the body of anarchist thought and practice. This camp urges 
radicals not only to build on anarchist ideas, but also to look for inspiration in other 
intellectual and revolutionary traditions (Day 1998b; Love and Rage 1997; 1998). 
This dissertation recognizes anarchism’s strengths while also positing that it 
should venture beyond its intellectual comfort zone for inspiration toward theory 
building. Below, I trace how anarchism already begins to analyze news media power 
from within its body of thought and practice. In later chapters, I pull together insights 
from anarchism as well as Marxism, critical communications studies, social movement 
studies in sociology, anthropology, and political science to develop anarchistic arguments 
                                                 
* Love and Rage was a revolutionary anarchist organization with members in the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico. In the span of nearly a decade (1989-1998), Love and Rage made important theoretical 
contributions to the anarchist movement on such as topics as white supremacy and revolutionary 
organization. The group also published a newspaper, called Love and Rage, which was a major influence 
on activists in the alter-globalization movement. 
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about the interrelationships among mainstream news media, alternative/activist media, 
and activism and social movements. 
 
CRITIQUE OF INFORMATION POWER AND TECHNOLOGY*  
Anarchism seeks to unmake and replace power structures such as white 
supremacy, heteronormative patriarchy, capitalism, and political authoritarianism because 
these produce forms of social control, inequity, and oppression. Although it receives less 
attention than race, gender, politics, or economics in most radical analyses, including 
those by anarchists, information—organized facts or data that have been communicated 
or received—is another important dimension of all systems of power (Beniger 1986; 
Deetz 1992; Foucault 1977; Innis 1950/1972; McCoy 2009; Martin 1998; Melucci 1994; 
Mosco & Wasko 1988; Raboy & Bruck 1989; Schiller 1969/1992; 1996; Scott 1998; 
Smythe 1981; Thussu 1998). “The circulation of information ties the world system 
together and raises new transnational problems over the control, circulation, and 
exchange of information. At the same time, it inflates the issues and arenas of conflict 
into worldwide proportions,” writes sociologist Alberto Melucci (1994, p.110). Elites, 
corporations, states, and other bureaucratic institutions collect, shape, control, and 
communicate information in myriad ways that serve to preserve and extend their power, 
privilege, wealth, and authority. By way of illustration, consider these examples: 
 
 In the United States and elsewhere, various law enforcement agencies, websites, 
marketing firms, banks, NGOs, and other bureaucratic institutions increasingly 
                                                 
* My examination in this section owes much to Brian Martin’s (1998) book Information Liberation, which 
introduces and critiques corruptions of information power, as well as Chapter 5 of Uri Gordon’s (2008) 
book Anarchy Alive!, which expertly addresses anarchism’s relationship to technology. 
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rely on legal and illegal means of surveillance in order to collect information on 
citizens, such as conducting censuses, recording fingerprints, collecting genetic 
material, reviewing phone records, and data mining emails and other online 
activity. In addition to deepening state-corporate power, surveillance carries 
complex psychological consequences for surveilled populations. Information 
gathered by surveillance is also vulnerable, as indicated by cyberattacks on 
websites that have compromised personal information on millions of people 
(Dandeker 1994; Gilliom & Monahan 2013; Lyon 1994; Martin 1998; Marx 
1988; Monahan 2010; Parenti 2003). 
 In addition to surveilling people, powerful institutions use coercion and violence 
to extract confessions and obtain information, such as by torturing those suspected 
of terrorism, espionage, theft, murder, heresy, witchcraft, and other crimes. 
According to historian Alfred McCoy (2012), after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 
United States revived coercive interrogation techniques developed during the 
Cold War in order to extract information from prisoners detained at facilities such 
as Abu Grahib and GITMO. Many other countries also used the attacks as a 
pretext for reviving repressive policies. 
 During crises, governments often use radio and television to quickly disseminate 
information to the public. Although this can save lives during natural disasters, it 
can also be a key vulnerability in national political crises such as wars and 
military coups. As Martin (1998) observes, “Because they allow a few people to 
communicate to a large population with little possibility of dialogue, television 
and radio stations are commonly the first targets in military takeovers. Censorship 
of newspapers is a next step. The connection between coups and mass media also 
highlights the role of mass media in authoritarian regimes” (p. 14). 
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 The U.S. military practices “information warfare,” for instance by jamming 
opponents’ radio and television transmissions, engaging in cyberattacks, 
collecting strategically relevant information, and spreading propaganda and/or 
disinformation. The U.S. military also extends allied countries’ information 
warfare capabilities, such as through personnel training and sharing information 
(such as satellite images) with foreign military and paramilitary groups. This 
frequently serves to protect oppressive regimes from internal populations and 
popular resistance movements, such as armed communities and guerilla groups 
(McClintlock 1992; McCoy 2009; Stokes 2005; Tedrow 2009; Wray 1997). 
 Large corporations hold patents on tens of thousands of machines, technologies, 
chemicals, biotechnologies, and even naturally-occurring species of plants and 
animals. These companies invoke legal claims to intellectual property in order to 
stifle innovation and squelch competition. At the global level, wealthy countries 
such as the United States seek to strengthen intellectual property laws so that U.S. 
corporations will have greater leverage over farmers and manufacturers in poorer 
nations. In countries such as India and Mexico, patents on seeds undermine food 
security. Aggressive protection of corporate patents also has negative implications 
for public health. For instance, under the World Trade Organization’s Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, several 
developing countries are barred from producing life-saving generic antiretroviral 
drugs used to treat HIV and AIDS (Madeley 2000; Martin 1998; Patel 2007; 
Perelman 2002; Shiva 2000; UNAIDS 2012).* 
                                                 
* For a critique of arguments commonly used to justify intellectual property laws, see Hettinger (1989) and 
Martin (1998, pp. 29-56). 
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 Public schools teach students to revere the United States as well as its institutions 
and symbols, such as the armed forces and national flag. Compulsory schooling 
also prepares students for life in capitalist work environments, for instance by 
conditioning children to endure boredom, or by teaching teenagers enrolled in 
“business skills” courses how to prepare resumes, photocopy documents, and 
perform other menial tasks related to low-ranking corporate jobs. As Gelderloos 
(2010a) observes, “The most important lessons consistently taught by schools 
under the state are to obey arbitrary authority, to accept the imposition of other 
people’s priorities on our lives, and to stop daydreaming. When children start 
school, they are self-guided, curious about the world they live in, and believe 
everything is possible. When they finish, they are cynical, self-absorbed, and used 
to dedicating forty hours of their week to an activity they never chose” (p. 97). 
 
These examples are the tip of the iceberg; corruptions of information power occur 
so often and in so many settings that it becomes hard to envision their scope. As Martin 
(1998) observes, “Information plays a role in nearly every field of human activity, from 
art to industry, and all of these are subject to the corruptions of power” (p. 5). This is 
hardly a recent development in human affairs. Religious and political authorities have 
gathered, produced, shaped, and/or exercised control over information for millennia, 
historically restricting access and interpretative rights to groups such as the priesthood, 
who claim to have privileged knowledge of divine truths. Turning to a more recent 
example, in the 20
th
 century, authoritarian states amassed enormous troves of information 
about their populations, geographies, natural resources, and so on, in order to impose 
what James C. Scott (1998) describes as large-scale “schemes to improve the human 
condition,” such as forced collectivization in Russia, which ended disastrously. Of 
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course, there is another side to this coin: Radical anti-capitalists have also taken great 
pains to gather, organize, and share information about their enemies, capitalism and the 
state, in order to provide intellectual weapons to proletarians as well as other radicals 
(Cleaver 1979; Negri 1984/1991). Karl Marx’s (1867/1967) magnum opus Capital, after 
all, is not a purely theoretical critique of capitalism; it is based on thirty years of 
observation and overflows with real-world data, especially from England, which was 
ground zero for the industrial revolution and social forces that Marx was concerned with 
theorizing about. 
Informational power cannot be understood separately from the technological 
systems used to gather, store, retrieve, and disseminate or communicate information; 
technologies thus constitute another important dimension of all systems of power 
(Beniger 1986; CrimethInc n.d.; Gordon 2008; Innis 1950/1972; 1951; Postman 1992; 
Schiller 1969/1992; Smythe 1981; Winner 1986). Here it is useful to introduce 
interrelated terms: 
 
 Artifacts refer to constructed objects which help people simplify tasks, such as 
hammers and computers. Artifacts allow people to embed knowledge in material 
things and are what most people think of when they hear the word ‘technology’ 
(Martin 2015, p. 11). 
 Technology refers to artifacts and their associated social relations, such as the 
processes used to design and manufacture products (ibid.). Technology is the 
application of science, mathematics, engineering, and other kinds of knowledge to 
problem solving. 
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 Technological ensembles refer to collections of objects that operate together. This 
can include cars, computers, and—on a wider scale—systems of roads and 
telephone cables (ibid.). 
 The term socio-technological complex refers to “interlocking systems of human-
machine interfaces that fix human behavior, sustaining and enhancing inequalities 
of wealth and power” (Gordon 2008, p. 111). 
Technologies allow societies to embed scientific knowledge in artifacts such as 
machines and computers; some play an important role in greasing the wheels of state-
corporate power and range from the mundane, such as electronic toll booths which 
capture images of license plates in order to bill commuters, to the truly horrifying, such 
as the IBM punch card systems Germany used to facilitate the Holocaust (Black 2001). 
Information and technology are so closely linked that, virtually by definition, an anarchist 
theory of news media—or of any other system in which information features 
prominently—must also consider the role of technology and the relationship between 
different forms of technology and anarchist politics.  
Many of anarchism’s early exponents were optimistic about technology’s role in 
post-capitalist societies, and endorsed technological progress so long as it could lead to 
improvements in material human conditions. For instance, Kropotkin (1906/1990) argued 
that new technologies could reduce the intensity and dangers associated with grueling 
industrial labor such as coal mining, as well as shorten the average work day to four 
hours. Similarly, anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist writers have argued at length that 
libertarian socialism is logically appropriate for advanced industrial societies—indeed, 
that complex societies necessitate anarchist forms of social organization—whereas 
democratic capitalism and state socialism are hugely inefficient, wasteful, and destructive 
political-economic systems (Bookchin 1970/2004; Chomsky 1970/2005; 2005; de 
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Santillan 1937/1996; Dolgoff 1974; 2001; Maximoff 1927/1985; Rocker 1938/2004; 
Sheppard 2003a; 2003b). In the words of the anarcho-syndicalist Sam Dolgoff (2001),  
The increasing complexity of society is making anarchism more and not less 
relevant to modern life. It is precisely this complexity and diversity, and above all 
their overriding concern for freedom and human values, that led the anarchist 
thinkers [Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin] to base their ideas on the principles 
of diffusion of power, self-management, and federalism (p. 5; emphasis in 
original). 
The anarchist ecologist Murray Bookchin (1970/2004) has even argued that modern 
industrial production technologies could allow humans to surpass the constraints imposed 
by material scarcity, which raises the prospect for post-scarcity anarchy. 
More often than not, such arguments assume that industrialism and technology are 
basically neutral, but have been corrupted by hierarchical forces such as the state and 
capitalism. Most contemporary anarchists consider this view to be antiquated, deluded, or 
even dangerous. Indeed, within the anarchist milieu, certain tendencies—notably green 
anarchism and anarcho-primitvism—are deeply antagonistic towards technology, 
industrialism, modernism, and even civilization itself. However, as Gordon (2008) notes, 
these critiques have generated so much controversy within anarchist circles that it is 
impossible to use anarcho-primitivism as a basis for launching a broad-based anarchist 
critique of technology. Rather than simplistically describing anarchism and anarchists as 
either for or against technology, he argues that contemporary anarchists express a 
“curious ambivalence” in their relationships with it, characterized by both rejection and 
endorsement (pp. 109-111). Instead of recasting primitivist criticisms of technology and 
civilization, or syndicalist faith in a “liberated industrial modernity,” Gordon draws on 
academic works by David Noble (1993), Paul Edwards (2003), Langdon Winner (1986), 
and other writers who specialize in science and technology studies, in order to develop an 
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anarchist critique which takes into consideration how social and political values shape 
scientific research and technological innovation, and how these in turn affect society. 
As Gordon (2008) observes, academic scholarship in this area is nearly unified 
around the position that, far from being neutral, technologies are powerful social forces 
which “both express and reproduce specific patterns of social organisation and cultural 
interaction,” fixing “social relations into material reality.” Extant technologies and 
infrastructures condition whether and how new technologies become integrated into the 
socio-technological complex. Under capitalism, newly introduced technologies will 
typically express and help reproduce capitalist hierarchies. 
On the macro level, new technologies must be integrated into an existing socio-
technological complex, and as a result are imprinted with its strong bias in favour 
of certain patterns of human interaction. This bias inevitably shapes the design of 
these technologies and the ends towards which they will be deployed. Because of 
the inequalities of wealth and power in society, the process of technical 
development itself is so thoroughly biased in a particular direction that it regularly 
produces results that favour certain social interests. 
One does not need to be an anarchist to see that the constraints created by the 
existing socio-technological complex and its infrastructures have a specifically 
exploitative and authoritarian nature. … The capitalist bias of modern society is 
also abundantly present in the mindsets shaping technological development. 
Today in every developed country, corporations exert a great deal of influence on 
every stage of the technological research, design and implementation process (p. 
117). 
It is difficult to describe nuclear weapons and closed-circuit video surveillance 
systems as “neutral,” when these technologies are clearly intended to undermine 
resistance to state-corporate power. Indeed, destructive technologies such as weapons of 
mass destruction can only be used by strong states civilian populations; these weapons 
have no defensive purpose and are inseparable from regimes of domination. Many other 
taken-for-granted technologies and technological ensembles ostensibly aid society while 
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actually reinforcing hierarchies and systems of domination. As Gelderloos (2010) 
observes, 
It is no coincidence that the nuclear arms and energy infrastructure creates a need 
for a centrally organized, high security military organization and disaster 
management agencies with emergency powers and the ability to suspend 
constitutional rights; that interstate highways allow the rapid deployment of the 
military, encourage the transcontinental shipping of goods and private 
transportation via personal automobiles; that new factories demand unskilled, 
replaceable laborers who couldn’t possibly hold the job until retirement (assuming 
the boss even wanted to give retirement benefits) because within a few years 
occupational injuries from repetitive tasks or the unsafe pace of the production 
line will render them unable to continue (p. 102). 
Generally speaking, new technologies which attempt to cut against this grain are 
not considered viable (Gordon 2008; Noble 1984; 1993). This is why, for instance, 
companies discourage consumers from installing non-proprietary operating systems on 
their computers, cell phones, or other electronic devices, and why sustainable, durable 
consumer goods are anathema to capitalism. Rather than develop and market items which 
will continue to be useful for several years or decades, companies purposefully produce 
goods based on fashion trends or on the notion of “planned obsolescence,” i.e., the policy 
of designing products with artificially shortened shelf lives in order to hasten future sales 
of products. Manufacturers frequently render automobiles, computers, and other 
appliances obsolete by unveiling new models or by discontinuing replacement parts and 
accessories. Not only does this inefficiency endemic to capitalism promote consumerist 
behaviors, helping to keep people in financial debt or otherwise drain their pocketbooks, 
but the waste generated by planned obsolescence contributes to catastrophic ecological 
problems (Packard 1960; Sheppard 2003b; Slade 2006). 
On the other hand, Gordon (2008) observes, certain technologies arguably “have 
inherent features that encourage decentralisation and localism” (p. 119). Compare, for 
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example, technologies which harness solar and wind energy to those based on extracting 
coal, oil, and natural gas. Whereas people can install solar panels and/or windmills nearly 
anywhere on the planet, fossil fuel reserves are unequally distributed across regions, 
making them susceptible to centralized control by states and corporations. From an 
anarchist perspective, solar and wind energy are preferable to fossil fuels because they 
are more compatible with decentralization and localism. Certain technologies also 
promote personal and community empowerment better than others do, especially when it 
comes to acquiring skillsets or expertise of the technologies themselves. For example, 
although in a capitalist society there might be advantages to commuting by car instead of 
by bicycle, generally speaking, bikes are much easier to repair or maintenance, as well as 
leave a smaller carbon footprint. An anarchist approach to technology would empower 
people by giving individuals “maximum support to develop their capacities” (Martin 
2015, p. 11-12).  
Mainstream writers often assume that humans can manage how technologies 
emerge and develop, but attempts to democratize and decentralize them are doomed to 
fail. Against this view—technological determinism—Gordon (2008) and Martin (2015) 
argue that, even though most technologies are highly compatible with systems based on 
hierarchical authority and forms of social control, not all of them are. Anarchists and 
other radicals frequently harness, create, and/or repurpose technologies and 
infrastructures with an eye toward promoting mutual aid, autonomy, freedom, self-
reliance, and resistance to domination and authority. For instance, even though the 
Internet was originally developed by the U.S. Department of Defense and is today 
heavily commercialized, contemporary anarchists routinely use the Internet and digital 
technologies such as cell phones in their organizing and activism. In fact, observes 
Gordon (2008), “among social movements in the North anarchists have been making the 
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most extensive and engaged use of information and communications technologies, to the 
degree of developing their own software platforms” (ibid., p. 109). Elsewhere, he 
observes that the Internet appeals to many anarchists because the free exchange of 
information enables people to pool resources and effectively turn large portions of the 
web into an “electronic commons” (pp. 131-132). 
 
CRITIQUE OF NEWS MEDIA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY 
The anarchist analysis of information power and technology extends to mass news 
media, which have only grown in size and influence since the 19
th
 century and now 
pervade the United States and other advanced capitalist societies. With inescapable reach, 
the mainstream press has effectively replaced the church as the main propagator of 
official information (Hedgecock 1990; Lull 2000; Thompson 1990). Even people who 
studiously avoid watching or reading the news feel its presence in their interactions with 
those who do. Moreover, its scale is global; since the 1990s, neoliberal trade policies—
specifically the privatization and deregulation of foreign media markets—have enabled 
Western transnational media companies to undermine other countries’ media systems and 
national sovereignty. The mass news media express and reproduce state and capitalist 
patterns of social organization: by interlocking with other state-corporate institutions, by 
distributing information premised on state-centric views of reality via ubiquitous 
communications technologies (print media, computers, television, radio, cell phones, 
tablets, etc.), and by participating as actors within the market (Altschull 1995; Herman & 
Chomsky 1988/2002; Herman 1995; 1996; 1999; McChesney 1997; 1999; 2004; Raboy 
& Bruck 1989). As a socio-technological complex, the mass news media undeniably 
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shape people’s understandings of social-political, economic, and cultural reality, as well 
as their behavior, such as whether and how they decide to engage in political activity. 
Leftwing and liberal academic cultural critics attuned to the rapid development 
and spread of surveillance and communications technologies have famously been more 
cynical than optimistic about the prospects for activating and spreading resistance within 
the media-saturated information societies of the United States and other advanced 
industrialized countries. Michel Foucault (1977), Herbert Marcuse (1964/1991), and Jean 
Baudrillard (1994; 1995), among others, consider resistance to the state or capital to be 
nearly impossible in these societies. Echoing Marshal McLuhan’s (1964) technological 
determinism, Baudrillard in particular argues that media content is irrelevant and that the 
mass news media are capable of completely coopting or neutralizing dissent.* Some 
anarchists express similar sentiments, such as those who associate with post-Left, anti-
organizational, and/or nihilist tendencies.  
However, anarchism’s premium on autonomy clashes with these critics’ analyses, 
as well as any other view of power which does not admit of the possibility of resistance. 
Given these assumptions, it is fair to say that an anarchist approach to theorizing about 
news media and media-movement interactions would emphasize opportunities for 
exploiting features of media systems and/or using media to promote causes and build 
movement strength, rather than bemoan factors which limit dissent and resistance. The 
point is to identify cracks in the system, in order to widen them. 
                                                 
* Among notable critics, Douglas Kellner (2010) argues that Baudrillard’s view of media smacks of 
technological determinism. Against Baudrillard’s “snide and glib” attitude toward alternative media, 
Kellner writes: “An alternative media system would provide the possibility for oppositional, 
counterhegemonic subcultures and groups to produce programs expressing their own views, oppositions, 
and struggles that resist the massification, homogenization, and passivity that Baudrillard and others 
attribute to the media. Alternative media allow marginal and oppositional voices to contest the view of the 
world, values, and life-styles of the mainstream, and make possible the circulation and growth of 
alternative subcultures and communities. Baudrillard's theoreticism, however, completely eschews cultural 
practice and becomes more and more divorced from the political struggles and issues of the day” (p. 200). 
 53 
In this vein, the anarchist response to corruptions of information power, as Martin 
(1998) suggests, is information liberation. He writes: “In order to bring about a just and 
more equal society, struggles need to be waged over information. … Since the expression 
‘freedom of information’ has been degraded [by politicians and government bureaucrats], 
perhaps it is better to talk of ‘information liberation,’ which is the general project of using 
information to move toward a society free of domination” (p. 172). Information liberation 
is of course a broad, nebulous objective. In addition to addressing the role of mass news 
media and communications technologies, the struggle for information liberation must 
also tackle issues such as surveillance, intellectual property, the political economy of 
research and academic scholarship, the roles of intellectuals, and how states and 
corporations collect and use information. 
As far as news media goes, these issues stand out as especially relevant: state-
corporate versus alternative constructions of reality, participation in meaning making, 
access to information, and ownership and control over the institutions which produce and 
shape news. 
 
Status Quo Constructions of Reality 
The mass news media shape policies and public attitudes by providing economic, 
political, and cultural information to a large audience. However, they do not frame or 
construct reality disinterestedly or “objectively,” as many journalists claim. From an 
anarchist perspective, who shapes the news matters at least as much as the information 
being conveyed. As Martin (1988) observes, “Powerful groups, especially governments 
and large corporations, shape the news in a range of ways, such as by providing selected 
information, offering access to stories in exchange for favourable coverage, spreading 
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disinformation and threatening reprisals” (p. 8). Rather than employ news frames or 
present information that could help move toward a society based on principles such as 
mutual aid, diversity, solidarity, liberty, and equality, the mainstream press preserves the 
status quo, by serving as a conduit for elite perspectives and information that reinforces 
powerful institutions (Altschull 1995; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Kaufman 2003; 
McChesney 1999; 2004; Martin 1998). This is by far the mass news media’s most salient 
corruption of informational power. 
Several critics use this as a launching point to identify perceived conservative 
and/or liberal biases in the mainstream press (e.g., Alterman 2003; Brock 2004; Coulter 
2002; Franken 2003; Goldberg 2001; Stossel 2004). However, it is barely worth 
examining whether the mainstream press exhibits a liberal or conservative bias, because 
anarchism does not see much difference between the two; neither liberal nor conservative 
news outlets challenge the fundamental assumptions underpinning state-corporate power 
(Chomsky 1989; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002). The Republican and Democratic 
parties merely represent competing factions within a larger, pro-business party (Ferguson 
1995). Moreover, focusing on liberal and/or conservative biases skirts more pressing 
issues, such as the institutional structure of mass news media, as well as suggests 
reformist rather than radical solutions, such as pressuring individual news companies to 
fire or reprimand individual journalists, or to alter editorial policies. It is not that reform 
efforts are pointless, as it is certainly the case that liberal and conservative biases matter 
in certain contexts (i.e., news coverage of domestic issues such as abortion or 
immigration). Hiring and firing decisions within media companies also matter (Cohen 
2006). Nevertheless, analyses that center on liberal versus conservative bias hardly get to 
the root of things. 
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A key task for anti-capitalist radicals is to undermine the credibility of the 
mainstream press and promote counter-narratives and analyses, i.e., alternative 
constructions of reality (Atton 2002; Atton & Hamilton 2008; Downing 2001; Hedgecock 
1990; Jensen 2001; Martin 1998; Ryan 1991). An anarchist account of news media would 
stress the importance of creating alternative/activist/independent media and propaganda 
in building causes and revolutionary movements.* Of course, this is not exactly a novel 
suggestion: radical media makers and sympathetic scholars have said as much, at length, 
for decades. As anarchist media maker Jen Angel (2008), cofounder of the influential 
activist magazine Clamor, explains: 
Activists need ways to communicate with other activists, with supporters, and 
with the general public. We need media that is our own to provide space for inter-
movement discussion and self-critique, to celebrate our own culture and victories, 
to record our own history, to critique dominant society, to distribute news not 
covered by mainstream outlets, and to expose people to radicalism. Media serves 
to strengthen and support our movements, and its role in the success of any 
movement cannot be underestimated (p. 7). 
Radicals throughout history have expressed similar motivations for producing and 
distributing their own news media products (Armstrong 1981; Downing 2001; Gitlin 
1980; Kessler 1984; McChesney & Scott 2004; Ostertag 2006; Streitmatter 2001). In 
addition to providing space for diverse, anti-elite viewpoints, activist and alternative 
media are notable for their anti-corporate aesthetics and promotion of alternative cultural 
mores (Atton 2002; Atton & Hamilton 2008; Downing 2001, pp. 56-66; Waltz 2005, pp. 
67-75). “Skilled activists use culture as an entry point into larger discussions of politics 
and theory, and use art and culture to celebrate victories and mourn losses,” observes 
Angel (2008, p. 12). 
                                                 
* Although the term ‘propaganda’ now carries a stigma due to its use by Germany and the United States 
during World Wars I and II (Bernays 1928/2005; Carey 1997), as anarchists and other radicals use the term 
it simply means information and argumentation aimed toward influencing others to accept a cause, political 
position, or idea. 
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Participation in Making Meaning 
Anarchism challenges the mainstream press as well as other powerful institutions 
that control and/or mediate information flows, because it holds that direct, non-
hierarchical communication is a necessary precondition for human freedom and 
development. As a powerful mediator of information, the mainstream press threatens 
liberty and autonomy. According to Rabin (1988), 
The greatest emphasis of anarchism must be on social relations. In fact, all 
anarchist relations have a social dimension. In order for people to be free, the 
relations between people must be free. People must interact directly with one 
another. People must not dominate one another. Mediation limits interaction, and 
hence the relations which are based on interaction. Mediation alienates people 
from one another and masks domination (p. 324). 
Rather than facilitate non-hierarchical forms of communication between non-elite 
audience members, the mainstream news media are, for the most part, unidirectional; 
they convey elite perspectives to mass audiences, but do not much care to receive mass 
audience input (Thompson 1995). Nor does the mainstream press facilitate information 
flows between peoples of different nations, for instance by allowing ordinary Americans 
and Palestinians to share each other’s perspectives on Israeli foreign policy.* Because the 
mainstream press defines newsworthiness based on the preferences of elite actors, as well 
as restricts participation in media making to a small class of so-called professional 
newsworkers, it is inherently undemocratic. Indeed, this important limitation to 
participation is built into the very structure of the mass news media (Altschull 1995; 
Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Martin 1998; Ryan 1991). 
                                                 
* For historical background and analysis of media coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict, as well as the 
critical U.S. role in undermining peace negotiations, see Chomsky (1999a), Finkelstein (2003), Friel & Falk 
(2007), and Zertal & Eldar (2007). 
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Because anarchism values forms of direct, non-hierarchical communication, 
anarchists and likeminded radicals propose using communications technologies and 
creating media that not only provide counter-narratives to those found in the mainstream 
press, but also diminish or erase power differentials between audiences and media makers 
(Angel 2008; Atton 2002; Atton & Hamilton 2008; Downing 2002). Many anarchists 
would likely agree with Douglas Kellner’s (2010) sentiment, who writes: 
In a genuinely democratic society, mass media would be part of a communal 
public sphere and alternative media would be made accessible to all groups and 
individuals who wished to participate in media communication. This would 
presuppose dramatic expansion of media access and thus of media systems which 
would require more channels, technology, and a social commitment to democratic 
communication (p. 200). 
Of course, we do not live in a genuinely democratic society, meaning activists 
must approach media-making cautiously. Cellphones, email, social media, and even more 
traditional forms of alternative media (such as newspapers, magazines, radio programs, 
etc.) may enable activists to quickly and easily spread ideas and information, but these 
can also open the door for state-corporate suppression. Nevertheless, activist/alternative 
media are essential for movement growth and stamina. As Angel (2008) explains, “It is 
necessary for all movements to have ways for people to talk with each other, share news, 
and strategize, which allows networks brought together around particular moments in 
time to build on each other and not rebuild continually. This is something inherently 
lacking in today’s media landscape” (p. 10).  
According to Andrew Hedgecock (1990), “An anarchist approach to cultural 
production would revolve around encouraging widespread participation in the production 
of alternative media and the erosion of categories like ‘producer’ (writer, artist, performer 
etc) and ‘audience’” (p. 374). Such an approach would also seek to promote diverse 
views by providing a platform for those who have never produced media content before, 
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not just established writers and journalists. According to John Downing (2001), a 
multiplicity of perspectives enables media audiences to experience “multiple realities” of 
oppression, political/social/economic life, and culture. Countless activist and alternative 
media projects commit(ted) themselves to this ethos, including well-known ones such as 
Clamor, Left Turn, and Z Magazine, as well as the global network of Independent Media 
Centers (IMCs), which originated in the 1999 anti-WTO protests in Seattle and sprang up 
around the world soon afterward.* 
Radically democratic in conception and execution, and frequently associated with 
anarchist politics, IMCs are organized as collectives in which decision-making power and 
journalistic responsibilities are shared equally. They are linked rhizomatically, without a 
central authority, and each IMC has complete autonomy relative to every other IMC. As 
Victor Pickard (2006) observes, “Despite an overall uniformity in website architecture 
and political ethos across Indymedia sites, there are significant differences among 
individual IMCs including but not limited to cultural particulars regarding editorial 
policy, membership criteria, and the size and location of the IMC” (p. 20). Exhorting 
audiences with the slogan “Don’t hate the media; be the media,” IMCs allow any person 
to contribute content as reporters, editors, and photographers (Kidd 2003; 2010; Pickard 
2006; Wolfson 2012). The roots of Indymedia can be traced directly to U.S. radicals’ 
solidarity work with the Zapatistas , who in 1996 “put forward a vision that directly 
linked the creation of an alternative communications infrastructure to the formation of a 
global social movement. … The core of the EZLN vision was that communications, 
particularly new media tools, should play a central role in connecting points of struggles 
across the world, cultivating a global social movement,” according to Todd Wolfson 
                                                 
* As a matter of disclosure, I was a member of the Austin Indymedia editorial collective between June 2010 
and June 2012. In addition to producing web content, our collective produced a weekly show for 
channelAustin, a local public access television channel. See http://austin.indymedia.org/ 
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(2012, p. 150-151). Indymedia’s emergence coincided with the advent of a global popular 
uprising against neoliberalism that placed communications technologies at the center of 
resistance efforts (Kidd 2003; 2010; Pickard 2006; Wolfson 2012). Indymedia activists 
were early combatants enmeshed in what Cleaver (1995) describes as the “electronic 
fabric of struggle.” As Kidd (2010) observes, 
The global IMC represented a qualitative shift in the scope and scale of media 
power. Until then, alternative media had been limited by small-scale production, 
shut out from most of the capitalist circuits of distribution, and divided internally 
by the craft logics of capitalist industry (print, radio, public access television, 
video, and music). The IMC represented a leap beyond the monopoly control of 
production of corporate media. It was a recomposition of media makers, bringing 
together open source software hackers and technicians, alternative media and 
independent video producers, punks, and social justice communicators. All of 
these groups developed, in part, through the mass appropriation of sophisticated 
digital tools of production and circulation, and earlier collective experiments in 
their use (p. 200). 
Despite starting off strong—the first IMC website received 1.5 million hits (more 
than CNN) in its first week—IMCs have been in decline for years, which critics attribute 
to their lack of original and/or investigative reporting, being overrun by right-wing 
content submissions and conspiracy theorists, IMC contributors being stretched too thin, 
and a widespread perception on the Left that Indymedia simply doesn’t matter anymore 
(Uzelman 2014; Whitney 2005). Furthermore, access to technology does not necessarily 
mean that contributors will write well, or produce content that will interest readers. It is 
also much easier for activist groups and movements to create their own forms of online 
media today than it was in 1999, owing to the proliferation of free publishing software 
tools such as Drupal and Wordpress, accessible corporate options such as Tumblr and 
Facebook, and more familiarity with what the available options are. These and other 
digital communications technologies are integral to contemporary activism (Castells 
2012; Earl & Kimport 2011; Harlow & Guo 2014; Harlow & Harp 2012; McCaughey & 
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Ayers 2003). For instance, a recent web survey conducted among 100 activists in the 
United States and Latin America found that nearly all of them use Facebook and 
approximately half use Twitter; respondents also reported that social media were 
important for organizing, mobilizing, and promoting debate, regardless of whether their 
activism occurred offline or online (Harlow & Harp 2012). Although IMCs are no longer 
as influential as they once were, they leave an important legacy, as many contemporary 
activist publications and social justice groups reflect a commitment to the anarchist 
values and practices articulated by Indymedia (Giraud 2014; Uzelman 2014; Whitney 
2005). 
 
Access to Diverse Views and Information 
An anarchist view of news media would also promote widespread access to 
diverse views and news content. Even though digital technologies reduce production and 
distribution barriers that confront more traditional forms of alternative media (i.e., radio, 
television, and print), which greatly enables the proliferation of radical media online, 
powerful mediators still influence who actually views this content. According to web 
analytics, people rely less on search engines and home pages, and more frequently on 
social media to discover news content online. Social media drives nearly a third of all 
web traffic to news websites, outstripping organic search engines (Shareaholic 2015). 
These means that Facebook and other companies which have amassed vast amounts of 
data about their users—concerning people’s personal tastes, online habits, friendships, 
and other aspects of their private lives—actively shape the kinds of information and 
range of opinions people are exposed to. Social media advocates may believe that users 
enjoy limitless options regarding news consumption, when in reality corporate algorithms 
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have narrowed the field of available options by customizing advertising, news, and 
entertainment for media audiences (Turow 2011). 
Furthermore, a digital divide persists between those who do and do not have 
regular access to information and communications technologies, which limits exposure to 
activist-made media. Among media-makers, anarchists and fellow travelers have been 
very sensitive to this. Describing Clamor’s decision to produce a print magazine, Angel 
(2008) observes, “Not only are print magazines and zines relatively inexpensive for 
consumers, they put out new information often (as opposed to books or DVDs), don’t 
require special equipment for the average person to decipher, and can be taken on a bus, 
into the bathroom, on an airplane, or into the woods” (p. 10). Print media may also be 
used as organizing tools, especially at demonstrations and on college campuses, where 
activists and organizers can use magazines and newspapers as conversation starters.  
However, some anarchists are skeptical of well-meaning attempts to bring more 
people into the digital fold. CrimethInc. (n.d.), an anonymous anarchist collective, warns 
readers that: 
The project of computerizing the masses recapitulates and extends the unification 
of humanity under capitalism. No project of integration has ever extended as 
widely or penetrated as deeply as capitalism, and the digital will soon fill its entire 
space. … 
To integrate is not necessarily to equalize: the leash, the rein, and the whip are 
also connective. Even where it connects, the digital divides. 
Like capitalism, the digital divides haves from have-nots. But a computer is not 
what the has-not lacks. The has-not lacks power, which is not apportioned equally 
by digitization. Rather than a binary of capitalists and proletarians, a universal 
market is emerging in which each person will be ceaselessly evaluated and 
ranked. Digital technology can impose power differentials more thoroughly and 
efficiently than any caste system in history. 
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Today, a small handful of corporations—including News Corp, Comcast, 
Bertelsmann, Viacom, Disney, Time Warner, CBS, Gannett, Google, and others—control 
the vast majority of the nation’s communications systems and media, including major 
book retailers and distributors.* This impacts where and how activists and citizens can 
access alternative media, which has motivated anarchists and other radical media makers 
to seek alternative distribution channels, especially those which allow publications to 
reduce waste, bypass major distributors and corporate bookstore chains such as Barnes & 
Noble, and directly connect with the activists, groups, and movements they intend to 
serve. Although publications such as Monthly Review, Z Magazine, and In These Times 
can still be found in the magazine aisles of major bookstores, more recent experiments in 
radical media such as Left Turn and anarchist groups such as CrimethInc. have created 
grassroots distribution models premised on sending bulk copies to supporters in different 
cities, who may decide to give them away for free, sell them at-cost, or use them to raise 
funds for local radical projects (Angel 2008, pp. 27-28).† Anarchist publishers and 
distribution groups such as AK Press‡, Little Black Cart§, Active Distribution**, and 
others also present opportunities for radical media makers to circumvent the distribution 
channels of corporate capitalism and deliver media products to English-speaking 
audiences. 
                                                 
* For more information on individual media companies and their holdings, see the “Who Owns the Media?” 
resource maintained by Free Press: http://www.freepress.net/ownership/chart 
† Inspired by Left Turn, while working on a newsprint magazine called The New Texas Radical, our 
editorial collective decided upon a similar distribution scheme, in which activists throughout Texas could 
purchase bulk copies of TNTR at-cost plus the price of shipping. Some issues included a suggested cover 
price of $2.00, plus an additional “solidarity price” of $3.00. Later on, a friend informed me that he had 
stumbled across several copies of the magazine at a local bookstore – hardly unusual, except that he was in 
Guatemala. 
‡ See http://www.akpress.org/ and http://www.akuk.com/ 
§ See http://littleblackcart.com/ 
** See http://www.activedistributionshop.org/ 
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Ownership and Organization 
McChesney (1997) writes that, “In democratic societies the manner by which the 
media system is structured, controlled and subsidized is of central political importance. 
Control over the means of communication is an integral aspect of political and economic 
power” (p. 6). Anarchists and other radical critics trace many of the corruptions of mass 
news media to its ownership by capitalists. Inasmuch as anarchists believe that something 
like the mass news media should even exist, which is far from obvious, they argue there 
should be popular control over it—just as there should be popular control over schools, 
banks, churches, and society’s other central institutions. Capitalist news companies are 
also organized hierarchically, which anarchism opposes, with owners, publishers, and 
high-ranking editors near the top and various levels of reporters, editors, and other media 
makers working below them. Those near the top of the hierarchy have greater influence 
over information output than those near the bottom, i.e., through story assignments and 
editorial decisions (Bagdikian 2004; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002). 
A century ago, it was not uncommon for socialist, Marxist, and even anarchist 
publications to replicate the basic internal structure of most other small, political 
publications, i.e., a stable of contributors submitted content to one or two people 
responsible for editing and publishing the newspaper or magazine. Since the 1960s, 
however, anarchists and other radical media makers have consciously moved away from 
traditional top-down structures and toward collective ownership models, as well as made 
an effort to include more people in the editing and production processes (Atton 2002; 
Atton & Hamilton 2008; Downing 2002; McMillian 2011). As Z Magazine co-founder 
Michael Albert (1997) argues, “Being alternative can’t just mean that the institution’s 
editorial focus is on this or that topical area. And being alternative as an institution 
certainly isn’t just being left or right or different in editorial content. Being alternative as 
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an institution must have to do with how the institution is organized and works.” He 
proposes the following: 
 Alternative media should reduce income differentials between media makers, and 
not endow some with more power than others. 
 Alternative media should assign comparable tasks and reduce disparities in work 
conditions, so that media makers have comparable quality of life. 
 Alternative media should reduce and eliminate hierarchies where possible. 
“Means of decision making should be participatory and democratic with the goal, 
broadly understood, that participants should affect decisions proportionately to the 
degree they are in turn affected by them. But also, circumstances of work (and 
training) should empower all participants so that their voting rights are not a 
formality but instead each participant has the information, confidence, time, and 
security to develop their opinions, present them, and effectively champion them, 
when need be” (ibid.). 
 Alternative media should embody feminist and multicultural aims by working to 
reduce gender- and race-based disparities between media makers. 
 Alternative media should try to reach a broad, socially relevant audience rather 
than advertisers and those with disposable income. “Relations with audience 
should respect and promote the same values and norms internally pursued, 
particularly those of openness, dialogue, and full communication” (ibid.). 
 Alternative media should work to support other alternative media projects. 
Albert writes that his view of alternative media promotes “sensitivity to issues of 
class relations and economic structure and a sense of mutual solidarity and outreach” 
(ibid.). His view is rooted in participatory economics, or parecon, an anarchist economic 
vision premised on participatory decision making, whose underlying values are solidarity, 
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equity, diversity, workers’ self-management, and efficiency (Albert 2003; 2006a; 2006b; 
Hahnel 2005). His view is purist and rather stringent, because it implies that publications 
such as The Nation and Mother Jones, which feature top-down editorial structures, are in 
some sense not really alternative media. Media scholar Chris Atton (2002), whose 
writings also reflect a commitment to anarchist politics, takes a different approach; he 
argues that media may feature different degrees of alterity according to their products and 
processes. These products (1-3) and processes (4-6) include: 
 
1. Content, such as that which is politically or socially radical or promotes dissident 
views (Downing 2001; Kessler 1984; Ostertag 2006; Streitmatter 2001). 
2. Form, which includes alternative visual elements and other aesthetic qualities 
(Duncombe 2001). 
3. Reprographic innovations, i.e., the use of different technologies (for instance, 
photocopiers or stencils and spray paint) to produce media (Atton 2002; 
Duncombe 2001). 
4. Distributive use, or the use of alternative and clandestine distribution networks, as 
well as rejection of copyright laws (Atton 2002). 
5. Transformed social relations, roles, and responsibilities, which includes 
alternative media institutions that organize non-hierarchically and emphasize 
deprofessionalization of journalists (Albert 1997; Atton 2002). 
6. Transformed communication processes, such as horizontal linkages with social 
movements and activists (Atton 2002; Downing 2001; Kessler 1984; Ostertag 
2006; Streitmatter 2001). 
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In addition, academic theorists have conceptualized alternative media as 
oppositional media (Downing 1984), as radical media (Downing 2001), as citizens’ 
media (Rodríguez 2001), and as community media (Howley 2005). From an anarchist 
perspective, Albert (1997) and Atton’s (2002) accounts are notable because they imply 
that alternative media production and distribution are forms of prefigurative political 
direct action, which not only address access and participation problems inherent in mass 
news media,* but also the corporate structure of corporate news media institutions 
themselves. Again quoting Angel (2008): 
By creating and maintaining media institutions that are accessible to everyone, 
that present readers with diverse ideas and concepts so they can make informed 
decisions, and allow us to connect with each other, we are building institutions 
that prefigure a better world, that show us what it could look like. By building 
viable alternative institutions and providing concrete examples on how society 
could be run, we help challenge the dominant structure (sometimes this is called a 
“dual power” strategy) (pp. 7-8). 
  
                                                 
* Downing (2001) mentions prefigurative politics in his section on anarchist media, but it is not central to 
his conception of alternative media, whereas it is clearly a major point of interest for Albert (1997) and 
Atton (2002). 
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Chapter 3: Doing Activist Communications Research 
Despite academic researchers’ claims to impartiality or overt political 
commitments to worthy causes and movements, anarchists, insurgents, and other anti-
capitalist activists are often wary of scholarly attempts at documenting, theorizing about, 
or otherwise examining social movements and communities in struggle. For instance, 
anarchist writer Peter Gelderloos (2010b) describes universities as “elite institutions 
engaged in the softer areas of counterinsurgency,” and writes: “…with or without valid 
arguments, people in the streets and people in prison know instinctually and from 
experience that academics are not their allies” (p. 43; emphasis mine). Although his 
remarks may appear strident, Gelderloos speaks for many anti-capitalist radicals who, far 
from mechanically rejecting academia and intellectual work, base their skeptical attitudes 
in a searching critique of universities, institutionally affiliated researchers, and academic 
scholarship. However, as outsiders to academia, their critiques leave small impacts, 
mainly at the fringes of the humanities and social sciences.* When confronted by these 
challengers, most academics easily choose to ignore them, citing their independence and 
need for appropriate scholarly distance as justification – a predictable response from 
those who have spent years undergoing the professionalization process and acculturating 
to academe (Schmidt 2000). 
For academic researchers who consider themselves movement allies, though, and 
who believe that scholarship can and, perhaps more importantly, should play a 
constructive role in the movements they study, it is not so easy to sidestep radicals’ 
criticisms. If movement allies within the academy hope to build rapport, trust, mutual 
understanding, and solidarity with activists outside the ivory tower, they will need to take 
                                                 
* Of course, arguably, academia’s radical insiders also fail to have much impact. 
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seriously the latter’s concerns – even if this means surrendering their perceived status as 
objective, neutral observers, or casting themselves as combative to their colleagues or the 
universities that employ them. 
Moreover, a main goal of this study is to show what anarchist thought and 
practice may contribute to activist discourse and communications research about 
commercial news media power, alternative media, and social movements. As noted 
earlier, Graeber (2004) writes that “Anarchism has tended to be an ethical discourse 
about revolutionary practice” (p. 6). Revolutionary practice includes, among other things, 
articulating movement ideas and concerns. For the anarchist academic engaged in 
communications research—a field in which mainstream, “embedded intellectuals” rather 
than critical or radical scholars hold sway (Bratich 2007)—the politically situated 
character of knowledge production poses several moral, epistemic, and political concerns. 
That is, how one generates ideas is often as important as the ideas themselves. 
To that end, this chapter examines four sources of friction between scholars and 
anti-capitalists, which challenge radical communications scholars and other social science 
researchers who study social movements, insurgency, and activism. These are: a 
distinction between scholarly/academic work and radical intellectual activity; academics’ 
class position; the troubling relationship between power and expertise; and academics’ 
privileged space in knowledge production. The fourth concern is the focus of this chapter, 
which leads into a discussion of administrative, critical, and possibly radical approaches 
to communications research; still, the first three deserve brief examination. Although 
there are dozens, perhaps hundreds of different threads to pull in the tapestry of activist 
argumentation against the academy, these stand out as especially important 
considerations for researchers captivated by the ideas of anarchists and other anti-
capitalist radicals. 
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ACADEMIC WORK VS. RADICAL INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY 
Scholars and academics are often conflated with intellectuals, but they are not 
necessarily the same and it is useful to distinguish between the two. By scholars and 
academics, I mean researchers employed by universities and colleges, who teach, 
research, perform service for institutions of higher learning, and otherwise contribute to 
fields of study as members of an academic community. By intellectuals, I mean people 
who reflect on society, culture, and life, who engage in “intellectual activity, reading, 
researching, writing, editing, and discussing ideas, all to a much higher degree than most 
people,” (Stein 2001, p. 43) paid or unpaid for this activity, and independently of their 
relationship to institutions of higher learning. According to the late anarchist sociologist 
Howard Ehrlich (2001), a scholar “is dedicated to the specialized study of objects and 
events. … The scholar’s primary, and primarily obsessive concern is with their [sic] 
(usually narrow) domain of study.” Ehrlich considers an intellectual, on the other hand, to 
be “a person who likes to play with ideas. All ideas, any ideas: playing with ideas through 
discussion, observation, reading, writing, are the intellectual’s obsession. Discussion and 
acquisition of knowledge are ends in themselves” (p. 46). Scholars and intellectuals are 
not mutually exclusive groups. Academics may engage in intellectual activity, and some 
intellectuals may be academics – but they may also be teachers, writers, doctors, 
computer programmers, plumbers, custodians, artists, musicians, electricians, farmers, 
and so on.* Academics and intellectuals alike may espouse reactionary or revolutionary 
ideas. 
                                                 
* For instance, few anarchists know that the anarchist intellectual Sam Dolgoff (1902-1990) worked as a 
house painter his entire life. As a leading voice for anarcho-syndicalism in the United States, Dolgoff wrote 
prolifically about anarchism and workers’ movements, edited books on anarchist theory and history, and 
co-founded and served as an editor for Anarcho-Syndicalist Review until his death. 
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Anarchists and other radical anti-capitalists have an uneasy relationship with both 
academics and intellectuals, but on the whole they tend to be harder on academics. There 
are important reasons for this. First, membership within the academic community is 
reasonably clear-cut. In addition to producing a distinct cultural product, i.e., academic 
scholarship, most academics hold graduate degrees, institutional affiliations, 
memberships within scholarly associations, and other hallmarks of professional status, 
which require significant economic underpinnings. Meanwhile, radical anti-capitalists do 
not always identify intellectuals within their own ranks as such – especially in circles 
where intellectuals and intellectualism are viewed with distaste or scorn. 
Second, for the most part academics tend to examine narrow questions for small 
audiences. As a result, academic scholarship rarely connects with or generates ideas of 
interest to activists, insurgents, and social movement participants. Expressions of 
intellectual activity, on the other hand, tend to be more down to earth, unbounded by 
disciplinary norms, more likely to be of interest to academia’s outsiders, and more likely 
to have a “real world” import or vitality. According to cultural critic Jack Miles (1999), 
the division of labor within academia and universities applies constant pressure on 
academics to “suppress random curiosity and foster, instead, only a carefully channeled, 
disciplined curiosity.” Without this pressure, an intellectual has more freedom to be an 
“explorer and generalist.” This in part is reinforced by the need to publish regularly in 
approved academic journals. As a result, Miles writes: “An academic is a specialist who 
has disciplined his curiosity to operate largely within a designated area, while an 
intellectual is a generalist who deliberately does otherwise” (p. 313). 
Of course, recognizing that radicals can also be intellectuals does little to assuage 
concerns about the influence of intellectuals in movements or strong state societies. 
Indeed, this is a main point of contention between anarchists and Marxists. Well before 
 71 
the “new working class” debates of the 1970’s (discussed below), the revolutionary 
anarchist Mikhail Bakunin warned in 1872 that Marxism would lead to complex, 
bureaucratic government that required and gave privileged position to intellectuals and 
experts. In his words: 
This government will not content itself with administering and governing the 
masses politically, as all governments do today. It will also administer the masses 
economically, concentrating in the hands of the State the production and division 
of wealth, the cultivation of land, the establishment and development of factories, 
the organization and direction of commerce, and finally the application of capital 
to production by the only banker—the State. All that will demand an immense 
knowledge and many heads “overflowing with brains” in this government. It will 
be the reign of scientific intelligence, the most aristocratic, despotic, arrogant, and 
elitist of all regimes. There will be a new class, a new hierarchy of real and 
counterfeit scientists and scholars, and the world will be divided into a minority 
ruling in the name of knowledge, and an immense ignorant majority. And then, 
woe unto the mass of ignorant ones! (Bakunin 1980, p. 319). 
A student of Bakunin, Noam Chomsky (1966/1987; 1967/2003) argues that the 
intelligentsia—the social class of intellectuals who lend ideological support to the state 
and capitalist institutions—is antagonistic to movements and social change that elites 
cannot control.* According to Chomsky (1987), the ideas of anarchism—which rejects 
hierarchies and concentrations of power—do not appeal to the intelligentsia, whose 
“natural ideology is one that gives a major role to state power, whether it’s state 
socialism, or welfare-state capitalism, or military-state capitalism of the Reagan variety” 
(p. 20). Anarchism does not offer these intellectuals the power and privilege they crave, 
and in fact undermines their position. Chomsky’s view of the intelligentsia also helps 
explain why historically there have been proportionally fewer anarchist intellectuals than 
Marxist and Leninist intellectuals. Marxism-Leninism appeals to intellectuals because “it 
                                                 
* As Chomsky and others argue (e.g., Schmidt 2000), institutions such as graduate school and prestige 
newspapers also play important roles in presocializing members of the intelligentsia on behalf of state and 
capitalist institutions. 
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offers justification for their rise to positions of power and manipulation in the course of 
popular struggles which they can exploit and subvert. When such hopes are seen to be 
illusory, it has been an easy transition to celebration of liberal capitalism and association 
with or service to its dominant elites” (p.19-20).* 
It comes as no surprise, then, that some contemporary anarchists reject the idea 
that intellectuals should have any role to play in movements or activism. As Jeff Stein 
(2001) observes, “The present anarchist movement does not place value on rationality 
and science. The tendency in our movement since the 1960s has been to equate 
rationalism with the horrors of modern warfare, police surveillance, and ecological 
destruction. …[M]any anarchists quite seriously extol the virtues of ignorance and 
superstition, which have the advantage of being low tech” (Stein 2001, p. 43-4). Needless 
to say, this is an untenable position for anarchists within the academy. Not only does it 
deny the autonomy of radical intellectuals, but if intellectuals have no roles to play in 
movements, the conversation ends here. 
Among the anarchists and anti-capitalists who do see a role for intellectuals in 
social movements, they challenge academics to become politically engaged, anti-
authoritarian intellectuals who bring their intellect and talents to bear on the problems 
that societies and movements face. That is to say, these anarchists contend that radical 
intellectuals can and should play important roles in building social movements and 
revolutions. As Graeber (2004) puts it, one “obvious role for a radical intellectual” is “to 
                                                 
* Of course, Chomsky is perhaps oversimplifying the issue when he claims that the transition from Marxist 
to liberal capitalist ideology is simple. Notable examples of Marxists-turned-conservatives include figures 
such as Whitaker Chambers, Max Eastman, David Horowitz, and Marvin Olasky. Following conservative 
critics such as Friedrech Hayek (1949) and Robert Nozick (1998), who scapegoated intellectuals for 
harboring leftwing or socialist sympathies, Horowitz (2006) argues that liberals and leftists dominate 
universities and mass media. Such arguments ignore that liberal and conservative members of the 
intelligentsia alike undermine socialist values by colluding with violent, oppressive state policies (Chomsky 
1967/1987). 
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look at those who are creating viable alternatives, try to figure out what might be the 
larger implications of what they are (already) doing, and then offer those ideas back, not 
as prescriptions, but as contributions, possibilities—gifts” (p.12). According to Shukaitis 
(2004), “The task of the utopian theorist is that of acting as a diplomat between struggles, 
sharing wisdom and experiences, connecting and synthesizing ideas created through 
everyday experience, and offer [sic] such back to the community” (p. 11). Ehrlich (2001) 
describes these kinds of radical intellectuals as “the map makers for the movement” (p. 
47). Writing for a primarily anarchist audience, Stein (2001) argues: 
The appropriate role of intellectuals is to contribute according to their ability, to 
do what intellectuals do already: to research, write, debate and educate on behalf 
of the anarchist movement. To engage in anarchist intellectual activity is to help 
other anarchists discover what they need to know to build an anarchist movement, 
and eventually, to discover what we all need to know to create a more libertarian 
society (p. 43). 
Similarly, when asked what role he sees for the intellectual in an anarchist 
society, Chomsky (1987) replies: 
That of intellectual worker. A person whose work happens to be more with the 
mind than with the hands. Although I would think that in a decent society there 
ought to be a mixture of the kinds of work that one does. Marx would agree in 
principle. An anarchist picture of society, or anarchist tendencies within society, 
offer no privileged role to the organized intelligentsia or to the professional 
intellectuals. And, in fact, it would tend to blur the distinctions between 
intellectual and worker, so that workers should take a direct, active role in the 
mental aspects of whatever work they’re doing, its organization and planning, 
formation of its purposes, and so on. The people whose major professional 
concern is knowledge and the application of knowledge would have no special 
opportunity to manage the society, to gain any position of power and prestige by 
virtue of this special training and talent. And that’s not a point of view that the 
intelligentsia are naturally drawn to (p. 21). 
Stein and Chomsky’s understandings have much in common with Antonio 
Gramsci’s (1971) conception of organic intellectuals who can articulate the ideas, 
interests, and experiences of the proletariat – as opposed to traditional intellectuals who 
 74 
see themselves as a disinterested class of thinkers apart from society. More recently, 
Chomsky draws a distinction between dissident intellectuals who betray powerful 
institutions and those who behave as commissars, supporting the status quo and its 
crimes.* 
 
CLASS LOCATION OF ACADEMICS AND INTELLECTUALS 
Radical intellectuals have always forged a complex, ambiguous relationship with 
other revolutionary anti-capitalists and members of the working class, both as 
revolutionary actors and as categories within class analyses. On the one hand, 
historically, countless intellectually gifted women and men have been responsible for 
articulating, extending, and promulgating revolutionary ideas. It is doubtful, for instance, 
that Marxism would have emerged and eventually taken hold were it not for the Young 
Hegelians. Likewise, defenders of anarchist and socialist ideas have included intellectual 
giants such as Bertrand Russell (1918; 1920), Albert Einstein (1949/1954), and Noam 
Chomsky (1970/2005; 2005). On the other hand, as Erik Olin Wright (1979) observes, 
[T]he very fact that most intellectuals are not unambiguously part of the working 
class has meant that they have always been viewed with suspicion within 
revolutionary movements. Although as individuals, intellectuals might be totally 
committed to a revolutionary project, as a social category intellectuals occupy 
privileged positions within bourgeois ideological relations and often privileged 
positions within bourgeois economic relations as well (pp. 191-2). 
The ambiguous class position of college-educated intellectuals, academics, 
scientists, technicians, bureaucrats, managers, engineers, doctors, lawyers, and other 
salaried professional workers embroiled Marxist writers in the “new working class” 
debates of the 1970s. These writers offered various explanations for the position of 
                                                 
* For an excellent discussion of Chomsky’s views, see chapters 4 and 5 of Robert Barsky’s (1998) 
biography Noam Chomsky: A Life of Dissent. 
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middle class professionals within the class structure of capitalist society, such as: 
professional, technical, and managerial workers are petty bourgeoisie who will be 
absorbed into the class of proletarians, as Marx predicted (Syzmanski 1979); they are part 
of a “new petty bourgeoisie” responsible for reproducing capitalist relations (Pouluntzas 
1975); they occupy a “contradictory class position” between proletarians and capitalists 
(Wright 1978; 1979); and so on, representing more or less orthodox Marxist-Leninist 
interpretations. 
Against the grain of orthodoxy, two participants in these debates, Barbara and 
John Ehrenreich, proposed in a stimulating essay that in the 20
th
 century salaried 
professionals came to constitute a distinct third class between labor and capital, which 
they term the professional-managerial class, or PMC (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich 1979; 
2013). According to the Ehrenreichs (1979), the PMC may be defined as “consisting of 
salaried mental workers who do not own the means of production and whose major 
function in the social division of labor may be described broadly as the reproduction of 
capitalist culture and capitalist class relations” (p. 11). As a class of technocrats, the PMC 
emphasizes knowledge and expertise, obtained usually by university training, as the basis 
of authority. In the Ehrenreichs’ view, the PMC’s emergence depended on its 
expropriation of the productive skills of the working class, creating an “objective 
antagonism” between the two classes (pp. 16-7). Inspired by the Ehrenreichs’ thesis, 
Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel argue that it is more useful to consider professionals as 
members of a coordinator class that monopolizes decision-making and empowering work 
roles (Albert 2003; 2006a; 2006b; Albert & Hahnel 1978; 1991a; 1991b).*  
                                                 
* Historically, in the view of Marxists, many anarchists, syndicalists, and other revolutionary socialists, 
capitalist societies have been marked by class war between proletarians and capitalists – the former, 
consisting of most of the population, who must sell their labor in order to survive and the latter, a much 
smaller class of people (perhaps one percent of the population) who own the means of production, control 
allocation, and hire and fire workers. Although there are many different nuances in Marxist class analysis, 
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Although the PMC and coordinator class theses provoked vitriolic responses (for 
instance, see the essays in Walker 1979)—which center, for the most part, on 
uninteresting definitional disputes about Marx’s original meanings of class and class 
analysis—the thrust of these arguments continues to resonate with working class radicals 
as well as some anarchists and other anti-Leninist leftists. Whether one accepts that a 
third class really exists between labor and capital—an idea that Marxists reject—or 
simply believes that professional-managerial workers represent a strata of the working 
class, it is hard to shake the feeling that under capitalism, acute differences in influence, 
                                                                                                                                                 
they are all undergirded by a basic understanding of capitalism as a system marked by intense class war 
between two poles, capitalists and workers – the former attempting constantly to accrue profits, and the 
latter to gain control of their lives. This two-class analysis has guided the global revolutionary left for over 
a century, giving inspiration to Communist takeovers in Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and 
throughout much of Latin America. It is now widely known that these experiments in Marxism-Leninism 
were, at best, mixed bags. Although Communist regimes arguably reduced inequalities in many of the 
countries where they came to power, they also brought about the deaths of tens of millions, as well as other 
horrors. 
After Communist regimes in Eastern Europe began collapsing in 1989, culminating in the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Western observers gushed that Communism’s demise showed once 
and for all that socialism had failed and capitalism was a superior economic system. The problem with 
these pronouncements, as Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel (1991) observe, is that they were untrue; 
actual socialist values—egalitarian and participatory values, embodied in workers self-managing their own 
economic lives—had never characterized the fallen Communist states. Moreover, anti-Leninist leftists had 
been arguing for decades that Communist regimes based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism were 
fatally flawed, unrepresentative of socialism’s core values, and could never hope to bring about stateless, 
classless societies. Indeed, many radicals from the movements of the 1960s had become disillusioned with 
Communism well before the fall of the Berlin Wall, owing in part to the New Left’s own failures with 
Maoism and Marxism-Leninism. This stimulated a reexamination of Karl Marx’s ideas in the 1970s, which 
generated new analyses that drew heavily from neglected historical inspirations, in particular the writings 
of Bakunin, Voline, G.P. Maximoff, Rudolf Rocker, Emma Goldman, and other anarchists, libertarian 
socialists such as Maurice Brinton, and anti-Leninist Marxists such as Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, 
Paul Mattick, and Anton Pannekoek. 
As libertarian socialists, Albert and Hahnel argue that Communist regimes inspired by Marxism-
Leninism failed to create societies and movements based on actual socialist values, because although 
Communist states eliminated private ownership of the means of production, they also imposed hierarchies 
that undermined workers’ self-management, for instance by breaking up autonomous workers groups and 
appointing technocrats to coordinate economic activities. A blind spot in orthodox Marxism is that it 
ignores the possibility that criteria other than ownership of the means of production can define or produce 
classes. Albert and Hahnel propose that coordinators can exist as a class whose class interests are opposed 
to those of both proletarians and capitalists. (Moreover, coordinatorism appears in Communist and 
capitalist economies alike.) Capitalists exploit coordinators, but coordinators exploit workers by 
monopolizing empowering decision-making on the job, as well as wielding considerable control over their 
own work lives and the work lives of those below them. 
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social status, culture, living standards, income, and class outlook divide professionals 
from members of the working class.  
Building on the Ehrenreichs’ insights, Jake Ryan and Charles Sackrey (1984) 
argue that universities serve capitalist class relations in several ways that perpetuate 
PMC-working class antagonisms. First, universities are the principal providers of 
credentials—college degrees—that separate members of the working class from those in 
the middle class. Second, universities perpetuate the technocratic outlook that treats 
knowledge and expertise as legitimate bases for political authority. Third, they support a 
meritocratic ideology that claims entitlement and privilege for high-level achievers, 
which ignores that privilege is largely a product of initial social class advantage. Fourth, 
universities and professors reproduce social hierarchy—and perpetuate the division 
between the PMC and the working class—by weeding out and ranking entrants into the 
academy, thus inhibiting or otherwise controlling upward mobility. Finally, according to 
Ryan and Sackrey, “the position of the academy and academics with the PMC has a 
unique dimension that further heightens the antagonism between this class and the 
working class” (p.111). They write: 
To distinguish themselves as a subgroup worth of membership, academics must 
flaunt their special credentials, their quality of knowledge, their eloquent taste, 
even their hip life style. Claim to membership cannot, in many cases, be based 
upon income…. In their flaunting, academics may well distinguish themselves 
from the “crass, monied, success elite” in order to demonstrate, ironically, that 
they belong to “another class.” The point is that while doing so, they contribute to 
cultural forms and styles that oppress working people, and contribute further to 
the propensity of such people to self-loathing. This assumed tendency to 
emphasize knowledge, cultured taste, and sophistication as credentials for 
membership in the PMC also limits the potential for sustained political alliance 
between left-leaning academics and working class rank and file (pp.111-2). 
In the final analysis, Ryan and Sackrey conclude “that the academic work process 
is essentially antagonistic to the working class, and academics for the most part live in a 
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different world of culture, different ways that make it, too, antagonistic to working class 
life” (p. 112-3).* Revolutionary movements not attuned to the class position of 
professional-managerial elements will stumble in their attempts to bring about 
classlessness. On the other side of this coin, radical academics and intellectuals unaware 
of or unwilling to acknowledge their class position will have difficulty building solidary 
relations with anti-capitalist radicals and working class folk. 
 
POWER AND EXPERTISE 
Intellectuals and academics possess expertise, i.e., highly developed skillsets and 
knowledges of their respective fields and problem areas. Historically, experts—
academics, lawyers, doctors, economists, political strategists, and other members of the 
intelligentsia—have provided key technical support to ruling groups, not to mention 
crimes of state. This is no accident; as Brian Martin (2009) observes, “The fundamental 
problem is that organised systems of expertise—experts and their knowledge systems—
are oriented to powerful groups rather than non-experts” (p. 13). This includes 
academics’ expertise, which is shaped by training in graduate schools and academia, 
wherein scholars are expected to further the goals of their employers and other powerful 
actors. Indeed, as Jeff Schmidt (2000) convincingly argues, the primary function of 
graduate education is to inculcate a subordinate mindset among academics and other 
                                                 
* Leftists from PMC/coordinator class backgrounds also exhibit this bias. Michael Albert (2006b) writes: “I 
have polled Left audiences at many talks I have given. I find disdain for religion and for most sports—try 
asking leftists about NASCAR or bowling, much less about football, and watch the incredulous, dismissive 
reaction. I find leftists disparage most TV shows and country-and-western music, as well as most 
restaurants where working people eat and most newspapers that working people read, and even the actual 
eating and reading. The idea that so many leftists accidentally adopt daily preferences that are not only 
different from but routinely denigrate working people, with nary a nod toward comprehension, is not, I 
think, an accident. There are additional factors, case by case, but overall this derives from our having not 
yet fully comprehended that coordinator elitism is as vile as capitalist or racist or sexist elitism” (p. 408). 
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knowledge workers, as well as condition research interests to align with the needs of 
elites. 
Anarchists have always approached expertise more cautiously than Marxists and 
especially Leninists, who underestimate bureaucracies’ ability to keep expert power in 
check. Bakunin (1953, pp. 248-55), for instance, deferred to experts where appropriate, 
but critically and skeptically, without recognizing infallible authority figures.* Expertise 
creates another kind of friction between academics and radicals, in that it positions 
experts as wielding power over non-expert activists. From an anarchist perspective, those 
with more knowledge, skills, and access to power can endanger movements by promoting 
vanguardism and inequality. Martin (2009) explains: 
Some activists are highly suspicious of experts, even those aligned to social 
movements, often for good reason. Someone who stands out as highly 
knowledgeable or an eloquent speaker may be taken up by the media as a 
spokesperson, thereby gaining a disproportionate influence on the direction of a 
group or an entire movement, often at the expense of others' participation. A 
talented figure can be a source of envy. Others may leave key tasks to the expert 
and not try as hard as they would otherwise. A group can become dependent on a 
single person and vulnerable to that person's disaffection or departure (p. 16). 
At the same time, Graeber, Martin, and other anarchist intellectuals recognize that 
some forms of expertise are useful or even necessary, and can have lasting, positive 
influences. For instance, radical legal scholars, lawyers, and analysts play indispensable 
                                                 
* Quoting Bakunin (1953): “Does it follow that I reject all authority? No, far be it from me to entertain such 
a thought. In the matter of houses, canals, or railroads, I consult the authority of the architect or engineer. 
For each special type of knowledge I apply to the scientist of that respective branch. I listen to them freely, 
and with all the respect merited by their intelligence, their character, and their knowledge, though always 
reserving my indisputable right of criticism and control. I do not content myself with consulting a single 
specialist who is an authority in a given field; I consult several of them. I compare their opinions and I 
choose the one which seems to me the soundest. 
“But I recognize no infallible authority, not even on questions of an altogether special character. 
Consequently, whatever respect I may have for the sincerity and honesty of such and such individuals, I 
have no absolute faith in any person. Such faith would be fatal to my reason, to my liberty, and to the 
successes of my undertakings: it would immediately transform me into a stupid slave, an instrument of the 
will and interests of others” (p. 253). 
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roles in contemporary struggles to end the death penalty, limit corporate influence, and 
protect the rights of vulnerable populations, such as immigrants, prisoners, and LGBTQ 
persons. Anarchists such as Graham Purchase (1990) distinguish between rational 
(helpful, justified) and irrational (corrupt, unjustified) forms of expertise. 
Although anarchists will not accept the irrational authority of a handful of 
politicians (whose only expertise is in the acquisition of prestige and power) 
anarchists do respect the rational authority of the expert. If one wishes to learn 
about, has a problem with, or is angry about some particular aspect of wine 
making, one approaches the workers of the wine making industries – and respects 
their expertise in matters of wine making (p. 7; emphasis in original). 
Irrational authority/expertise may be viewed as a corruption of information power. Martin 
(2009) argues that the problem lies not in expertise per se, but in the fact that expertise is 
bound up with systems of power (p. 14). He urges radicals to reorient expertise to serve 
society rather than elites and experts, thus delinking it from systems of power (p. 18). 
Anarchists also propose two arguments that demystify expertise. First, experts 
frequently direct their knowledge toward antihuman ends, such as crafting oppressive 
social policies, war planning, and the creation of weapons of mass destruction and 
cancer-causing chemicals (Bouchier 1996, p. 107). Simply put, there is a large body of 
expert knowledge the world could do without. Even when experts do not intend to cause 
harm, i.e., are not outwardly “bad people,” they often act as unthinking technocrats who 
leave pernicious legacies. For example, it is worth remembering that several of the 
economic experts who were called upon to help fix the 2008 financial crisis were also 
chief architects of the banking and fiscal policies that helped cause the crisis in the first 
place. Second, anarchists argue that most socially desirable expertise is not so complex 
that people of average intelligence cannot develop these same skills. Higher education 
and especially graduate education, after all, are often more about credentialing workers 
and professionals than anything else (Aronowitz 2004; Martin 2004; Moten & Harney 
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2004; Newfield 2004; Schmidt 2000); the idea that only a certain subset of the 
population, so-called experts, are qualified to carry out certain jobs is an elitist myth. As 
Ehrlich et al. (1996) observe, although skills such as surgery and engineering would still 
require intense, lengthy training in a post-capitalist society, most of the work now done 
by experts “can be learned in a relatively short time so that it could be done by nearly 
everyone” (p. 8).  
 
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
Taken together, academics’ intellectual stature, class position, and expertise foster 
a perception that they are uniquely qualified to produce and share ideas about society, 
that they have “earned” or deserve social prestige and a near-monopoly on intellectual 
cultural production. Not only is this perception false and elitist, but it misses that 
academics’ privileged space in knowledge production is warped by factors such as the 
historically conservative functions of universities, state-corporate pressures, and research 
traditions unique to each field of study. 
Scholarship and knowledge production are always politically, economically, and 
culturally situated, meaning they are never neutral or value-free (Berger & Luckmann 
1966; Deetz 1992; Freire 1970/2000; Haraway 1988; Krippendorff 1985/1989; Schmidt 
2000; Zinn 1970/1990). In their introduction to an important volume on anarchist 
research perspectives, co-editors Stephven Shukaitis and David Graeber (2007) observe 
that historically, universities have functioned primarily as “places for compiling and 
redacting received knowledge and teaching students to respect authority,” not as “places 
that much fostered innovation or the questioning of received knowledge” (pp. 15-16). As 
they observe, “universities were never meant to be places for intellectual creativity. If it 
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happens, it’s not because it’s especially conducive to them, but only because if you pay 
enough people to sit around thinking, some new ideas are bound to get through” (p. 16). 
Universities continue to depict themselves as hotbeds of critical intellectual activity, but 
critics paint a different picture: Pervasive corporatism and the needs of the national 
security state have radically reshaped the purpose and structure of higher education, 
creating a military-industrial-academic complex in which critical attitudes are stifled, a 
heavy emphasis on skills training supersedes intellectual curiosity, and radical scholars 
experience alienation and academic repression (Aronowitz 2000; Giroux 2007; 2014; 
Nocella, Best, & McLaren 2010; Schiffrin 1997; Schmidt 2000). There is still plenty of 
innovation to be found, but this knowledge production occurs in the mainstream, serving 
mainly the state and capitalist institutions, not their challengers (Shukaitis & Graber 
2007, p. 15). 
Student activists of the 1960s sought to challenge this, first as members of the 
New Left, then later as academics, by waging a protracted, counter-hegemonic cultural 
struggle in academia by swelling its ranks with critical Marxist scholars. As a result of 
their “long march through the institutions,” today thousands of academics at universities 
in the United States and throughout the world anchor their research in Marxism and its 
intellectual offshoots. Over the past two decades, anarchists have made their own inroads 
into academia, by securing jobs in universities, publishing academic books and journal 
articles on anarchist theory and practice, creating courses that deal with anarchism, and 
establishing professional networks of anarchist scholars (Amster et al. 2009; Shantz 
2008). However, as Jeff Shantz (2008) argues, these scholars have not matched their 
growing enthusiasm with “critical reflection on the limitations of a turn to the academy 
by anarchists” (p. 37). Citing Beth Hartung (1983), he warns that, taken from the streets, 
anarchist knowledge risks becoming technology, contradicting anarchism’s anti-
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vanguardism (Shantz 2008, p. 39). Shantz also casts doubt on the New Left’s strategy of 
a “long march through the institutions.” Despite the growth of participatory and 
community-based research approaches, ultimately, he argues, this research “still takes 
place within and is conditioned by its existence within an authoritarian and unequal 
political economy of knowledge production” (p. 40). As Martin (1998) keenly observes, 
“The institutions change the activists long before the activists have a chance to change 
the institutions” (p. 1). Rather than using anarchist thought and practice to bolster 
academic work—allowing anarchism to become technology, per Hartung’s (1983) 
phrase—Shantz (2008) argues that academic work should enrich anarchist analyses. He 
writes: 
The primary orientation of anarchist academics must remain the anarchist 
movements actively involved in struggles against capitalism and the state. In 
some senses anarchist academics are subsidized by the movement activists who 
are doing the day to day work of building movements while the academics are 
pursuing their own, often very personal, interests. Anarchist academics need to 
recognize that while they’re doing the academic work … someone else is taking 
care of the organizing work (that they may be theorizing or analyzing) (pp. 41-2). 
The anarchist critique of academic knowledge production poses a quandary. On 
the one hand, although universities embody authoritarian relations, they also represent an 
important site of struggle as well as potentially offer tremendous resources to radicals 
who can take advantage of them. There is no reason, in principle, why anarchists should 
not take up academic positions; certainly academic anarchists are better than the 
alternative, i.e., mainstream thinkers who uncritically serve power. Although few in 
number, anarchists can join other radical scholars and students waging important battles 
on campuses against attacks on academic freedom as well as the forces of neoliberalism, 
corporatism, and militarism. To quote Henry Giroux (2007), 
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[T]he greatest challenge facing higher education centers on the collective task of 
developing a politics that extends beyond nation-state and reclaiming the academy 
as a democratic public sphere willing to confront the myriad global problems that 
produce needless human suffering, obscene forms of inequality, ongoing 
exploitation of marginalized groups, rapidly expanding masses of disposable 
human beings, increasing forms of social exclusion, and new forms of 
authoritarianism (p. 203). 
On the other hand, as Shantz (2008) suggests, there are limits on what anti-
capitalists in the academy can hope to accomplish. The institutional features which 
condition the political economy of knowledge production leave indelible imprints on 
scholars and scholarship. Do these necessarily limit liberatory potential and disconnect 
scholars and scholarship from activists and social movements? If not, how might 
anarchists and other anti-capitalist scholars begin to address and evaluate these 
limitations, per Shantz’s admonition? For radical communications students and scholars, 
fortunately there exists several decades of critical scholarship addressing the politics of 
research. Drawing from this rich tradition, the remainder of this chapter examines the key 
features of different orientations toward communications research in an effort to 
illuminate an approach that confronts the ethical-political and epistemological issues 
raised by anarchists and other radical critics of academic scholarship.  
 
ADMINISTRATIVE, CRITICAL, AND RADICAL/ACTIVIST RESEARCH 
Among journalism and mass communications scholars, it is not uncommon to 
hear that the main split among researchers concerns methodology, with those who carry 
out quantitative research pitted against those who do qualitative research. Arguably, 
though, the main cleavage occurs between those who do administrative research and 
those who do critical research (Melody & Mansell 1983). As the terms suggest, 
administrative researchers perform work supportive of the status quo or within 
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recognized boundaries of critiques, whereas critical researchers try to challenge power 
inequities. Among the first to clearly distinguish between these orientations were 
members of the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer 1937/1989; Horkheimer & Adorno 
1944/1990) and Paul Lazarsfeld (1941/1972), who tried unsuccessfully to integrate the 
two (Melody & Mansell 1983, p. 104). According to Jack Bratich (2007), 
“Administrative research seeks to make Western institutions run more smoothly while 
critical research challenges the very legitimacy of those institutions. Even today, 
communications studies finds itself embedded in this legacy” (pp. 141-142). 
Administrative research includes work by academics, industry analysts, and other 
professional researchers, which services or otherwise contributes to the maintenance of 
universities, corporations, large foundations and non-profits, NGOs, and various other 
administrative or government agencies. Interlocking institutions of the state and corporate 
capitalism are the main sponsors and beneficiaries of this type of research, which 
typically favors quantitative methods in order to study or speculate about the effects of 
mass communication on audiences (Bratich 2007; Lazarsfeld 1941/1972; 1964; Melody 
& Mansell 1983; Schiller 1973; Smythe & Van Dinh 1983). The origins of administrative 
mass communications research lie in the 1920s and ‘30s, when U.S. corporations 
developed audience survey methods to collect information of use to advertisers, and it 
received a second major boost during World War II, when the information needs of the 
U.S. government spurred survey research into civilian morale, soldiers’ attitudes, and the 
effects of propaganda (Lazarsfeld 1941/1979; 1964; Schiller 1973). According to Herbert 
Schiller (1973), “The war-induced research created ties between poll-takers, the 
government …, and the military bureaucracies, just as the pre-war market research had 
produced a close and continuing business-polling connection” (p. 107). Today, most 
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administrative research about journalism centers on political communications or helping 
the news industry, but it also includes market research and audience effects studies. 
Meanwhile critical research into journalism and media questions the very 
foundations and power relations that infuse media institutions and shape communication 
processes, connecting these to broader cultural, social, and political-economic contexts 
(Bratich 2007; Horkheimer 1937/1989; Lazarsfeld 1941/1972; Melody & Mansell 1983; 
Smythe & Van Dinh 1983). Its transdisciplinary scope includes the humanities, social 
sciences, and art, and it ranges from literary criticism to “sharp critical analysis of 
communications phenomena in their systemic context” (Smythe & Van Dinh 1983, p. 
123). Critical research typically favors qualitative methods, the use of which can be 
traced to the Chicago School of Sociology, because these allow for a deeper 
understanding of human behavior and society than quantitative methods permit (Denzin 
& Lincoln 1998). The origins of critical communications research lie in the 1930s, when 
Max Horkheimer became director of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, and 
members of the Frankfurt School launched new Marxist inquiries into ideology and 
society during Germany’s troubled interwar years (Arato & Gebhardt 1982; Horkheimer 
1937/1989; Horkheimer & Adorno 1944/1990; Jay 1973/1996; Smythe & Van Dinh 
1983). Although the origins of critical research may commonly be attributed to these 
Neo-Marxist scholars, its evolving examination of the economic underpinnings of power 
is now applied to a widespread and well respected analysis of power relations. Unlike 
administrative research, critical research often lacks institutional support (Bratich 2007), 
and its main beneficiaries include critical researchers and scholarly social justice 
activists, who incorporate its insights into their own analyses and strategies (Shukaitis & 
Graeber 2007).  
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Dallas Smythe and Tran Van Dinh (1983) classified communications research as 
administrative or critical based on problems selected for study, research methodologies 
employed, and researchers’ ideological perspective. Though these criteria are useful, they 
do not fully address anarchists and other radical activist researchers’ concerns about 
intellectuals and experts, the self-reproducing nature of academic labor, or how 
academia’s intellectual-institutional setting and creative legitimization requirements 
influence research. As noted above, anarchists are very critical of these influences on 
scholarship, and in recent years have produced literature that critiques academia while 
exploring what it means to be a radical intellectual (e.g., Chomsky 1987, pp. 19-21; 
Ehrlich 2001; Shantz 2008; Shukaitis & Graeber 2007; Stein 2001). 
Building on the established definition, I propose that research be categorized as 
more or less administrative, critical, or possibly radical according to 1) problems selected 
for study, 2) research methodologies employed, and 3) the influence of ideology, as well 
as 4) the use of theory, 5) patronage that supports research, 6) the means of validating 




Questions posed by administrative researchers and the projects they pursue 
generally address elite interests (Bratich 2007; Melody & Mansell 1983; Schiller 1973; 
Schmidt 2000; Smythe & Van Dinh 1983). For instance, several recent articles in 
Newspaper Research Journal explore how journalists and newspapers react to the 
problem of declining youth readership (Chen et al. 2011; Collins, Rabby, & Brown 2013; 
Graybeal 2011; Kaufhold 2010; Zerba 2013). This scholarship typifies administrative 
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research, because the questions these studies address are mainly of interest to capitalist 
news companies trying to accrue more readers and advertising profits. Because so much 
administrative research aims to fine-tune theories about the effects of mass media 
content, its research questions are often presented as testable hypotheses or narrow 
questions. 
Meanwhile, the questions that critical researchers ask and the research projects 
they pursue ostensibly seek to challenge the status quo and power inequities (Bratich 
2007; Melody & Mansell 1983; Smythe & Van Dinh 1983), as well as to “reshape or 
invent institutions to meet the collective needs of the relevant social community” 
(Smythe & Van Dinh 1983, p. 118). Similarly, radical activist researchers also 
deliberately pose questions that challenge power structures and resulting inequities. Their 
work tries to understand the root causes of inequality, violence, and oppression (Bratich 
2007; Hale 2001; 2006; Martin 2010; Shukaitis & Graeber 2007). Critical and activist 
researchers both tend to pose more open-ended questions than administrative researchers 
do. 
But there are also important differences between critical and radical researchers. 
To begin, critical researchers frequently seek to address questions that activists consider 
to be arcane or irrelevant. In addition, whether it is due to timidity or the requirements of 
validation within the academic system that supports them and decides what is a legitimate 
version of their ideas, critical researchers and others seeking tenure and promotion often 
avoid prescription or linking their research to activist political projects. They provide 
cultural critique rather than propose or articulate reformist insight or movement strategy 
(Cleaver 1979; Frey & Carragee 2007; Martin 2010; Shukaitis & Graeber 2007).*  
                                                 
* From an academic’s perspective, this characterization of problem selection might be criticized as naïve, 
because it skirts the issue of radical activist researchers’ own needs to secure promotion and tenure. It 
should be noted that the line between critical and radical research is by no means clear-cut; radical 
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Thousands of books and articles by critical scholars that criticize corporate media, 
describe the evolution of alternative media, or analyze the role of media in contemporary 
social movements, rarely venture beyond critique or description to suggest what lessons 
activists might draw from these experiences. As Lawrence Frey and Kevin Carragee 
(2007) observe: 
Unfortunately … communications scholars, like their counterparts in the other 
social sciences and humanities, and perhaps, in part, because of their desire to 
obtain disciplinary legitimacy in the eyes of those colleagues, all too frequently, 
over the course of time, shied away from addressing important social issues to 
focus, instead, on disciplinary theoretical concerns…. 
This failure to confront salient social issues is unfortunate, for given the sheer 
volume and significance of these issues and the potential contributions that 
communication knowledge can make to managing them, the exigency for 
communications scholars to engage in direct vigorous action in support of needed 
social change has never been more apparent and important. In short, 
communications scholars need to engage in “communication activism” (p. 3). 
Similarly, McChesney (1999; 2004; 2007a) forcefully argues that we find ourselves in a 
“critical juncture,” which he describes as a window of opportunity in which activists, 
communications scholars, and students have an important role to play in fomenting a 
“communication revolution” capable of creating a media system that promotes 
democratic values over corporate profits.  
                                                                                                                                                 
researchers produce critical scholarship and vice versa. Universities suppress radical scholars in myriad 
ways, though, because of their politics and commitments to social justice causes. Notable, recent examples 
include the cases of Norman Finkelstein and David Graeber, both radicals who were denied tenure for 
political reasons, as well as Ward Churchill, whose tenure was revoked. As the editors of a volume on 
academic repression observe, “hit jobs” like these are typically justified “in terms of alleged professional 
inadequacies rather than naked political differences” (Nocella, Best, & McLaren 2010, p. 31; emphasis in 
original). Successful radical academics develop various strategies for combining activism and career 
advancement (Cancian 1993), but there is no easy response to the aforementioned criticism. A second 
criticism is that radical scholars bite the hand that feeds them by assailing the university system. The 
obvious rejoinder is that radical scholars owe no allegiance to the hierarchical institutions that employ 
them, and in fact have a duty to severely criticize the institutions, cultures, and norms of academe. 
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Nor are critical scholars keen on providing concrete proposals for creating 
alternative media institutions, or suggesting media strategies that activists might pursue. 
Following Harry Cleaver’s (1979) criticisms of philosophical and political economy 
readings of Karl Marx’s Capital, which fail to inspire anti-capitalist struggles, we might 
say that most critical communications work is ideological, not strategic. Although it rails 
against capitalism, it does not serve capitalism’s radical opponents. Not only is this 
ideological work of limited use to activists, dissidents, and social movements, but if it is 
accurate then it can actually work against them by helping elites plan their strategies. 
The matter of problem selection ultimately boils down to researchers’ goals. 
Research can serve different purposes, reflected in the distinction that scholars draw 
between “pure” (sometimes called theoretical) and “applied” research. Pure research is 
work driven by scholars’ curiosity, whereas applied research involves searching for 
knowledge that has practical application. “The focus on research directed toward other 
scholars rather than toward helping communities to solve societal problems probably was 
related to the privileging of ‘theory’ over ‘application’ in the academy,” according to 
Frey and Carragee (2007, p. 2). According to Charles Hale (2001), activist research 
challenges the dichotomy between pure and applied research, because activist research 
“is both theoretically driven and intended to be put to use.” He writes that “the practice of 
activist research asks us to identify our deepest ethical-political convictions, and to let 
them drive the formulation of our research objectives” (p. 14). 
According to Hale (2001; 2006), activist researchers build affinities with the 
communities they study and allow these communities to drive or influence the research 
process at every step, from problem formulation to interpretation of data and 
dissemination of findings. For Hale, allowing a community to play a hands-on role 
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throughout the process is an important feature of activist research. In Hale’s (2001) 
words: 
Activist research requires a process of dialogue and collective work with the 
subjects of study prior to the finalization of the research design. Through 
collective work you identify a common set of problems, analytical puzzles, gaps 
in existing knowledge that the people in question are genuinely interested in 
addressing. … The activist scholar will have, or develop, particular affinities with 
[an aggrieved group] (or at times more than one), and give special priority to the 
dialogue with them. … Building on affinities this way does not require one to 
neglect alternative or contrasting perspectives; it does not assume that the group is 
completely unified or free from internal division; nor does it prevent stepping 
back to take in the big picture—indeed the research design must involve precisely 
that. It does provide some assurance that the research objectives, from the outset, 
coincide at least in part with what actors in the processes under study think it is 
important to know and to understand (p. 14) 
This criterion aptly depicts Hale’s own ethnographic research, which focuses on 
indigenous land rights in Central America. Hale’s (2001; 2006) criteria for activist 
research undoubtedly reflect his and other radical anthropologists’ ethical-political 
commitments to not betraying the communities they represent and frequently live in as 
participant observers. It is unclear that it can or should characterize all radical social 
science research, though. As Robert McChesney (2008b) observes, core research into the 
political economy of mass media “has a direct and important relationship with policies 
and structures that shape media and communication and influence the course of society,” 
as well as “a direct relationship with policy makers and citizens outside the academy” (p. 
51). Indeed, he argues, the writings of politically engaged scholars such as Ben 
Bagdikian, Herbert Schiller, Ed Herman, and Noam Chomsky laid the intellectual 
groundwork for the current media reform movement – to say nothing of McChesney’s 
own influence in activist circles, which is significant. Much of this foundational work 
would not be considered activist research according to Hale’s strict criterion, because 
even though it is informed by and draws inspiration from ongoing struggles, it is 
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produced more conventionally than the politically engaged, ethnographic anthropological 
research that Hale is concerned with. Given the clear activist bent of these political 
economists and their connections to oppositional movements in the United States, 
though, it would be strange, to say the least, not to treat their major works as examples of 
activist scholarship. 
The truth in Hale’s criterion is the notion that activists and movements’ concerns 
should guide problem selection for activist researchers, rather than problems identified in 
academic literature produced by previous generations of critical scholars. (There may, of 
course, be overlap.) For these reasons, I propose a broader criterion for problem 
selection: Radical activist research consciously pursues questions that address activists 
and/or movements’ strategic needs or gaps in knowledge. This conception still fulfills the 
underlying ethical-political goal of Hale's definition, but is broader and more suitable to 
media and journalism studies. 
 
Methodology 
The decision to investigate certain problems but not others predisposes 
researchers to prefer certain methodological approaches over others. This is also true 
when the interests of certain actors over others determine the research theories or 
methods used. Administrative researchers mainly employ quantitative methods such as 
public opinion surveys and content analyses of communication texts, although they also 
apply qualitative methods such as focus groups and structured interviews in search of 
context (Lazarsfeld 1941/1972; Smythe & Van Dinh 1983). For instance, telephone 
surveys are often used to study voter attitudes, because they are an expedient means of 
collecting data from a large number of respondents in a timely fashion (Poindexter & 
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McCombs 2000, p. 28). For most of the 20
th
 century, the bulk of administrative mass 
communications research was concerned with the effects of media content on audiences, 
such as the effects of televised images of violence on children (Klapper 1960; Lowery & 
De Fleur 1983; Schramm, Lyle, & Parker 1961). According to Shearon Lowery and 
Melvin De Fleur (1983), the application of statistical techniques in the social and 
behavioral sciences opened the door for quantitative methods in mass communications 
research (pp. 20-21). 
These methods were frequently developed to suit the needs of administrative 
organizations that could benefit from this research (Schiller 1973). Although states have 
collected statistical information about their territories and populations for hundreds of 
years, often with the intent to control or direct society (Scott 1998), modern survey 
research techniques have distinctly commercial origins. As Paul Lazarsfeld (1964) noted, 
“Commercial consumer studies had greatly contributed to the development of sampling 
methods and had given rise to public opinion polling. Radio had come on the scene [in 
the 1920s] and audience surveys were needed to parallel the circulation figures of 
magazines and newspapers. These data became the raw material for the new field of 
communications and opinion research” (quoted in Schiller 1973, pp. 106-107).  
Purveyors of quantitative methods frequently lay claim to scientific rigor and/or 
accuracy, a perception reinforced by their emphasis on testing cause-and-effect 
hypotheses and mathematical interpretation of findings using statistical formulae, such as 
chi-squared tests for variance in sample populations (Lowery & De Fleur 1983; 
Poindexter & McCombs 2000; Severin & Tankard 2001).* For instance, noted 
quantitative scholars Paula Poindexter and Maxwell McCombs (2000) claim that 
                                                 
* In fact, these methods have fueled a longstanding schism between quantitative researchers in the academy 
and journalists in the field, reflected in the debate between the “green eyeshades and the chi-squares” 
(Cohen 2005; Highton 1967; 1989). 
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communications research relies on scientific research methods (p. 11-12); elsewhere, they 
write that qualitative research “is grounded in the humanities—not science” (p. 290). In 
their important history of quantitative mass communications research, Lowery and De 
Fleur (1983) write that communications research builds on the social and behavioral 
sciences, which in turn rest heavily upon the natural sciences (p. 19). 
Critical communications scholars are more likely to use qualitative methods, on 
the other hand, such as ethnography and in-depth interviewing, which better lend 
themselves to “thick” description and promoting an in-depth understanding of human 
societies and behavior than quantitative methods permit (Geertz 1973; Lindlof & Taylor 
2002; Potter 1996). The roots of this tradition lie in the Chicago School, a body of 
ethnographic fieldwork generated in the early 20
th
 century by sociologists at the 
University of Chicago (Denzin & Lincoln 1998; Geertz 1973). Whereas administrative 
quantitative research is positivistic—meaning it valorizes empiricism and the scientific 
method— critical qualitative research tends to be more reflexive or idealistic, meaning it 
recognizes that human societies and behavior are unlike the physical world that natural 
scientists study. That is to say, administrative quantitative and critical qualitative 
researchers occupy fundamentally different positions on the epistemological continuum 
(Potter 1996). 
A radical research orientation sits comfortably with Barbie Zelizer’s (2004) 
assessment that there is no “correct” paradigm or perspective from which to study 
journalism and media. There are multiple interpretative communities, such as political 
science, history, cultural studies, and sociology, which may offer useful and valid 
approaches. An activist researcher’s decision to prefer one interpretative paradigm over 
another is a strategic choice. Likewise, activist research methods do not lend themselves 
to formalization, and draw on the entire range of methodological tools available to social 
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scientists (Hale 2001, p. 14). As Jeff Ferrell (2009) writes, “Methodological closure and 
intellectual fastidiousness suggest stasis and stagnation; raggedy methods, methods not 
fully conceptualized or completed, suggest intellectual life and disciplinary vitality” (p. 
74). Activist research also seeks to give voice to positions that are ignored due to a belief 
in scientific objectivity. 
Nevertheless, for obvious reasons radical researchers typically gravitate toward 
the qualitative methods favored by critical scholars. Not only do these approaches better 
lend themselves to addressing the questions that radical researchers pursue, but they are 
more affordable and accessible to those outside the academy. For instance, a telephone 
survey can cost hundreds, if not thousands of dollars, which can be a serious obstacle for 
groups operating on shoestring budgets. The problem is not limited to survey research, 
either. Quantitative research also relies to a considerable extent on expensive computer 
software used to code, categorize, and quantify content for quantitative analyses, which 
can be too costly for researchers unaffiliated with colleges or universities. Most 
qualitative research, on the other hand, can be conducted cheaply, such as with audio 
recorders, pens, and paper. In addition to employing accessible methodologies, radical 
research also tries to incorporate sources of information that are accessible to other 
activists and citizens, such as books, newspapers, and magazines rather than academic 
journal articles.  
 
Influence of Ideology 
Smythe and Van Dinh (1983) define administrative ideology as the “linking of 
administrative-type problems and tools, with interpretation of results that supports, or 
does not seriously diminish, the status quo.” They define critical ideology as “the linking 
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of ‘critical’ researchable problems and critical tools with interpretations that involve 
radical changes in the established order” (p. 118). To build on this useful distinction, it is 
helpful to ask how researchers perceive themselves. Do they view themselves first and 
foremost as disinterested scholars, as unbiased researchers contributing to institutional 
success, as mainly critics of power, or as radicals who self-consciously orient their 
teaching and research practices to serve movements? Within the field of mass 
communication, administrative researchers typically consider themselves as apolitical, 
objective social scientists. Critical researchers often consider themselves stalwart critics 
of power. Radicals consider both views deluded: administrative researchers fail to 
recognize that their work serves dominant power relations (or simply do not care that it 
does), while critical researchers fail to see that generating ideas which challenge status 
quo interpretations is not the same as generating knowledge that activists and movements 
can actually incorporate into their analyses or use to threaten or challenge dominant 
power relations. 
In addition, critical scholars blind to their status as “embedded intellectuals” 
(Bratich 2007) often do not challenge important ways in which university settings 
replicate systems of oppression. Autonomists such as Harry Cleaver (2006), for example, 
note that even though one of the hallmarks of capitalist domination is its imposition of 
work on laborers, critical scholars ironically often impose just as much, if not more 
schoolwork on students than their administrative counterparts do.* The increasingly 
precarious nature of academic employment under neoliberalism also has a warping effect 
on critical scholars’ ideological outlooks. For example, at McGill University in Quebec, 
                                                 
* I recognize, of course, that critical scholars often assign so much work and reading material out of a 
desire to help students unlearn decades of socialization to capitalist, heteropatriarchal, white supremacist, 
and other dominant values. I also recognize that Cleaver’s view more accurately depicts schoolwork 
imposed on undergraduates, who generally speaking have less freedom to pursue their own interests than 
graduate students do. 
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faculty members of the school’s Institute for Gender, Sexuality and Feminist Studies 
recently condemned striking students involved in anti-austerity protests for their 
strategies, politics, and commitments to feminism, describing pickets as forms of 
violence, intimidation, and bullying. Fully aware of the irony, striking students at McGill 
responded by writing, 
We ask that those faculty members who have indicated they will call security on 
us if we picket, reconsider their commitment to resistance against state violence, 
and critically self-reflect on the violence they would be inviting us to be subject to 
should they do this. … Solidarity is not a word you say at the end of a one-sided 
conversation during which you have threatened to fail us and call security on us 
(McGill WSSA Strike Mobilization Committee 2015). 
 
Developing and Applying Theory 
Journalism scholars often concern themselves with developing and testing 
theories about news media and communication. A theory simply posits a way of 
understanding a phenomenon; theories can be either good or bad, both value-laden terms 
(Shoemaker, Tankard & Lasorsa 2004). Fundamental differences between administrative, 
critical, and radical research orientations center on researchers’ different theoretical 
assumptions, or in other words, on their decisions to include or exclude certain features of 
society, media, and communications processes as objects of study (Smythe & Van Dinh 
1983).  
Hierarchical forces invest themselves in the ideas of journalism and news media 
(Zelizer 2004, p. 5), meaning dominant conceptualizations of journalism and media are 
presented in politicized and frequently hierarchical terms. This is certainly the case for 
administrative researchers, who exclude from their analysis “issues relating to the 
structure of economic and political institutions ... , the centralization of power, the 
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characteristics of dominant-dependent relations and the incentives of vested interests” 
(Melody & Mansell 1983, p. 104). For instance, nearly the entire field of political 
communications research ignores the communicative activity of non-state actors such as 
activists and social movements. This favors a state-centric view of reality, which assumes 
that legitimate political activity occurs in formal political institutions and channels, such 
as the Habermasian “public sphere” or voting in elections. This perspective also ignores 
important class, race, and gender issues embedded in the population of these institutions. 
Probably the dominant tradition within administrative journalism research is 
agenda-setting, which refers to the ability of news media to transfer salience of objects in 
communication texts to the public, so that the media agenda becomes the public’s agenda 
(for an overview, see McCombs 2004). This theory has tremendous applications for elites 
concerned with managing public opinion. Indeed, the research institute Media Tenor, 
which organizes the world’s main agenda-setting conference every year, uses this theory 
to serve governments, politicians, CEOs, banks and corporations, NGOs, elite 
universities, and other powerful, wealthy interests by providing “analytics and strategies 
to manage reputational risk and the value of brands,” according to their website.* 
Critical and radical researchers focus on power’s troubling influence on media 
and communication processes, and as such include ideas about power and domination in 
their analyses. A chief difference persists between critical and radical research, though: 
Theory as it appears in critical research is often grand, jargonistic, and disconnected from 
the realities of struggle. In this respect, it shares much in common with administrative 
research couched in pseudo-scientific jargon. As Patricia Limerick (1993) observes,  
For all their differences, most right-wing scholars and most left-wing scholars 
share a common allegiance to a cult of obscurity. Left, right and center all hide 
                                                 
* See http://www.mediatenor.com/ 
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behind the idea that unintelligible prose indicates a sophisticated mind. The 
politically correct and the politically incorrect come together in the violence they 
commit against the English language (p. 3). 
On the other hand, radical and especially anarchist researchers advocate that 
theory should be “small,” easy to understand, and have implications for on-the-ground 
activism (Martin 2010).* As the editors of a recent volume on “militant” research 
observe, information flows between theory-building activists and critical researchers are 
for the most part unidirectional: Activists draw from the stream of academic literature to 
some extent, but academics virtually ignore new ideas from activists and social 
movements (Shukaitis & Graeber 2007, pp. 20-25). 
Administrative, critical, and radical researchers also differ in their understandings 
of what makes a theory “good” or “bad.” For mainstream administrative researchers, 
media theories are more or less good or bad depending on whether they can make 
accurate predictions about media behavior, communications systems, or audience effects 
(e.g., Poindexter & McCombs 2000). For critical researchers, what makes a theory good 
or bad hinges mainly on how well it captures or explains some aspect or aspects of social 
reality. For radicals, a theory’s value lies in how well it serves activists and movements’ 
needs to generate analyses and strategies that will propel social transformation (e.g., 
Albert 1974; Albert et al. 1986; Cleaver 1979). 
Shukaitis (2004) suggests that radical theorizing about political, economic, and 
social change typically proceeds in one of three ways. In the first, traditional approach, 
the radical theorist selects a set of values, then tries to articulate new social institutions 
which incorporate or are based upon these values. This is the approach taken by Michael 
                                                 
* It should be noted that use of the term ‘theory’ to describe ideas in the social sciences, which includes 
mass communications research, is problematic. Social science theories come nowhere close to the 
intellectual rigor of actual scientific theory as it appears, for instance, in physics or chemistry. According to 
Kevin Clarke and David Primo (2013), social scientists suffer from “physics envy,” in that they try too hard 
to emulate the hard sciences. This dissertation employs the word ‘theory’ because it is convenient to do so. 
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Albert and Robin Hahnel in their development of participatory economics, for example, 
which provides a detailed outline for a radical economic system based on equity, self-
management, diversity, and solidarity (Albert 2003; 2006a; Albert & Hahnel 1991a; 
1991b; Hahnel 2005). This approach certainly has its strengths—in particular, it can help 
radicals show to a wider audience what sort of world anti-capitalists envision—but 
abstract models can also provoke ideological disputes as well as gloss over pragmatic 
issues that arise in the process of trying to realize radical visions. 
A second approach to theorizing about radical transformation is to focus on the 
methods used to achieve political, economic, and social change. This is the approach 
taken by anarcho-syndicalists, for instance, who stress revolutionary industrial unionism, 
general strikes, and other forms of direct action as crucial to social change. The main 
weakness of this overall approach to theory building is that it generates theories of 
transformation which apply only to specific, frequently narrow historical, political, 
economic, and social contexts. Ideas such as revolutionary syndicalism or council 
communism, for instance, might resonate among industrial workers, but remain largely 
unappealing to those who live in cities without factories, or to those who don’t believe 
factories should exist in the first place (pp. 8-9). 
A third approach, argues Shukaitis (2004), “would be to look at the existing forms 
of cooperative economics and social practice that have existed throughout human history 
and around the planet, and to try to draw out their underlying logic into a more 
generalized pluralistic vision” (p. 9). The main strength of this approach is that, since the 
researcher starts from actually existing cooperative structures and practices, she or he 
does not need to argue that they are possible; obviously they are. This approach is also 
notable because it locates anarchist ideas and practices in contemporary examples, rather 
than in texts authored by long dead, white, European men (p. 10-11). In addition to 
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Shukaitis, this ethnographic impulse underlies theorization by anarchists and fellow 
travelers such as Peter Gelderloos (2010a), David Graeber (2004; 2007; 2009), Uri 
Gordon (2008), James C. Scott (1985; 1990; 1998; 2009; 2012), and others (e.g., the 
activist writers collected in Shukaitis & Graber 2007). These ethnographically-inclined 
researchers share much in common with radicals who adopt a more “grounded theory” 
approach, which involves immersing oneself in qualitative data in order to identify trends 
or construct categories with the aim of deriving theory inductively from the ground up, 
rather than collecting data to test preexisting theoretical frameworks (Charmaz 2014; 
Corbin & Strauss 2008; Glaser & Strauss 1967; Martin 2010). Examples include works 
by Gene Sharp (1973a; 1973b; 1973c), Jules Boykoff (2007), and Bill Moyer (2001). 
 
Patronage 
Who supports research, and who become its main beneficiaries? Administrative 
researchers enjoy state and corporate patronage. As mentioned above, funding and 
research directives for early communications research came from the federal government 
and corporate America. During the Cold War, the Defense Department, CIA, and various 
other U.S. intelligence agencies also transfused money into administrative 
communications research (Simpson 1993; 1996). Administrative researchers often 
dismiss criticisms of this patronage, by arguing that the research itself is neutral or value-
free, or that they are working towards a kind of unified theory* of media production and 
effects, so it should not matter where funding comes from (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, 
pp. 20-4). But clearly, administrative researchers are more likely to ask those questions 
                                                 
* The term ‘unified (field) theory’ comes from physics, and originally referred to the hope of reconciling 
Einstein’s general theory of relativity with quantum theory. 
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that catch the eyes of grant-givers and other powerful institutional actors, while some 
questions will not be asked at all (Schmidt 2000). 
Critical researchers do not receive institutional support on the scale that 
administrative researchers do. They receive minimal funding compared to administrative 
researchers, which often comes from foundations and NGOs, rather than government 
agencies or corporations.* Radicals nevertheless question this patronage, pointing to the 
troubling influence that the “non-profit industrial complex” has on directing movement 
activity and thwarting social change (INCITE 2007). They urge that movements, victims 
of social injustice, and oppressed peoples be the main beneficiaries of scholarship (Hale 
2001; 2006; Martin 2010). 
In addition to funding, patronage entails the question of what role researchers play 
vis-à-vis activists and movements. As noted above, anarchist scholars such as David 
Graeber (2004) and Jeff Shantz (2008) admonish radical academics to reject intellectual 
vanguardism. More recently, anarchists have proposed arguments that academics should 
move beyond ally status to become accomplices. This puts conflict with the state and 
capitalism as front-and-center. As Indigenous Action puts it (2014): 
[Academics and intellectuals’] role in struggle can be extremely patronizing. In 
many cases the academic maintains institutional power above the knowledge and 
skill base of the community/ies in struggle. Intellectuals are most often fixated on 
un-learning oppression. These lot generally don’t have their feet on the ground, 
but are quick to be critical of those who do. 
Should we desire to merely “unlearn” oppression, or to smash it to fucking pieces, 
and have it’s [sic] very existence gone? 
                                                 
* This discussion focuses on patronage that directly and actively subsidizes scholars’ research projects. It 
goes without saying that administrative, critical, and radical scholars alike enjoy a different sort of 
patronage from the universities who employ them, in the form of tenure, promotion, salaries, and 
institutional backing. 
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An accomplice as academic would seek ways to leverage resources and material 
support and/or betray their institution to further liberation struggles. An 




Administrative and critical researchers both operate within the confines of the 
academy and mainstream academic scholarship. For them, validating research findings 
comes in the form of refereed journal articles and conference papers, as well as annual 
peer reviews by colleagues in their university departments. Reviews for tenure and 
promotion are done within a community of scholars with expertise in the reviewee’s 
field. The validation system privileges scholars who research familiar ideas within 
established paradigms. Applying Thomas Kuhn’s (1964) ideas to journalism research, 
Barbie Zelizer (2013) observes, “Ideas can be easily and successfully disseminated when 
they discretely pass the familiar and expected threshold rather than overtly challenge, 
minimize or make irrelevant long-standing parts of the canon” (p. 468). 
Peer review has its merits and possible pitfalls, but radical academic research 
carries with it an additional, expressly ethical-political standard of validation. According 
to Hale (2006), “At the end of the day, activist scholars must embrace two quite distinct 
sets of objectives and forms of accountability, and they must negotiate the often 
considerable tensions between them” (p. 105). The first set of accountability measures 
refers to the aforementioned university system of validation. Above and beyond this, 
according to Hale (2001), activist research is considered valid if the research “helped 
produce knowledge that helps to resolve a problem, to guide some transformation, which 
formed part of the research objectives from the start” (p. 15). In other words, the 
additional standard of validation for activist research is that the research benefits 
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activists, oppositional movements, and/or oppressed people. The important link between 
political economy research and on-the-ground activism (McChesney 2008b), mentioned 
above, is a prime example of this. By informing and furthering oppositional movements, 
this scholarship attempts to meet the additional standard of validation. 
However, peer review does not assure that peers or colleagues will value activist 
research. Academic journals respected by the component of the university to which the 
activist scholar is attached may not accept activist material and within professional 
journalism associations, only one, the Union for Democratic Communications, values 
activist scholarship. This structure imposes the negotiation stress noted by Hale (2001; 
2006). Indeed, arguably, the academic publishing system works to suppress radical 
scholars, by favoring students and faculty who proffer “legitimate” perspectives or are 
otherwise willing to play the academic game. As Derric Shannon and William Armaline 
(2010) observe, “The notion of ‘legitimacy’ in academe is not only problematic in the 
sense that it is socially constructed by those who hold power in higher education and 
alienates those who do not. It is also problematic in the silencing of political and 
institutional dissent” (p. 424). Although the system of refereed journal article publishing 
is portrayed as objective or meritocratic, it is a stretch to say that most reviewers and 
editors are “peers” of graduate students or radical academics, and often it is the case that 
editors will solicit colleagues for submissions or create special issues based on 
conference proceedings or certain theoretical and/or methodological approaches (ibid.). 
When journal editors and reviewers perform powerful gatekeeper roles, the odds are 
stacked against radical graduate students and faculty seeking publication. 
 
 105 
Presentation and Distribution of Research Findings 
The conventions of academe pose a notable challenge to the circulation of 
scholarly research among interested, non-academic audiences. This is equally true for 
administrative and critical scholars. To begin, a good deal of academic research is 
purposefully indirect and obtuse. As Limerick (1993) observes, 
While we waste our time fighting over ideological conformity in the scholarly 
world, horrible writing remains a far more important problem. For all their 
differences, most right-wing scholars and most left-wing scholars share a 
common allegiance to a cult of obscurity. Left, right and center all hide behind the 
idea that unintelligible prose indicates a sophisticated mind. The politically 
correct and the politically incorrect come together in the violence they commit 
against the English language. … The habits of academic writers lend powerful 
support to the impression that research is a waste of the writers’ time and of the 
public’s money (p. 3). 
Administrative and critical researchers are expected to present the findings of 
their research through conventional academic channels: as conference papers, journal 
articles, and academic books. The more prestigious the peer-reviewed journal, the better, 
because scholars’ careers depend on their ability to annually update curriculum vitaes 
with lists of notable publications. Administrative journalism researchers emphasize 
publishing in “first-tier” journals such as Journalism & Mass Communication Educator 
and Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, the flagship journal of the 
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.* Critical researchers 
meanwhile have their own “first-tier” journals, such as Critical Studies in Media 
Communication and Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, which serve as house 
organs for the National Communication Association.† These “first-tier” publications 
prominently gate-keep for professional organizations linked to communications 
industries. As Jack Bratich (2007) observes, 
                                                 
* See http://www.aejmc.org/home/publications/ 
† See https://www.natcom.org/journals.aspx 
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[W]hile professional associations have historically functioned as gatekeepers 
within their respective fields, now they gate-keep between the field and 
state/corporate institutions. Publishing in association-affiliated journals enhances 
professional status, especially in contrast to the proliferation of non-association 
journals (where more experimental and critical work can take place). The 
invocation of standards in the field has the potential to further marginalize 
innovative and critical work. It is not that cutting-edge work can’t appear in the 
association-sponsored journals; it often does. But more and more the assumption 
is that the only innovative work that matters appears in the official organs. This 
fetishizes the field’s own filters, which is by definition a conservative maneuver 
(p. 140). 
Radicals argue that the selective system of distribution alienates scholars from 
activists, movements, and oppressed people (e.g., Gelderloos 2010b; McChesney 2007a). 
Although digital technologies and the internet can facilitate the spread of scholarly 
research, most “reputable” academic journals bury this content behind paywalls, as well 
as require authors to transfer their copyrights to journal publishers. Both work to restrict 
non-academic audiences from accessing large bodies of scholarly knowledge. Although 
there is a strong argument to be made that knowledge produced within universities can 
and should be considered a public good, the scholarly publishing industry has worked 
instead to enclose the knowledge commons—a process which has accelerated over the 
past 60 years as academic journal publishing has become more and more lucrative 
(Oliphant 2007). As Tami Oliphant (2007) explains, “Scholarly publishers exploit the 
publishing model by creating inelastic markets and partial monopolies, by lobbying for 
stricter laws regarding intellectual property, and by supporting the commodification of 
knowledge and information to maximize profits” (p. 77). The commodification of 
knowledge is part of the larger neoliberal vision of the digital university, which seeks to 
proletarianize skilled knowledge workers. An open access movement is now underway to 
undermine publishers’ attempts at monopolizing academic knowledge, galvanized by the 
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martyrdom of computer programmer and hacktivist Aaron Swartz, who, facing multiple 
indictments and a lengthy prison sentence for illegally downloading thousands of articles 
from the academic digital library JSTOR, committed suicide on January 11, 2013.*  
As primarily tax-payer supported academics, radical scholars believe that they 
and other scholars should present their research findings in ways that are accessible to a 
much wider community of interested, politically involved readers. (It must be noted, 
however, that there are no restrictions or policies against doing so.) This can occur in 
many ways: on various websites, as workshops in community spaces, and even through 
journals that are distributed through radical bookstores and infoshops. These activities, 
however, are often not viewed as proof of scholarly value by the academy and are often 
left off vitaes. Similarly, academic journals premised on open access are, for the most 
part, not considered to be as reputable as the “first tier” journals which are not. 
Timeliness is a factor as well. In addition to the act of writing a scholarly article, a 
process which can take months or years, the decision to sit on findings until they have 
appeared in a peer-reviewed academic journal often delays information flows by several 
months. As Harry Cleaver (2000) observes, “the academic need for publication and for 
individual identification with new ideas and research” is a serious obstacle for academics 
who wish to circulate their research among activists and solidarity networks.†  
 
                                                 
* For instance, several academics now make all of their published papers available for free on their 
university personal pages as well as on the website http://www.academia.edu/. 
† Cleaver himself has made all of his writings and lecture notes available online for free, and since retiring 
has been using his free time to digitize writings associated with the Zerowork collective. See: 
https://la.utexas.edu/users/hcleaver/hmchtmlpapers.html. See also http://utexas.academia.edu/HarryCleaver  
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SITUATING THE PRESENT WORK 
The preceding discussion elucidates what I consider to be important features of 
administrative, critical, and radical research orientations. The radical research position is, 
of course, highly idealized and it is fair to say that I have overdrawn some of the 
distinctions between radical and critical academics. In the final analysis, it appears 
unlikely that scholars who identify as radical or activist researchers can ever completely 
escape the dilemmas posed above, i.e., they could ever be completely “pure” in their 
commitments to a radical research orientation. As such, in actual practice a radical 
research orientation will share much in common with the critical orientation. This, of 
course, is not an easy balance to strike. Even tenured radicals face immense pressure not 
to push the envelope too far. Given pervasive gender bias, validation can often be even 
more difficult for women and minorities. For academia-bound radical graduate students, 
the pressures are far greater – to finish a dissertation or thesis, build a curriculum vitae, 
and secure a job that will put one in a position to pay off crippling student debt. 
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Chapter 4: Three Roles of News Media: 
Battleground, Adversaries, and Tools/Resources 
Throughout the history of the United States, marginalized groups have sought 
recourse by forming or joining movements working toward various goals, such as 
abolishing the institution of slavery, establishing workers’ protections as well as ending 
child labor, upholding and expanding freedom of expression, extending the franchise to 
women and people of color, protecting the ecology and nonhuman animals, and 
compelling U.S. military forces to abandon war plans, among other things (Zinn 
1980/2003). These actions, seen by entrenched power as threatening, were considered 
illegitimate and responded to in various ways over time by those who sought to define 
and often to dismiss them.  
In their goals, actions, and cultural influence, progressive, radical leftwing, and 
insurgent social movements represent a kaleidoscope of challenges to elites, authorities, 
corporations, governments, and other powerholders, e.g., “all those who occupy 
influential positions in society and who support and reproduce existing social relations” 
(Woehrle, Coy, & Maney 2008, p. 28). According to the eminent social movement 
scholar Doug McAdam (1982), 
[A]ll social movements pose a threat to existing institutional arrangements in 
society. The basis of this threat is only partially a function of the goals of the 
movement. … What marks social movements as inherently threatening is their 
implicit challenge to the established structure of polity membership and their 
willingness to bypass institutionalized political channels. Emerging, as they do, 
among excluded groups, social movements embody an implicit demand for more 
influence in political decision-making. This raises the spectre of a restructuring of 
polity membership, a prospect that is anathema to all components of the elite (p. 
26; emphasis in original). 
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As non-state actors, activists and movements contend with opponents who 
stigmatize and (often literally) outgun them—culturally, economically, politically, and 
militarily. From the perspective of elites, this stigmatization is a perfectly reasonable, 
perhaps even necessary, response to the growth and power of insurgent groups and 
movements. Despite this, for over two centuries, contentious collective action such as 
protests, demonstrations, social movements, and revolutions has been an important means 
by which ordinary people affect change outside of official channels such as the courts and 
ballot box (McAdam 1982; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2011; Tilly 1978; 
Zinn 1980/2003; Zinn & Arnove 2014). Indeed, for many, social movement participation 
is a main point of entry into political life. As Sidney Tarrow (2011) observes, 
Contentious collective action serves as the basis of social movements, not because 
movements are always violent or extreme, but because it is the main and often the 
only recourse that most ordinary people possess to demonstrate their claims 
against better-equipped opponents or powerful states (pp. 7-8; emphasis mine). 
Early scholars of collective behavior, many of whom were motivated to explain 
the revolutionary upheavals that rocked countries such as France and Germany in the 19
th
 
century, saw things differently. In his important study of crowd psychology, the French 
social psychologist Gustave LeBon (1895/1960) argued that violent emotions, inability to 
reason, and herd mentality characterized crowd behavior. In LeBon’s disparaging 
outlook, these characteristics were common to “women, savages, and children.” Drawing 
on LeBon’s work, American sociologists Robert Park (1904/1972) and Herbert Blumer 
(1939) also believed that collective behavior transformed individuals, diminishing their 
self-control and ability to think critically (McPhail 1989). Although these scholars 
focused mainly on crowd behavior rather than social movements per se, their approaches 
colored studies of contentious collective action for decades. According to these early 
writers’ model of social insurgency, underlying structural strains on society produce 
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disruptive psychological effects in people, such as feelings of isolation, anomie, and 
cognitive dissonance. When these disruptive effects come to a head, movements emerge 
as a way to help societies manage psychological tensions. In this view, social movements 
are mainly psychological rather than political phenomena; “healthy” societies do not 
feature social movements, because they manage psychological tensions. 
It was not until after the 1960’s that social movement scholars began to appreciate 
rationality, agency, and organization as critical to understanding movement dynamics, 
pointing for instance to activists’ abilities to mobilize resources (Jenkins & Perrow 1977; 
McCarthy & Zald 1973; 1977; McPhail 1991; Oberschall 1973) and capitalize on 
expanding political opportunities (Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994). 
Scholars have also attempted to explain collective action in such terms as individuals’ 
attitudes, grievances, and rational choices; people join movements at least in part because 
doing so resonates with their personal beliefs (Elster 1979; Ferree 1992; Friedman & 
McAdam 1992; Gamson 1992). Activism also produces important psychic benefits; being 
part of a social justice movement can raise activists’ self-esteem, give them feelings of 
belonging and solidarity, or instill a sense of empowerment (Owens & Aronson 2000; 
Taylor & Whittier 1992). Tarrow’s observation above thus captures an important feature 
of contentious collective action: that people take up activism and join social movements 
because, on some level, it makes sense for them to do so. As Michael Schwartz (1976) 
puts it, “people who join protest organizations are at least as rational as those who study 
them” (p. 135). 
Unlike social movement studies in sociology, much of contemporary political 
science devalues this perspective, focusing on “rational,” institutionalized politics rather 
than on the “irrational,” insurgent politics of social movements (McAdam 1982, pp. 2-3). 
For similar reasons, state-centric research perspectives pervade the field of political 
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communications, which virtually ignores the discursive activities of activists, social 
movements, and other non-state actors. This dissertation departs from the self-serving 
elite perspective which devalues rationality and agency as key components of contentious 
collective action. It assumes instead that complex ideas about power in society, as well as 
an awareness or sense of relevant strategic concerns, inform and animate activists and 
their socially transformative work. Movements are fundamentally about power (influence 
over resources and people) and politics (how people decide to organize and govern 
themselves). Movement power and politics cannot be understood separately from 
overarching socially transformative goals, strategies to pursue those goals, the tactics 
employed to further those strategies, and the obstacles that activists and movements 
encounter. 
Establishment and oppositional media rarely feature prominently in historical 
accounts of social movements, but they have played huge roles in every major social 
struggle in the United States from the Revolutionary War to the present, either as 
catalysts for action or obstacles to change (Armstrong 1981; Downing 2001; Gitlin 1980; 
Kessler 1984; McChesney & Scott 2004; Ostertag 2006; Streitmatter 2001). Critical 
communications scholars and activists have generated four main currents of literature that 
reflect and acknowledge media’s significance vis-à-vis social movements and activism. 
 
 The first current focuses on the power of corporate mass media and addresses 
such issues as: how this power developed, corporate media’s relationships with 
other centers of power, its implications for democracy, the effects of news content 
on audiences, and how mainstream news media depict or frame political-
economic and social issues, including the activities of activists, movements, and 
other non-state actors. 
 113 
 The second current focuses on alternative and activist media: what roles they play 
in building and sustaining movements, the political-economic and cultural forces 
which influence their organizational forms and content, the influence of these 
media on popular consciousness as well as on mainstream media, and definitional 
disputes over what constitutes alternative media. 
 A third current focuses on popular culture, the public sphere, and subaltern 
counterpublics as areas of human life where activists and movements articulate 
dissident ideas as well as contend with their opponents. 
 The fourth current focuses on the ways in which activists can use mass media to 
reach large audiences and build movements. 
 
These currents frequently dovetail or combine with one another in literature on 
news media and contentious collective action. Taken together, they are theoretical 
wellsprings for this chapter and Chapter 5. In this chapter, I will reorganize key themes or 
ideas from these currents to sketch out three roles of news media that appear in critical 
scholarship as well as activist discourse on media-movement interactions.  
 
THREE ROLES FOR MEDIA: BATTLEGROUND, ADVERSARIES, AND RESOURCES 
According to an idealized view of the press, in democratic capitalist societies, 
mass news media serve as watchdogs and stewards of democracy: News media inform 
voters about policy options, function as a discursive space for diverse views and political 
discourse, limit government and corporate power, ensure government transparency, and 
hold elected officials accountable to their constituents. Journalism scholars debate how 
well the press measures up to these tasks, but the core belief—that journalism and 
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representative democracy go hand-in-hand—continues to guide academic inquiry (e.g., 
Cook 1998; Gans 2003; Iyengar & Reeves 1997; Jones 2009; McChesney 1999; 2004; 
McChesney & Nichols 2010; McNair 2000; Overholser & Jamieson 2005). This core 
belief also inspires U.S. journalists as well as journalism educators and students. To quote 
the late White House correspondent Helen Thomas (2006), 
What makes the press so indispensable in a democracy is that it is the only 
institution in our society that can question the president, or other public officials, 
regularly. Challenging a public leader is not required in the Constitution, but if a 
leader is unchallenged, he can rule by executive order, edict, or act on his own 
whim in secrecy. Fortunately, we do not have a king or a dictator with unlimited, 
unquestioned power. There is a governmental system of checks and balances in 
place among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, but beyond those, a 
free society depends on the press to keep the government honest (p. xxi). 
According to Barbie Zelizer (2013), the idea of democracy occupies a more 
central role in journalism research than it deserves. This occurs “because much of the 
scholarly world in the West—and specifically in the USA—depends directly or indirectly 
on the presumption of democracy and its accoutrements” (p. 467). Citing historical, 
cultural, geographic, and political-economic evidence to show that the notion of 
democracy is not central, or even necessary, for understanding journalism, Zelizer urges 
scholars to retire the linkage between journalism and democracy in order to promote new 
understandings in the field. 
In this vein, this chapter shifts attention away from the journalism/democracy 
nexus to pursue different conceptions of news media. Specifically, a distillation of the 
aforementioned four currents of critical scholarship and radical activist literature 
identifies three important roles of news media vis-à-vis activism and social movements: 
 News media constitute a site of struggle on which activists and their opponents 
contend with one another; 
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 Mass news media act as adversaries that suppress and obstruct activists and 
movements; 
 and news media serve as tools and resources that activists may harness or exploit 
in their struggles against elites. 
 
I should emphasize that my focus is on how scholars and activists conceptualize 
news media as it relates specifically to contentious collective action. I recognize that non-
activist perspectives might identify other important roles for news media, such as 
providers of non-political information (regarding the weather, sports, etc.) or as sources 
of entertainment. In addition, although I aim to present and asses these roles in a way 
consonant with anarchist thought and practice, in no sense are these three conceptions 
uniquely anarchist; these roles slot easily into several analytical perspectives, including 
rightwing accounts of news media.  
 
Critique of the Public Sphere 
For mass social movements to succeed, activists and organizers must garner the 
support of large sections of the non-activist population. As Angel (2008) explains, “if 
social change is going to happen in the United States it needs to happen on a mass scale. 
Activists need to break out of insular communities and reach out to the general public” 
(p. 9). However, they cannot hope to accomplish this solely through direct interactions 
with people, such as face-to-face encounters, protests, demonstrations, or door-to-door 
organizing.* Recognizing this important limitation, dissidents and activists throughout 
                                                 
* My emphasis is, of course, on activists and news media. For an overview of how activists use different 
mediums, see John McHale’s (2004) Communicating for Change: Strategies of Social and Political 
Advocates. 
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U.S. history have turned to media in order to circulate texts, images, and other messages 
with the goals of building public support, solidarity, and organizational strength. 
Arguably, the very origins of American radicalism are linked inextricably with 
print media (Armstrong 1981, pp. 10-15; Loughran 2007). According to historian Harvey 
Kaye (2005), 150,000 copies of Thomas Paine’s pamphlet Common Sense, which 
inspired revolutionary Americans to seek independence from Great Britain in 1776, were 
distributed in America alone, making it proportionately the best-selling publication in the 
United States to date. Moreover, as Kaye notes, “copies were shared, and those who 
could not read it heard it read aloud in homes, taverns, workshops, and fields,” meaning 
Paine’s ideas reached many more people than circulation figures indicate (p. 43; see also 
Loughran 2007).* A little over five decades later, from 1830 to 1865, William Lloyd 
Garrison’s newspaper The Liberator similarly animated American political life, by 
uncompromisingly arguing for the immediate emancipation of all slaves. Along with 
Garrison, Frederick Douglass and other antislavery editors catapulted radical abolitionism 
from a fringe position in U.S. society onto the national political stage as a moral 
imperative (Mayer 1998; Ostertag 2006, pp. 23-53; Streitmatter 2001, pp. 20-35). 
A century later, after the corporate mainstream press came to prominence in the 
Reconstruction era, both the underground press and mass news media played pivotal 
roles in building and undermining the radical New Left movements of the 1960s and 
1970s (Armstrong 1981; Gitlin 1980; McMillian 2011; Peck 1991). Today, activists 
depend on many different kinds of media technologies and tactics to facilitate their 
socially transformative work. Mass corporate news media are now so central to society 
                                                 
* Circulation figures for Common Sense are frequently exaggerated, with some writers quoting estimates as 
high as 600,000 copies distributed in the colonies (e.g., Gatto 1992, p. 13). These figures are unreliable. For 
discussion, see Trish Loughran’s (2007) The Republic in Print: Print Culture in the Age of U. S. Nation 
Building, 1770-1870. 
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that most ordinary people learn what they know about activists and social movements 
through their encounters with the media. As Mayer Zald (1996) observes, “Movement 
activists may debate in coffeehouses, in bars, or in meeting halls, but they have to change 
and mobilize bystander publics, many of whom may only know of the movement and its 
issues as portrayed in various media” (p. 270). Moreover, not only is it true that most 
communication from and about activists and movements is mediated for the vast majority 
of ordinary Americans by whichever medium they turn to, but most communication 
between activists and within movements is mediated as well by their choices. 
Given the central importance of the “mediascape” to U.S. dissidents, activists, and 
movements (Boykoff 2006b; 2007; Downing 2001; Gitlin 1980; Rodríguez 2001; Ryan 
1991; Zald 1996), how should communications scholars and activists conceptualize this 
arena or terrain and its many dimensions vis-à-vis the strategic concerns of activists and 
movements? 
Perhaps the most popular perspective guiding inquiry into these matters is that 
news media represent a public sphere (e.g., Brundidge 2010; Downing 2001; Garnham 
1993; Howley 2005; Ruiz et al. 2011; Socolow 2010). The term public sphere is a 
translation of Jürgen Habermas’s (1962/1991) complex concept Öffentlichkeit, which 
refers variously to the public, the public sphere, and publicity (p. xv). In his book The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas argues that the bourgeois or 
liberal public sphere is the foundation of civic society, a discursive space where citizens 
come together to debate issues of general interest and policies that widely affect society, 
and where possible, to arrive at common judgments or solutions. According to Habermas, 
the public sphere depends on the quality of debate and the quantity of perspectives 
presented within debates. Through sustained rational-critical discourse between 
individuals who hold multiple competing perspectives, the best ideas rise to the top and 
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effectively “win” or settle debates in the public sphere. Habermas considers these debates 
to be the basis of popular political activity. As Kevin Howley (2005) explains, 
Isolated or ‘bracketed’ from both state and market forces, this public sphere is the 
space in which a public comes to understand and define itself, articulate its needs 
and common concerns, and act in the collective self-interest. In short, it is a space 
in which a social aggregate becomes a public (p. 19).  
The idea of the public sphere is linked to a liberal conception of deliberative 
democracy. It holds public discursive activity in high esteem because it presumes that 
rational-critical debate on political and social issues will lead eventually to the best 
possible outcomes in society and polity structures, i.e., that rational-critical discourse is 
what allows democracy, an admittedly nebulous idea, to flourish and function. For 
obvious reasons, this vision appeals to many communications scholars and left-
progressive activists in the United States; Habermas’s work has been “indispensable” to 
those committed to theorizing about democratic practice and the limits of democracy in 
late capitalist societies (Calhoun 1992; Emden & Midgley 2013; Fraser 1990, p. 56-57; 
2014). Arguably, though, liberal democracy is too narrow a vision. As Benjamin Barber 
(1984/2003) observes, 
Liberal democracy has in fact become such a powerful model that sometimes, in 
the Western world at least, the very future of democracy seems to depend entirely 
on its fortunes and thus on the American system of government and its supporting 
liberal culture. This perceived monopoly not only limits the alternatives apparent 
to those seeking other legitimate forms of politics but leaves Americans 
themselves with no standard against which to measure their own liberal politics 
and with no ideal by which to modify them, should they wish to do so (p. 3). 
There are compelling reasons to push critical and radical conceptions of media-
movement interactions beyond the public sphere/democracy nexus. To begin, in actual 
practice the public sphere falls far short of the idealized version presented by Habermas. 
Feminists, antiauthoritarians, and other critics contend that historically, the liberal public 
 119 
sphere has excluded the voices of women, non-property owning men, proletarians, people 
of color, and dissident citizens (Boykoff 2007, pp. 16-21; Eley 1992; Fraser 1990; Landes 
1988; Negt & Kluge 1993). In a seminal essay critiquing Habermas’s ideas, critical 
theorist Nancy Fraser (1990) notes that “discursive interaction within the bourgeois 
public sphere was governed by protocols of style and decorum that were themselves 
correlates and markers of status inequality. These functioned informally to marginalize 
women and members of the plebeian classes and to prevent them from participating as 
peers” (p. 63). These protocols of style are “informal impediments to participatory parity 
that can persist even after everyone is formally and legally licensed to participate” (ibid.) 
– for instance, men’s tendencies to interrupt women, talk over them, ignore what they 
have to say, or “mansplain” things to them (Solnit 2014; Tannen 1990; 1994).* According 
to Fraser (1990), these and related experiences suggest that “deliberation can serve as a 
mask for domination” (p. 64). 
Fraser contends that in stratified societies, “deliberative processes in public 
spheres will tend to operate to the advantage of dominant groups and to the disadvantage 
of subordinates” (p. 66). The thrust of Fraser’s critique of the public sphere also applies 
to contemporary mass news media; her position is shared by critical scholars across the 
board. Later in this chapter and in Chapter 5, I will review studies of news content as well 
as critical theoretical accounts which support the claim that elite perspectives dominate 
press coverage of important political, economic, and social issues. 
 Recognizing the liberal public sphere’s foundations of exclusivity, various 
writers have attempted to show how subaltern groups construct alternatives to it, such as 
black, proletarian, and women’s public spheres (Black Public Sphere Collective 1995; 
                                                 
* Rebecca Solnit’s (2014) term “mansplaining” refers to men’s tendencies to explain things to women in 
patronizing or condescending tones. 
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Landes 1988; Negt & Kluge 1993; Ryan 1990).* According to Jules Boykoff (2007), 
“These zones of opposition provide safe arenas from which alternative ideas and 
principles can be catapulted into the mainstream public sphere, thereby widening 
democracy” (p. 19). But Boykoff also recognizes that some activists and dissidents have 
little to no interest in joining the liberal public sphere or widening democracy. 
Commenting on this idea, he writes: 
[M]any of these subaltern counterpublics are not simply working outside the 
pathways of institutional power in order to muster the confidence to ask for a seat 
at the state-sanctioned table. Nor do many of them have the desire to make the 
table bigger. Rather, many of the dissidents [featured in Boykoff’s study] want to 
throw out the table altogether because they believe true democracy is impossible 
if the existing institutions aren’t destroyed and replaced by new social relations. 
Many members of these progressive, oppositional groups believe that nothing 
truly transformative ever makes it to the institutional table if it’s not backed up by 
massive activity thrumming in the streets and thronging in workplaces. Many 
dissidents would say that real change, especially anything that threatens the power 
or wealth of the dominant classes, never originates within the institutions of our 
“democratic society.” As long as there are rulers and ruled, owners and owned, 
any meaningful social change will be forced from below (pp. 19-20). 
In addition, public sphere conceptions privilege a specific kind of discursive 
activity, rational-critical discourse. Yet experience shows that activists and movements 
engage in a wide range of discursive activity, which includes presenting and debating 
carefully measured arguments, but also includes graffiti, rude gestures and insults, 
sloganeering, deception, and other non-rational-critical ways of communicating. Indeed, 
some radicals, such as certain “post-Left” anarchists, openly reject the idea that 
presenting rational arguments is key to spreading insurgency. These perspectives, 
                                                 
* Although Habermas (1962/1991) suggests there can be alternative public spheres, he does not develop the 
idea of a non-bourgeois public sphere. As a result, Fraser notes (1990), “we are left at the end of Structural 
Transformation without a conception of the public sphere that is sufficiently distinct from the bourgeois 
conception to serve the needs of critical theory today” (p. 58). 
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admittedly a hard sell, do not reconcile easily with the idea of a public sphere, liberal or 
otherwise.* 
Arguably, too, Habermas’s conception of the public does not accurately capture 
the internet’s nature as a realm of discursive activity. Whereas the bourgeois public 
sphere envisioned by Habermas “sought to form a common will,” the internet “seems to 
fragment or at least question the idea of a universality or common interest, facilitating 
precisely the opposite—pluralism,” according to Lee Salter (2003, p. 122). In addition, 
Salter observes, 
Habermas takes communicative action to be premised on the existence of 
criticizable validity claims. That is, whenever we act communicatively, we raise 
claims that the other party(s) in communication can question. In order for a 
speech act to be accepted, the hearer must be able to accept its truth, the 
corresponding normative basis, and the sincerity of the speaker. Of course, such 
criteria might be unavailable on the Internet (p. 136). 
Public sphere conceptions also emphasize conciliation instead of conflict, and fail 
to consider non-discursive activity as it relates to media-movement interactions, topics I 
turn to below. 
 
News Media as a Site of Struggle 
The ideas of liberal democracy and the public sphere cast tensions between 
dominant and subaltern groups as reconcilable through the formal mechanisms of 
                                                 
* In fact, anarcho-primitivists such as John Zerzan (1999) reject symbolic thought altogether, including 
mathematics and even language itself (pp. 31-62). Anarcho-primitivism is a tendency within contemporary 
anarchism that critiques and rejects civilization and the processes which lead to it, such as industrialism and 
the transition from hunter-gatherer societies to agricultural ones. Anarcho-primitivists propose returning to 
a feral state by overcoming human domestication in a process called “rewilding.” Notable anarcho-
primitivist writers include Zerzan (1994; 1999; 2002; 2005; 2012) and Derrick Jensen (2000; 2002; 2006a; 
2006b). Although Ted Kaczynski, the infamous Unabomber who mailed several explosives to various 
targets between 1978 and 1995, has criticized anarcho-primitivism for idealizing primitive societies (cf. 
Kacynski 2008), his manifesto resonated with anarcho-primitivists such as Zerzan after both the New York 
Times and Washington Post published it in 1995. 
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government and public debate on social-political issues. As we have seen, critics such as 
Fraser (1990) challenge this view by emphasizing the public sphere’s exclusionary 
character. Another important criticism comes from the camp of radical anti-statists who 
have long considered liberal democracy a ruse. This perspective was articulated 
forcefully, for example, in Rudolf Rocker’s (1938/2004) classic treatment of anarchism, 
which traces the demise of liberalism and democracy to the emergence of capitalist 
national economies in the late 18
th
 century: 
Liberalism and Democracy were pre-eminently political concepts, and, since the 
great majority of the original adherents of both maintained the right of ownership 
in the old sense, these had to renounce them both when economic development 
took a course which could not be practically reconciled with the original 
principles of Democracy, and still less with those of Liberalism. Democracy with 
its motto of “equality of all citizens before the law,” and Liberalism with its “right 
of man over his own person,” both shipwrecked on the realities of the capitalist 
economic form. So long as millions of human beings in every country had to sell 
their labour-power to a small minority of owners, and to sink into the most 
wretched misery if they could find no buyers, the so-called “equality before the 
law” remains merely a pious fraud, since the laws are made by those who find 
themselves in possession of the social wealth. But in the same way there can also 
be no talk of a “right over one’s own person,” for that right ends when one is 
compelled to submit to the economic dictation of another if he does not want to 
starve (p. 10). 
In addition to Rocker, countless anarchists, far left Marxists, autonomists, and 
other radical anti-capitalists have argued that corporate capitalism, which concentrates 
political-economic power into the hands of relatively few individuals, is incompatible 
with, and in fact works to undermine popular control over society’s central institutions.*  
Today this idea enjoys strong cultural resonance, expressed for example in the Occupy 
                                                 
* The French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville (1835-40/2003) also foresaw this. In Vol. II of his 
Democracy in America, he observed, “the industrial aristocracy which we see rising before our eyes is one 
of the most harsh ever to appear on the earth … this is the direction in which the friends of democracy 
should constantly fix their anxious gaze; for if ever aristocracy and the permanent inequality of social 
conditions were to infiltrate the world once again, it is predictable that this is the door by which they would 
enter” (p. 648). 
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Wall Street movement’s slogan “We are the 99 percent,” which highlights glaring class 
inequalities in the United States, an ostensible liberal democracy (Skonieczny & Morse 
2014). It also finds contemporary expression in critical analyses of concentrated media 
power (e.g., Bagdikian 2004; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; McChesney 1999; 2004). 
I will have more to say about these issues later. The upshot is: In public spaces pervaded 
by corporate capitalist influence, such as the mass news media, elite views will generally 
prevail. For this reason, rather than focusing on governing mechanisms which facilitate 
conciliation between political-economic elites on the one hand and dissidents, activists, 
and oppositional movements on the other, radical anti-capitalists draw attention to 
enduring antagonisms between elites and their opponents, and the ways in which activists 
and movements develop forms of counterpower grounded in popular grassroots activity 
in order to displace elites’ influence on society (Gordon 2008; Gramsci 1971; Guérin 
1970; Schmidt & Van der Walt 2009).  
Working within this broad tradition, I propose that an anarchist account of news 
media view media-movement interactions through a lens of conflict or antagonism, and 
consider the mediascape a contested terrain or site of struggle rather than as a more 
conciliatory, liberal public sphere. From an anarchist perspective, the primacy of conflict 
is key to conceptualizing the news media terrain. As social movement scholar Dieter 
Rucht (2004) observes, “All social movements strive to achieve certain goals. Therefore, 
at least implicitly, they reject goals that are incompatible with their own. In this broad 
sense, social movements always engage in a struggle against something or somebody” (p. 
210). 
The news media are, in fact, one of many sites of struggle where activists and 
dissidents contend with opponents. Other sites include, for example, schools, courts, 
neighborhoods, and the streets (Freire 1970/2000; Herod 2004; hooks 1994; Irons 1999; 
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Nomad 2013). Importantly, each site of struggle contains its own logic, limitations, and 
possibilities conditioning what activists can reasonably hope to accomplish. This applies 
to news media, where several antagonisms play out. In addition to political and class 
conflicts, which are the focus of this chapter and Chapter 5, activists and their opponents 
in the mediascape contend with one another over issues such as racial oppression, gender 
inequities, discrimination against LGBTQ people, the ecology crisis, and inhumane 
treatment of animals. According to Ryan (1991), organizers aim to turn news media into 
a “contested terrain,” which presents an “opportunity for challengers, at a minimum, to 
point out that the establishment view is not the only or ‘natural’ way to look at a problem 
and, at best, to present an alternative” (p. 4). 
Conflicts on this terrain have several dimensions. Struggles over the meanings of 
individual words constitute an important one (Del Gandio 2008; Edelman 1998; 2001; 
Herman 1982; 1992; 1995; 1999; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Tarrow 2013). 
According to Edward Herman (1999), “The integration of word usage, framing, and 
source selection points up the fact that language is an arena of conflict and struggle. 
Word meanings, connotations, and applications are fluid and change in the course of 
struggle” (p. 283). In addition, “there are barriers to communication caused by the 
stratification of work in the interests of profit for production, barriers reflected in our 
language and in our tone of voice,” writes Michael Duane (1990, p. 295). 
For example, in news coverage reactionaries have endeavored to define ‘strikes’ 
as acts of labor violence and inconveniences to consumers, whereas unions have fought 
to define strikes as legitimate labor tactics to improve working conditions (Herman 1999, 
pp. 283-4; Martin 2004). For activist media makers, this can mean paying close attention 
to the language used in their own acts of cultural production, especially when the intent is 
 125 
to rouse allies and sympathetic bystander publics (Del Gandio 2008; Salzman 2003). 
Former Clamor editor Angel (2008) writes: 
We tried to appeal both to activists and to what we called “supporters”—people 
who in general agree with activists’ sentiments but haven’t been moved to action, 
or those who feel isolated in their opinions. We made careful choices about what 
words to use, for example not using activist or anarchist, to avoid alienating these 
individuals while drawing out commonalities with which they could identify. 
Especially in the early years, we discouraged people from labeling Clamor as “the 
best new anarchist publication” (p. 9). 
Herman and Chomsky’s (1988/2002) propaganda model also highlights language 
conflicts arising out of news coverage of “worthy” and “unworthy” victims of oppressive 
and exclusionary policies. And there are, of course, several other discursive dimensions 
of conflict as they relate to mass media’s adversarial roles. 
Drawing on autonomist Marxism and ecofeminist theory, Dorothy Kidd (1998) 
argues that alternative and activist media makers are involved in building a 
“communications commons” that resists corporate and government attempts at media 
enclosure. By casting conflicts over the airwaves and cyberspace as a struggle between 
capital and its opponents, Kidd’s account differs markedly from mainstream views, 
which focus narrowly on how corporations can best exploit these for economic gain (p. 
58; see also Kidd 2003; 2010). 
Conceptualizing news media as a site of struggle also points up dimensions of 
conflict that have implications for, but may only be indirectly related to, discursive 
activity, such as activist attempts to directly undermine the institutional supports for mass 
news media (e.g., advertisers, favorable government policies) and its interlocks with 
other centers of power. Public sphere accounts do a poor job of capturing this activity as 
well as various kinds of intermedia power plays, such as postage rate hikes that benefit 
large publishers but threaten small periodicals with higher operating costs and eventual 
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extinction (McChesney 2007b; Tady 2010). This opens the door to strategic conceptions 
that move beyond efforts to directly influence the production of news content, such as 
activist efforts to directly attack legal protections and forms of subsidy that large media 
companies benefit from. These and other non-discursive aspects of media-movement 
interactions remain, for the most part, undertheorized. 
 
The Adversarial Press: Defenders of State-Corporate Power 
The idealized view of the democratic capitalist press characterizes mass news 
media as a check on state-corporate power. Critical scholars and left-progressive activists 
challenge this view by proposing arguments which characterize the mainstream press as 
defenders of state-corporate power and opponents of activists, social movements, and 
even societal progress itself. As William Gamson and Gadi Wolfsfeld (1993) observe, 
There is … a fundamental ambivalence and, for some, estrangement between 
movements and media. Movement activists tend to view mainstream media not as 
autonomous and neutral actors but as agents and handmaidens of dominant groups 
whom they are challenging. The media carry the cultural codes being challenged, 
maintaining and reproducing them. In this sense, they are a target as much as a 
medium of communication (p. 119).  
To begin, recurring themes or patterns in news content provide considerable 
evidence that mainstream news media promote or convey state, corporate, and other elite 
perspectives or agendas. This is especially true of “prestige” newspapers such as the New 
York Times and the Washington Post, which have enormous intermedia agenda-
conveyance capabilities.* The three issues below highlight areas in coverage where 
                                                 
* As Ralph Nader (2002) puts it, “The Washington Post looks over the shoulder of the New York Times and 
vice versa, and the national networks read both papers every morning to see what is deemed significant” (p. 
162). 
 127 
mainstream news media play adversarial roles by aligning content with the agendas of 
political-economic power concentrations that most left-progressive activists oppose. 
Foreign policy. Anti-war and left-progressive activists associate U.S. foreign 
policy with a long, violent history of misdeeds. Since the end of World War II, the United 
States has invaded, overthrown, or attempted to overthrow dozens of foreign 
governments (Blum 2004; Chomsky 1991; 2000; Kinzer 2006; LaFeber 1984; Zinn 
1980/2003). It has also provided crucial material support to right-wing dictatorships and 
other authoritarian forces, by means of economic assistance as well as weapons flows and 
military training. Recipients of so-called “security assistance” include members of death 
squads and other human rights violators, many of whom studied at the notorious School 
of the Americas* located at Ft. Benning outside Columbus, Georgia (Brenner & Campbell 
2000; Center for International Policy 2005; Clarke, O’Connor, & Ellis 1997; Gareau 
2004; Gill 2004; Klare & Aronson 1977; McClintlock 1992; Nelson-Pallmeyer 1997; 
Schmitz 1999; 2006). In Latin America, where U.S. military influence has been 
especially pernicious, state terrorism—state-directed political violence against internal 
populations—has “developed as a product of a regional political structure in which U.S. 
political interests weigh heavily” (Menjívar & Rodriguez 2005, p. 3). U.S.-backed 
governments in Colombia, El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Argentina, and Peru have all 
committed acts of state terrorism on a massive scale, with a combined death toll reaching 
into the tens, if not hundreds of thousands of lives lost (Chomsky & Herman 1979; 
Gareau 2004; Grandin 2006; McClintlock 1985a; 1985b; 1992; Menjívar & Rodriguez 
2005; Stokes 2005). 
                                                 
* In an obvious public relations maneuver, in January 2001 the military renamed the School of the 
Americas the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. The school’s purpose remains 
unchanged (Gill 2004). 
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The U.S. military and political establishments routinely justify inhuman, 
interventionist policies by appealing to principles of “humanitarian intervention” or by 
citing a need to protect U.S. citizens from foreign threats such as drug traffickers, 
communists, terrorists, and WMD-wielding foreign dictators (Chomsky 2003; Herman 
1982; Shalom 1993). Critics and activists familiar with these issues, however, argue that 
U.S. interventions abroad are intended to extend an empire of U.S. military bases, 
integrate other countries into the U.S.-dominated global capitalist system, protect 
corporate investments in regions unsympathetic to the United States, or otherwise 
promote U.S. geostrategic interests, such as control over oil reserves and other natural 
resources (Blum 2004; Chomsky 1991; 2000; 2003; Johnson 2000; 2004; Kinzer 2006). 
Press coverage of U.S. foreign policy is remarkably uniform; overall, it aligns 
with, or does not depart far from, official rationales for policy. For instance, a content 
analysis of 794 news items examining how the New York Times framed U.S. involvement 
in Colombia, a leading recipient of U.S. military aid, from 1997 to 2008 showed that the 
“paper of record” adopted the official U.S. position that military assistance was motivated 
primarily by counternarcotics concerns. This clashes with the critical, arguably more 
realistic view that the U.S. and Colombian governments use the “war on drugs” as 
justification for carrying out a military-paramilitary assault on left-wing guerrilla groups 
and their supporters. (Tedrow 2009; 2011). Turning to a more recent example of press 
negligence, major U.S. news outfits such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, 
and influential television networks uncritically supported George W. Bush’s unilateral 
decision to invade and occupy Iraq in March 2003. This occurred despite that the Bush 
administration offered dubious evidence about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction 
program, that the invasion violated principles of international law, and that Iraq did not 
pose any credible threat to the United States, let alone Iran and Kuwait – two neighboring 
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countries it warred with previously, with U.S. support (Chomsky 2003; Friel & Falk 
2004; Rampton & Stauber 2003; 2006). In addition, the mainstream press uncritically 
supports U.S. allies such as Israel, Turkey, Colombia, and Indonesia, even when their 
governments commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, or other human rights abuses 
(Chomsky 1989; Friel & Falk 2007; Herman 1999; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; 
Herman & Peterson 2010; Tedrow 2009; 2011). 
Economy. After the Civil War, U.S. corporations rapidly gained considerable 
cultural, political, and economic power, despite anti-monopoly laws (Nace 2003; 
Trachtenberg 1982/2007). In their “pathological” pursuit of profits (Bakan 2004), 
corporations use this power to roll back social safety nets enacted in the New Deal, to 
influence with financial support lawmakers and governments, to destroy unions and 
undermine workers, and to pressure for enactment of policies favorable to the profit goals 
that benefit the top 1 percent of the population, even in times of crisis. These interlocking 
outcomes lead radicals and some left-progressive critics to conclude that corporate 
capitalism and democracy are, in fact, incompatible with one another (Chomsky 1999b; 
Hertz 2002; Klein 2007; Nace 2003). 
Yet mass news media are generally supportive of the U.S. system of corporate 
capitalism. Although the press may pillory specific companies for negligence and bad 
business practices, they attribute these to the actions of a few “bad apples” rather than 
flaws at the core of corporate capitalist ideology. Corporate perspectives pervade 
coverage of food and public health issues, such as carcinogenic chemicals that harm 
humans and the environment, as well as the federal regulatory agencies charged with 
monitoring these (Herman 1999, pp. 231-256; Lee & Solomon 1990, pp. 201-227; 
Rampton & Stauber 2001; Stauber & Rampton 1995). News media also negatively depict 
activists and sovereign foreign governments that reject neoliberal economic policies and 
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U.S. corporate influence, both at home and abroad (Chomsky 1995; Chernomas & 
Hudson 2011; Martin 2004). In addition, mainstream news media rarely contest elite 
interests, as well as misrepresent class conflict and the class structure of U.S. society 
(Allen & Savigny 2010; Kendall 2005; Lee & Solomon 1990, pp. 175-200; Martin 2004). 
Prestige newspapers such as the New York Times and Financial Times facilitate discourse 
among political and economic elites, quite separately from the mass public (Chernomas 
& Hudson 2011; Corcoran & Fahy 2009). 
Politics. In the money-driven U.S. political system, business elites and not voters 
mainly determine policy; elections are occasions on which different sectors of the 
business community band together to throw their extensive monetary support behind 
preferred candidates in the Democratic and Republican parties, in order to invest in 
control of the state. This view of the U.S. political system—what political scientist 
Thomas Ferguson (1995) terms the “investment theory” of politics—is a strong predictor 
of policies and election outcomes. A recent analysis of the 2004 Annenberg National 
Election Survey by Thomas Hayes (2013) supports Ferguson’s analysis, by showing that 
U.S. Senators are responsive to the concerns of their wealthy constituents, while 
neglecting the concerns of citizens on the lower economic rungs. What’s more, the 
Democratic Party fares no better than the Republican Party on this count. Hayes writes 
that his analysis “suggests oligarchic tendencies within the American system” (p. 595).  
These tendencies are a logical outcome of the growth in corporate power as well 
as steadily widening income differences between affluent and working Americans since 
the 1970s, when median real wages began stagnating. According to Nobel prize winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz (2011), today the richest 1 percent of Americans take in nearly 
a quarter of all U.S. income and control 40 percent of the nation’s wealth. The anti-
poverty NGO Oxfam International (2015) predicts that the world’s richest 1 percent will 
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control more wealth than the rest of the world’s population by 2016. Another recent, 
comprehensive study of 1,779 policy issues by political scientists Martin Gilens and 
Benjamin Page (2014) finds that government policies reflect the wishes of economic 
elites and organized business groups, whereas average citizens and mass-based interest 
groups have a negligible influence on public policy formulation. For example, the 
political network of brothers Charles Koch and David Koch, the billionaire co-owners of 
Koch Industries, has given hundreds of millions of dollars to rightwing think tanks, 
political candidates, and lobbying groups in order to undermine liberal and progressive 
causes such as universal healthcare and environmental protections; the Koch network is 
expected to spend nearly 900 million dollars during the 2016 campaign season (Mayer 
2010; Vogel 2015). It bears mentioning that oligarchic tendencies and the exclusionary 
character of the U.S. political system help explain why some Americans choose to join 
social movements rather than place their faith in the system. 
Mainstream political news coverage troubles activists because it is oriented 
toward a political system dominated by two business parties, which narrowly defines 
options for civic engagement and political participation. Simply put, the press is neither 
fair nor balanced in its treatment of activists, movements, and third-party candidates who 
attempt to break from convention. U.S. presidential election coverage provides a useful 
illustration. When the progressive consumer advocate Ralph Nader ran for president in 
2000 on the Green Party ticket, he received almost no press coverage. The coverage he 
did receive typically took the form of a feature story—“a modestly colorful narrative 
dispatch from the trail with a marginal candidate”—rather than a news story about his 
political agenda (Nader 2002, p. 163). When Nader announced his candidacy at a press 
conference in early 2000, “the announcement earned a three-hundred-word squib in the 
New York Times, akin to the amount of space they devote to a couple of marriage 
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notices.” The Washington Post did not even bother to send a reporter (Nader & Amato 
2001, p. 164). As Nader and his then-campaign manager Theresa Amato observe: 
[A]t the end of the day, the only thing the press cares about is the horse race and 
whether a third-party candidate is “stealing” votes from either or both of the 
major party candidates. The use of the press’s language itself is indicative of the 
two-party mind-set: a candidate who competes in a primary is accorded equal 
footing as a “challenger” with the “frontrunner,” while a third-party candidate 
who competes in the general election is considered a “spoiler” for daring to enter 
the duopolists’ playing field (ibid.). 
Nader was even physically denied access to the presidential debates. In October 
2000, at the first presidential debate at the University of Massachusetts, the Commission 
on Presidential Debates (CPD)—a private firm established by Democrats and 
Republicans in 1987 to sponsor and produce debates between presidential candidates—
used state troopers to block Nader from listening to the debates or talking to the media, 
even though he had been invited to do so (p. 170). 
 
The Adversarial Press: Suppressing Dissidents and Activists* 
The historical trajectory of the American Left appears as somewhat unusual. In a 
history spanning two centuries, movements and political parties describing themselves as 
social democratic, progressive, leftwing, Labor, socialist, or Communist have failed to 
make major inroads in the U.S. political system, even though leftist movements have 
done so in every other democratic country (Archer 2008; Davis 1986; Foner 1984; Lipset 
& Marks 2000; Sombart 1906). Why this occurred is a timeless debate among historians 
and leftists; as a theoretical dilemma it weighed heavily on early 20
th
 century Marxists, 
because classical Marxism predicted that, as the most advanced industrialized country, 
                                                 
* My examination of the issues in this section owes much to the influence of Jules Boykoff’s (2007) 
excellent study, Beyond Bullets: The Suppression of Dissent in the United States. 
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the United States would usher the world into a socialist future. Historians, sociologists, 
and left-progressive thinkers propose many explanations for why the Old Left’s socialist 
vision failed to materialize, including: the exclusionary character of the U.S. political 
system (Davis 1986; Lipset & Marks 2000); so-called “American exceptionalism,” 
exemplified by ample social and geographical mobility opportunities, relatively high 
standards of living, liberal values, and America’s lack of a feudal past and working class 
consciousness (Hartz 1955; Lipset & Marks 2000; Sombart 1906); Americans’ libertarian 
and individualist sympathies (Lipset & Marks 2000; Moody 1988); sectarianism, 
opportunism, and the split between the U.S. labor movement and the Socialist Party 
(Archer 2008; Bell 1952/1996; Davis 1986; Lipset & Marks 2000); political, cultural, 
ethnic, religious, and racial tensions within the working class (Archer 2008; Davis 1986; 
DuBois 1935/1998; Foner 1982; Roediger 1991/2007; 2005; Saxton 1971); and political 
repression of laborers and activists (Archer 2008; Carey 1997; Lipset & Marks 2000; 
Norwood 2002; Sexton 1991).  
Although a deep examination of each of these themes falls outside the scope of 
this study, the intense debate over the Old Left’s unrealized socialist vision is important 
because it illustrates that a complex stew of historically situated cultural, political, and 
economic factors may explain why oppositional political projects succeed or fail. It is 
rarely the case that one factor alone explains a movement’s demobilization.* Causes of 
demobilization are, in fact, an undertheorized area in social movement studies: Scholars 
have focused intently on the origins of contentious collective action, such as how 
                                                 
* For instance, reflecting on their experiences in the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, former New 
Left activists have suggested that movements foundered due to flaws in activists’ analyses, activities, and 
radical ideologies (e.g., Albert 1974; 2006b; Ayers 2001; Haynie 2009; Rudd 2009). These explanations 
locate the proximal causes of movement demobilization as internal to movements; although there is a great 
deal of truth in radical criticisms of New Left ideology, especially of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, 
these explanations do not give much consideration to disruptive forces external to movements, such as the 
state, the Ku Klux Klan, or mass news media. 
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movements emerge and their opportunities for expansion, but have said relatively little 
about later phases in the lives of movements, such as the factors that lead to their 
eventual decline (Boykoff 2007, p. 14; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001, pp. 42-3; Voss 
1996). As Jules Boykoff (2007) observes, 
While most studies on dissident citizens and social movements explore the 
emergence, growth, and effectiveness of social movements, they virtually ignore 
the failure of movements to emerge, grow, become influential, maintain 
solidarity, meet their collective goals, and the factors—both internal and 
external—that play into this failure (p. 14). 
Among the factors which have hobbled organizing and activism in the United 
States, Boykoff and others argue that scholars and activists have not paid sufficient 
attention to modes of political repression and suppression, even though these do exist in 
advanced democratic capitalist societies (e.g., Blackstock 1975; Boykoff 2006b; 2007; 
Carey 1997; Churchill & Vander Wall 1990a; 1990b; Wolfe 1978). Boykoff (2007) 
draws a useful distinction between repression and suppression. Whereas repression refers 
to direct violence used to coerce or silence dissidents and activists, suppression can be 
defined as “a process through which the preconditions for dissident action, mobilization, 
and collective organization are inhibited by either raising their costs or minimizing their 
benefits” (p. 12). This definition initiates new exploration in that it does not necessarily 
link suppression to the actions of the state; in other words, corporations and other non-
state actors (for instance, the Ku Klux Klan) can also produce forms of social control. 
They can act in place of the state as surrogate defenders of state objectives. Suppression 
encompasses repression, but also includes subtler forms of control, including those which 
impact activists as well as the general public and potential allies.*  
                                                 
* For instance, enormous debts incurred by consumers and students arguably suppress contemporary social 
movements: Many people saddled with debt simply cannot afford to participate in movements or activism, 
because arrests endanger employment opportunities. Major economic crisis like the 2008 collapse of the 
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By preconditions for dissident action, Boykoff means “factors that 
organizationally, operationally, strategically, or tactically make dissent more possible” (p. 
13). These factors include the ability of activists and movements to: 1) maintain 
solidarity; 2) attract new recruits; 3) create and nurture leaders/leadership; 4) generate 
media coverage; 5) mobilize support from “bystander publics”; and 6) carve out tactical 
freedom to pursue socially transformative goals (ibid.). These actions also require the 
right to assemble peaceably and redress grievances against actors other than the state. In 
the repression of union activists, for example, corporations can call upon city and state 
power to protect corporate interests. 
Many Americans are unaware that compared to other industrialized countries, the 
United States has an unusually violent labor history (Chomsky 2002, p. 193). In the early 
20
th
 century, conflict between laborers and private and state security forces resulted in the 
deaths of several hundred workers, including executions of anarchists and radical 
unionists, as well as physical injuries to thousands (Adamic 1931/2008; Avrich 1984; 
Brecher 1972; Noorwood 2002; Sexton 1991; Zinn 1980/2003). Among radical left 
tendencies—those that have historically identified with causes such as anti-colonialism, 
radical environmentalism, anarchism, socialism, and communism—throughout the 20
th
 
century, state and federal agencies targeted their movements with violence and other 
forms of coercion in order to neutralize or eliminate perceived subversive elements 
(Boykoff 2007; Carey 1997; Churchill & Vander Wall 1990a; 1990b; Redden 2000; 
Williams 2015). State suppression of oppositional movements has not abated in the 21
st
 
century, either, as law enforcement agencies continue to target anarchists, animal 
liberation activists, and radical environmentalists (Boykoff 2006b; 2007; Chang 2002; 
                                                                                                                                                 
mortgage industry that saw record numbers of Americans displaced by foreclosure eliminated the 
possibility of sustained activism to address the financial fraud that brought about this situation. 
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Del Gandio & Nocella 2014; Potter 2011; Williams & crow 2015). Commenting on the 
nationally coordinated police crackdown of the Occupy Wall Street movement that began 
in New York’s Zuccotti Park in September 2011, journalist Chris Hedges has said, “The 
state was quite rattled by the Occupy movement and is determined not to allow a 
movement, a mass movement like that to rise up again” (Jay 2013). 
The mainstream news media do not sit on the sidelines of suppressive activity, 
reporting on events as neutral, disinterested observers. Historically, the press plays an 
important role in suppressing activists and dissidents in the United States, reinforcing 
other modes of social control perpetuated by the state and powerful corporations 
(Boykoff 2006b; 2007). In his important study of activist suppression in the United 
States, Boykoff (2007) identifies six main ways in which the mass news media directly 
and indirectly work to suppress dissidents, activists, and movements: mass media 
manipulation, bi-level demonization, mass media deprecation, mass media 
underestimation, false balance, and disregard. These adversarial functions are natural 
corollaries to the mass media’s role as a promoter of state-corporate perspectives.  
 
Mass media manipulation. The state directly interferes in mass news media production by 
implanting stories and strong-arming journalists. Story implantation can take the form of 
either “black propaganda” or “gray propaganda.” As Boykoff explains (2007), “Black 
propaganda involves the use of fabricated documents assiduously designed to forge 
schisms or prevent solidarity between social movement organizations.” (p. 126; see also 
Churchill & Vander Wall 1990a, p. 42). This occurs in press coverage of activists when 
the state provides false news stories to journalists, who then publish these either verbatim 
or nearly verbatim. Gray propaganda occurs when the state feeds “calculated 
misinformation” to the press and electronic media, in order to discredit and sow tensions 
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among activists (Churchill & Vander Wall 1990, p. 43; Boykoff 2007, p. 126). Both 
black and gray propaganda involve manipulating “friendly” journalists and editors 
working in the mass media (Boykoff 2007, p. 179). 
Black and gray propaganda operations are both relatively rare, but specific 
examples are well documented. For instance, during the 1960s and 1970s, under the 
umbrella of the FBI’s COINTELPRO—an extensive, nationwide counterintelligence 
program, the purpose of which was to disrupt and neutralize activist groups and 
movements—federal agents provided false stories and misinformation about New Left 
activists and groups to their allies in the mass news media, in order to create schisms, 
marginalize activists, and weaken public support. In addition to disrupting New Left 
groups such as Students for a Democratic Society, these acts of media manipulation 
targeted famous organizers such as Martin Luther King, Jr., as well as groups such as the 
Black Panther Party, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Nation of Islam, 
and scores of other social movement organizations that the FBI deemed subversive 
(Blackstock 1975; Boykoff 2007, pp. 176-190; Churchill & Vander Wall 1990a; 1990b; 
Cunningham 2004; Drabble 2008; Glick 1989). As Boykoff (2007) observes, story 
implantation is exceedingly rare, because journalists typically already frame stories in 
ways that align with elite interests (pp. 179-180), a topic discussed below. 
In addition to feeding black and gray propaganda to “friendly” journalists, the 
state strong-arms the mass news media by censoring the press and intimidating reporters 
and editors. Heavy-handed press censorship—e.g., legal prohibitions on criticizing the 
U.S. military during World Wars I and II, which was considered seditious (Carey 1997; 
Rabban 1997; Washburn 1986)—is now rare, but the Pentagon continues to control 
coverage of war through the controversial practice of “embedding” journalists within 
military units (Boykoff 2007, pp. 186-187; Buchanan 2011). According to Paul Buchanan 
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(2011), in the post-Vietnam War era, U.S. military officials saw critical coverage as 
problematic because it undermined public support, which threatened war efforts 
themselves. From a military perspective, embedded journalism seeks to correct this by 
promoting favorable coverage of U.S. military forces. For example, during the 2003 
invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, embedded journalist accounts of the conflict 
were more favorable in tone to U.S. forces than unembedded accounts were. In addition, 
embedded reporters made little effort to report accurately on the human toll incurred by 
Iraqi civilians, as well as biasedly characterized those who fought back against U.S. 
forces as “insurgents” rather than as resistance fighters (Jamail 2007; Kuypers & Cooper 
2005; Pfau et al. 2005). Meanwhile, unembedded reporters such as Dahr Jamail (2007) 
presented readers with haunting stories about the occupation’s ramifications for ordinary 
Iraqis. 
Although it is rare, the state also censors journalists by denying or revoking 
access to conflict/disaster areas and military installations. When Ronald Reagan directed 
U.S. forces to invade Grenada in October 1983, in violation of international law, press 
censorship was total during the first 48 hours of the attack, forcing journalists to rely on 
second-hand information provided by the military (Linfield 1990, p. 158; Project 
Censored 2015). As Michael Linfield (1990) observes, “From the government’s 
viewpoint, the blanket denial of access to the press was successful since it prevented 
questioning of administration propaganda and policy” (p. 158). Press censorship in 
Grenada worked so well that when U.S. forces invaded Panama in December 1989 to 
oust strongman and former CIA asset Manuel Noriega, the military restricted reporters to 
a “media pool” responsible for covering military actions. These journalists were confined 
to a windowless room at Fort Clayton, where they were allowed to cover propaganda 
briefings but were not allowed to exercise journalistic initiative by observing the conflict 
 139 
firsthand (p. 158-159). Even today, Panamanian victims and their families do not know 
how many died during the assault, although the Central American Human Rights 
Commission estimates the death toll may have been as high as 3,000. These types of 
restrictions are not limited to coverage of conflict areas: When Hurricane Katrina struck 
New Orleans in September 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Agency also 
moved to block journalists from covering body recovery efforts. 
Another strong-arming tactic is journalist intimidation. For example, the 
administrations of U.S. presidents Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and 
George W. Bush all moved to intimidate journalists by phoning their bosses to criticize 
news coverage, freezing out uncooperative reporters, wiretapping phones, or warning 
Americans to “watch what they say, and watch what they do,” as White House Press 
secretary Ari Fleischer told reporters shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks (Boykoff 2005, pp.188-189). Perhaps the most aggressive action was taken by the 
Reagan administration, which expanded and used the Office of Public Diplomacy headed 
by Otto Reich to pressure newspaper editors. It became routine for editors to receive calls 
from Reich conveying the president’s displeasure about coverage of events in Central 
America, where the Reagan administration was carrying out acts of international 
terrorism against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. Personal visits to newsrooms 
were not uncommon (Sklar 1988). According to Holly Sklar, (1988) “Reich acted as a 
quasi-government censor, monitoring and pressuring the news media to toe the 
administration line and accusing critical reporters of being agents of Nicaraguan 
disinformation” (p. 245). As Bill Buzenberg, who became vice president of National 
Public Radio, recounted these activities, “Reich bragged that he had made similar visits 
to other unnamed newspapers and major television networks…Reich said he had gotten 
others to change some of their reporters in the field because of a perceived bias, and that 
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their coverage was much better as a result” (Buzenberg quoted in Sklar 1988, p. 246).* 
More recently, journalist Will Potter (2011) has described how the FBI threatened to add 
his name to a domestic terrorism list if he did not provide information about animal rights 
groups.†  
For the most part, though, the mass news media suppress dissidents and activists 
in more subtle ways. The following suppressive techniques identified by Boykoff (2007, 
pp. 191-260) are all closely related to the concept of framing, which according to Todd 
Gitlin (1980) refers to “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of 
little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters” (p. 6). As noted 
earlier, I will examine framing theory in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Bi-level demonization. This suppression technique refers to “the state and mass media 
linking dissidents to a demonized group or individual from the international arena, even if 
the activists are not working directly with or supporting the demonized external foe 
materially or ideologically. As long as the social movement appears to be supporting the 
external demon, even if tacitly, bi-level demonization may kick into motion” (Boykoff 
2007, p. 191; emphasis in original). The veracity of state claims is largely irrelevant; 
links between activists and external enemies can be real, imagined, or fabricated (p. 192-
3). This technique has been used extensively throughout U.S. history, particularly in 
                                                 
* Mark Hertsgaard (1988) has also described how the Reagan administration manipulated the prestige 
press, as well as the press’s complicity in these activities. 
† As a matter of disclosure, I should mention that in May 2010, two Texas Rangers sought me out while I 
was attending graduate school in Austin to interview me about any information I might have related to the 
arson attack on the Texas Governor’s Mansion that occurred on the morning of June 8, 2008. Most of their 
questions focused on my close personal friend Roberto Garcia (1985-2008), who was one of approximately 
thirty suspects the Texas Rangers told me they were considering. After viewing surveillance footage of the 
suspect, I told the Rangers I could not identify the person in the video. They also questioned me about 
whether anarchist groups might have been responsible for the fire. After replying that I seriously doubted 
my friend or local anarchists had anything to do with the incident, they sent me home. Although I have not 
heard from the Texas Rangers since being interviewed in 2010, the experience had a chilling effect. 
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wartimes as a way to paint dissident citizens as unpatriotic (Boykoff 2007). For instance, 
the mass news media exaggerated links between international Communists and the 
movement against the Vietnam War (Gitlin 1980). Bi-level demonization has been 
especially potent in the post-9/11 political environment, where in addition to targeting 
terrorists overseas, Congress and President George W. Bush gave the federal government 
sweeping powers to suppress domestic groups and individuals also deemed to be 
“terrorists,” such as anarchists, radical environmentalists, animal liberators, and religious 
(primarily Muslim) groups (Boykoff 2006b; 2007; Chang 2002; Del Gandio & Nocella 
2014; Human Rights Watch 2014; Potter 2011). 
 
Mass media deprecation. In addition to painting domestic activists as linked with foreign 
enemies, the mainstream press more directly frames activists, dissidents, and movements 
in unfair or deprecatory ways. For example, mainstream press coverage of the 1999 
protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle overwhelmingly frames 
members of the alter-globalization/global justice movement as violent, lawless, 
disruptive, out-of-touch with the rest of civil society, and ignorant of the issues they 
organize around (Boykoff 2006a; 2007, pp. 216-246; Martin 2004), rehashing several 
themes that appeared in mainstream press coverage of the 1960s student movement 
against the Vietnam War (Gitlin 1980). To take another example, media scholars Michael 
Parenti (1986) and Christopher Martin (2004) argue the mainstream press frames 
organized labor and unions, a legitimate social institution, in deprecatory ways, such as 
by depicting organized workers as unreasonable and obstinate, or as a threat to 
consumers’ economic well-being.  
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Mass media underestimation. The mainstream press frequently underestimates the scope 
of movement activity, or the scale of specific actions, such as how many people attended 
a protest march or demonstration (Boykoff 2007, pp. 248-250; Gitlin 1980; Small 1994). 
Journalistic routines—in particular, reliance on official sources for crowd size 
estimates—contribute to mass media underestimation, which allows police and other 
officials to project the image that they have protestors under control. As Boykoff (2007) 
observes, “During the breakdown of social order that often accompanies social-
movement activity, the state is frequently seen by the mass media as an objective source 
of information and looked to for the restoration of public confidence” (pp. 250-251). 
Similarly, the mainstream press underestimates the scale of public support for movement 
activity (Parenti 1986), even when this support is significant and may lead to shifts in 
state or corporate policies. 
 
False balance. The mainstream press falsely balances coverage by giving equal treatment 
to activists and counterdemonstrators. This creates the “impression of dueling protestors,” 
which “conveniently omits the fact that the forces are unequal, that one side has many 
more protestors, while the other side may have only a handful of supporters. In turn, this 
‘balance’ is a powerful political tool that government officials can use to downgrade 
dissidents, arguing that their numbers are not overwhelming or significant” (pp. 250-
251). For example, mainstream press coverage of the movement against the Vietnam War 
gave comparable page space and air time to demonstrators and counterdemonstrators 




Disregard. Finally, the mass news media help to undermine dissidents and activists by 
not covering them. According to Boykoff, “When the mass media disregard social 
movements, they exert a subtle form of suppression that affects the ability of dissidents to 
maintain morale, to gain new adherents, or to get taken seriously by potentially bystander 
publics” (p. 252). This invisibilization is a form of censorship by exclusion.  
 
The Adversarial Press: Audience Influence 
My presentation of media’s adversarial roles vis-à-vis dissidents, activists, and 
movements so far has focused on problematic aspects of news media content and its 
production. Dissidents and activists also characterize mass news media as adversarial 
because of its complex, frequently negative effects on audiences. Unfortunately, an in-
depth examination of this issue is well beyond the scope of this study. News media’s 
effects on audiences are of concern to activists because audiences encompass activists 
and dissidents involved in other movements, as well as “bystander publics,” defined as 
nonadherents who do not oppose a social movement or its organizations, but who merely 
witness its activities (McCarthy & Zald 1977; Turner 1970). According to social 
movement scholars John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977), a crucial task for social 
movements is to convert these nonadherents into adherents, i.e., “individuals and 
organizations that believe in the goals of the movement” (p. 1221). However, the mass 
news media arguably thwart these conversion efforts by promoting or instilling false 
understandings, cynicism and apathy, and ideological beliefs.  
 
False understanding. Mass news media circulate texts and images that instill false or 
flawed understandings about society, politics, economics, culture, and humans’ 
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relationship with the natural world. This information deficiency indirectly suppresses 
social movements because activists can find it difficult to communicate with, let alone 
win over, those who hold opposing, false beliefs. For instance, mainstream press 
coverage of climate change is horribly flawed, in large measure because journalists 
produce dramatized stories which play up looming crises over sober, macroscopic 
treatments, as well as falsely balance authoritative, scientific consensus with sources who 
deny that anthropogenic climate change even occurs. This has clear implications for 
policy—not to mention human survival—as public perceptions of the dangers caused by 
climate destabilization will influence which actions are taken to address our planet’s 
cascading ecological crises (Boykoff 2007; Boykoff & Boykoff 2004; 2007; Lorenzoni & 
Pidgeon 2006). 
To take another, well known example, in the lead-up to the March 2003 U.S. 
invasion of Iraq, the mainstream press perpetuated several lies, now well-known, about 
the U.S. rationales for invading, which originated from the administration of President 
George W. Bush (Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston 2007; Gershkoff & Kushner 2005; 
Rampton & Stauber 2003). As a result of these distortions, an October 2003 survey 
conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes found that: 
[A] significant portion of the American public has held a number of 
misperceptions that have played a key role in generating and maintaining 
approval for the decision to go to war. Significant portions of the public have 
believed that Iraq was directly involved in the September 11 attacks and that 
evidence of links between Iraq and al-Qaeda have been found, that weapons of 
mass destruction were found in Iraq after the war and that Iraq actually used 
weapons of mass destruction during the war, and that world public opinion has 
approved of the US going to war with Iraq (p. 2). 
These widespread public misunderstandings about the reasons for the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq hampered the antiwar cause. Moreover, the intense stream of pro-war 
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propaganda coming from the Bush administration White House, emphasizing “Arab 
extremism” and “Islamic fundamentalism,” fueled anti-Arab racism in the United States, 
which hampered activists and organizers engaged in other causes, such as Palestine 
solidarity work. 
 
Cynicism and apathy. The mass news media’s emphasis on the game of politics rather 
than on substantive political issues activates widespread public cynicism, or the absence 
of trust in political actors, processes, or institutions (Cappella & Jamieson 1997; 
Lawrence 2000; Pedersen 2012; Shehata 2014; Valentino, Beckmann, & Buhr 2001). 
Activist theorist Cynthia Kaufman (2003) argues that the mass media encourage people 
to view human connections as corrupt and social movements as ineffectual, which allows 
systems of domination to secure consent (pp. 251-267). Political cynicism is closely 
linked with voter apathy. Most public opinion polls show that about three in four 
Americans disapprove of Congressional inaction (Real Clear Politics 2013), and Obama 
has not brought about the changes many progressives hoped he would (NPR 2013).  
According to liberal media critic Marty Kaplan, Americans do not rise up in 
protest because mass media packages news as “infotainment,” which distracts citizens 
from taking action to address pressing issues such as health care, economic corruption, 
and climate change. “We have been taught to be helpless and jaded, rather than to feel 
that we are empowered and can make a difference,” Kaplan told independent journalist 
Bill Moyers in a 2013 interview on July 12. In addition to “infotainment,” both parties’ 
allegiance to wealthy constituencies helps explain why most voters show little interest in 
the U.S. political process, even when there are charges of election fraud, such as in the 
presidential elections of 2000 and 2004. To quote Chomsky (2004), “If one is flipping a 
coin to the pick the king, it is of no great concern if the coin is biased” (p. 223). 
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Ideological beliefs. Activists and dissidents also argue that the mass news media circulate 
texts and images which reinforce ideological beliefs about corporations, government, the 
environment, and social and cultural reality. According to Robert Jensen (2001), 
Even though it may seem that, in the post-Cold War era, capitalism has “won,” 
smart capitalists understand that victory is always tentative. Today, working 
people and the unions that once created a channel for working people’s power are 
on the defensive, but thoughtful capitalists know quickly that can change. Hence 
the need for intense ideological control and indoctrination (p. 32). 
 I will examine the issues of ideological control and indoctrination in more detail in 
Chapter 5, which takes up the issue of media hegemony. 
 
Alternative Opponents and Mainstream Allies 
A final comment on media’s adversarial roles: To a lesser extent, critics 
characterize alternative or activist media as adversarial. For instance, many left-
progressive activists are critical of contemporary anarchist and Marxist publications for 
putting forward strident editorial positions which, they argue, sow disunity on the left. 
Meanwhile, anarchists and Marxists chastise liberal and progressive publications such as 
Huffington Post and The Nation for “selling out,” supporting big business and/or the 
Democratic Party, or for throwing radicals, progressives, and third-party candidates under 
the bus. In addition, internecine debates between radical groups and personalities 
frequently play out online—through email, blogs, and other websites—as well as in the 
pages of movement publications. These attacks fragment countless groups and causes, as 
well as injure the left’s overall esprit de corps.  
It is not always the case that mass news media perform adversarial roles vis-à-vis 
activists and social movements, either. As social movements grow and gain political 
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legitimacy and social influence, the mainstream press often will either ally with them, or 
at least come to identify with some or all of their major goals. Indeed, over the past 
century this has been the case for most major U.S. social movements that achieved lasting 
gains. For instance, the main positions of the Civil Rights Movement—that racial 
segregation and discrimination should be illegal—are now journalistic common sense, 
and several major papers have even apologized for their neglectful reporting on civil 
rights issues during the 1950s and 1960s (Heckman 2013).  
To take another example, in Texas over the past two decades editorial boards at 
major state newspapers have adopted positions that the death penalty should either be 
abolished or have a moratorium placed on it. These editorial positions align with the 
goals and policy preferences of the anti-death penalty movement but stand in stark 
opposition to the state’s pro-death penalty, dominant Republican culture.  
 
News Media as Tools and Resources 
In addition to constituting a site of struggle and performing several adversarial 
functions vis-à-vis activists and social movement actors, mainstream and 
alternative/activist media may be thought of as tools and resources that present 
strategic/tactical opportunities for activists and movements, who use both as vehicles for 
recruiting members, intragroup communication, crystalizing movement goals, strategies, 
tactics, and analyses, building public support, pressuring power holders, and spreading 
information to bystander publics and other activists (Atton 2002; Atton & Hamilton 
2008; Downing 2001; Gitlin 1980; Kessler 1984; Ostertag 2006; Ryan 1991; Salzman 
2003; Streitmatter 2001). The difference between mainstream and alternative strategies 
may be thought of as the difference between playing an “insider game” versus an 
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“outsider game,” respectively, although it is not necessarily the case that one approach 
will produce preferable results (Ryan 1991, p. 5).* The concept of media activism itself is 
broad†, but there are three basic approaches related to news media. 
 
 Activists may try to influence mass news media content by capturing its attention, 
such as by staging protests and demonstrations, holding news conferences, and 
issuing press releases (Gitlin 1980; Kahn 1991; Ryan 1991; Salzman 2003). 
 Activists may try to create mass news media content by producing their own 
stories, working closely with sympathetic journalists, or writing op-eds and letters 
to the editor (Jensen 2001; Kahn 1991; Ryan 1991; Salzman 2003). After leaving 
the news industry, award-winning journalist A. Kent MacDougall (1988a; 1988b) 
published a two-part essay for Monthly Review, in which he revealed that he had 
been a socialist during his ten-year employment with the Wall Street Journal, all 
the while writing for radical publications under pseudonyms. 
 Activists may produce alternative/activist media (Angel 2008; Armstrong 1981; 
Atton 2002; Atton & Hamilton 2008; Downing 2001; Kessler 1984; Ostertag 
2006; Streitmatter 2001). This eschews mass media involvement. According to 
                                                 
* Deana Rohlinger (2015) draws another useful distinction: “There are two kinds of media: direct media, 
which are created by activists associated with a movement group, and external media, which use a 
particular set of norms and practices to create a media product that (ideally) generates profit from consumer 
sales and advertising. Direct media typically include newsletters, pamphlets, websites, listservs, forums, 
videos/documentaries, and songs or radio programming produced by group activists, while external media 
include mainstream and alternative news outlets (on- or off-line), radio stations, blogs, commercial 
documentaries, concerts, and social media. The distinction between direct and external media is important 
because while all movements may use mass media, not all groups choose to regularly engage media over 
which they have little to no control” (p. 5). 
† Other forms of media activism may include, for instance, composing and playing/distributing radical 
music, wheatpasting signs or tagging property with political graffiti, radical (street) theatre, hacktivism, and 
culture jamming, i.e., the practice of subverting mainstream cultural symbols and institutions, often by 
altering the signs and logos of influential corporations (Cohen-Cruz 1998; 2005; Collin 2013; Danaher 
2010; Klein 2000; Lasn 2000). 
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Kidd (2010), activists and social justice groups “developed alternative media as a 
tool for community building and as part of the articulation and circulation of their 
own self-directed expertise, social identities, and analyses” (p. 203). Alternative 
media may also influence mass news media content indirectly via intermedia 
agenda-setting and other processes, although interactions between mainstream 
and alternative media remain undertheorized. 
 
Ideally, seasoned activists will weigh a number of strategic considerations when 
deciding whether to try to use the mainstream press, produce alternative news media, 
pursue both options, or do neither. Strategically relevant factors related to news media 
activism include: 
 
Target audience. Different forms of news media (print, television, radio, and/or web), as 
well as different news organizations within established mediums, specifically target or 
are more likely to reach certain audience demographics. For example, it is well 
documented that Millennials* consume more news online and with digital devices than 
their elders, who are more likely to watch televised news or listen to radio broadcasts 
(Pew 2015). Thus, an activist media campaign aimed at audiences in their 20s or 30s 
would likely perform better if it were launched on social media such as Facebook rather 
than delivered via public radio broadcasts. Other demographic information relevant to 
media activism may include audience members’ genders, sexual orientations, political 
outlook, and socioeconomic status. Activists engaged in media work may seek to reach 
some or all of the following groups: 
                                                 
* As distinct from Baby Boomers (adults who were born between approximately the end of World War II 
and the early 1960s) and Gen Xers (those born between the mid-1960s and early 1980s), Millennials are the 
demographic cohort born between the early 1980s and early 2000s. 
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 Policy makers and power holders – for instance, to demand a stay of execution for 
a death row inmate; 
 Journalists and other media-makers – to attract initial coverage or influence how 
an issue is being treated in the media; 
 Other activists and dissidents – to rally allies to a cause; 
 International audiences – for instance, to arouse international solidarity or attract 
the attention of foreign governments and international governing bodies such as 
the International Criminal Court or United Nations; 
 Niche audiences – this may include historically marginalized groups and 
minorities. 
 
Opportunity costs. Certain opportunity costs correspond to choosing certain media 
strategies over other available options, which may include time, money, and material 
resources available to activists and organizers. For instance, a small group may decide 
that, because it does not have enough members or public support to stage a televised 
protest, a better tactic might be to have one of its members appear on a radio or television 
talk show. 
 
Skills and talent. Activists may decide to use media strategies which play to their 
strengths. For instance, tech-savvy activists may create their own websites and do 
outreach through social media online, rather than seek the attention of the mainstream 
press. The activists who established Indymedia in 1999, for instance, drew on their 
extensive experience using computers and web technologies (Kidd 2003; 2010; Pickard 
2006; Wolfson 2012). 
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Goal consonance and ethical-political convictions. Activists may use tactics and 
strategies because they believe they are best suited for reaching their goals. Activists and 
organizers may also prefer approaches that are consonant with their deepest ethical-
political convictions. 
 
Of course, some activists may pursue media strategies with no consideration of 
these or other factors. 
 
LINKING THE BATTLEGROUND, ADVERSARY, AND TOOLS/RESOURCE CONCEPTIONS 
Each of the three roles described above suggests a different approach to thinking 
about news media-movement interactions. Importantly, each role offers only a partial 
understanding. For instance, if activists dwell only on media’s adversarial functions, 
viewing mainstream news media mainly as opponents or obstacles to movement building, 
and not as tools or resources, they are unlikely to pursue strategies that involve 
influencing journalists or seeking mass news media coverage. Meanwhile, activists who 
fail to appreciate media’s adversarial functions may feel stymied in their efforts to attract 
favorable coverage, because they do not fully appreciate how and why power warps the 
production of news content. 
The three roles outlined above also suggest different ways of thinking about 
activists’ agency. Conceptions of media that focus only or predominantly on its 
adversarial functions cast activists and movements as mainly victims of suppression. On 
the other hand, focusing on how activists actually use and create forms of news media 
allows us to see them as agents of change. Thinking about media as a site of struggle also 
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shifts the focus away from activists as passive victims of negative coverage, to rational 




Chapter 5: Anarchism and Critical Media Theories 
Over the past half-century, leftwing and progressive academics, watchdog 
organizations, and other critics have responded to the explosive growth in corporate news 
media power with a large, penetrating body of research and theory describing how this 
power operates, from whence it comes, and why it threatens democracy and human 
freedom.* Thanks to the efforts of prominent activist-scholars (e.g., Bagdikian 2004; 
Chomsky 1989; Gitlin 1980; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Herman 1982; 1992; 1995; 
1996; Herman & Peterson 2010; Lee & Solomon 1990; McChesney 2000; 2004; 
Miliband 1969; Parenti 1986; 1992; Schiller 1969/1992; 1973; 1989; 1996), alternative 
news media and journalists, and news monitoring groups such as Project Censored and 
Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting,† today most left-progressive and radical anti-
capitalist elements in the United States appreciate that social movements must directly 
confront the “problem of the (mainstream news) media” to further political, economic, 
and cultural struggles (Gitlin 1980; McChesney 2004; 2008b; Ryan 1991). 
At the same time, among activists, academics, and other informed critics, there 
does not appear to be widespread agreement about what, exactly, constitutes this problem 
or on what the strategically relevant features of news media are. Activists proffer uneven, 
conflicting accounts of the mainstream press, as well as lean on diverse theoretical 
perspectives to support their claims. Meanwhile, scholars who critique different aspects 
of mass news media—such as its content, effects on audiences, ideological assumptions, 
                                                 
* Criticisms of contemporary mainstream corporate media have notable historical antecedents (McChesney 
& Scott 2004; Reynolds & Hicks 2012; Sinclair 1919/2003). Surveying a century of critiques of U.S. news 
media, Robert McChesney and Ben Scott (2004) argue that, far from being a “fringe phenomenon,” radical 
press criticism “can make a legitimate claim to being the mainstream tradition of a free press in the United 
States” (p. 7; emphasis in original). See the introduction to McChesney & Scott (2004), pp. 1-30. 
† Several left-progressive alternative media devote sections of their publications to press criticism. In fact, 
the magazine Extra!, the official organ of Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting, is given over entirely to 
critiquing mass news media content through the lens of fact checking and political economy. 
 154 
and institutional structure—often stop short of promoting strategies or tactics that 
activists might develop to challenge these powerful institutions. Arguably it would 
benefit both camps to seek more common or comparative ground; instead we find a 
disconnect between those who research corruptions of information power and those who 
stand to benefit from this research. Moreover, some research conclusions seem 
speculative when proposing what effect media has on the general public. 
Radical communications scholars are uniquely positioned to pick up where most 
critics leave off, by analyzing and assessing different accounts of media power, tracing 
their ideological roots, subjecting them to academic scrutiny, and most importantly, 
mapping, cataloging, and promoting their strategic and tactical implications for social 
movements (Frey & Carragee 2007; McChesney 2007a; Martin 2010; Shantz 2008; Ryan 
1991). Reflecting on these matters also presents an opportunity to continue theorizing 
about news media along anarchist lines. In addition to providing a lens through which 
one may examine news media’s informational power, anarchism provides a basis for 
interrogating other critical theories and concepts related to news media. This can carve 
out new ground for anarchism within academic discourse on media and communications, 
by showing how anarchist conceptualizations challenge, differ from, or bear similarities 
to other approaches. 
To these ends, this chapter examines three different theoretical perspectives from 
which activists, academics, and other critics often draw to examine or explain media-
movement interactions and/or the power of mass news media: framing, media hegemony, 
and critical political economy. These three were selected because they represent 
conceptually broad, relatively popular, well-developed perspectives among critical 
scholars and left-progressive activists in the United States. Moreover, each theory 
addresses questions that are on the minds of those who dwell on the issue of media 
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power. Importantly, each one offers only a partial explanation; in an important sense, 
framing, media hegemony, and political economy accounts attempt to fill explanatory 
gaps left by one another (Maxwell 2001; Shoemaker & Reese 1996; Ryan 1991). Of 
course, examination of any theory or group of theories will provide an incomplete 
picture. For example, it is possible to bring anarchism to bear on other important critical 
perspectives, such as feminism and critical race theory, or even more mainstream 
academic theories of news media, such as agenda-setting theory and 
gatekeeper/organizational models (e.g., Lewin 1947; McCombs 2004; McCombs & Shaw 
1972; Shoemaker 1991; 1996; Shoemaker et al. 2001; White 1950). Likewise, it is 
possible to analyze through an anarchist lens various attempts at synthesis, such as 
Ryan’s (1991) important work, which incorporates insights from different theoretical 
perspectives. Although I may reference ideas or recast arguments from some of these 
studies, tackling them directly falls outside the scope of the present work. For each 
perspective, this chapter will take up the following questions: 
 
 Theoretical content. How does each perspective account for media-movement 
interactions and/or the power of mass news media? Does it try to explain the 
corrupting influence of power on the production of news media content, the 
effects of news content on movements or media audiences, both, or something 
else entirely? 
 Implications for strategy. What does each perspective imply for activist or 
movement tactics and strategy? How do these strategic implications relate to other 
activist concerns? What political consequences are associated with these 
implications? 
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 Anarchist interrogation. How does each perspective stand in relation to anarchist 
thought and practice? On what grounds does anarchism challenge or possibly 
modify each of these theoretical perspectives? How does anarchism denaturalize 
or defamiliarize, i.e., problematize, the taken-for-granted, commonsense 
assumptions involved with each theory and its strategic implications? 
 
I should note that, in presenting and assessing these theories, it is not my intent to 
weigh every important objection that critics and scholars direct at them. For example, I 
am aware that journalism scholars have sought to cast doubt on critical political 
economists’ contention that media consolidation erases a diversity of perspectives. 
Although I disagree with the defenders of capitalist media systems in this instance, it is 
beside the point. Rather, my aim is to present these theoretical accounts based on how 
their advocates understand and use these concepts, tease out their implications from an 
activist perspective, and assess these theories and their implications from an anarchist 
perspective. 
 
NEWS MEDIA FRAMING AND THE PROTEST PARADIGM 
Mainstream and alternative news media present readers, viewers, and listeners 
windows onto the world, but do not necessarily mirror social, political, or economic 
realities. In addition to selecting and presenting events, images, and sounds for public 
consumption, news media also interpret their meanings, contextualize information, and 
speculate about their consequences (Entman 1993; 2004; Gitlin 1980). This phenomenon 
is called framing, and interpretations of events are called (news or media) frames. 
According to Gitlin (1980): 
 157 
Media frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organize the world both 
for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely on 
their reports. Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and 
presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers 
routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual. Frames enable journalists 
to process large amounts of information quickly and routinely: to recognize it as 
information, to assign it to cognitive categories, and to package it for efficient 
relay to their audiences. Thus, for organizational reasons alone, frames are 
unavoidable, and journalism is organized to regulate their production (ibid., p. 7).  
Gitlin is concerned with media frames, but in a broad sense framing can refer to 
how individuals, groups, or institutions analyze, label, make sense of, and/or make 
connections among different aspects of social phenomena (Goffman 1974). For instance, 
sociologists use framing theory to explain how social movement participants define 
social problems, formulate strategies, and spur calls to action (Benford 1993; Snow et al. 
1986; Benford & Snow 2000; Johnston & Noakes 2005; see also Part III in McAdam, 
McCarthy, & Zald 1996). Among journalism and mass communications scholars, 
framing theory is commonly used to analyze political news coverage, especially coverage 
of elections and governmental policy (e.g., D’Angelo & Kuypers 2010; Entman 2004; 
Iyengar 1991; Reese, Gandy, & Grant 2001). Scholars also use the concept to analyze 
media treatment of activists and movements (e.g., Ashley & Olson 1998; Boykoff 2006a; 
Di Cicco 2010; Gitlin 1980; Martin 2004; Xu 2013). 
Political communications scholar Robert Entman (2004) provides a robust 
account of framing and framing functions. He writes that framing means “selecting and 
highlighting some aspects of events or issues and making connections among them so as 
to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (p. 5; see also 1993, p. 




 Defining problems. Media frames define effects or conditions as problematic. 
This is one of the two most important framing functions, because problem 
definition “often virtually predetermines the rest of the frame” (p. 6). 
 Identifying causes. In defining problematic effects or conditions, media frames 
also locate their causes. 
 Conveying moral judgment. In addition to identifying problems and locating their 
causes, media frames convey moral judgment on those deemed responsible. 
 Endorsing remedies. Finally, media frames suggest or endorse remedies or 
solutions to effects or conditions defined as problematic. According to Entman, 
this is the second of the two most important framing functions, “because it 
directly promotes support (or opposition) to public policy” (ibid.). 
 
As Entman observes, “All four of these framing functions hold together in a kind 
of cultural logic, each helping to sustain the others with the connections among them 
cemented more by custom and convention than by the principles of syllogistic logic” (p. 
6). To illustrate how these functions work together, consider post-9/11 news coverage of 
the U.S.-led “war on terror,” inaugurated by the administration of President George W. 
Bush. In mainstream framing of U.S. foreign policy, the threat of international terrorism 
was defined as a problem that the United States must confront, with or without the 
support of the international community. Foreign actors such as al Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein were framed as the principal instigators or causes of 
terrorism – even erroneously in the case of Saddam, where U.S. media repeated false 
claims that Iraq harbored weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and maintained important 
links to al Qaeda, the group presumed responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Rather than asking 
what might have motivated the attacks, or questioning the Bush administration’s claims 
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about Iraq’s WMD program and supposed links to al Qaeda, instead the mass news media 
overwhelmingly conveyed negative moral judgment on these actors. Rather than consider 
options such as international law enforcement or take seriously the reports by the 
international team sent to investigate the existence of WMD who reported that no such 
weapons were found anywhere after extensive searching—conclusions backed up by 
invading forces—the mass news media framed U.S. military intervention targeting 
foreign terrorist groups and Saddam’s regime as ethically appropriate means to address 
the problem of terrorism (Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston 2007; Chomsky 2001a; 2003; 
Entman 2004; Friel & Falk 2004; Gershkoff & Kushner 2005; Nikolaev & Hakanen 
2006; Rampton & Stauber 2003; 2006). 
Framing theory holds that the mass news media are predisposed to frame news 
coverage in ways that promote elites’ preferred policy options and dominant political 
interests (Carragee & Roefs 2004; Entman 2004; Gitlin 1980). Thus, it provides a 
theoretical account of corrupted informational power. As the above example shows, this 
is especially true in coverage of U.S. foreign policy, where frame construction privileges 
the state’s view of problems, causes, moral judgments, and solutions over other available 
options. In the lead up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, the global anti-war movement 
coordinated enormous public protests against the war—indeed, the largest protests in 
recorded human history—which identified U.S. foreign policy as problematic and 
advocated peaceful alternatives to the Bush administration’s unilateral war plans. 
Nevertheless, antiwar frames and voices, such as those who urged that the United States 
follow international law, were virtually absent from mainstream press coverage of the 
attack, while official, pro-war frames and voices dominated (Chomsky 2003; Friel & Falk 
2004; Hayes & Guardino 2010; Rendall & Broughel 2003; Whiten 2004).  
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Arguably, antiwar frames failed to gain traction because it is difficult for activists 
to displace or undermine the strong influence of elite narratives, especially after an 
invasion begins. As William Dorman (2006) observes, “the only meaningful time to 
debate the need for war is before one begins; it is too late once it is underway. History is 
abundantly clear that the myth of war, once a war starts, has a power to overwhelm 
culture and public discourse, and therefore takes over thought to an extraordinary degree” 
(p. 11). Indeed, social pressure to conform includes claims that to criticize or question is 
not patriotic. Excluding antiwar voices subtly suppresses peace-seeking activists, groups, 
and movements because it short-circuits opportunities for these actors to reach wide 
audiences, recruit new members, or meet other preconditions for action, mobilization, 
and organization (Gitlin 1980; Boykoff 2007). 
There appears to be wider latitude in framing domestic policy issues, such as 
immigration, same-sex marriage, and abortion, as well as international concerns such as 
climate change, reflecting more divergent attitudes among policy makers and elites. 
However, even in these cases the parameters for debate within coverage are largely 
predetermined by policy makers’ views on which options are politically feasible (Bennett 
1990; Shehata & Hoppman 2012). Mainstream press coverage of the recent health care 
debate, for example, framed single-payer and public option healthcare proposals as 
impractical, and their advocates as naïve, childish, or socialist, even though the public 
option had overwhelming public support and was cheaper than the pharmaceutical 
industry’s proposals. Commenting on the tone of the coverage, press critic Michael 
Corcoran (2010) observes, 
Progressive ideas with majority popular support are falsely portrayed as radical, 
ideological fantasies, while those who oppose them are praised as pragmatic and 
reasonable. … “Pragmatic” is a curious way to describe letting the public option 
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die; how practical is it to make a bill more expensive and less popular? But this 
framing has been commonplace throughout the debate. 
Entman (2004) distinguishes between frames and schemas; whereas frames refer 
to interpretations of reality found in media texts, schemas are clusters of ideas and 
feelings stored in people’s memories. Schemas connect with one another in individuals’ 
knowledge networks, and once a schema becomes incorporated into a person’s long-term 
memory, new knowledge and schemas can bring to mind associated feelings, images, and 
concepts. This occurs through a process called spreading activation, which depends on a 
kind of semantic priming. According to spreading activation theory, when concepts are 
activated in memory, related concepts are activated as well. Spreading activation means 
just that: Rather than evoking singular ideas, phrases, or images, a concept can rapidly 
“spread,” activating several associated concepts at once.* For example, for many U.S. 
citizens the phrase “September 11” evokes several images related to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks: Osama bin Laden, the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings, rescue 
efforts, and subsequent U.S. military action against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq. 
Moreover, these images are more likely to be evoked than, say, images of baseball games 
or dinosaurs (Anderson 1983; 1990; Collins & Loftus 1975; Entman 2004, pp. 6-9; 
Lodge, McGraw, & Stroh 1989; Lodge & Stroh 1993). Entman (2004) argues that the 
theory of spreading activation gives elites compelling reasons for wanting to impose their 
own interpretations on news coverage of important political events as early as possible: 
“A dominant frame in the earliest news coverage of an event can activate and spread 
congruent thoughts and feelings in individuals’ knowledge networks, building a new 
event schema that guides responses to all future reports” (p. 7). 
                                                 
* These activations do not occur randomly. As Jonathan Schooler and Sonya Dougal (1999) observe, “the 
direction and extent of the spread of activation critically depends on (a) the specific items that were 
activated and (b) the underlying structure of an individual’s knowledge representation” (p. 352). 
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Likewise, framing and spreading activation are of interest to activists and 
dissidents because initial coverage of a cause or movement can set the tone for future 
coverage. When negative frames and deprecatory themes surface early in news accounts, 
they become hard to displace. For instance, in Gitlin’s (1980) landmark study of 
mainstream press coverage of Students for a Democratic Society, he observes that the 
New York Times’s first in-depth story on SDS—a March 15, 1965 front page story by 
reporter Fred Powledge—“derived its information from within the radical student orbit, 
and conveyed respect and a certain distanced sympathy. It cited the movement’s 
preferred labels, and not those of opponents; it took at face value the radicals’ own 
statements of belief; and it spoke from the perspective of the students, even when it 
proceeded toward balance” (p. 36). This respectful, sympathetic treatment proved to be a 
fluke, however, as deprecatory themes and framing devices soon cemented themselves in 
coverage of SDS, in line with the media’s overarching pro-war narrative. Ultimately, 
argues Gitlin, the pro-war orientations of the New York Times and CBS News motivated 
these news organizations to frame SDS in ways that helped both to build and unmake the 
New Left groups and movements of the 1960s. Even today, the mass media and 
intellectual culture treat these groups and movements with an air of disdain. 
The mainstream press frames activists and their concerns around dominant frames 
and news narratives, which puts challengers who do not share these assumptions at a 
disadvantage (Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991; Tarrow 2011). As Ryan (1991) observes, 
Dominant frames have ideological inertia on their side, i.e., they build on 
assumptions so taken for granted that mainstream media perceive them as the only 
logical approach to a situation. Conversely, challengers present unknown 
information organized around unfamiliar political assumptions. The resulting 
frames initially seem strange, forced, or unnatural to the mainstream media and its 
audience. … One of the most common forms of distortion involves the rendering 
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of challenger perspectives from within the logic of the dominant perspective (p. 
68). 
For instance, antiwar activists may find it difficult to frame U.S. interventions 
abroad as motivated by geopolitical concerns, despite overwhelming evidence to support 
this interpretation (Blum 2004; Chomsky 1991; 2000; 2003; Johnson 2004; Kinzer 2006; 
LaFeber 1984), because this characterization directly contradicts mainstream accounts 
depicting U.S. military attacks on foreign countries as well-meaning attempts at 
democracy promotion. Dominant frames can also distort media characterizations of 
activists’ range of concerns. According to Gitlin (1980), the Times and CBS News 
framed their coverage of SDS around the issue of the Vietnam War, with the result that 
SDS was narrowly conceptualized as an anti-war group. However, in actual practice SDS 
was a multi-issue organization, which embraced a broad, radical agenda and worked on 
many different political projects simultaneously. The group’s founding document, the 
Port Huron Statement, articulated from a radical left perspective several concerns and 
policy recommendations regarding such issues as the nuclear arms race, the military-
industrial complex, racism, colonialism, and the class character of U.S. society (Gitlin 
1980; Hayden 1962/2005).  
The mainstream news media relies on other important frames and narrative 
devices as well—in particular, a “protest paradigm” that characterizes coverage of 
activists, dissidents, protestors, groups, and movements. The protest paradigm focuses, 
somewhat superficially, on the spectacle of social protest rather than on the concerns or 
issues that motivate people to engage in activism in the first place. By obscuring the root 
causes of activism and protest, and by failing to provide media audiences with multiple 
perspectives and information that might spur people to take action, this paradigm 
supports the status quo and marginalizes challengers (Ashley & Olson 1988; Boykoff 
 164 
2007; Boyle, McLeod, & Armstrong 2012; Brasted 2005; Chan & Lee 1984; McLeod & 
Hertog 1999; McLeod 2007; Rauch et al. 2003). The protest paradigm is far from 
monolithic, especially in online coverage of movements (e.g., DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun 
2012; Harlow & Johnson 2011), but research suggests that the more radical a group or 
movement is, the more closely mainstream coverage of it will resemble the 
characteristics of the routinized template (Boykoff 2007; McLeod 2007; McLeod & 
Hertog 1999; Shoemaker 1984). Recycled across decades, social issues, and geographic 
diversities, its themes and frames include: 
 
Official perspective. Rather than turn to activists, organizers, and other non-elite sources, 
mainstream news accounts of activism, protests, and other social movement activities 
often rely on the views of experts, police, government figures, business leaders, and other 
official sources to explain protests and underlying issues (Boykoff  2006a; Brasted 2005; 
Dardis 2006; Gitlin 1980; McLeod & Hertog 1999; Xu 2013). This is because journalists’ 
reliance on accessible, official sources—who can provide quotes and information quickly 
and succinctly—“gives news stories prestige, increases news production efficiency, and 
adheres to the rituals of objectivity,” observes Douglas McLeod (2007, p. 186-187; see 
also McLeod & Hertog 1999). Journalists also turn to official sources as a way to shield 
themselves from criticism, such as accusations of bias (Gans 1979; Tuchman 1972; 
1978). According to sociologist Gaye Tuchman (1972), “objectivity refers to routine 
procedures which may be exemplified as formal attributes … and which protect the 
professional from mistakes and from his critics. It appears the word ‘objectivity’ is being 
used defensively as a strategic ritual” (p. 678). 
Official frames are not merely the product of journalists’ normal newsgathering 
routines, however. After all, governments, corporations, and law enforcement 
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organizations have been using sophisticated public relations techniques for well over a 
century (Bernays 1928/2005; Carey 1997; Cutlip 1994; 1995; Olasky 1987). It is 
important to recognize that official sources actively construct and promote frames, and 
that these have tangible consequences for activists and movements, such as official 
frames which provide police agencies with autonomy to suppress challengers to the status 
quo (Boykoff 2006b; 2007; Cunningham & Browning 2004; Gitlin 1980; Noakes 2000).  
 
Ineffectiveness. Rather than highlight organizational strength, the mass news media frame 
activists and movements as disorganized, ineffective, ignorant of issues, and incapable of 
articulating realistic goals, demands, or messages. News accounts attribute this to several 
factors, such as intra-organizational conflict, disarray, dissension, and bad or nonexistent 
leadership (Ashley & Olson 1988; Boykoff 2006a; 2007; Di Cicco 2010; Gitlin 1980; Xu 
2013). For instance, mainstream accounts of the second wave feminist movement 
emphasized dissension within its ranks, and coverage of the anti-WTO protests and the 
Occupy Wall Street movement framed activists as not being united in their goals, 
demands, or messages (Ashley & Olson 1988; Skonieczny & Morse 2014; Xu 2013). The 
protest paradigm’s focus on actions rather than issues strengthens perceptions that 
activists are inept. As McLeod (2007) observes: 
The media often fail to adequately explain the meaning and context of protest 
actions, leading the audience to perceive them as futile, pointless, and even 
irrational. Journalists may further delegitimize protests by judging them as futile 
or as failures, ignoring many of the latent functions of protest groups (e.g., 
spreading information, generating resources, building solidarity among 
individuals and coalitions among like-minded groups, etc) (p. 187).  
 
Deviant behavior, language, and appearance. Mainstream media commonly paint 
activists and dissidents as countercultural deviants, nonconformists, and freaks, by 
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drawing attention to their unusual clothing, personal appearance (piercings, tattoos, etc.), 
diets, sexual orientations and behaviors, races and ethnicities, speech, and ages (Ashley & 
Olson 1988; Boykoff 2006a; 2006b; 2007; Dardis 2006; Gitlin 1980; Mendes 2011). For 
example, media coverage of the second wave feminist movement critiqued women’s 
aberrant appearances and used nonspeech quotation marks around words such as 
“women’s movement” and “liberation” to denote that these ideas should not be taken 
seriously (Ashley & Olson 1988, p. 268). 
News media often highlight deviant characteristics in order to promote status quo 
distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate participants within movements, which 
some activists might view as being part of a divide-and-conquer strategy. Mainstream 
coverage of the women’s movement constructed “ordinary,” liberal feminists—women 
who were described as attractive, heterosexual, well educated, housewives, and/or 
mothers—more positively than it did deviant feminists, i.e., radical women who were 
described as militants, lesbians, and “extreme feminists” who hated men (Mendes 2011; 
see also Ashley & Olson 1988). In addition, other female sources were often used to 
discredit these radical feminists. As Kaitlynn Mendes (2011) observes, “The use of 
female voices … helps to legitimise a rejection of the movement because women 
themselves do not want it” (p. 493; emphasis in original).  
 
Violence, lawlessness, and the threat to social order. The mass news media demonize 
activists and social movements by associating them with criminal behavior, general 
lawlessness, and acts of violence, and by framing police forces as responsible for 
restoring and maintaining social order. This theme runs through coverage of anarchists, 
radicals, and economic issues such as strikes and protests against neoliberal policies and 
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institutions, e.g., the WTO and G-20* (Boykoff 2006a; 2006b; 2007; Dardis 2006; Douai 
2014; Gitlin 1980; Hertog & McLeod 1995; Martin 2004; Rauch et al. 2003; Xu 2013). 
Whereas mass media sanitizations of state violence help to justify suppressive policies, 
framing activists as threats to the social order plays an important role in delegitimizing 
dissent and protest in democratic capitalist societies (Boykoff 2006a; 2006b; 2007; 
Chomsky 1989; 1997; 2001b; Douai 2014; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002). 
 
Public threat/nuisance. Mainstream news accounts often suggest that members of the 
general public and protestors share fundamentally different interests, by characterizing 
the latter as anti-American, unpatriotic, and/or harmful to society and the economy – in 
other words, as public threats or nuisances. This framing strategy assumes that citizens 
should put their faith in the state and corporations, that protestors have no business trying 
to bring about change, and that activism and protests cause more trouble than they are 
worth, especially when these actions disrupt commerce and people’s daily lives (Brasted 
2005; 2014; Di Cicco 2010; Hertog & McLeod 1995; McLeod 2007; Martin 2004). 
Martin (2004) writes: 
The news media disapprove of collective action—including strikes, slowdowns, 
boycotts, and protests—with a number of standard canards: It is inflationary, un-
American, protectionist, naïve, causes bureaucratic red tape, disrupts consumer 
demand and behavior, foments fear and violence, etc. The frame carries an 
underlying assumption: that economic intervention by citizens should happen 
only at the individual level…. Of course, individual action preempts collective 
action, which is more democratic and potent. But, politics outside the reigning 
corporate-political structure is largely disdained, if not usually ignored, by the 
press (pp. 10-11). 
                                                 
* The Group of Twenty (G-20) is an international economic forum for Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. In June 2010, the G-20 
summit in Toronto was the target of massive protests and demonstrations, in which more than 20,000 
police, security, and military personnel were called in to subdue half as many demonstrators. 
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The public menace/nuisance frame relies on journalists and their sources making 
sweeping generalizations about public attitudes (Hertog & McLeod 1995; McLeod 2007). 
As McLeod (2007) observes, 
Most protest stories do not contain reports of actual public opinion polls, with the 
occasional exception for issues like abortion and anti-war protests. It is actually 
more common for reporters or the sources they quote to make generalizations 
about public opinion on protest issues or about public reactions to the protesters 
(p. 187). 
 
FRAMING’S IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY 
According to Gitlin (1980), although it is difficult to pin down framing’s effects, 
we can speak of the significance of frames as well as their complex political 
consequences (pp. 127-8). As we have seen, an important consequence of pro-status quo 
news framing is that it minimizes the threat posed by challengers. Dominant frames and 
the protest paradigm are of significant interest to activists, then, because one-sided media 
constructions of movements and social issues influence public support and opportunities 
for social-political change. At the same time, research on dominant frames and the protest 
paradigm may be faulted for exhibiting a kind of tunnel vision, insofar as studies focused 
on mass media’s adversarial role tend to obscure other important dimensions of framing, 
such as how framing theory casts the news media as a site of struggle; how activists and 
movements cultivate and promote their own frames; and framing contests between 
activists and their opponents (Gamson & Meyer 1996; Gamson & Wolfsfeld 1993; Gitlin 
1980; Lakoff 2004; Ryan 1991; Ryan, Carragee, & Meinholder 2001; McAdam 1996b; 
Zald 1996). As Ryan (1991) observes:  
Framing is more than a process of interpreting selected events; it is actually the 
process of creating events, of signifying, from the vast pool of daily occurrences, 
what is important. Struggles over framing decide which of the day’s many 
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happenings will be awarded significance. Today, the media have become critical 
arenas for this struggle, and social movements have increasingly focused on the 
media since it plays an influential role in assigning importance to issues facing the 
public. But gaining attention alone is not what a social movement wants; the real 
battle is over whose interpretation, whose framing of reality, gets the floor (p. 53; 
emphasis in original). 
Framing theory throws up a dilemma. On the one hand, protest paradigm studies 
suggest that activists who seek to gain media attention should expect that the mainstream 
media will distort or marginalize their viewpoints and messages. On the other hand, 
activists and the news media arguably need one another: Social movements provide 
dramatic stories that journalists crave, and the mass media certify protests and 
movements as important in the public eye (Gamson & Wolfsfeld 1993, pp. 116-117; 
Gitlin 1980, p. 24). Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) argue as well that social movements 
need the mass media in order to mobilize people, validate their status as important 
political actors, and broaden the scope of conflict (p. 116). For these reasons, theorists 
argue that generally speaking, activists should err on the side of seeking rather than 
avoiding media attention (Gamson & Wolfsfeld 1993; Gitlin 1980; McAdam 1996b; 
Ryan 1991). Keenly aware of the pitfalls and possibilities associated with mass media 
engagement, activists tend to agree. According to McAdam (1996b), 
Activists are neither deluded into thinking the media are important nor driven by 
their egos to court media attention. The simple fact is, most movements lack the 
conventional political resources possessed by their opponents and thus must seek 
to offset this power disparity by appeals to other parties. The media come to be 
seen … as the key vehicle for such influence attempts (p. 346). 
Moreover, capitalist-owned websites such as Facebook and Twitter can be a major 
unifying tool and indeed journalists turn to social media in search of newsworthy trends, 
emerging political concerns, and movement building stories, as occurred during the 
Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter movements. 
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Mobilization and cohesion within social movements depend on movement 
participants constructing, maintaining, and altering a collective identity, i.e., a sense of 
belonging to the movement (Melucci 1989, p. 34). Framing theorists argue that identity 
constructions are proffered and affirmed through engagement in collective action itself, 
as well as through collective action framing processes (Benford & Snow 2000; Hunt, 
Benford, & Snow 1994; Snow et al. 1986). “Not only do framing processes link 
individuals and groups ideologically but they proffer, buttress, and embellish identities 
that range from collaborative to conflictual,” according to Hunt, Benford, and Snow 
(1994, p. 185). Through intragroup discursive activity, movement participants form 
collective identities as well as define grievances, social problems, their causes, and 
strategies for addressing them. Increasingly, social media and other internet-based tools 
facilitate the formation of these collective identities (Harlow & Guo 2014). 
Gamson (1990) writes that a collective action frame “has three elements: (a) it 
defines the root of the problem and its solution collectively rather than individually; (b) it 
defines antagonists—‘us’ and ‘them’; and (c) it defines an injustice that can be corrected 
through the challenger’s action” (p. 155). Benford and Snow (2000) define collective 
action frames as “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate 
the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (p. 614). They write: 
[Framing] denotes an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and 
contention at the level of reality construction. It is active in the sense that 
something is being done, and processual in the sense of a dynamic, evolving 
process. It entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social 
movement organizations or movement activists. And it is contentious in the sense 
that it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from 
existing ones but that may also challenge them. The resultant products of this 
framing activity are referred to as “collective action frames” (ibid.). 
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An important part of movement recruitment is “frame alignment,” which refers to 
“the linkage of individual and SMO [social movement organization] interpretive 
orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO 
activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary” (Snow et al. 1986, p. 
464). Activists and movements encourage frame alignment in various ways, such as by 
trying to appeal to other, sympathetic activists, or by stretching their frames to 
accommodate diverse views. When collective action frames resonate with or appeal to 
audiences, i.e., the targets of mobilization, they achieve “frame resonance” (Benford & 
Snow 2000; Snow & Benford 1988; Snow et al. 1986). That is to say, successful frames 
work because people find them convincing or appealing. 
Framing theory’s main strategic implication for media activism, then, is that 
activists can work to counter the influence of dominant framing and the protest paradigm 
by articulating and promoting their own collective action frames in the mass media arena 
(Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991; Ryan, Carragee, & Meinholder 2001; Zald 1996). Of course, it 
not as if the mass media will unproblematically transmit a faithful interpretation of a 
group or movement’s collective action frame. Thus, there are important considerations 
involved with these “strategic framing” processes (Ryan 1991; Smith 2002; Zald 1996). 
 
Framing and Cultural Resonances 
To begin, although framing struggles are informational struggles, they are not 
merely disputes over which side has its facts straight. Indeed, two or more competing 
frames may all convey true information (Ryan 1991, p. 54-56, 79). Framing struggles can 
be understood only within the context of a society’s culture—its shared beliefs and 
understandings, symbols, and language—because framing contests are born from cultural 
 172 
breaks and contradictions (Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991; Zald 1996). These contradictions 
“occur and lead into mobilization when two or more cultural themes that are potentially 
contradictory are brought into active contradiction by the force of events, or when the 
realities of behavior are seen to be substantially different than the ideological 
justifications for the movement,” writes Zald (1996, p. 268). Activists and movements 
actively construct strategic frames in order to draw attention to cultural contradictions. 
For example, by recognizing and articulating the contradiction between democratic 
values and the unequal treatment of women and people of color, activists in the United 
States since the 1950s have been able to force the issues of racism and sexism onto the 
public stage. According to Ryan (1991), every society features cultural resonances in 
which challengers can base their own frames. 
Cultural resonances are used to shape generally recognizable plots (rags to riches, 
power corrupts). They offer easily recognized social/cultural stereotypes of 
characters (evil villains, honorable victims, noble heroes and heroines), and they 
reinforce general social goals, i.e., the underlying or implicit values that shape the 
way the mainstream media organize their impressions of society. For the United 
States, these include belief in capitalist democracy, centrism in political thought, 
and emphasis on individualism. … The more a frame draws from the rich web of 
cultural resonances, the more likely it will be accepted as the obvious, natural way 
to interpret reality (pp. 79-80). 
Large movements also cultivate culturally resonant “master frames” that later 
movements may draw on; these are generic collective action frames that shape discourse 
within movements, appeal to broad, diverse audiences, and influence activists’ tactical 
decisions. For example, several left-progressive movements operate under a nonviolence 
master frame, which originated with the civil rights movement, and as a result find it 
difficult to use or endorse violent tactics. The civil rights movement also provides 
language, as well as an equal rights and opportunities master frame, which several other 
movements have adopted and incorporated into their specific movement campaigns 
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(Benford 2013; McAdam 1996a; Snow & Benford 1988; 1992; Zald 1996, p. 269). As 
framing theorist Robert Benford (2013) observes: 
Whereas most collective action frames are context specific (e.g., drunk driver 
frame, cold war frame, exploited worker frame, environmental justice frame, etc.), 
a master frame’s articulations and attributions are sufficiently elastic, flexible, and 
inclusive enough so that any number of other social movements can successfully 
adopt and deploy it in their campaigns. Typically, once a social movement 
fashions and espouses a highly resonant frame that is broad in interpretive scope, 
other social movements within a cycle of protest will modify that frame and apply 
it to their own cause. 
 
Journalistic Codes and Templates of Organization 
Besides tapping into culturally resonant themes, activists must also frame 
information and messages in ways that conform to journalists’ needs. Research confirms 
that reporters, editors, photographers, and other newsworkers are not passive conduits for 
frames and information; they work with established routines and practices, which allow 
them to produce news relatively easily and efficiently, and are sensitive to perceived 
threats to their objectivity and autonomy (Gans 1979; Schudson 2011; Sigal 1973; 
Tuchman 1972; 1978). Moreover, as David Altheide (1976) argues, “the organizational, 
practical, and other mundane features of newswork promote a way of looking at events 
which fundamentally distorts them” (p. 24). In order to limit this distortion and attract 
journalists’ attention, activists make use of several templates of organization and 
repertoires of contention, i.e., techniques of social protest (Ryan 1991; Tarrow 2011; 
Tilly 1977; 1995; 2008; Zald 1996).  
Templates of organization refer to skills and technology of communication that 
may be drawn from the whole society; media-related templates of organization that 
activists commonly rely on include writing op-eds and letters to the editor, granting 
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interviews to journalists, appearing on talk shows, issuing press releases, holding press 
conferences, creating websites, and using social media. Repertoires of contention, on the 
other hand, are available from the whole social movement sector; media-related 
repertoires of contention that activists commonly use include protests and 
demonstrations, picket lines, public acts of civil disobedience, street theater, and various 
kinds of political violence (Kahn 1991, pp. 204-221; Ryan 1991; Salzman 2003; Zald 
1996, p. 267).* Effectively using both sets of tools requires activists to understand various 
aspects of how journalists and the mass news media operate. Although an in-depth 
evaluation of specific framing-related media tactics falls outside the scope of this study, 
relevant concerns include: journalistic conceptions of newsworthiness, packaging news 
stories, attention-grabbing visual elements, what makes for a good soundbite or slogan, 
and so on (Jensen 2001; McHale 2004; Ryan 1991; Salzman 2003).† 
Often, though, sensitivity to journalists’ needs means playing into the logic of the 
protest paradigm, which values spectacle over ideas. Research indicates that a group’s 
tactics—more than its goals—influences how much and what kinds of coverage it will 
receive (Boyle, McLeod, & Armstrong 2012; McLeod 2007). “A peaceful protest that 
focuses on articulating issue positions is not likely to fit established news conventions for 
what makes a good news story. As such, protest groups often engage in activities that 
provide the kind of drama that garners media attention,” observes McLeod (2007, p. 
185). Boykoff (2006a) argues that journalistic norms bracket mass media’s framing 
                                                 
* From an anarchist perspective, certain repertoires of contention are of concern because their use depends 
in the first place on the approval of authorities, such as parades and marches, which require permits. 
Similarly, authorities’ attempts to impose so-called “free speech zones” at protests and on university 
campuses are clearly attempts to enclose public space and render activists toothless. 
† For an excellent (if somewhat dated) compendium of activist media tactics, see Jason Salzman’s (2003) 
Making the News: A Guide for Activists and Nonprofits. See also George Lakoff’s (2004) Don’t Think of an 
Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate—The Essential Guide for Progressives. 
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practices, which pressures activists to radicalize their tactics and rhetoric to gain 
attention: 
The interplay between social movements and the mass media results in a dialectic 
of escalation in which dissidents feel pressed to amp up their tactics. Escalation is 
both a reaction to the ability of social movement opponents to adapt to previous 
tactics as well as the result of the mass media’s unquenchable penchant for 
novelty. Dissident challengers, who are almost by definition at a disadvantage in 
terms of social status and resources, often try to make up for these limitations by  
engaging in exceptional, creative actions that are designed to gain mass-media 
attention. Carrying out contained, sanctioned actions is not likely to get mass-
media attention, but disruptive, novel events improve the chances of mass-media 
interest. This creates a dilemma where dissidents feel compelled to foment protest 
activities that are novel enough to be newsworthy, yet not easily dismissible as 
gimmicky, violent, or weird, or that distract from or trivialize their social 
movement goals. This can be a fine line to walk. Even if social movements are 
successful in garnering mainstream press, they nevertheless have to ceaselessly 
adapt since what is considered exceptional, and therefore newsworthy, is an ever-
shifting category. This all leads to the fomentation of “pseudo-events” 
characterized by inflated rhetoric and militancy beyond the group’s capabilities, 
which sets the table for mass-media deprecation (p. 203). 
Moreover, once a large national movement—e.g., the civil rights movement, the New 
Left, Occupy Wall Street, or Black Lives Matter—finds itself in the media’s “floodlit 
social terrain,” there is no going back (Gitlin 1980, pp. 1-3). This suggests that activists 
should tread carefully when stepping into the spotlight. 
 
Framing and Alternative/Activist Media 
Framing theory also points to the significance of activist/alternative media as a 
tool or resource. William Gamson and David Meyer (1996) write that “movement organs 
can play an important role as an organizing resource. They convey activist frames and 
information, and can become part of a shared movement culture. On a more mundane 
level, they can provide a reliable source of organizing information, such as where and 
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when a demonstration will take place” (pp. 287-288). Available framing research also 
suggests that activists have more latitude in strategic framing online than conventional 
mass media permit; however, it is unclear whether activists fully take advantage of the 
framing opportunities posed by online media (DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun 2012; Harlow & 
Johnson 2011; Zoch et al. 2008). Arguably, capitalist-owned social media such as 
Facebook, Tumblr, and Twitter mitigate these concerns because they allow activists to 
take advantage of media consumption habits in the socio-technological complex by 
directly reaching a potentially ever-growing group. However, activists who rely 
exclusively or primarily on these social media for outreach are playing in someone else’s 
sandbox. 
 
Avoiding Media Coverage: A Non-Implication 
Finally, framing theory is notable for what it does not imply. As noted above, 
based on the available framing research, theorists conclude that although media 
treatments may be problematic, activists should nevertheless seek media attention. Yet 
this perspective overlooks that there they may be important reasons not to seek coverage. 
For example, movements often expend considerable resources in efforts to respond to the 
tactics of the dominant frame (Ryan 1991). Rather than waste resources to engage in 
framing struggles, activists may find that a more sensible course of action ignores or 
avoids framing contests altogether. In addition, framing accounts overlook that silence 
can serve a strategic purpose when activists confront certain dilemmas, such as: whether 
to engage with media outlets external to social movements; whether to respond to 
negative media coverage; and how to address or publicly deal with losing issues 
(Rohlinger 2015, pp. 5-10). Building on this insight, Deana Rohlinger advocates a 
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strategic choice approach for understanding media-movement interactions, which 
recognizes the importance of media framing of activists but also emphasizes that activists 
make decisions in light of current organizational and political realities (pp. 3-4). 
 
ANARCHISM AND FRAMING 
Framing theory represents a rich conceptual toolbox for examining issues such as: 
how the mass news media construct and promote dominant interpretations of reality; how 
these frames suppress activists, dissidents, and movements; how activists transform the 
mass media arena into a site of struggle; and how activists construct and promote their 
own narratives by tapping into cultural resonances and exploiting the routines and logic 
of news media systems. Given the vast literature on these topics, now spanning decades, 
it is hardly surprising that activists use framing concepts to evaluate strategic and tactical 
proposals, or that scholars, activists, and other critics express concern over how social-
political issues, activists, and movements are framed or depicted in coverage. Despite 
framing theory’s strengths and obvious appeal, though, anarchism problematizes much of 
its received wisdom regarding activist participation in framing processes, strategic frames 
and state power, media depictions of political violence, and the relationship between 
framing theory and power structures. 
 
Participation in Framing Processes 
To begin, from an anarchist perspective framing theory inadequately addresses 
the problem of unequal participation in meaning making. This stems from researchers’ 
tendency to anthropomorphize social movements, which leads them to gloss over 
ideological differences within movements and neglect the role that human agency plays 
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in constructing and promoting collective action frames. “Movement scholars often write 
about social movements as ‘speaking,’ ‘framing,’ ‘interpreting,’ ‘acting,’ and the like, 
that is, engaging in activities that only human beings are capable of doing. Social 
movements do not frame issues; their activists or other participants do the framing,” 
writes Benford (1997, p. 418). 
Within movements, groups, and organizations, certain voices wield more 
influence than others do in the construction of strategic frames and overarching master 
frames. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) argue that, because activists do not have automatic 
standing in the news media, journalists tend to treat activists as more or less credible 
according to their organizational strength, resources, professionalism, coordination, 
media sophistication, and objectives. In other words, activists’ influence over framing 
processes is partly a function of how well they emulate establishment actors. Strategic 
framing approaches tend to favor movement celebrities, spokespersons, media savvy 
organizers, large nonprofits and foundations, and activists whose views are more 
moderate than radical (Gamson & Wolfsfeld 1993; Gitlin 1980; Martin 1998; Mendes 
2011; Ryan 1991). This can be a significant disadvantage for marginalized groups such as 
women, people of color, immigrants, prisoners, gays and lesbians, transgendered people, 
political radicals, and others who historically have lacked social, economic, and political 
resources and power (Heider 2000; Mendes 2011; Zinn 1980/2003). This points to a 
catch-22: Framing theory suggests that marginalized groups stand to gain power by 
promoting their own frames, but it also implies that the relative success of strategic 
framing efforts depends on how much power those groups have in the first place. 
The participation problem is especially concerning given that so many media-
savvy activists are progressives and liberals connected to the non-profit industrial 
complex (NPIC), i.e., the “system of relationships between government, the owning 
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classes, foundations, and nonprofit social service and social justice organizations that 
results in the surveillance, control, derailment, and everyday management of political 
movements” (Rodriguez 2007, p. 21). Furthermore, due to differences in power, status, 
resources, cultural knowledge, education, race, and ethnicity, not all groups or activists 
can make effective use of the routinized templates of organization or repertoires of 
contention that define mainstream media activism. This is especially true of those who 
operate at the margins of society or outside the NPIC. For example, groups who lack 
economic power usually cannot afford to hire public relations firms or produce expensive 
press packets (Heider 2000, p. 58).  
Rather than accept or encourage tactical and strategic implications that privilege 
the views of NPIC-affiliated activists and other, more moderate actors over marginalized 
and radical voices, an anarchist approach to strategic framing might seek to increase the 
number of diverse views involved in frame construction, divert resources from the NPIC 
to grassroots efforts operating on shoestring budgets, and provide underrepresented, 
marginalized groups with more opportunities and room to make strategic framing choices 
and engage in media activism.  
 
Strategic Framing and the State 
Another anarchist concern is that activists’ strategic framing efforts can augment 
the power of state agencies and institutions. To take one example, zero tolerance laws and 
tough penalties for drunk driving are directly related to collaborative strategic framing 
efforts involving citizens groups such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving as well as 
federal, state, and local policymakers, who laid the blame for alcohol-related driving 
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deaths squarely on drunk drivers and embraced a law enforcement strategy to address this 
problem (McCarthy 1994). As McCarthy (1994) explains,  
[The] movement against drunk driving was only possible through the earlier 
efforts of federal, state, and local functionaries. It emerged without direct 
assistance from the state, but it could not have emerged when it did had the 
federal functionaries not worked so diligently and successfully in framing the 
issue and mobilizing a collectivity of diverse state advocates in support of it. Only 
with the movement’s emergence, however, were the many state functionaries able 
to bring their framing of the issue to wide public attention through the mass media 
(p. 155). 
Unlike the early 20
th
 century national prohibition movement, which treated 
alcoholism as a public health problem that threatened commerce and liberty (Blocker 
2006; Pegram 1998; Rumbarger 1989), the activist-sponsored anti-drunk driver frame 
adopts a law-and-order perspective that links alcohol consumption with criminal 
behavior. In doing so, the frame implicitly supports incareral policies that allow the state 
to penetrate people’s lives; in addition to facing jail time, fines, and community service, 
people with DUI and DWI convictions often find it more difficult to secure jobs, 
education, scholarships, and other opportunities. 
To take another example, over the past two decades, in the wake of several high 
profile mass shootings throughout the United States, activists in the gun control reform 
movement have engaged in strategic framing efforts to push for tighter federal 
restrictions on firearms. Mass shootings and other gun-related deaths and injuries are 
certainly a serious problem in this country, and research indicates that there is direct link 
between gun availability and homicides and suicides committed with firearms 
(Hemenway 2004; Hepburn & Hemenway 2004; Miller et al. 2006; Miller, Azrael, & 
Hemenway 2002; Miller & Hemenway 1999; 2001). More Americans now die by guns 
than cars, at a rate of over 30,000 fatalities a year, and Congress will not even allow the 
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Center for Disease Control to conduct research on this problem, because doing so would 
upset gun manufacturers (Diamond 2015). As Tom Diaz (1999) observes, firearms 
manufacturers “vigorously conceal information that most other U.S. industries routinely 
reveal. Indeed, the firearms industry is a business so secret that it makes the tobacco 
industry look like a model of transparency” (p. 5). Given the circumstances, it is easy to 
see why victims’ family members, parents and teachers, and other activists push for 
tougher regulations on people’s ability to own or purchase firearms. 
However, this frame does not address deeper issues related to the causes and 
consequences of gun violence and firearms control in the United States. In particular, gun 
control laws both stigmatize and criminalize those who are most affected by gun 
violence— namely, those defined as mentally ill, people of color, and queer, gender 
nonconforming, and transsexual folk of color—without addressing the sources of 
violence against these communities (Arkles 2013; Covert 2013; Gourevitch 2015; Kaplan 
& Kerby 2013; Metzi & MacLeish 2015). Gabriel Arkles (2013) writes: 
Gun control laws are a mechanism of this criminalization. Rather than preventing 
violence, most existing and proposed gun control laws increase violence through 
creating more mechanisms for the search, arrest, prosecution, and incarceration of 
marginalized communities, particularly communities of color. Laws purportedly 
about reducing guns and gun violence serve to justify greater use of guns on the 
part of law enforcement and  corrections  officers  to  enforce  those  laws (p. 
857). 
And as political scientist Alex Gourevitch (2015) observes: 
It is perhaps counterintuitive to say so but gun control responses to mass killings – 
whether racially motivated or otherwise – are a deep mistake. The standard form 
of gun control means writing more criminal laws, creating new crimes, and 
therefore creating more criminals or more reasons for police to suspect people of 
crimes. More than that, it means creating yet more pretexts for a militarized 
police, full of racial and class prejudice, to overpolice. 
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Furthermore, as these observations hint at, the gun control frame overlooks police 
killings of civilians, especially of young black men, even though Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, and the United Nations’ Human Rights Council have all criticized 
the United States for its police violence and racial discrimination (Amnesty 2015; Collins 
1998; Sheriff 2015). This frame also emphasizes mental illness in shooters, which is 
rarely a factor, while failing to address how white supremacy, misogyny, and toxic 
masculinity motivate killers who perpetrate mass shootings (Chu 2015; Metzi & 
MacLeish 2015). 
Rather than view gun violence as primarily a regulatory problem, an alternative 
collective action frame might treat it as a public health issue to be confronted in myriad 
ways, e.g., by promoting free access to mental and medical health care, racial justice, and 
true disarmament, that is, reducing widespread access to firearms but also disarming and 
demilitarizing the police, decreasing incarceration, keeping cops out of public schools 
and marginalized communities, and breaking up the military-prison-industrial complex 
(Alexander 2010; Arkles 2013; Balko 2013; Chu 2015; Williams 2015).* This framing 
would not only affirm radical values, but would also align with anarchism’s position that 
state crimes can be eliminated by abolishing the state (Martin 1995). 
 
Political Violence and Framing 
A major area of concern is the manner in which the protest paradigm and 
collective action frames, in particular the nonviolence master frame which has been 
carried down from the civil rights movement, shape perceptions of political violence and 
                                                 
* Similarly, in response to law-and-order media frames which advocate drug criminalization and other 
prohibition policies that disproportionately impact people of color (Alexander 2010), radical activists could 
frame decriminalization and harm reduction efforts as an appropriate response to drug abuse and addiction. 
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influence activists’ tactical options. Within the anarchist tradition, the use of violent 
tactics historically has been a complex issue. Not only do anarchists disagree on the role 
that violence plays in social struggles, but there is no general consensus on what 
constitutes violence (Anonymous1 1979/1990; Chan 2004; Epstein 2001; Gordon 2008; 
Martin 2008; Richards 1993; Schmidt & Van der Walt 2009; Wolff 1969).* Indeed, 
anarchists are even reluctant to describe actions as violent or use terms such as 
‘revolution’, suggesting that anarchism’s ideological ambivalence regarding political 
violence poses a “strategic paradox” (Chan 2004; Gordon 2008). 
It was not always so: In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, Marxists, anarchists, 
and other radicals all assumed that revolution would be a bloody affair. Insurrectionary 
anarchists such as Johann Most and Alexander Berkman even held that “propaganda of 
the deed”—assassinations, terrorism, and other acts of political violence and criminality 
carried out against members of the ruling class—could foment social revolution 
(Berkman 1912/1999; Gordon 2008; Schmidt & Van der Walt 2009). After these 
movements dispersed in the early 20
th
 century, though, the civil rights movement, which 
emerged in the 1950s, eschewed violent tactics, contributing to inspiring later social 
movements to do the same. According to Gordon (2008): 
It was only in the second half of the twentieth century that a principled 
commitment to non-violence came to the fore in the worldviews of progressive 
social movements. But this happened during a period where anarchism had 
already largely disappeared from the scene, and it was in its absence that civil 
rights and anti-war movements popularised the notion of non-violent action in 
public discourse, inspired by figures such as Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin 
Luther King. Later, the movements at whose intersection anarchism reappeared 
were either squarely rooted in this new tradition of civil-rights pacifism – as in the 
case of the women’s anti-nuclear movement – or focused on self-endangering 
                                                 
* These definitional disputes are well beyond the scope of this dissertation. For in-depth examination of 
anarchist thinking on violence, see Chan (2004) and Gordon (2008), pp. 78-108. 
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tactics without too much attention to questions of violence – as in the case of 
direct-action environmental defence (pp. 80-81). 
As a result, when anarchism reemerged with political inertia in the 1990s, it found 
itself in “an environment where a culture of non-violent radicalism had achieved a 
hegemonic status,” which has weakened creative thinking on the issue (p. 81). Against 
this perceived hegemony, some anarchists and other radicals argue that pacifism—the 
belief that political violence of any kind is unjustifiable under any circumstances—is a 
pathological, counterrevolutionary philosophy (Churchill 1998; Gelderloos 2007; 2013; 
Ryan 1998). In response to critics and activists’ arguments that violent tactics are 
unethical, many anarchists counter that whether activists should use violence is a tactical 
question, not a moral one; against claims that nonviolent tactics are proven to be 
effective, these anarchists contend that activists ought to embrace a diversity of tactics, 
“meaning effective combinations drawn from a full range of tactics that might lead to 
liberation from all components of this oppressive system: white supremacy, patriarchy, 
capitalism, and the state,” according to Gelderloos (2007, p. 3). This is not to say, of 
course, that advocates of tactical diversity believe violent tactics are appropriate or 
necessary in every situation. 
Moreover, there are limits on what violent tactics can realistically achieve 
(Gordon 2008); very few anarchists believe political conditions are ideal for violent 
revolution.* In any case, it is fair to say that even though anarchists remain divided on the 
subject of political violence, nevertheless anarchist argumentation, practice, and modern 
warfare have eroded the taboo on violent repertories of contention over the past two 
decades (Epstein 2001, p. 12; Gordon 2008, p. 86). Although most reject lethal actions 
such as bombings and assassinations, contemporary anarchists and other radical anti-
                                                 
* Even so, the anarchist view of tactical diversity arguably is too broad, because it does not rule out any 
methods, including assassinations, land mines, or biological weapons. For discussion, see Martin (2008). 
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capitalists sometimes rely on nonlethal violent tactics at protests and demonstrations, 
such as property destruction and confrontations with police (Gelderloos 2007; 2013; 
Gordon 2008; Van Deusen & Massot 2010). 
Because these actions, which directly challenge the nonviolence master frame, are 
covered by the mass media from the perspective of the protest paradigm—and perhaps 
more importantly, because deprecatory media coverage of violent social protest provokes 
intense debate among activists—the use of political violence raises important questions 
about its appropriateness and political consequences. Without arguing for or against the 
use of violent tactics, and while remaining agnostic on the question of what constitutes 
violence, it is useful to examine some of the issues at the heart of activist debate on this 
topic.  
A major dispute among anarchists and other radical activists concerns whether 
violent tactics divert attention from the social issues that activists seek to address, or 
otherwise distract from their strategic framing efforts at protests and demonstrations. This 
is closely related to another concern, namely, whether violent tactics aid movement 
efforts to gain public support, attract new recruits, or raise consciousness. To take a 
notable example, during the 1999 anti-WTO protests in Seattle, which united over 70,000 
alter-globalization activists in massive street demonstrations, a small contingent of 
anarchists—numbering perhaps a few hundred—clashed with police and destroyed 
commercial retail property while participating in “Black Blocs,” i.e., ad hoc affinity 
groups made up of individuals who wear black clothing and masks in order to remain 
anonymous and show solidarity with one another. As a tactic, the Black Bloc allows 
activists to push protests into more militant directions, such as property destruction and 
street fighting with police, while protecting participants from being arrested, identified, 
and/or prosecuted (Active Transformation 2002; Albert 1999; Epstein 2001; Infoshop 
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2004; Van Deusen & Massot 2010).* After mass news media circulated images of 
activists smashing the windows of corporate storefronts in downtown Seattle, those who 
participated in Black Blocs defended their actions in communiques (Van Deusen & 
Massot 2010), arguing that “window smashing, and the police violence that it provoked, 
had brought the attention of the media and given the demonstration a prominence that it 
would not have otherwise had,” according to Epstein (2001, p. 12). 
Unconvinced by the anarchists’ justification for property destruction, veteran 
activists criticized those who engaged in violence. Writing in Z Magazine shortly after 
the events, Michael Albert (1999) leveled several criticisms against these actions: 
The events in Seattle had, before any trashing occurred, already entirely 
hamstrung the WTO. … The addition of trashing had no positive effects. It did 
not win useful visibility that would otherwise have been absent. It did not enlarge 
the number of folks participating or empathizing with the demonstration. It did 
not cause more substantive information to be conveyed either in the mainstream 
or on the left. It did not respect much less enlarge democracy. What it did do, 
instead, was (a) divert attention from the real issues, (b) provide a pretext for 
repression which would otherwise have been unequivocally seen as crushing 
legitimate dissent, and (c) and arguably most important, cause many to feel that 
dissent is an unsympathetic undertaking in which instead of actors respecting one 
another, some, at least, feel that they have the right to undemocratically violate 
the intentions and desires of most others. 
Other participants and observers proffered similar criticisms. For instance, in an 
open letter to the demonstrators, a group of movement veterans argued that those who 
engaged in property destruction possibly shut out opportunities for consciousness raising, 
destroyed their own credibility by displaying a lack of consciousness (such as a protestor 
who destroyed a Nike window while wearing Nike shoes), possibly “contributed to turn 
off average people from the crucial central message that these corporations are the real 
                                                 
* The origins of the Black Bloc can be traced to European autonomist social movements of the 1970s-
1990s, in particular Germany’s Autonome movement, who adopted militant tactics in order to create and 
defend free spaces (Katsiaficas 1997/2006; Van Deusen & Massot 2010). 
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vandals and violators,” and “allowed the media to replace coverage of mass mobilization 
with fringe vandalism” (Campbell et al. 2002, pp. 192-193). Various left-progressive 
accounts of the “Battle of Seattle” have also sought to distance the anti-WTO protestors 
from expressions of anarchist militancy (e.g., Solnit & Solnit 2009; Thomas 2000). 
This debate between defenders and opponents of political violence might be 
thought of as representing, on some level, a dispute over the significance of framing 
concepts. Even if they do not mention ideas such as media framing, activists who oppose 
political violence on public alienation grounds implicitly hitch their assessment of these 
tactics to the protest paradigm and nonviolence master frame, that is, a specific 
theoretical conception of news media performance, its likely effects on media audiences, 
and associated strategic implications. On the other side of this coin, activists who endorse 
or condone the use of violent tactics may be thought of as rejecting the basic precepts of 
the nonviolence master frame and the protest paradigm’s implied political consequences. 
From this vantage point, it could be argued that those who base their tactical analyses in 
the protest paradigm take a dim view of activists’ agency in framing processes, as well as 
of media audience members’ ability to draw their own conclusions from news accounts 
of activism and social protest. 
One possible alternative approach would be to modify theoretical conceptions by 
incorporating ideas such as audience reception theory and resistant reading, which stress 
that media audiences often receive and interpret media texts (information, messages, etc.) 
in counterintuitive ways, which their original communicators (in this case, journalists 
working in the mass news media) might not have intended, and which might even 
transcend prevailing cultural attitudes and beliefs (Fetterley 1978; Fiske 1987/2011; Hall 
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1980; Holub 1984/2003; Jauss 1982).* This approach, which recognizes that media 
audience members can actively engage with cultural texts and look past dominant 
interpretations of reality, values the autonomy/agency of activists and media audiences. It 
also moves beyond the protest paradigm’s adversarial conception of news media to 
suggest how deprecatory news coverage of activists can possibly serve a strategic 
purpose. Psychological research indicates that there is value in random, unanticipated, or 
disruptive stimuli, because this can foster creative thinking (Schooler & Dougal 1999). 
Those who think about media-movement interactions along these lines might consider it 
valuable for activists to embrace disruptive resistance tactics and their status as deviant 
actors. In this view, disparaging news coverage of activist violence can, somewhat 
paradoxically, actually attract public support for a movement or draw more people to a 
cause. This is especially true when media audiences are already skeptical of how mass 
news media frame social-political information, events, and issues.† 
This perspective is exemplified by Gelderloos (2007), for example, who suggests 
that mass media coverage of activist violence at the anti-WTO protests actually had 
positive political consequences: 
The official claim was that the violence of the protests demonized the entire 
movement…. In fact, the violence of Seattle intrigued and attracted more new 
people to the movement than were attracted by the tranquility of any subsequent 
mass mobilization. The corporate media did not—and never will—explain the 
motives of the activists, but the violence, the visible manifestation of passion and 
fury, of militant commitment in an otherwise absurd world, motivated thousands 
to do that research on their own (p. 57). 
                                                 
* I thank Harry Cleaver for introducing me to these concepts and discussing their implications. Reception 
theory adds an important dimension to anarchist and autonomist conceptualizations of news media and 
popular culture, even if it is rarely discussed in these theoretical contexts. 
† According to Gallup (2012; 2014b) data, in the United States, trust in mass news media has reached an 
all-time low while there has been a sharp uptick in the number of Americans who believe the mass media 
are too conservative. 
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Moreover, there is no reason in principle why mass media coverage of political 
violence must always be palatable to media audiences in order to advance a movement’s 
goals. For instance, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF)—a clandestine, leaderless 
network of radicals who use direct action methods in order to protect the rights of 
nonhuman animals—arguably benefits from deprecatory media treatments, because even 
bad press coverage of acts of sabotage and violence committed by ALF activists 
advances the goal of animal liberation by contesting widespread cultural ignorance about 
animal suffering. When in August 2003 animal rights activists bombed the offices of the 
Chiron Corporation because of its ties to Huntingdon Life Sciences, a biomedical 
research company that tests on animals, the event was covered by over a hundred 
newspapers and reminded millions of Americans that not everyone condones vivisection 
(Dawn 2004). 
Of course, even if political violence can attract media coverage that possibly 
benefits activists, this does not necessarily translate to heightened consciousness or other 
indicators of movement growth. Critics challenge “riot porn”— videos and photos of 
riots and confrontations between activists and police—on the grounds that these images 
merely fetishize political violence (Harvey 2009; Nomad 2013; Razsa 2014). 
Furthermore, because activist violence is typically met with state violence, an important 
issue to consider is the extent to which media depictions of violent tactics invite state 
repression, such as by heightening the risk of inciting police violence against activists 
involved in protests and demonstrations (e.g., Albert 1999; Epstein 2001; Harvey 2009). 
Defenders of tactical diversity do not appear to disagree with the critics on this point. 
However, they argue that the threat of repression is not a compelling reason to exclude 
violent tactics from the activist toolbox. Activist violence invites state repression, sure, 
but this is to be expected when issuing a violent challenge to the state. As Mike Ryan 
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(1998) asks, “Do we really believe that if we could devise a non-violent means of 
eliminating the state we would be allowed to proceed unhindered in carrying it out? The 
state is violent in its very nature” (p. 135; emphasis in original). It should be noted, too, 
that activists are not always responsible for inciting violence. During the anti-WTO 
protests, police began attacking demonstrators before Black Bloc participants began to 
act, and in fact, the first act of property destruction occurred when police fired a tear gas 
grenade through a store window (Active Transformation 2002, p. 188). 
Over the past decade, following the demise of the anti-war and Occupy Wall 
Street movements, anarchists and other radicals have begun to question the usefulness of 
violent tactics such as Black Blocs and property destruction, as well as nonviolent tactics 
such as protests, press conferences, and sit-ins, because these have become stale, 
routinized behaviors for journalists, activists, media audiences, and the targets of social 
protest (e.g., Day 2005; Nomad 2013). However, most activists have avoided hard 
conversations about whether certain strategies and tactics remain relevant, and continue 
to rely on familiar or comfortable repertoires of contention, which now might be 
moribund. Even though the global protests against the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq in 
February 2003 were the largest in recorded human history, it is doubtful that these actions 
had any appreciable impact on U.S. policy. In fact, war planners likely viewed these 
actions as completely irrelevant, and within a few years, participation in the U.S. antiwar 
movement dropped off significantly. A two-year survey study of 5,398 antiwar activists 
in 24 different U.S. cities showed that the movement demobilized as Democrats, who had 
been motivated to join antiwar efforts by anti-Republican sentiment, withdrew from 
antiwar activity, putting their efforts into political campaigns (Heaney & Rojas 2011). 
Activist “summit-hopping”— journeying around the country, continent, or world in order 
to attend a series of mass demonstrations—has been criticized as an exclusionary, elitist 
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practice that fails to connect with local organizing efforts (Burns 2012; Day 2005; Pastor 
& LoPresti 2004). Critics also argue that Black Blocs and riot porn are divorced from real 
strategies for social change (e.g., Harvey 2009). Arguably radical anti-capitalists are in 
the midst of a tactical impasse (Anonymous2 2013; Nomad 2013).  
A final concern related to media coverage of political violence is whether violent 
tactics are compatible with anarchism’s ethical-political commitments and emphasis on 
prefigurative politics (Albert 1999; Gordon 2008; Martin 2008). Gordon (2008) 
summarizes the problem: 
Can violence ever be coherent with strategies that are an embryonic 
representation of an anarchist society? Unlike other revolutionary movements, 
anarchists explicitly distance themselves from the position that the end justifies 
the means. They cannot say that violence, on whatever level, would be justified 
because it helps achieve a free society. Rather, they believe that means and ends 
should always be of the same substance (pp. 97-98). 
As a defender of strict nonviolence, Martin (2008) argues that nonviolent social 
protest can be organized openly, allowing for widespread participation in activism, 
including of women, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities, and that 
nonviolence is compatible with the goal of living in a society without organized violence. 
On the other hand, as Gordon (2008) observes, it can be argued by defenders of tactical 
diversity that “anarchist violence against the state is precisely prefigurative of anarchist 
social relations,” because anarchists would expect people to defend themselves from 
attempts to reconstitute or impose social hierarchy (p. 99). 
 
Framing’s Inattention to Power 
A notable strength of framing research is its ideational component, which values 
activists’ goals and beliefs as they relate to collection action framing processes. However, 
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framing research may be criticized for overlooking the roles that ideology and powerful 
institutional actors play in shaping news media frames (Carragee & Roefs 2004; Oliver & 
Johnston 2000). Whereas early framing studies such as Gitlin’s (1980) emerged from the 
critical research tradition and focused on how powerful social, political, and cultural 
influences shape frame construction processes, recent studies tended to move away from 
these roots. Reese (2007), for instance, laments that framing researchers will often “give 
an obligatory nod to the literature before proceeding to do whatever they were going to 
do in the first place,” while graduate students he works with use framing theory simply as 
a hook for their content analyses (p. 151). Recognizing this limitation, some researchers 
have argued that critical theoretical concepts such as ideology, media hegemony, and 
political economy may serve as useful correctives to the neglect of power in framing 
research (Carragee & Roefs 2004; Oliver & Johnston 2000; Tedrow 2009; 2011; 
Woehrle, Coy, & Maney 2008). 
 
DOMINANT IDEOLOGY AND MEDIA HEGEMONY 
Do all power struggles reduce to acts of coercion and resistance, or can groups 
secure and maintain power without using force or violence to impose their will? The 
writings of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, and Antonio Gramsci invite radicals to consider 
the role that ideology plays in power struggles, especially in Western democratic 
capitalist societies such as the United States, where outright coercion is generally 
considered unusual.* The term ‘ideology’ is a slippery, contested concept, infused with 
                                                 
* Radicals such as Chomsky argue that in democratic capitalist societies, mind management via propaganda 
and public relations replaces the social control function that violence serves in totalitarian countries. On the 
historical roots of this in the United States, see Alex Carey’s (1997) important book, Taking the Risk Out of 
Democracy. Although Herman and Chomsky (1988/2002) do not cite Carey in Manufacturing Consent, the 
2002 edition of their masterful work is dedicated to Carey and Herbert Schiller, two scholars who virtually 
pioneered the study of corporate propaganda. After Carey committed suicide in 1987, Chomsky and others 
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multiple, incompatible meanings due to its wide application in different texts related to 
philosophy, history, sociology, Marxism, feminism, race, politics, language, media, 
communications, and other fields of study (Eagleton 1991; Larrain 1979; Lull 2000; 
McLellan 1995; Rehman 2013; Thompson 1984; 1990).*  For this reason, it is useful to 
begin by examining some important dimensions of the term as it appears in activist and 
critical scholarly discourse. 
According to John Thompson (1990), a prominent theorist of ideology, 
conceptions of ideology are either neutral or critical. “Neutral conceptions are those 
which purport to characterize phenomena as ideology or ideological without implying 
that these phenomena are necessarily misleading, illusory or aligned with the interests of 
any particular group” (p. 53). Neutral conceptions may also be described as 
nonevaluative conceptions. According to philosopher Tommie Shelby (2003), “The 
nonevaluative use of ‘ideology’ is epistemically and morally neutral: it does not take a 
stand on whether one should accept or oppose a given ideology” (p.156; emphasis in 
original). Activists and scholars employ neutral/nonevaluative conceptions when they 
define ideology broadly to refer to the organized systems of beliefs, values, aspirations, 
and/or worldviews of specific individuals, groups, classes, or institutions. For instance, 
James Lull (2000) formulates a neutral conception of ideology: 
In the most general sense, ideology is organized thought – sets of values, 
orientations, and predispositions that are expressed through technologically 
mediated and interpersonal communication. Ideologies are internally coherent 
ways of thinking. They are points of view that may or may not be “true;” that is, 
ideologies are not necessarily grounded in historically or empirically verifiable 
fact. Ideologies may be tightly or loosely organized. Some are complex and well 
                                                                                                                                                 
endeavored to bring his work to a wider audience. Nevertheless, Carey’s work is still not widely known 
outside of (or even within) academic circles. 
* Indeed, even within Marx’s prodigious body of writing, the term ‘ideology’ takes on multiple meanings. 
For more, see Michèle Barrett’s (1991) The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault, Chapter 1. 
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integrated; others endure. Some meet strong resistance; others have immediate 
and phenomenal impact (p. 13; emphasis in original). 
In the neutral view, different political ideologies include fascism, nationalism, 
conservativism, liberalism, socialism, Marxism, anarchism, and so on. Religious and 
spiritual belief systems such as Christianity and Islam also represent ideologies, as do 
other internally coherent ways of thinking about different aspects of social reality, such as 
sexism, racism, patriotism, anthropocentrism, and technological determinism. 
Institutional actors may also be said to operate according to ideologies, such as 
corporatism or neoliberalism. These ideologies guide action by helping those who ascribe 
to these belief systems to explain and interpret the world. They make specific normative 
claims about the social order and people’s roles therein. Ideologies prescribe how things 
should be, distinguish between right and wrong (as well as positive and negative, etc.), 
and provide bases for evaluating competing belief systems. 
Critical conceptions of ideology, on the other hand, “are those which convey a 
negative, critical or pejorative sense. Unlike neutral conceptions, critical conceptions 
imply that the phenomena characterized as ideology or ideological are misleading, 
illusory, or one-sided; and the very characterization of phenomena as ideology carries 
with it an implicit criticism or condemnation of them,” according to Thompson (1990, pp. 
53-4). Critical conceptions may also be described as evaluative conceptions. “To claim 
that a particular belief system is ideological, in the evaluative sense, is to impute to the 
system of belief some negative characteristic(s) that provides a reason to reject it (or at 
least some significant part of it) in its present form,” observes Shelby (2003, p. 157). 
Activists, dissidents, critical scholars, and others employ critical conceptions when they 
criticize, disparage, or condemn specific ideas or beliefs by labeling them as ‘ideology’ 
and/or ‘ideological’. For instance, many leftists would label as ideological the belief that 
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poor folk could improve their lot by working harder, because this belief assumes a 
capitalist view of economic reality and a just social order.* 
Thompson (1990) argues that neutral conceptions tend to overlook several 
problems related to the intersection of power and belief, which critical conceptions were 
formulated in order to draw attention to (e.g., Marx 1859/1970; Marx & Engels 
1932/1970). It is troubling, but hardly surprising, that status quo defenders dismiss 
radical left views as ideological, with no apparent sense of irony. Even so, there are 
important difficulties associated with critical conceptions. A main one, as Terry Eagleton 
(1991) observes, is that “not every body of belief which people commonly term 
ideological is associated with a dominant political power” (p. 6; emphasis in original). 
For example, many activists and scholars find it useful to speak of socialist or feminist 
ideologies as distinct from capitalist or sexist ideologies. It is also worth mentioning that 
this dissertation employs a neutral conception of ideology in its examination of 
communications scholars’ different research orientations. Neutral conceptions cannot be 
dispensed with simply because they create antinomies; indeed, these conceptions 
arguably reflect how the term ‘ideology’ most commonly is used. 
Another difficulty associated with critical conceptions is that the object of 
criticism is not always entirely clear. Here Shelby (2003) offers clarification: 
[T]he charge of ideology … can be directed at symbolic representations that are 
embodied, not in the consciousness of individuals, but in discourse and cultural 
                                                 
* Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan Turner (1980) draw a similar distinction as Thompson 
(1990) and Shelby (2003): “It is widely agreed that the notion of ‘ideology’ has given rise to more 
analytical and conceptual difficulties than almost any other term in the social sciences. … One issue in 
particular has bedeviled theoretical debate, namely, whether to understand the term in a special or in a 
general sense. In the first sense, ‘ideology’ is taken to refer to distinctive kinds of belief which are 
produced by particular social structures. ‘Ideology’ understood in this sense typically refers to false beliefs, 
although there is considerable room for dispute as to the precise way in which they are false. … By 
contrast, to employ the term ‘ideology’ in the general sense means that it can refer to any set of beliefs 
regardless of its social causation or its truth or falsity” (p. 187). 
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products, such as slogans, jokes, print media, film, theater, music, art, 
advertisements, television programming, web sites, and the like (p. 158). 
For instance, media texts that invoke racist stereotypes—e.g., that blacks are athletes, 
criminals, or unintelligent—can be described as ideological in the critical sense (Bristor, 
Lee, & Hunt 1995; Ewen & Ewen 2008; Hall 1995; Shelby 2003). 
Stuart Hall (1995) relates three important points about ideologies: First, 
“ideologies do not consist of isolated and separate concepts, but in the articulation of 
different elements into a distinctive set or chain of meanings” (p. 18). For instance, in 
liberal ideology, terms such as ‘capitalism’ and ‘freedom’ may be associated with 
individual liberty and the free market, whereas these terms take on very different 
meanings in radical left political ideologies such as Marxism or anarchism, which 
consider capitalism to be an unjust economic system and view the pursuit of freedom as a 
collective enterprise. Second, although individuals can make ideological assertions, 
“ideologies are not the product of individual consciousness or intention. Rather, we 
formulate our intentions within ideology” (p. 19; emphasis in original). Unlike frames, 
which people actively construct and promote, ideologies are formed collectively through 
unconscious processes. People speak through ideologies, which pre-date individuals and 
provide them the means to make sense of their social environments. “The transformation 
of ideologies is thus a collective process and practice, not an individual one,” he writes 
(ibid.). Third, according to Hall, “ideologies ‘work’ by constructing for their subjects 
(individual and collective) positions of identification and knowledge which allow them to 
‘utter’ ideological truths as if they were their authentic authors” (ibid.). 
Despite the conceptual ambiguities associated with the term, for activists, 
dissidents, and scholars, ideology—in both its neutral/nonevaluative and 
critical/evaluative senses—is a foundational concept for understanding the power of 
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cultural and informational institutions such as schools, organized religion, the culture 
industries (music, cinema, television, etc.), and the mass news media. For activists and 
dissidents, an issue of particular significance is the perceived role of bourgeois ideology 
in defending the status quo and preserving dominant class relations. Below, I examine 
two accounts of mass media which develop this theme: the dominant ideology thesis and 
the media hegemony thesis. 
 
Dominant Ideology Thesis 
Critical conceptions of ideology can be traced to Marx and Engels, who argued 
that the bourgeoisie, i.e., society’s ruling class, obscures capitalist oppression and masks 
its true intentions by producing and transmitting ideological phenomena, defined 
asymmetrically as those ideas, values, and aspirations which express the interests of the 
ruling class (Marx 1859/1970, p. 21; Marx & Engels 1932/1970; Thompson 1990). In a 
famous passage in their book The German Ideology, Marx and Engels (1932/1970) write: 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class 
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its 
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so 
that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental 
production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal 
expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material 
relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one 
class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals 
composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and 
therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent 
and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, 
hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate 
the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the 
ruling ideas of the epoch (p. 64-65; emphasis in original). 
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This view of ideology lays the foundation for the dominant ideology thesis of 
mass media, which may be summarized as follows: There exists a set of beliefs, values, 
and aspirations which constitute a “dominant ideology” that reflects the interests of those 
who belong to society’s ruling class, who stand to benefit from its influence. As members 
of the ruling class, those who own and control the mass media and culture industries 
manipulate media content, both overtly and subtly, in order to disseminate dominant 
ideology to the members of the working class. The propagation of dominant ideology 
creates widespread acceptance of capitalism and society’s class structure among members 
of the working class—what Marxists refer to as false consciousness—which produces 
working class quiescence despite unfair and oppressive economic conditions. Because it 
inhibits the development of working class consciousness, the influence of dominant 
ideology is instrumental in reproducing class relations in capitalist society, as well as 
neutralizing anti-capitalist resistance (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner 1980; Abercrombie & 
Turner 1978; Althusser 1965/2005; 1971/2008; Marx & Engels 1932/1970; Marcuse 
1964/1991; Miliband 1969; Poulantzas 1973; Thompson 1990, pp. 85-97). 
Even though Marx and Engels did not consider the ideological incorporation of 
the working class into capitalist society to be a serious issue, the dominant ideology 
thesis nevertheless has become a cornerstone of their followers’ accounts of how social 
reproduction occurs in capitalist societies (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner 1980, p 8). From 
a critical media studies perspective, the thesis is notable for several reasons: It theorizes 
about the adversarial role of mass media; it suggests that a process of massive 
indoctrination occurs in capitalist societies; it accounts for the conformist, conservative 
outlook of the mainstream press; and it challenges the pluralist assumption that the mass 
media provide a forum for ideologically diverse views (Miliband 1969). For these 
reasons and others, the dominant ideology thesis is a common analytical substructure in 
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Marxist analyses of social reproduction and the power of mass media (Abercrombie, Hill, 
& Turner 1980; Abercrombie & Turner 1978; Thompson 1990). 
The French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser (1971/2008) provides a well-
known formulation of the dominant ideology thesis in his essay Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses. Althusser takes a structuralist view of society in which “the social 
whole is a totality of instances, relatively interdependent and relatively autonomous” 
(Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner 1980, p. 31). Focusing his attention on those institutions 
which, in his view, have considerable autonomy from society’s economic base, he argues 
that one group of institutions constitute a (Repressive) State Apparatus (SA), which 
includes the government, the head of state, police, courts, prisons, and the military. 
According to Althusser (1971/2008), “The State is a ‘machine’ of repression, which 
enables the ruling classes … to ensure their domination over the working class, thus 
enabling the former to subject the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion (i.e. to 
capitalist exploitation)” (p. 11). Another group of institutions constitute Ideological State 
Apparatuses (ISAs) distinct from the SA. Unlike the SA, which Althusser treats as a 
single entity, there exists a plurality of ISAs, such as: the religious ISA, the educational 
ISA, the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA, the trade union ISA, the 
communications ISA, and the cultural ISA (pp. 17-18). “What distinguishes the ISAs 
from the (Repressive) State Apparatus is the following basic difference: the Repressive 
State Apparatus functions ‘by violence’, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses 
function ‘by ideology’,” writes Althusser (pp. 18-19). Each ISA is responsible for 
conveying different components of the dominant ideology. For example, the political ISA 
subjects individuals to the dominant political ideology (fascism, democracy etc.) while 
the mass media subject individuals to nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism, moralism, and 
so on. Althusser argues that the school represents the dominant ISA, but together, the 
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ISAs all provide the knowledge and ideological discipline necessary for members of the 
working class to reproduce the capitalist system. “All Ideological State Apparatuses, 
whatever they are, contribute to the same result: the reproduction of the relations of 
production, i.e. of capitalist relations of exploitation” (p. 28).* 
In the standard, Marxist formulation of the dominant ideology thesis, which 
focuses primarily on social reproduction and cohesion under capitalism, dominant 
ideologies express dominant class relations (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner 1980; 
Abercrombie & Turner 1978; Thompson 1990). An alternative formulation of the thesis, 
on the other hand, generalizes the concept of dominant ideology to refer to all of those 
prevailing, rarely questioned ideas, values, and aspirations related to a society’s politics, 
economics, and culture. These ideologies shape prevailing social attitudes and set the 
parameters for acceptable thought within and between institutions such as government, 
courts, mass media, corporations, workplaces, unions, schools, churches, and families. As 
Lull (2000) writes, “Selected ways of thinking are advocated through a variety of 
channels by those in society who have widespread political and economic power. The 
ongoing manipulation of public information and imagery by society’s power holders 
constructs a particular kind of ideology – a dominant ideology which helps sustain the 
material and cultural interests of its creators,” (p. 14; emphasis in original). This 
articulation of the dominant ideology thesis moves beyond classical Marxism’s focus on 
state-organized social reproduction by drawing attention to the influence of a wider array 
of society’s power holders. It recognizes multiple realities of oppression, not just class 
                                                 
* The dominant ideology thesis is also a common theme in popular culture, including several works of 
dystopia fiction, such George Orwell’s classic Nineteen Eighty-Four and John Carpenter’s satirical science 
fiction film They Live, which can be seen as offering an Althusserian critique of the mass media ISA (Grant 
2004, p. 16). 
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oppression, and allows activists and theorists to contrast dominant ideologies with 
oppositional ideologies such as socialism, anarchism, and feminism. 
By way of illustration, consider the ideology of patriotism—defined as “loyalty, 
support, service, and devotion to one’s country” (Woehrle, Coy, & Maney 2008, p. 53)—
which exerts significant influence in the United States (Gallup 2013; 2014a; 2015). 
Patriotism entails a set of beliefs and values regarding appropriate political thought and 
behavior. It suggests that Americans should support and respect the nation’s president, 
system of government, members of the armed forces, and national symbols such as the 
American flag.  Moreover, to be patriotic is viewed as good or commendable; unpatriotic 
people are considered to be deviant, dangerous, selfish, or ungrateful. Although patriotic 
beliefs appear as commonsense to many Americans, they could be described as 
ideological according to a critical conception of ideology, because they mask unpleasant 
realities about U.S. leaders, icons, government policies, etc. According to a neutral view 
of ideology, we might say that patriotism’s normative implications conflict with other 
ideologies. For instance, the slogan “support the troops” is an obvious dictum for 
patriotic citizens, but from a radical left-wing or anarchist perspective this assertion is 
naïve and possibly dangerous, because it discourages citizens from questioning 
government policy or the morality of war, while implicitly demanding that those who 
oppose war drop their opposition to this policy (Goldman 1917/1969, pp. 127-144; 
Jensen 2004, pp. 19-21). 
 
Media Hegemony Thesis 
Another important account of ideological influence comes from Antonio Gramsci, 
an Italian Communist and intensely creative Marxist theorist imprisoned for much of his 
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life by the fascist dictator Mussolini (Forgacs 1988; Gramsci 1971; Jones 2006; Lears 
1985; Sassoon 1987). Like the dominant ideology thesis, Gramsci’s theory of hegemony 
attempts to explain how members of the ruling class maintain a position of dominance 
without using force or violence to impose their will. According to Gramsci, the 
supremacy of a ruling class in any given society rests on both domination (i.e., forms of 
coercion institutionalized in the state) as well as intellectual and moral leadership. As 
Gramsci (1971) writes: 
[The] supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as “domination” 
and as “intellectual and moral leadership”. A social group dominates antagonistic 
groups, which it tends to “liquidate”, or to subjugate perhaps even by armed 
force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, 
already exercise “leadership” before winning governmental power (this indeed is 
one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently 
becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its 
grasp, it must continue to “lead” as well (pp. 57-58). 
In Gramsci’s view, it is not enough for ruling groups in a society to exercise 
control through state coercion and the means of production. Nor is it the case that ruling 
groups can maintain their position “merely by giving their domination an aura of moral 
authority through the creation and perpetuation of legitimating symbols” (Lears 1985, p. 
569). In order to win and maintain power, ruling groups must also secure the consent of 
those they rule over. As Steve Jones (2006) explains: 
Rather than imposing their will, ‘dominant’ groups … within democratic societies 
generally govern with a good degree of consent from the people they rule, and the 
maintenance of that consent is dependent upon an incessant repositioning of the 
relationship between rulers and ruled. In order to maintain its authority, a ruling 
power must be sufficiently flexible to respond to new circumstances and to the 
changing wishes of those it rules. It must be able to reach into the minds and lives 
of its subordinates, exercising its power as what appears to be a free expression of 
their own interests and desires. In the process, the ruling coalition will have to 
take on at least some of the values of those it attempts to lead, thereby reshaping 
its own ideals and imperatives (pp. 3-4). 
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Thus, unlike the dominant ideology thesis, which treats ideological domination as 
essentially a static state of affairs, hegemony theory emphasizes that hegemony has a 
dynamic character and can never be established once-and-for-all (Eagleton 1991, p. 115; 
see also Williams 1977, pp. 108-114). According to hegemony theory, ruling groups 
secure consent by an indoctrination process based on ideological saturation of civil 
society, i.e., “the ensemble of educational, religious and associational institutions” 
(Femia 1981, p. 24). Ideas, attitudes, values, and images supportive of the status quo 
emanate from society’s cultural and informational institutions—its schools, churches, 
political organizations, military, courts, media, and so on—which according to Lull 
(2000) constitute 
an interlocking system of information-distributing agencies and taken-for-granted 
communications practices that permeate every corner of social and cultural 
reality. … This inter-articulating, mutually reinforcing process of ideological 
influence is the essence of hegemony. Society’s most entrenched and powerful 
institutions … fundamentally agree with each other. Hegemony therefore depends 
on widespread circulation and social acceptance of the dominant ideology (p. 50). 
As Downing (2001) observes: 
The perspectives on the wider society generated in these institutions often 
produced, [Gramsci] proposed, an unquestioning view of the world that took the 
status quo as inevitable and ruling class power as founded on that class’s unique, 
self-evident ability to run the nation successfully …. Thus, although the system 
was also powered by its economic mechanisms and shored up during political 
crises by the use of police, courts, jails, and ultimately the military …, mass 
hegemonic institutions such as those listed were, so to speak, its first line of 
defense, its outer ramparts (pp. 14-15). 
Because hegemony theory holds that the transmission of ideological phenomena 
is a crucial means by which ruling groups secure and maintain their power, it is often 
conflated with the false consciousness of the dominant ideology thesis. Yet this treatment 
misses that hegemony unites “persuasion from above with consent from below,” to quote 
Gitlin (1980, p.10).Whereas the dominant ideology thesis posits that ideological 
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phenomena serve to mask social reality, hegemony theory suggests that ruling groups 
endeavor to depict their view of a just social order as preferable to alternative visions. As 
Bob Jessop (1982) explains: 
[H]egemony involves the successful mobilisation and reproduction of the ‘active 
consent’ of dominated groups by the ruling class through their exercise of 
intellectual, moral, and political leadership. This should not be understood in 
terms of mere indoctrination or false consciousness – whether seen as the reflex 
of an economic base or as an arbitrary set of mystifying ideas. For the 
maintenance of hegemony involves taking systematic account of popular interest 
and demands, shifting position and making compromises on secondary issues to 
maintain support and alliances in an inherently unstable and fragile system of 
political relations (without, however, sacrificing essential interests), and 
organising this support for the attainment of national goals which serve the 
fundamental long-run interests of the dominant group (p. 148). 
This has important implications. To begin, it means that people are not simply 
dupes or blind to alternatives. Although subaltern groups may come to see ruling class 
values, attitudes, and ideas as common sense, the process of ideological indoctrination is 
a negotiated one (Gramsci 1971; Jones 2006). More importantly, it also suggests that 
subaltern groups are complicit in hegemony. Following this line of thought, in fact, it is a 
mistake for theorists to treat hegemony as a purely ideological notion. As political 
scientist Adam Przeworski (1986) argues, Gramsci’s account of hegemony indicates that 
material conditions provide a basis for ruling groups to establish hegemony, which raises 
the question: Under what material conditions can hegemony be sustained? By attempting 
to answer this, activists and revolutionaries can move from questions about the influence 
of ideological phenomena to questions concerning people’s actual, material needs – food, 
shelter, safety, and so on. By focusing on the material conditions under which people will 
or will not consent to being ruled over, the notion of class compromise becomes essential 
to understanding how ruling groups exercise hegemonic power especially in the face of 
clear social injustice. One can assume that subaltern groups actually recognize alternative 
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visions of society, politics, economics, and culture, but that they make a rational decision 
to accept certain forms of domination, such as capitalist exploitation. 
There are many reasons why subaltern groups may choose to do this: They might 
believe it is not possible to overthrow capitalism given current political conditions. They 
may consider it politically risky to pursue alternatives to capitalism, because doing so 
could threaten the material gains achieved from previous compromises staked out with 
the ruling class. Or they may decide they do not want to experience a decline in living 
standards of undetermined duration and intensity in a transition to socialism (pp. 133-
169). In his ethnography of peasant resistance in Malaysia, James C. Scott (1985) raises a 
similar point: “Except for those comparatively rare moments when a political opening or 
a revolutionary situation creates new possibilities or revives old aspirations, an attitude of 
pragmatic resignation is likely to prevail” (p. 325). In any case, members of subaltern 
groups are not passive, empty receptacles for dominant ideological beliefs imposed by a 
ruling class (Hall 1980; Scott 1985; 1990; Willis 1977).*  
Hegemony theory is flexible. Even though Marx and Engels (1932/1970), 
Gramsci (1971), and other writers working within the Marxist tradition examine ideology 
primarily in its relations to forms of power institutionalized in capitalism and the modern 
state (e.g., Althusser 1971/2008; Jessop 1982; Laclau 1979; Laclau & Mouffe 1985/2001; 
Lukács 1923/1971; Marcuse 1964/1991; Miliband 1969; Poulantzas 1973), scholars such 
as Downing (1996; 2001), Eagleton (1991), Gitlin (1980), and Raymond Williams (1977) 
propose diffuse conceptions of hegemony that attempt to transcend classical Marxism’s 
base/superstructure approach. Owing to its flexibility, scholars and critics have applied 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to research areas such as education (Borg, Buttigieg, & 
                                                 
* For more on this, see Adam Przeworski’s (1986) Capitalism and Social Democracy, Chapter 4. 
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Mayo 2002; Coben 1998; Hill 2007; Mayo 1999; 2010; 2015), political science (Femia 
1981; Jessop 1982; Laclau & Mouffe 1985/2001; Przeworski 1986; Sassoon 1987), 
international relations (Ayers 2008; Bieler & Morton 2004; Gill 1993; McNally & 
Schwarzmantel 2009), sociology (Burawoy 1979; 2003; Sallach 1974; Woehrle, Coy, & 
Maney 2008), and, of course, media (Altheide 1984; Downing 1996; 2001; Gitlin 1980). 
Even though Gramsci wrote very little about media, “he has been widely 
perceived as offering a general framework for the analysis of culture and power within 
which the roles of media can readily be slotted and understood,” observes Downing 
(1996, pp. 199-200). His notion of hegemony thus appears in critical and activist 
examinations of alternative media and media-movement interactions (e.g., Downing 
2001; Gitlin 1980; Kaufman 2003), as well as scholarly books and articles on mass 
culture, the production of mass news media content, and the distribution of power in 
media framing (e.g., Altheide 1984; Carragee & Roefs 2004; Martín-Barbero 1993; 
Oliver & Johnston 2000; Rachlin 1988; Sallach 1974; Shoemaker and Reese 1996). 
Extending the concept of hegemony to the realm of mass media, the media hegemony 
thesis suggests that the mass media are directly implicated in the continuation and 
maintenance of power structures (capitalism, the state, white supremacy, patriarchy, and 
so on). 
According to Lull (2000), ideologies have persuasive force only when ideas can 
be represented and communicated, in particular through the culture industries and mass 
media (p. 14-15). The concepts of hegemony and dominant ideology thus take on special 
importance in societies where the circulation of symbolic phenomena increasingly is 
mediated by the institutions of conglomerated, corporate mass media. Because they reach 
large audiences while disabling widespread participation in meaning making, the mass 
news media are considered to be crucial actors in the production and transmission of 
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ruling class ideologies within advanced capitalist societies (Gitlin 1980; Hall 1995; 
Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Lull 2000; Thompson 1990; Woehrle, Coy, & Maney 
2008). According to Hall (1995),  
In modern societies, the different media are especially important sites for the 
production, reproduction and transformation of ideologies. Ideologies are, of 
course, worked on in many places in society, and not only in the head…. But 
institutions like the media are peculiarly central to the matter since they are, by 
definition, part of the dominant means of ideological production. What they 
“produce” is, precisely, representations of the social world, images, descriptions, 
explanations and frames for understanding how the world is and why it works and 
is said and shown to work (pp. 19-20). 
And as Gitlin (1980) observes: 
The media bring a manufactured public world into private space. From within 
their private crevices, people find themselves relying on the media for concepts, 
for images of their heroes, for guiding information, for emotional charges, for a 
recognition of public values, for symbols in general, even for language. Of all the 
institutions of daily life, the media specialize in orchestrating everyday 
consciousness—by virtue of their pervasiveness, their accessibility, their 
centralized symbolic capacity. They name the world’s parts, they certify reality as 
reality—and when their certifications are doubted and opposed, as they surely are, 
it is those same certifications that limit the terms of effective opposition. To put it 
simply, the mass media have become core systems for the distribution of ideology 
(pp. 1-2; emphasis in original). 
This is made possible by the fact that control over media and communications 
systems rests in the hands of relatively few elite actors, i.e., those who own and control 
the culture industries and the institutions of the mass media, which promulgate ruling 
groups’ ideology via media texts and images in concert with one another (Altheide 1984; 
Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Lull 2000; Sallach 1974). As Lull (2000) explains, “In 
Gramsci’s time and continuing today, owners and managers of media industries are able 
to produce and reproduce ideological content, inflections, and tones far more easily than 
other people in society because the elites manage the key socializing institutions, thereby 
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guaranteeing that their points of view are constantly and attractively cast into the public 
arena” (p. 50). 
Hegemony acts as a linking mechanism between dominant ideology and people’s 
consciousness (ibid., p. 48). This linkage occurs when media makers “encode” 
hegemonic ideas and messages into media content, which audiences then “decode,” or 
interpret, and incorporate into their own understandings (Hall 1980). Thus, the media 
hegemony thesis posits that journalists themselves are among the main conduits for the 
dissemination of dominant ideology. Reporters and editors often view themselves as 
independent, objective observers, but in actual practice their beliefs, socialization, habits, 
and work routines are replete with dominant ideology, which become encoded in media 
texts and decoded by audience members. Moreover, before they become journalists, they 
pass through and are socialized by those institutions of ideology aforementioned. 
According to Altheide (1984), the media hegemony thesis entails three assumptions about 
journalists’ behavior: (1) the socialization of journalists involves guidelines, routines, and 
orientations replete with dominant ideology; (2) journalists tend to cover topics and 
present stories which are conservative and supportive of the status quo; and (3) 
journalists tend to present pro-American and negative coverage of foreign countries (p. 
478). As a result, journalists unwittingly promote ideological hegemony by generating 
news coverage supportive of the status quo and its interpretations of social, political, and 
economic issues (Altheide 1984; Fishman 1980; Gitlin 1980; Rachlin 1988).  
For this reason, media hegemony is associated with the concept of media framing 
(Carragee & Roefs 2004; Gitlin 1980). Like framing theory, hegemony theorists 
acknowledge the important role that culture plays in constructing different visions of 
social reality. According to sociologists Lynn Woehrle, Patrick Coy, and Gregory Maney 
(2008), hegemonic processes occur in the context of a dominant symbolic repertoire, 
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which they define as “cultural resonances that occupy a particularly privileged position 
due to their frequent invocation by powerholders and by many others, and due to their 
widespread acceptance by the general public” (p. 29). 
Other important issues related to media hegemony, which coincide with concerns 
identified by political economists of mass news media, include media globalization and 
cultural imperialism. Powerful media corporations easily cross national borders, raising 
concerns about whether these companies encroach upon local cultures and customs, while 
eroding other peoples’ sovereignty (e.g., Innis 1950/1972; Lull 2000; Schiller 1969/1992; 
Smythe 1981; Thussu 1998; Tomlinson 1991). These and other topics unfortunately fall 
outside the scope of this study. 
 
THE TWO THESES’ IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY 
Prima facie, the dominant ideology thesis and the media hegemony thesis are very 
similar: Both have distinctly Marxist origins, in that they assume class relations in 
capitalist societies are inherently unstable. Both posit that capitalism’s inherent instability 
motivates ruling groups to transmit ideological phenomena via the mass media and other 
informational/cultural institutions, in order to reproduce the capitalist social order and 
thereby preserve a position of dominance. And both point to working class quiescence as 
a consequence of the dissemination of ruling class ideology (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner 
1980; Abercrombie & Turner 1978; Thompson 1990). Indeed, for these reasons and 
others, scholars tend to treat Gramsci’s (1971) theory of hegemony as a version of the 
dominant ideology thesis, especially since “Gramsci’s conceptions of hegemony, and of 
ideology as cementing and unifying, are important in that he has, probably more than any 
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other theorist, contributed to the contemporary dominant ideology thesis” (Abercrombie, 
Hill, & Turner 1980, p. 14). 
However, I have purposefully sketched these two perspectives in such a way to 
draw attention to important differences between them: First, the dominant ideology thesis 
holds that ruling class ideology obscures, mystifies, or masks objective reality, which 
assumes that there is a “true” version of reality which people could access if only their 
perceptions were not clouded. The media hegemony thesis does not share this epistemic 
commitment to an objective reality by making assumptions about the truth or falsity of 
ideological phenomena. The difference in epistemic commitments is directly related to 
the theses’ different analytical focuses, and how each views the purpose of ideological 
phenomena. Ideologies are tautologically false according to the dominant ideology thesis, 
because their purpose is to obscure objective reality. According to the media hegemony 
thesis, the truth or falsity of ideological phenomena is not a central concern, so long as 
they secure consent. As Eagleton (1991) observes, “Gramsci is an historicist Marxist who 
believes that truth is historically variable, relative to the consciousness of the most 
progressive social class of a particular epoch” (p. 121). 
Second, the dominant ideology thesis and the media hegemony thesis take very 
different views of media audiences. Simply put, the dominant ideology thesis asserts that 
people are duped into holding a false view of reality. Hegemony theory, on the other 
hand, stresses the role of an active audience, which is complicit in its indoctrination 
(Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner 1980; Abercrombie & Turner 1978; Gramsci 1971; Jones 
2006; Thompson 1990). As Steve Jones (2006) observes, “Hegemony is a more sensitive 
and therefore useful critical term than ‘domination’, which fails to acknowledge the 
active role of subordinate people in the operation of power” (p. 41). 
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Third, even though both theses represent accounts of state-organized and 
ideologically secured social reproduction (Thompson 1990, p. 86), the theory of 
hegemony is more nuanced in that it contains an important political analysis concerning 
how members of the ruling class maintain a position of dominance by constantly 
reassessing and repositioning themselves vis-à-vis subaltern groups. To quote Eagleton 
(1991), “As a concept … hegemony is inseparable from overtones of struggle, as 
ideology perhaps is not. … [Hegemony offers] a signal advance on some of the more 
ossified, scholastic definitions of ideology to be found in certain ‘vulgar’ currents of 
Marxism” (p. 115). Due to their divergent political emphases, the two theses have 
different strategic implications for activists and movements; moreover, it seems likely 
that theorists’ inattention to strategic implications helps to explain why these perspectives 
are conflated in the first place. 
 
Impenetrable Ideology 
The dominant ideology thesis carries two main strategic implications. The first 
one is not comforting, but bears mentioning. Taken to their logical conclusion, certain 
strong formulations of the thesis view ideological domination as so pervasive, and ruling 
class power as so entrenched, that resistance is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. 
For instance, in Althusser’s (1971/2008) account of ideology, people can never hope to 
stand outside of, let alone mount a challenge to, the ISAs’ dominant ideological 
influence. As Paul Willis (1977) observes: 
Structuralist theories of reproduction [such as Althusser’s] present the dominant 
ideology (under which culture is assumed) as impenetrable. Everything fits too 
neatly. Ideology always pre-exists and pre-empts any authentic criticism. There 
are no cracks in the billiard ball smoothness of process. All specific contradictions 
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and conflicts are smoothed away in the universal reproductive functions of 
ideology (p. 175). 
The strategic implication of Althusser’s cynical view, if it could be called strategic, is that 
one should simply accept the influence of pervasive ruling class ideology; at best, 
opponents of the status quo can take solace in the fact that they are clever enough to 
realize the futility of attempting to challenge the influence of dominant ideology. 
 
Ideology-Critique 
For proponents of the dominant ideology thesis who do believe there are paths of 
resistance, the second main strategic implication is that activists and revolutionaries 
should tear down bourgeois mystifications and unmask ideological phenomena by 
engaging in the critique of ideologies, or what Marx referred to as ideology-critique (e.g., 
Lichtman 1993; Marx and Engels 1932/1970; Shelby 2003). Although this technique is 
viewed by many social scientists as too politically loaded, obsolete, and passé to be of 
any use, “ideology-critique is indispensable for understanding and resisting the forms of 
oppression that are characteristic of the modern world,” according to Shelby (2003, p. 
154). However, there are important difficulties associated with its use. First, it is by no 
means obvious how ideology-critique translates to resistance; whatever repertoires of 
contention might be associated with ideology-critique remain underspecified. A second 
difficulty, as noted above, is that the dominant ideology thesis assumes there is an 
objective reality, which people can access once their ideological blinders have been 
removed. Not only is this far from obvious, but there is a tacit suggestion here, rooted in 
Marx’s understanding of capitalism as a system characterized by intense class conflict, 
that once false consciousness has been lifted and people discover the truth about capitalist 
oppression, this will somehow lift the floodgates of revolutionary sentiment. As 
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Przeworski (1986) and Scott’s (1985) arguments suggest, this assumption is questionable, 
to say the least, given that people can have perfectly valid, rational reasons for not 
wanting to commit themselves to anti-capitalist struggle. 
 
Challenging and Harnessing Hegemony 
On the whole, the media hegemony thesis’s implications for activist strategy are 
much more compelling. The concept of hegemony assumes a neutral view of ideology 
wherein there are multiple, competing interpretations of “how things are” in society and 
the world. Ruling groups, by virtue of their entrenched political, economic, and cultural 
power, enjoy unparalleled access to society’s cultural and informational institutions, 
which gives them disproportionate control over language and political discourse within 
society, as well as the ability to transmit their preferred ideologies. At the same time, 
hegemony theory stresses that because capitalism is an inherently unstable system, 
hegemony is never complete or definite; since ruling groups depend on the consent of 
those they rule over, they must constantly adapt to shifting popular attitudes and changes 
in social-political, economic, and cultural conditions (Gramsci 1971; Jones 2006). 
Hegemony theory thus suggests that media and discourse become important terrains of 
struggle between powerholders and movements, as well as tools of resistance for activists 
and social movements (Downing 1996; 2001; Gitlin 1980; Woehrle, Coy, & Maney 
2008).  
As a Leninist, Gramsci (1971) argued that ruling class ideological hegemony 
could only be broken by a mass political party, i.e., the Communist Party, organized by a 
revolutionary vanguard of organic intellectuals, i.e., working class intellectuals who 
naturally obtain positions of leadership in the course of struggle. Gramsci urged 
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revolutionaries to form counter-hegemonic blocs, composed of subalterns and their allies, 
which could undermine consent and ruling class ideology by promoting alternative, 
socialist visions of economic, political, and social organization. After waging a protracted 
“war of position,” meaning an intellectual and cultural struggle against ruling class 
hegemony, revolutionaries could shore up enough popular support to launch a “war of 
manouvre,” meaning a physical confrontation with the ruling class. If victorious, the 
revolutionary socialists would attain state power and impose a new hegemony (Day 2005; 
Downing 2001, pp. 14-17; Gramsci 1971; Jones 2006). 
In a more general sense, though, hegemony theory suggests that activists and 
movements can challenge elite control over discourse while engaging the non-activist 
public in the process. In order to contest the entrenched power of ruling groups, activists 
must create oppositional knowledge, or a body of social meanings that challenge 
dominant ideological conceptions. According Woehrle, Coy, and Maney (2008), 
Oppositional knowledge questions what is considered possible and what is 
considered impossible, what is considered desirable and what is considered 
undesirable. It injects criticism of assumed limits and it also provides a vision for 
what is outside ‘normal’ practices. It becomes both the basis and expression of a 
counter-culture (p. 8).  
The authors use the example of patriotism to illustrate their point. After the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the concept of “patriotism” became associated 
with a willingness to use preemptive violence to defend the United States. Anti-war 
groups that chose, instead, to link patriotism with peace and democracy produced a kind 
of oppositional definition of citizenship, i.e., a type of oppositional knowledge (ibid.). 
Woehrle, Coy, and Maney specify four types of oppositional knowledge: 
 Counter-informative knowledge aims to present information that is “missing from 
the picture,” in order to “widen the discussion and possibly change the political 
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assessment people make or the outcomes they desire” (p. 9). For instance, peace 
activists may question war policies by arguing that the amount of money the 
federal government spends annually on defense dwarfs what it spends on social 
programs. 
 Critical-interpretative knowledge “assesses the information that has been 
provided as accurate, but questions the moral or social basis for how that 
information is present, interpreted, or used” (ibid.). Rather than present counter-
informative information, critical-interpretative knowledge articulates a different 
meaning of the information presented. For instance, peace activists may agree that 
the purpose of U.S. military interventions abroad is to promote democracy in 
foreign countries, but they might also question whether this is an ethically 
appropriate means of doing so (pp. 15-16). 
 Radical-envisioning knowledge builds on the understandings exposed by counter-
informative and critical-interpretative knowledge in order to envision or raise 
“what alternatives could and should look like if they are instituted” (p. 10). For 
instance, peace activists may articulate a conception of democracy which 
advocates for broad political participation (p. 18). 
 Transformative knowledge “defines specific ways to achieve the alternatives that 
are envisioned by the movement” (p. 10). For example, peace activists may urge 
people to engage in forms of political activism that hold leaders accountable and 
challenge U.S. foreign policy (pp. 18-19). 
Woehrle, Coy, and Maney argue that oppositional knowledge allows activists 
either to challenge hegemony or to harness hegemony. In both cases, the dominant 
symbolic repertoire predetermines the nature of activist argumentation and discourse: 
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The cultural resources that make up the dominant symbolic repertoire perform a 
constraining role insofar as it is difficult to and sometimes unwise for challenging 
movements to attempt to operate completely outside of the dominant symbolic 
repertoire. To do so may compromise the cultural resonance of the movement’s 
messages. On the other hand, challenging movements are far from completely 
constrained by the dominant symbolic repertoire, since it always remains 
available for appropriation and is vulnerable to challenges. They can reinterpret 
and refashion the meanings of elements in the dominant symbolic repertoire, 
thereby contributing so substantive cultural change in the process (p. 29). 
This connects with Ryan’s (1991) insight that activists draw from a wide reservoir 
of cultural resonances in the process of constructing and promoting collective action 
frames. Like framing theory, the media hegemony thesis suggests that activists should 
engage with the institutions of mass news media in order to promote oppositional 
knowledge which challenges and/or harnesses hegemonic ideology (Gitlin 1980; 
Woehrle, Coy, & Maney 2008). 
 
Hegemony and Framing 
An important strategic implication of the media hegemony thesis, then, is that 
activists and social movement organizations can challenge ruling class ideological 
hegemony by engaging in strategic framing efforts that promote ideas, values, and 
messages—counterhegemonic ideologies, in other words—which contradict the dominant 
symbolic repertoire. For example, peace activists may challenge the taken-for-granted, 
hegemonic belief that the United States is the world’s greatest democracy, by arguing that 
the U.S. political system is marred by corruption and voter apathy. “Antiwar framing like 
this that challenges hegemony counters not only specific prowar framing but also broader 
ideas from the dominant symbolic repertoire … that give these frames their potency,” 
according to Woehrle, Coy, and Maney (2008, p. 32). Of course, activists can do more 
than simply challenge hegemonic ideas. Because discourse is multivocal and open to 
 217 
multiple meanings and interpretations, another strategic implication is that activists and 
movements can harness ruling class ideological hegemony by engaging in strategic 
framing efforts which draw from the dominant symbolic repertoire in order to fashion 
alternative meanings (p. 34). For example, peace activists draw from cultural resonances 
in order to reconstruct the idea of patriotism in such a way that the concept serves the 
anti-war movement’s strategic ends (pp. 41-67). 
In addition to engaging with mass media institutions, the media hegemony thesis 
implies that activists should create their own forms of activist/alternative media. For 
instance, Downing (2001) argues that radical alternative media play important roles as 
counter-hegemonic forces. In this view, activist media makers are analogous to the 
organic intellectuals who lead a war of position. “A proliferation of such media would be 
vital, both to help generate those alternatives in public debate and also to limit any 
tendency for oppositional leadership, whatever forms it took, to entrench itself as an 
agency of domination rather than freedom” (p. 15). Radical media also fill the void, 
according to Downing, in those everyday scenarios where dominant ideologies lead 
mainstream journalists to engage in acts of self-censorship. “Radical media in those 
scenarios have a mission not only to provide facts to a public denied them, but to explore 
fresh ways of developing a questioning perspective on the hegemonic process and 
increasing the public’s sense of confidence in its power to engineer constructive change” 
(p. 16). 
 
ANARCHISM, DOMINANT IDEOLOGY, AND MEDIA HEGEMONY 
Several terms, concepts, and arguments associated with the dominant ideology 
and media hegemony theses not only undergird critical and radical scholarship of news 
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media (e.g., Downing 2001; Gitlin 1980; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Ryan 1991), 
but have also become leftist parlance. This is especially true in Marxist-Leninist circles, 
where terms such as ‘(dominant) ideology’, ‘false consciousness’, ‘hegemony’, 
‘counterhegemonic’, and so on continue to be common currency in intramovement 
discourse and organizing materials, such as websites, books, newspapers, and pamphlets. 
It is unsurprising, then, that activists and dissidents often find these theoretical accounts 
to be useful, appealing, or intuitive ways to talk about the power of mass media, even if 
they do not explicitly evoke Gramsci or Marx in their analyses. Nevertheless, anarchism, 
autonomist Marxism, and academic scholarship on ideology problematize these 
theoretical perspectives.  
 
Empirical and Theoretical Validity 
Ideology is an indistinct, immaterial concept, and it is far from obvious that a 
ruling class ideology really exists, that its content can be isolated or analyzed, or that it 
actually exerts the strong influence attributed to it by the dominant ideology and media 
hegemony theses (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner 1980; Abercrombie & Turner 1978; Scott 
1985; Willis 1977). In a groundbreaking critique, sociologists Nicholas Abercrombie, 
Stephen Hill, and Brian Turner (1980) argue that the contention that there is a dominant 
or hegemonic ideology, which serves to create acceptance of capitalism and incorporate 
lower classes into the social order, is empirically false and theoretically unwarranted. 
They establish this by constructing case studies of feudalism, early capitalism, and late 
capitalism in British society. Although there were ruling class ideologies in feudalist and 
early capitalist settings, these served mainly to reinforce the social cohesion of the 
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dominant class itself; these ideologies had a negligible influence on members of the 
lower class, however, because the mechanisms of transmission were underdeveloped. 
In late capitalism, a different situation obtains: Because powerful corporations 
rather than wealthy families now own and control the economy, insofar as a ruling class 
ideology can be said to exist, it is ill-defined, internally incoherent, and not shared by 
members of dominant groups, i.e., its supposed proponents (pp. 128-140). This critique 
dovetails with Fred Block’s (1977) argument that the idea of a class-conscious ruling 
group must be rejected in order to understand how contemporary capitalism actually 
operates: Capitalists act on the basis of a self-interested, profit-maximizing rationality, 
which often puts them in conflict with state managers, who act on the basis of protecting 
capitalism’s long-term interests. The “ruling class does not rule,” or at least it does not do 
so in the sense that proponents of the dominant ideology and media hegemony theses 
typically assert it does, i.e., as a more-or-less ideologically unified group. 
Furthermore, despite the advent of well-developed mechanisms for the 
transmission of dominant ideology in late capitalist societies, such as mass education and 
mass media institutions, the influence of dominant/hegemonic ideology in shaping 
subordinate beliefs is greatly exaggerated. Against the view that mass media secure 
adherence of the working class to the social order by promulgating dominant ideology, 
Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1980) observe that “The evidence of media influence is 
so thin and subject to so many caveats that our conclusion must be that the media are not 
significant except in the most isolated instances” (p. 152). This jives with over a half 
century’s worth of mass communications research casting serious doubt on models of 
communication which hold that the mass media directly influence media audiences. The 
mass media often do exert a strong influence on audience members’ beliefs and 
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behaviors, but they do not unproblematically transmit ruling class ideologies (Klapper 
1960; Lowery & De Fleur 1983; McCombs 2004; Severin & Tankard 2001). 
In addition, observe mass communications scholars Werner Severin and James 
Tankard (2001), “The idea of media hegemony is a difficult one to test with research. 
Although suggesting a powerful influence, it is somewhat vague in its actual 
implications. If it is true, it is describing such a pervasive phenomenon that it becomes 
difficult to study because it is nearly impossible to set up a control group that is not 
subject to the effect being researched” (p. 282). Media hegemony research also treats 
hegemony as both an attribute and effect of late capitalist social orders, “which creates a 
methodological challenge to empirically assess claims made by researchers,” according 
to Altheide (1984, p. 479). 
 
Social Reproduction and Class Reductionism 
The dominant ideology and media hegemony theses are examples of what 
Thompson (1990) refers to as the consensual theory of social reproduction, according to 
which “the ongoing reproduction of social relations depends in part on the existence of 
values and beliefs which are collectively shared by individuals, and which thereby bind 
individuals to the social order” (p. 87). However, ideological incorporation is not 
necessary to bind people to the capitalist social order, and in fact cynicism and hostility 
toward dominant values can sometimes coincide with social reproduction (p. 90). For 
example, in his classic study Learning to Labor, Willis (1977) shows how youth 
resistance to public schooling paradoxically inculcates ideas, values, and attitudes that 
prepare rebellious teens for working class jobs later on in life. Thus, observes Thompson 
(1990), “The prevalence of sceptical and cynical attitudes, and the rejection of values and 
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beliefs propagated by the principal agencies of socialization, do not necessarily represent 
a challenge to the social order” (p. 90).  
In addition, argues Thompson, theoretical accounts of state-organized and 
ideologically secured social reproduction such as Althusser’s (1971/2008) take a troubled 
view of the role of the state: First, these accounts assume a class-reductionist approach to 
the modern state, which sees the state primarily as an institution through which ruling 
class power is exercised. The problem with this view is that it oversimplifies the role and 
historical development of the modern state, which cannot be understood exclusively in 
terms of class relations (Thompson 1990, pp. 92-93). It also assumes that the ruling class 
works in its long-term interests, which is not always the case (Block 1977). As Thompson 
(1990) observes, the state does more than simply solidify class rule: 
It is no doubt the case that some aspects and activities of the state can be 
understood in terms of the long-term interests of the dominant class, but it could 
hardly be maintained that state institutions are unresponsive to the demands of 
other classes and major interest groups, nor could it be plausibly argued that all 
aspects and activities of the modern state, including some of the most important 
aspects, can be analysed in terms of class interests and class relations (p. 93; 
emphasis in original). 
Second, argues Thompson, the very idea of ruling class ideology takes a class-
reductionist view of ideology, which tends to overvalue the importance of class. By 
relativizing dominant/hegemonic ideology and its analysis to class relations, the 
dominant ideology and media hegemony theses marginalize other types of domination 
and their associated symbolic phenomena (pp. 94-95). Of course, as noted above, some 
articulations of the dominant ideology and media hegemony theses try to avoid this by 
proposing more diffuse conceptions of dominant/hegemonic ideology, which recognize 
multiple realities of oppression (e.g., Downing 2001; Eagleton 1991; Gitlin 1980; 
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Williams 1977). Nevertheless, this class reductionism is a common problem in dominant 
ideology and media hegemony accounts. 
Third, while accounts of state-organized and ideologically secured social 
reproduction draw attention to mass news media institutions, they do not treat the mass 
media as seriously as they should. Again, quoting Thompson (1990): 
The institutions of mass communication are treated in a relatively peripheral way, 
as some among a broad range of ideological state apparatuses; but this perspective 
fails to do justice to the mediazation of modern culture and, in general, to the 
centrality of mass communication in modern social and political life. … The 
media of mass communication are not simply one among several mechanisms for 
the inculcation of a dominant ideology; rather, these media are partially 
constitutive of the very forum within which political activities take place in 
modern societies, the forum within which, and to some extent with regard to 
which, individuals act and react in exercising power and in responding to the 
exercise of power by others (p. 95). 
The concerns raised by issues of empirical validity and class reductionism 
motivate scholars to pursue alternative conceptions of ideology (e.g., Abercrombie, Hill, 
& Turner 1980; Thompson 1990). For example, Thompson’s (1990) account of ideology 
offers an important alternative to Marxist formulations. Eschewing neutral conceptions, 
he defines ideological phenomena as symbolic forms that establish and sustain relations 
of domination: “to establish, in the sense that meaning may actively create and institute 
relations of domination; to sustain, in the sense that meaning may serve to maintain and 
reproduce relations of domination through the ongoing process of producing and 
receiving symbolic forms” (p. 58). According to Thompson’s definition, ideological 
phenomena may include, for example, symbolic forms that compound oppression by 
depicting capitalism as morally superior to other economic systems, whites as superior to 
people of color, or men as superior to women. 
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Unlike neutral conceptions, which treat ideology as simply an aspect of social life 
or inquiry present in any political program, Thompson’s formulation captures some of the 
term’s intent as it appears in the writings of Marx and Engels. Because Thompson 
proffers an asymmetrical definition of ideology, he does not speak of ideologies that 
counter dominant ideologies, e.g., of socialist ideology as distinct from capitalist 
ideology, but rather of contestatory symbolic forms “which may help to highlight … 
those symbolic forms which serve to establish and sustain relations of domination” (p. 
68).  
However, Thompson’s formulation differs from the classical Marxist treatment of 
ideology in three important ways. First, unlike the dominant ideological thesis, he is 
unconcerned with the truth or falsity (i.e., the illusory character) of ideological 
phenomena (pp. 56-57). Second, Marxist accounts conceptualize ideology mainly in 
terms of dominant/subordinate class relations, whereas Thompson’s formulation 
considers a wide range of ideological phenomena, which includes class relations, but also 
“other kinds of domination, such as the structured social relations between men and 
women, between one ethnic group and another, or between hegemonic nation-states and 
those nation-states located on the margins of global power” (p. 58). Third, his account 
draws attention to how ideological forms are partially constitutive of social reality: 
“Symbolic forms are not merely representations which serve to articulate or obscure 
social relations or interests which are constituted fundamentally and essentially at a pre-
symbolic level; rather, symbolic forms are continuously and creatively implicated in the 
constitution of social relations as such” (ibid.). Thompson’s account captures an 
important aspect of why ideology matters to critical and radical analysts of news media. 
Because his conception of ideology treats power broadly, focuses on meaning in the 
service of power (i.e., a corruption of information power), and draws attention to the 
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significance of mass media institutions, it has important strengths from an anarchist 
perspective.  
 
Inability to Theorize Resistance 
The critiques proffered so far of the dominant ideology and media hegemony 
theses are compatible with anarchism’s rejection of Marxist economism and of state-
centric theoretical perspectives. A final objection is that, by focusing mainly on the 
ability of the ruling class to influence, indoctrinate, and incorporate subordinate groups, 
these two theses cast members of the working class and other subaltern groups in the role 
of passive victims. Against this one-sided view of class conflict, anarchism and 
autonomist Marxism emphasize that ruling groups must constantly adapt to pressures 
from the working class and/or subaltern groups, who are not passive victims, but rather 
are unruly subjects who actively fight back against forms of oppression and resist being 
integrated into capitalist society (Cleaver 1979; Gordon 2008; Guérin 1970; Negri 
1984/1991; Scott 1985; 1990; 2009; Zinn 1980/2003). From an anarchist/autonomist 
perspective, the dominant ideology and media hegemony theses are inherently defeatist 
perspectives that reflect an inability to theorize about the possibilities for resistance to 
forms of oppression institutionalized in capitalism and the state (the dominant ideology 
thesis obviously more so than the media hegemony thesis). As Harry Cleaver (1979) 
observes: 
The flaw that lies at the very heart of Critical Theory’s concept of bourgeois 
cultural hegemony … is its total one-sidedness. The positing of cultural 
hegemony, like that of an all-powerful technological rationality, reflects the 
inability to recognize or theorize the growth of any working-class power capable 
of threatening the system (p. 40). 
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Cleaver’s comment above refers mainly to the work of Herbert Marcuse 
(1964/1991) and other members of the Frankfurt School, but his insight applies to 
Gramsci (1971) and Althusser (1971/2008) as well. Cleaver (1979) also writes: 
[D]espite the originality and usefulness of their research into the mechanisms of 
capitalist domination in both the economic and cultural spheres, and indeed 
precisely in the formulation of those mechanisms as one-sidedly hegemonic, 
Critical Theorists have remained blind to the ability of working-class struggles to 
transform and threaten the very existence of capital. Their concept of domination 
is so complete that the “dominated” virtually disappears as an active historical 
subject. In consequence, these philosophers have failed to escape the framework 
of mere ideological critique of capitalist society (p. 42). 
To further illustrate this point, it is useful to consider how the dominant ideology 
and media hegemony theses treat media audiences. According to Stuart Hall’s (1980) 
encoding/decoding theory, media audiences are hardly uniform: Rather than 
unproblematically accepting the codes or intended meanings of specific media texts, 
audience members may occupy one of three positions in relation to ideological meanings, 
according to their economic, political, and cultural backgrounds: 
 
 Dominant/hegemonic position – Media audience members in this position share 
the text’s code and take its meaning directly. 
 Negotiated position – Media audience members in this position accept or reject a 
mixture of dominant elements. 
 Oppositional position – Media audience members in this position understand the 
literal meaning of the media text, but do not share its codes and in fact challenge 
its ideological content.  
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Using Hall’s categories, the dominant ideology thesis stresses the 
dominant/hegemonic position, whereas the media hegemony thesis draws attention to 
both the dominant/hegemonic position and the negotiated position. Both smack of textual 
determinism, i.e., the theoretical assumption that media audiences interpret texts as they 
were intended to be read by media makers, because neither gives any consideration to the 
possibility that audience members may occupy oppositional positions or produce resistant 
readings, etc. 
Furthermore, the dominant ideology and media hegemony theses overlook the 
pervasive forms of “quiet resistance” that operate outside of formal organizations, 
movements, and revolutions, such as foot-dragging, false compliance, sabotage, 
shoplifting and employee theft, arson, vandalism, and so on, even though these are the 
ordinary means of class struggle (Scott 1985; 1990; 2009; Sprouse 1992). The internet 
and digital technologies also facilitate acts of quiet resistance, such as piracy of music, 
movies, television shows, software, and copyrighted texts. These and other violations of 
intellectual property law are not only widespread, but a large majority of internet users—
as many as 70 percent, according to one study—view these actions as socially acceptable 
(TorrentFreak 2011). 
Moreover, quiet resistance can feed into open forms of resistance, such as when 
activist media makers steal resources or use pirated publishing software in order to create 
activist/alternative media products. This omission from hegemony theory is especially 
significant considering that quiet resistance is ubiquitous, whereas revolutions are 
episodic events. Capitalists have been forced to adjust to everyday forms of anti-capitalist 
resistance, for instance, by creating entire industries based around what radical economist 
Michael Perelman (2010) has termed “guard labor,” i.e., jobs whose function is primarily 
to “protect [capitalists’] commodities, including the goods and premises they own, but 
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especially the labor-power in their employ. Capitalism’s reliance on guard labor deforms 
the entire productive process, not only wasting labor, but also snuffing out badly needed 
creativity” (p. 10). By Perelman’s estimate, approximately a quarter of all jobs in the U.S. 
economy could be classified as guard labor, including security guards, police, military 
personnel, managers, cashiers, bill collectors, lawyers, and so on. 
In his book Gramsci is Dead, political theorist Richard Day (2005) also mounts 
an important anarchist challenge to hegemony theory’s assumption that there is a distinct, 
single enemy that contemporary social movements are fighting. Rather, contemporary 
social movements are engaged in “in a disparate set of struggles, each of which needs to 
be addressed in its particularity” (pp. 5-6). Day argues that contemporary movements 
operate under the “hegemony of hegemony,” meaning the belief, widespread among 
Marxist and liberal activists, that seizing state power in order to impose a new hegemonic 
order is necessary to achieve freedom. Against the Gramscian view that only mass 
movements can break hegemony by organizing into a counterhegemonic bloc capable of 
seizing state power, Day argues that contemporary social movements display an “affinity 
for affinity, that is, for non-universalizing, non-hierarchical, non-coercive relationships 
based on mutual aid and shared commitments” (p. 9). Elsewhere, Day writes: 
[C]ontinuing with an exclusive focus on hegemonic change via the state form, or 
on escaping it entirely, prevents us from imagining and implementing modes of 
social organization that are not only possible and desirable, but are becoming ever 
more necessary as Empire consolidates its hold on our bodies, minds, lands ... on 
our very ability to produce ourselves and the contexts in which we encounter 
others (p. 176). 
Hegemony theory’s failure to appreciate the oppositional position and the 
ubiquity of quiet resistance, to recognize the anti-Marxist character of contemporary 
movements, and more generally to link ideology with subaltern group’s actual 
experiences with media, leads to vanguardist strategies such as those proposed by 
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Gramsci (1971) and Lenin (1902/1969), which seek to move the working class from 
“trade union consciousness” to “socialist consciousness.” For anarchists and fellow 
travelers, as I have already suggested, this approach leaves much to be desired. 
 
THE CRITICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY TRADITION 
While European scholars tended to base their critiques of the mass media in 
Marxist understandings of culture, ideology, and hegemony, over the past several 
decades, U.S. and Canadian communications scholarship “has made substantial 
contributions to political economic theory, once the primary emphasis of European 
research,” observes Vincent Mosco (2008, p. 47). The political economy of news media 
encompasses multiple perspectives, which range from mainstream to more radical views, 
all of which focus on the production and reproduction of society (e.g., Hardy 2014; 
McChesney 2007a; 2008a; Mosco 2009; Wasko, Murdock, & Sousa 2014; Winseck & 
Jin 2011). It is useful, then, to briefly highlight notable differences between two general 
approaches: mainstream (classical) political economy and critical political economy 
(Atton & Hamilton 2008; McChesney 2007a; Mosco 2009). First, mainstream political 
economy—as founded by classical political economists Adam Smith (1776/1937), David 
Ricardo (1817/1973), Thomas Malthus (1820/1963), James Mill (1821/1963), and his son 
John Stuart Mill (1848/1909)—assumes the moral desirability of capitalism as inevitable 
and obvious. On the other hand, critical political economy—as founded by Karl Marx 
(1859/1970; 1867/1967; 1893/1967; 1894/1967), Thorstein Veblen (1989/2007), and 
other heterodox political economists—challenges capitalism’s assumed moral 
desirability. As Atton and Hamilton (2008) observe: 
Critical political economy … seeks to evaluate morally the modes of production 
and reproduction, and to recognize the immense inequalities produced by 
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capitalism. However, also importantly, critical political economy does not take 
such inequalities and such a system as natural and thus inevitable. By contrast, it 
views them as the cumulative and ongoing result of countless intentional policies, 
human decisions and actions that not only reproduce these inequalities and this 
system, but that also serve particular interests – in some cases, an individual’s 
interests, but much more frequently impersonal, social interests such as those 
interests of a particular class (p. 24). 
Second, as Mosco (2009) notes, mainstream political economy has all but 
eliminated its political dimension, choosing instead to concentrate on economic issues, 
such as the outcomes of different combinations of productive factors (p. 21). Although 
some critical political economy acocunts tend to dwell on how market forces influence 
news production (e.g., Baker 2002; 2007), overall, this tradition embraces its broad, 
interdisciplinary nature, which draws inspiration from economics, political science, 
sociology, journalism, communication, and other areas of study (McChesney 2007, p. 39; 
Mosco, pp. 21-23). Third, mainstream political economy falls into the tradition of 
administrative research, which purports to be neutral or value-free, whereas critical 
political economy does not shy away from its Marxist or prescriptive overtones 
(McChesney 2007a, pp. 39-45; 2008a; Smythe 1977; Smythe & Van Dinh 1983). 
Unlike framing and hegemony, critical political economy does not represent a 
specific theory of news media power so much as it does a tradition of critical analysis and 
argumentation which calls attention to the relationship between media industries and 
other centers of power, such as corporations, the state, and the military-industrial 
complex. Beginning with pioneering studies by Harold Innis (1950/1972; 1951), Herbert 
Schiller (1969/1992; 1973; 1976; 1989), and Dallas Smythe (1957; 1960; 1977; 1981),* 
                                                 
* Important work by the sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929) arguably predates these North 
American scholars. According to Peter Simonson (2012), “Across more than three decades of work, Cooley 
provided an expansive vision for communication study that blended normatively grounded political 
economy, interpretive sociology, social psychology, and cultural criticism into a larger project committed 
to democracy as a way of life. His was the first extended American social theory of communication, which 
he took to be constitutive of selves, moral communities, and society writ large” (p. 1). 
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critical political economists of media have cast a wide analytical net, seeking to explain 
mass media power and performance in terms of factors such as ownership patterns, 
market pressures, advertiser influence, federal law, journalists’ routines and beliefs, and 
the general intellectual culture, all the while connecting their analyses to larger concerns 
about governance and human freedom (e.g., Bagdikian 2004; Foster, Holleman, & 
McChesney 2008; Hamilton 2004; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Herman 1982; 1992; 
1995; 1996; Lloyd 2006; McChesney & Nichols 2010; McChesney 1997; 1999; 2000; 
2004; 2007a; 2008a; Mosco 2009; Parenti 1986; 1992). Although I cannot examine every 
analytical theme that critical political economists touch on, I take up major ideas below. 
 
Media Ownership and Market Pressures 
“All approaches to the political economy of media take it as axiomatic that the 
media industries—the structure of the markets they operate in, their patterns of 
ownership, the strategies of key players, trajectory of development, and so on—are 
important objects of analysis,” observes Dwayne Winseck (2011, p. 11). According to the 
mainstream political economy perspective, media systems based on private ownership, 
the profit motive, and markets are preferable to other systems, because they establish and 
promote a “free marketplace of ideas,” which enables media audiences to make informed 
decisions as consumers and citizens (Entman 1989; Ginsberg 1986; Peterson 1963). 
The superiority of capitalist news media has become an article of faith in U.S. 
journalism schools; it is represented, for instance, in the widely taught “social 
responsibility theory of the press” articulated by Theodore Peterson (1963), which holds 
that the major functions of the press in Western democratic capitalist societies such as the 
United States are to (1) service the political system by providing information and a forum 
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for debate/discussion, (2) enlighten the public to make it capable of self-government, (3) 
safeguard individual rights by acting as a government watchdog, (4) service the economic 
system by bringing together buyers and sellers via advertising, (5) provide entertainment, 
and (6) maintain financial self-sufficiency in order to remain free from influence of 
special interests (p. 74). Moreover, in the mainstream political economy view, capitalist 
media markets self-correct problems as they arise, because media audiences will avoid 
content they find objectionable, while gravitating toward that which appeals to them. This 
view comes very close to uses and gratifications theory, which holds that media audience 
members select and use media from all the available options, based on their individual 
needs and motives (Katz 1959; Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch 1973; Katz, Gurevitch, & 
Haas 1973; Lee 2013; Ruggiero 2000). 
The innate, obvious superiority of capitalist news media has become an article of 
faith in the U.S. academic community and journalism schools, even though elsewhere in 
the world, media systems are understood to be the outcome of policy decisions. As 
McChesney (2008a) observes: 
For much of the past century there has been a decided split in the political 
economy of media between U.S. scholars and those based in almost every other 
nation in the world. In the United States it generally has been assumed, even by 
critical scholars devoted to social change, that a profit-driven, advertising-
supported corporate media system was the only possible system. The media 
system reflected the nature of the U.S. political economy, and any serious effort to 
reform the media system would have to necessarily be part of a revolutionary 
program to overthrow the capitalist political economy. Since that was considered 
unrealistic, even preposterous, the structure of the media system was regarded as 
inviolable. The circumstances existing and transmitted from the past allowed for 
no alternative (p. 52). 
Drawing from a long tradition of radical press criticism in the United States 
(McChesney & Scott 2004; Reynolds & Hicks 2012; Seldes 1938; Sinclair 1919/2003), 
the critical political economy perspective challenges the optimistic mainstream view of 
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capitalist news media. Critics and scholars working in this tradition contend that the free 
marketplace of ideas is highly idealized, given that a small handful of powerful 
corporations own and control the lion’s share of the country’s traditional forms of media 
(print, television, and radio)—about 90 percent, in fact—as well as the major distribution 
channels and huge portions of the internet. The chain of mergers which resulted in this 
state of affairs accelerated rapidly over the past three decades, with the number of major 
mass media firms shrinking from over 50 in 1980 to the small handful which dominate 
today’s media landscape (Bagdikian 1983; 1987; 1990; 1992; 1997; 2000; 2004; Baker 
2007; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Noam 2009).* This rapid mass media 
convergence is of concern to activists, dissidents, media critics, critical media scholars, 
and journalists because eliminating or absorbing competitor news organizations threatens 
media diversity, creates content discrimination within media markets, keeps female and 
minority ownership of media at low levels, and undermines the public interest, such as 
when media produce content that prioritizes entertainment over information (Bagdikian 
1983; 2004; Baker 2002; 2007; Barnouw et al. 1997; Klinenberg 2007; McChesney 1997; 
1999; 2004; McCord 1996; Turner & Cooper 2006). Some critical political economists 
take this a step further, arguing that capitalist ownership and control over mass media 
institutions virtually guarantees that certain types of news will rarely if ever be published 
or broadcast, such as stories which directly contradict U.S. foreign policy narratives, or 
stories which undermine the interests of media owners and/or the parent companies of 
mass media institutions (e.g., Herman 1982; 1992; 1995; 1996; Herman & Chomsky 
                                                 
* Although he is not a critical political economist, according to Eli Noam (2009), media ownership by 
“insiders” (families, newspaper founders, and top managers) has declined steadily since 1984, across all 
mediums, while corporate ownership of media has grown. However, Noam observes, “the popular belief 
that convergence in the information industries has resulted in a small group of media moguls is not an 
accurate one. A better description is one of a large number of fund managers owning, on behalf of their 
fund investors, narrow slices of a big pie” (p. 407). 
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1988; Herman & Peterson 2010; Parenti 1986).* Moreover, news outlets with more reach, 
prestige, and resources than other media organizations constitute the top tier of the U.S. 
media system, which has considerable influence in supplying information and defining 
the news agenda for lower tiered news media – a process referred to as intermedia 
agenda-setting (Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002, pp. 4-5; McCombs 2004). 
Critical political economists also argue that media consolidation and market 
pressures compel news organizations to cut costs and push stories that are easier/cheaper 
to produce and which attract larger audiences. As newspapers search for ways to save 
money, it is inevitably the case that investigative reporting and other resource- and time-
intensive forms of journalism are first on the chopping block. This has negative 
consequences for an informed democratic citizenry, as well as subtly suppresses activists 
such as those involved in criminal justice reform and anti-death penalty organizing, who 
not only benefit from investigative reporting but in fact work closely with investigative 
journalists to expose police misconduct and false convictions. The threat posed to daily 
newspapers by media consolidation and market influence is a huge cause for concern, 
because most original reporting still comes from newspapers and other traditional news 
media (McChesney 2013; McChesney & Nichols 2010; Pew 2010).  
As Charlene Simmons (2010) observes, several media scholars view the internet 
as a democratizing alternative to the corporate consolidation of traditional forms of 
media, because web users can access and share diverse perspectives. However, critical 
political economists point out that a process of media consolidation occurs online as well, 
which leads directly to the same problems caused by corporate consolidation of 
traditional media, such as content discrimination and the marginalization of diverse 
                                                 
* As Gitlin (1997) notes, in response to these criticisms, the news industry has “been bending over 
backwards to avoid the charge of taint,” as evidenced by journalists’ overt attempts to critically cover news 
media organizations’ parent companies (p. 8). 
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viewpoints (Baker 2007; Blevins 2002; Dahlberg 2004; Foster & McChesney 2011; 
Herman & McChesney 1997; McChesney 1999; 2004; 2013; Simmons 2010). In 
addition, most web users tend to spend a large majority of their time online using 
software and websites owned and controlled by large media companies such as 
Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, and Google, i.e., what some scholars refer to as the “web 
within the web” (Herman & McChesney 1997; Simmons 2010). As noted in Chapter 1, 
the corporate nature of online media and the gatekeeper roles played by websites such as 
Facebook creates a tension between activist beliefs and behavior, because activists 
express concern over the corporate structure of mainstream news media, yet incorporate 
social media into their organizing. 
 
Advertisers and the Audience Commodity 
A large body of historical research and cultural critique traces the development of 
sophisticated advertising and public relations techniques over the past century, showing 
how these have been used to mislead the public, protect and empower corporations, instill 
commodity fetishism, and promote a consumerist culture (Carey 1997; Clark 1988; 
Cohen 2003; Ewen 1996; 2001; Ewen & Ewen 1982; Fones-Wolf 1994; Leach 1993; 
Lears 1994; Ohmann 1996; Preston 1996; Schudson 1984). Because advertising is the 
main source of revenue for mass news media in the United States, advertiser influence is 
also a central concern for critical political economists of news media, who draw attention 
to advertisers’ influence on news production, as well as the historical symbiosis between 
advertisers and news media institutions. McChesney (2007a), an influential critical 
political economist, traces his own views on the mass media-advertiser relationship to the 
Marxist theory of monopoly capitalism developed by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (1966) 
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in their seminal book Monopoly Capital. According to Baran and Sweezy, in 
monopolistic capitalist societies such as the United States, advertising takes on special 
importance as a means by which the economy absorbs surplus: The role of the “the sales 
effort,” as they refer to it, moves “from being a relatively unimportant feature of the 
[capitalist] system … to the status of one of its decisive nerve centers” (p. 115). As 
McChesney (2007a) summarizes their argument, which has great import for critical 
media scholars: 
In a capitalism dominated by large corporations operating in oligopolistic 
markets, advertising becomes a necessary, even mandatory, competitive weapon. 
Firms no longer produce as much as they can to sell at a market price over which 
they have no control. They can produce only as much as they can sell at prices 
that permit them satisfactory profit, and they have considerable influence over 
pricing. Advertising, and marketing more generally, is the means to that end, 
especially since it does not require cutthroat price competition (p. 69). 
This view has profound implications for critical media scholars and anti-capitalist 
radicals, one of which is that, as a result of the U.S. transition from its pre-Civil War 
system of partisan media to a commercial media system based on advertising revenue, 
journalism became “the lynchpin of the political economy of American society” 
(McChesney & Scott 2004, p. 10). The mass media’s reliance on advertising revenue 
directly contributed to the emergence of the U.S. consumer culture which exploded in the 
early years of the Gilded Age, during which ad-supported magazines and newspapers 
began to reach large audiences and create a mass culture (Baldasty 1992; Leach 1993; 
Lears 1994; Ohmann 1996; Schudson 1984). These same economic pressures also helped 
pave the way for the hallmarks of objectivity which have come to define mainstream 
commercial journalism, such as depoliticization, nonpartisanship, and journalists’ 
reliance on official sources, which by creating a class of “professional journalists” 
provide a form of industry self-regulation (Baldasty 1992; Hackett & Zhao 1998; Herman 
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& Chomsky 1988/2002; Kaplan 2002; Mindich 1998; McChesney & Nichols 2010; 
Schudson 1978). 
According to the mainstream political economy view of capitalist news media, the 
mass media’s principal good or product is “news”—the magazine, daily paper, radio or 
television program, etc.—which is distributed to readers, viewers, and/or listeners who 
are conventionally understood to be the media’s clients or customers. That is to say, in 
the traditional view, media consumers have sovereignty, because the mass media give 
them what they want. Critical political economists invert this relationship, by theorizing 
that news audiences are actually the “product” news organizations sell to advertisers, who 
represent the mass news media’s actual customers. This perspective is summed up in 
V.O. Key’s (1964) observation that “newspaper publishers are essentially people who sell 
white space on newsprint to advertisers” (p. 379). 
According to the “audience commodity” theory, first articulated by Dallas Smythe 
(1951; 1977; 1981), the main transactions in media markets occur between media 
companies and advertisers, not between media companies and audiences or consumers. In 
this view, the mass media exploit and commodify media audiences, who perform 
unwaged “work” on behalf of mass media institutions. The value of this work—e.g., what 
advertisers are willing to pay—is determined by price schedules based on market 
research to determine media ratings and desirable audience demographics.* In this view, 
because advertisers are the main customers exerting demand in the marketplace, 
journalism is basically a positive externality and advertisers have enormous influence 
over shaping news media content as both censors and gatekeepers (Artz 2008; Baker 
                                                 
* It is hardly surprising that Smythe was a vocal critic of the administrative research methods used to 
collect this demographic information (Smythe & Van Dinh 1983). 
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1994; Caraway 2011; Fuchs 2012; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Meehan 1984; 1993; 
Smythe 1951; 1977; 1981).* 
 
The Role of the State 
Critical political economists also draw attention to the role of the state in enacting 
policies which can either facilitate the growth of democratic forms of media, such as 
legal provisions carving out space for community radio and public access television 
stations, or, alternatively, strengthen the corporate media giants which currently dominate 
today’s media landscape, such as deregulation which makes it legal for media companies 
to own and operate multiple TV stations in the same media market. Critical political 
economists contend that, by allowing corporations to dominant the mass media market, 
the federal government has been negligent in its responsibility to uphold the first 
amendment, which guarantees freedom of expression (Baker 2002; 2007; Lloyd 2006; 
McChesney 1993; 1999; 2000; 2004; 2007a; McChesney, Newman, & Scott 2005; 
McChesney & Nichols 2010).  
 
The Propaganda Model 
Although, as noted above, critical political economy does not represent a specific 
theory of news media so much as it does a broad array of concerns, one account of 
critical political economy bears mentioning. A popular theory of news media 
performance among left-progressive activists in the United States is the propaganda 
model, developed by Ed Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988/2002) in their influential 
                                                 
* For in-depth discussion of the relevance of Smythe’s audience commodity theory for contemporary 
critical media studies, see Fuchs (2012). 
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book Manufacturing Consent, which is firmly rooted in the critical political economy 
tradition, but also borrows insights from studies of ideology and media sociology. The 
propaganda model includes five filters which, when taken together, purport to explain the 
institutional behavior of mass news media. These filters are: 
 
1. The size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of mass 
media corporations (pp. 3-14). 
2. Advertising as a primary source of revenue for the mass media (pp. 14-18). 
3. The reliance on official sources of information, such as government officials, 
businesspersons, and experts funded by concentrations of power (pp. 18-25). 
4. ‘Flak’—press criticism—as a means of disciplining the news media, so that its 
content does not stray far from the fixed parameters of acceptable thought (pp. 26-
28). 
5. ‘Anticommunism’, an ideological filter, which serves as a national religion and 
control mechanism (pp. 29-31). This filter might be updated to anti-terrorism or 
simply “fear.” 
 
As Herman and Chomsky explain, 
These elements interact with and reinforce one another. The raw material of news 
must pass through successive filters, leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print. 
They fix the discourse and interpretation, and the definition of what is 
newsworthy in the first place, and they explain the basis and operations of what 
amount to propaganda campaigns (p. 2). 
As a testable, theoretical account of news media performance, the propaganda 
model predicts that certain issues will receive uneven or inadequate coverage in 
mainstream news, such as the “unworthy victims” of repressive U.S foreign policy or 
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state terrorism committed by U.S. allies such as Israel and Colombia (Chomsky 1989; 
Herman 1982; 1992; 1995; 1996; Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Klaehn 2005; 2010; 
Mullen & Klaehn 2010; Tedrow 2009; 2011). 
Because it paints an unflattering portrait of journalists and the news industry, 
among journalism and mass communications scholars, the propaganda model often is 
derided as taking a conspiratorial view of media (e.g., Corner 2003). In fact, one of the 
model’s second-order predictions is that it will be marginalized within academic circles 
(Jensen 2010; Mullen 2010; Mullen & Klaehn 2010). However, as Herman and Chomsky 
(1988) observe, far from representing a conspiracy theory, their model actually offers a 
free market analysis of the mass media. Moreover, the propaganda model is notable in 
that it does not simply predict media behavior and performance, but also theorizes about 
the relationship between mass media institutions and other structures of power in 
advanced capitalist societies. As Andrew Mullen and Jeffrey Klaehn (2010) observe: 
Within the context of the social sciences, the PM [propaganda model] constitutes 
a critical-structural model. It is in the first instance concerned to explore the 
interplay between power, social structure and ideology. Social inequalities within 
the broader society and social world are highlighted by the PM. It is 
fundamentally democratic and advocates scholarship that is accessible and can be 
read and understood by specialist and non-specialist audiences alike (p. 225). 
The propaganda model is widely assumed to be a theory of media influence, 
because many assume the model predicts that the mass media “manufactures” or secures 
public consent for elites. However, this view is mistaken. As Herman (1996) observes, 
“[Noam Chomsky and I] never claimed that the propaganda model explains everything or 
that it shows media omnipotence and complete effectiveness in manufacturing consent. It 
is a model of media behavior and performance, not media effects.” Moreover, Herman 
and Chomsky (1988/2002) state explicitly in the introduction to Manufacturing Consent 
that “we are talking about media structure and performance, not the effects of the media 
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on the public” (p. xii). The propaganda model is also built on case studies of prestige 
news media reporting on foreign events, which may leave readers less equipped to 
challenge this framework. However, this is not a limitation of the propaganda model 
itself. For instance, as Mercedes de Uriarte (2010) has shown, the model can also be 
applied to study local news coverage of issues such as gentrification. 
 
CRITICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY’S IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY 
Compared to most other social science research traditions, few of which have 
forged important connections with contemporary oppositional movements, the critical 
political economy of media appears as somewhat unusual, because scholars working 
within this tradition have joined in activist efforts to influence communications policies 
and structures, while laying important groundwork for the U.S. media reform movement 
(Mosco 2008; McChesney 1999; 2004; 2007a; 2008b). As Mosco (2008) observes, 
“Praxis, or the unity of research and action, is a fundamental characteristic of a political 
economy approach. Most political economists of communication have been activists as 
well as scholars, involved in media democracy, development communication, 
independent media and universal access work, as well as with labour, feminist, and anti-
racist movements” (p. 58). 
To take a notable example, Robert McChesney, who explicitly links his critiques 
of mass news media to prescriptions for federal communications policy and calls for 
media activism (e.g., 2001; 2004; 2008a; McChesney & Nichols 2010), co-founded and 
serves as the president for Free Press, a national media reform organization that seeks to 
protect net neutrality, i.e., the principle that internet service providers should treat all 
online data equally instead of discriminating against certain types of users or content. In 
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addition to McChesney, journalists and critical scholars working from within a critical 
political economy framework such as Noam Chomsky, Ed Herman, Michael Parenti, 
Norman Solomon, Jeff Cohen, Naomi Klein, Amy Goodman, and others have lent their 
voices to a wide array of left-progressive efforts. Within the academy, critical political 
economists associated with the Union for Democratic Communications, an association of 
activist communications scholars, have also cast their lot with opponents of neoliberalism 
and media oligopolies. 
In terms of linking theory with movement strategy, activists have distilled at least 
two important lessons from the critical political economy tradition. The first main 
strategic implication for activists is that they should engage in media reform efforts 
aimed at breaking up consolidated media. The second implication is that activist media 
makers must be mindful of how they structure and subsidize alternative/activist media 
projects. 
 
Media Reform and Contesting Media Monopoly 
According to framing scholars William Gamson and David Meyer (1996), even 
though the mass news media are relatively open to movements, “Ownership and 
consumption patterns of media, as well as their relation to the state and political parties, 
are relatively stable and generally beyond the scope of movement claims” (p. 287). 
Against this view, critical political economists argue that activists can and should contest 
the institutional structure of mass media by incorporating media reform strategies into 
overarching movement goals. The mass media are treated not simply as tools or resources 
which activists can exploit or use in order to further their efforts, but rather, are seen as 
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powerful institutions that activists involved in diverse struggles must bring under popular 
control if they are to have any hope of succeeding. To quote McChesney (2008), 
No one thinks any longer that media reform is an issue to solve “after the 
revolution.” Everyone understands that without media reform, there will be no 
revolution. In that sense it is similar to the labor movement, where the demand for 
free trade unions, hardly revolutionary in its own right, is a necessary 
precondition to building a viable organized left that can contest for power. Even if 
we do not get the revolution in the United States, media reform much like 
organized labor can make the nation a more just and humane place, for its own 
inhabitants and the peoples of the world (p. 59). 
Thus, although critical political economy depicts the mass news media primarily 
in an adversarial capacity, it is an adversarial conception linked to a significant 
implication for activist strategy. As an active participant in the media reform movement, 
McChesney (1993; 1999; 2000; 2004; 2007a) argues that both citizens and the federal 
government can play important roles in shaping communications systems during “critical 
junctures,” i.e., “those historical moments when the policy-making options are relatively 
broad and the policies put in place will set the media system on a track that will be 
difficult to reroute for decades, even generations” (McChesney 2004, p. 24). Today, 
activists and movements find themselves in a critical juncture, as battles are being waged 
to save net neutrality from telecommunications corporations that seek to privatize the 
internet by deciding which web content can be downloaded at the fastest speeds 
(McChesney 2008a, p. 57; 2013). For critical political economists such as McChesney, 
efforts to break up oligopolistic media industries, protect net neutrality, restore popular 
control over the news media, and create a truly democratic news media system will 
depend to a great extent on state intervention, in particular federal communications laws 
and tax breaks for various kinds of news media (McChesney 1997; 1999; 2000; 2004; 
McChesney & Nichols 2010). 
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The notion that the government should have any role to play in regulating media 
markets or subsidizing news organizations is anathema to mainstream political 
economists and other defenders of the capitalist press, who consider it natural and 
obvious that the state should not intervene in the mass media system. Critical political 
economists counter that this view of news media is ahistorical; the federal government 
has played a significant role in subsidizing media in the United States, as well as crafting 
policies that benefit capitalist media companies (Lloyd 2006; McChesney 2004; 
McChesney & Nichols 2010). 
For instance, when Congress passed the Post Office Act of 1792, which 
established postal routes and allowed newspapers to mail at low rates, they created a vast, 
publicly subsidized infrastructure for exchanging information across the country. 
Although newspapers and pamphlets accounted for about 95 percent of all mail weight, 
they brought in less than 15 percent of all postal revenues. As the only nationalized 
industry, for several decades the Post Office was the largest branch of the federal 
government, employing 75 percent of civilian federal employees in 1831 and an even 
higher proportion in 1860. In fact, by 1832 there were more postmasters than soldiers. 
This subsidy was an incredible boon to newspapers, whose numbers fairly exploded in 
the early decades of the republic (Lloyd 2006, pp. 23-34; McChesney & Nichols 2010, 
pp. 121-7). Newspapers were also subsidized by lucrative government printing contracts 
and benefited from railroads and mass forced schooling, i.e., state policies that helped 
promote a large, literate population. According to Mark Lloyd (2006), whose important 
book Prologue to a Farce traces the history of communications in the United States, the 
massive subsidy for papers represented by the U.S. postal system reflected “Madison’s 
civic vision, a vision that elevated the importance of popular information and public 
opinion that would dominate communications policy in the early republic” (p. 34). 
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Because today’s capitalist media system does not elevate the importance of popular 
information, or for that matter value popular participation in the process of making 
meaning, critical political economists argue that it is out of sync with the principles on 
which U.S. democracy was founded. 
 
Structuring and Subsidizing Alternative Media 
The critical political economy critique has also profoundly influenced how left-
progressive activists approach questions related to structuring and subsidizing 
alternative/activist media projects and institutions. Over the past several decades, 
beginning with the New Left movements of the 1960s and 1970s, activist media makers 
have increasingly expressed concern over the fact that prominent alternative media 
institutions tend to replicate corporate hierarchies and divisions of labor. This has 
motivated several activists to organize alternative/activist media institutions as 
collectively run enterprises in which editorial responsibilities are shared (Albert 1997; 
2006a; 2006b; Atton 2002; Atton & Hamilton 2008; Downing 2001). In addition, by 
calling attention to the troubling influence of advertisers, critical political economy has 
challenged activist media makers to seek alternative revenue streams to fund their 
projects (Albert 1997; 2006a; 2006b; Angel 2008). For instance, the radical left 
publication Z Magazine is not only organized nonhierarchically, but has been ad-free and 
subsidized primarily by reader subscriptions since it was first published in 1987. 
Arguably, a problem with the critical political economy perspective is that, by 
focusing so much attention media convergence and audience-exploitative nature of 
advertisements, this research tradition has, regrettably, discouraged some activists from 
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giving serious consideration to the question of how movements can generate revenue for 
the media they produce. As Jen Angel (2008) observes: 
A central problem in activist culture is the denial of money as a powerful force. 
Whether it’s that people are afraid of money because they don’t understand it, 
they believe that it’s just a tool for capitalist lackeys, or they feel that it’s an 
instrument that can only be used for evil, this kind of mythology around money 
means that activists and organizations often lag far behind their conservative or 
for-profit counterparts in terms of building structure and long-term stability. To 
build projects and institutions that are sustainable and effective within the 
capitalist system we currently live in, we need to fund them. There simply needs 
to be money to pay for paper, computers, and electricity. To fund projects and 
institutions, we need two things: activists that understand money and can use it 
effectively, and activists who will support institutions with financial resources 
(pp. 22-23). 
As Angel and others emphasize, there are diverse forms of media subsidy that 
activist media makers can take advantage of, if they wish to eschew advertising. 
Journalism scholar Jay Rosen (2009), for instance, identifies twenty different sources of 
subsidy besides advertisers, including government, political parties, rich benefactors and 
philanthropists, related and unrelated businesses, spin-offs, colleges and universities, 
religious groups, family members, e-commerce, and passionate news consumers. In 
addition, activist media makers can generate revenue by holding benefit concerts, hosting 
bake sales and garage sales, asking for donations, taking out loans, and using credit cards 
(e.g., Angel 2008). Software piracy, black market activity, and expropriation—theft from 
employers and corporations—also helps subsidize various activist media projects, even if 
activists do not write about these activities or discuss them openly. It should be 
mentioned that some revenue streams have important drawbacks—for instance, crime can 
subsidize media quickly but also land activists in jail—while other revenue streams may 
be consonant with a publication’s goals but fail to generate a steady flow of income, such 
as paid subscriptions. 
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ANARCHISM AND CRITICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
For anarchists, especially those in English-speaking countries such as the United 
States, critical political economy accounts of media likely have more influence than other 
critical theoretical accounts of the mass media, owing to the influence of Noam 
Chomsky, a known anarchist, as well as the Anarchist FAQ, which offers a summary of 
Herman and Chomksy’s (1988/2002) propaganda model in its section covering the 
anarchist critique of news media (McKay 2008, pp. 380-386). And indeed, from an 
anarchist perspective, the critical political economy tradition has important strengths: To 
begin, the critique of corporate ownership of mass media institutions is a naturally 
corollary to the anarchist/autonomist critique of the commodification of information and 
the enclosure of the knowledge commons (Hamilton 2004; Kidd 1988; 2003; 2010; 
Smythe 1981), as well as the critique of corporate influence in everyday life (Deetz 
1992). Political economists’ activism on behalf of net neutrality is basically consonant 
with anarchism’s premium on media systems and communicative processes that enable 
non-hierarchical information flows, free from corruptions of informational power. In 
addition, political economy’s strategic implication that activists should break up media 
monopolies and restore democratic control over media institutions is basically consistent 
with anarchism’s assault on different forms of domination and power structures. 
Likewise, critical political economy’s implications for activist/alternative media makers 
are consistent with the premium anarchism places on prefigurative politics and direct 
action. Finally, the critical political economy tradition is notable from an anarchist 
activist-scholar perspective because the researchers who work within this tradition tend to 
be very close to those activists who stand to benefit from their research. 
For anarchism, where critical political economy arguably falters is in its 
recommendation that activists should pursue strategies aimed at pressuring the state to 
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enact policies to regulate media markets, break up monopolies, and help subsidize media 
systems. As Gordon (2006) observes, “Clearly anarchist theory is not geared towards 
underpinning ‘policy change’, which inevitably means change through the state. Rather, 
the goal is to underpin various forms of grassroots action that take place outside and as-
against the state” (pp. 17-18). Furthermore, anarchists might argue that news media 
owners, politicians, and other elite actors have no strong incentive to enact policies 
promoting media democracy and a vibrant press, because doing so would undermine their 
power and prestige. 
There are two points to be made here. The first is that critical political economists 
obviously are not opposed to grassroots efforts to establish democratic media outside and 
as-against the state. McChesney (2008a), for instance, considers the media reform 
movement to be one of three branches of media activism, which is closely related to those 
involved in creating grassroots, independent media, and to those who provide criticism of 
the mainstream media (p. 58). The second point to be made is that, in the view of 
anarchists such as Chomsky (1970/2005; 2002; 2005), media reform efforts which seek 
to leverage the power of the state against powerful media companies are actually 
consistent with anarchist politics and the goal of a stateless, classless society. Chomsky 
(2002) argues that anarchists must be able to defend at least some attempts to defend and 
expand state power, because the state provides essential services—such as welfare and 
forms of healthcare—that are under attack by conservatives and powerful corporations. 
Although both the state and corporations must ultimately be dismantled in the anarchist 
view, the population exerts at least some control over the state, whereas corporations 
basically operate as unaccountable, private tyrannies. “Supporting these aspects of the 
governmental structures just seems to me, to be part of a willingness to face some of the 
complexities of life for what they are – and the complexities of life include the fact that 
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there are a lot of ugly things out there,” he observes (p. 346). This is consistent with 
Chomsky’s position that anarchists and other activists should look for ways to “expand 
the floor of the cage,” that is, extend the limits to what the current political-economic 
environment currently allows, on the assumption that doing so will serve as a preliminary 




Chapter 6: Interview Research Methodology 
Despite the mountain of critical communications research generated by scholars 
over the past several decades, in an important sense the interrelationships between critical 
media theory, activist consciousness, and movement strategy remain hazy. Scholars have 
studied activists’ media consumption habits as well as their use of mainstream media, 
alternative/activist media, and digital technologies in their activism and organizing (e.g., 
Atton 2002; Atton & Hamilton 2008; Castells 2012; Downing 2001; Earl & Kimport 
2011; Harlow & Harp 2012; Harlow & Guo 2014; McCaughey & Ayers 2003; Rodríguez 
2001;Waltz 2005). However, it remains unclear how most activists actually think about 
the many dimensions of news media power, how they incorporate these understandings 
into their activism and organizing, or whether these understandings mirror or reflect the 
content of critical and radical communications theory as theorists understand it. It is in 
this disconnect—between those who research corruptions of information power and the 
activists and dissidents who could benefit from this research—that anarchist scholars can 
play an important role, as activist researchers who assist other radicals in their capacity as 
movement map makers (Ehrlich 2001; Gordon 2006; 2008; Graeber 2004; Shukaitis 
2004; Shukaitis & Graeber 2007; Stein 2001). Engaging with activists’ actual beliefs and 
dilemmas is essential for generating reflexive radical political theory. This is true not just 
for anarchist researchers, but for activist social science researchers across the board (De-
Shalit 2000; Gordon 2006; 2008; Graeber 2004; Shukaitis & Graeber 2007). To quote 
Gordon (2006): 
By bringing the (often conflicting) views of activists to a high level of 
articulation, the theorist can construct a discussion where the activists’ debates 
can be undertaken in a more precise and clear way, with attention to detail and a 
coherent thread of argument. The role of the theorist, on this score, is to partake in 
and facilitate the reflexive process of theorising among activists, functioning as a 
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clarifier, organiser and articulator of ideas, an activity that takes place with and 
for activists. Her or his goal is to address, in theoretical form, the issues that 
activists face in their everyday organising, to assemble ideas so that they can be 
discussed carefully, to lay open hidden assumptions and contradictory statements, 
and in general to advance activists’ thinking by transposing it from the 
fragmented terrain of brief and informal debate to a dimension where a more 
structured and “high definition” discussion can be undertaken – to the written 
page (p. 17). 
Thus, in addition to developing anarchistic theoretical arguments in Chapters 2 
through 5, this study features an exploratory research component which examines how 
contemporary activists think about media power and media-movement interactions as it 
relates to their organizing and activism. The basis of this investigation is a series of in-
depth, ethnographic interviews conducted with activists based in Austin, Texas. The 
purpose of this interview research is twofold: First, it aims to explore how the theoretical 
arguments in this dissertation possibly resonate or conflict with contemporary anarchist 
understandings of news media. Second, these interviews initiate exploration about the 
ways in which contemporary anarchist understandings possibly deepen or extend the 
theoretical arguments of this dissertation. Below, I review the dilemmas and 
methodological considerations which shaped the interview research process. 
 
THE IRB DILEMMA: JOURNALISTIC PRACTICE VERSUS HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) are committees of experts and researchers 
charged with reviewing and approving projects that involve human subjects research, 
intended originally to address medical and criminal activity privacy for subjects. On 
university and college campuses, IRBs are responsible for ensuring that all research 
conducted by faculty members and graduate students does not violate federal, 
institutional, or ethical guidelines. At the time this dissertation was proposed, researched, 
and written, the IRB of the University of Texas at Austin required all PhD students to 
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obtain its approval—including those engaged in oral history, journalism, and biographical 
research—before conducting anything it considered to be human subjects research. This 
is because UT-Austin’s IRB, like most IRBs, proposes a broad definition of human 
subjects research: 
Any systematic investigation that is designed to develop or contribute to 
generalizable knowledge, and which involves living humans about whom an 
investigator obtains information through intervention or interaction or obtains 
identifiable private information, qualifies as human subjects research.* 
After a series of medical and behavioral experiments in the 1930s and 1940s—
notably, the Tuskegee syphilis study and Nazi research on concentration camp 
prisoners—raised important questions about the ethical commitments of those engaged in 
human subjects research, Congress passed the National Research Act in 1974, which 
identified basic principles and guidelines for responsible research, as well as prompted 
the establishment of IRBs throughout the country. IRB protections for human subjects 
were initially designed to monitor the activities of researchers engaged in biomedical and 
behavioral research, that is, areas in which research subjects need strong protections from 
possible abuse (Edgar & Rothman 1995; White 2007). Although it is important to insure 
that subjects are neither mistreated nor abused, and that researchers conduct themselves 
in an ethically appropriate, responsible manner, IRBs are not immune from criticism. For 
instance, many of those who serve on IRBs at universities and colleges maintain 
important links with industry, as funding recipients, consultants, speakers, members of 
advisory boards, and so on. This represents a conflict of interest when these board 
members participate in protocol decisions sponsored by companies with which they have 
a financial relationship (Campbell et al. 2006). 
                                                 
* See http://www.utexas.edu/research/rsc/humansubjects/faqs/index.html 
 252 
Furthermore, First Amendment defenders argue that IRBs’ broad conception of 
human subjects research ought to be challenged, because allowing institutions to oversee 
research based in journalistic methods of inquiry (in particular, in-depth interviews with 
subjects who are willing to go on record) constitutes a form of prior review. This is the 
position that my dissertation co-chair Dr. Mercedes de Uriarte and I arrived at, after 
consulting with constitutional lawyers and comparing UT-Austin’s IRB protocols with 
those used at other universities. Our position—that UT-Austin’s IRB has no business 
inserting itself into research rooted in journalistic practice—is supported by scholarly and 
legal arguments that IRB’s “mission creep” is unconstitutional and deeply at odds with 
the American free speech tradition, because it threatens the integrity of humanities 
research and violates the First Amendment principle forbidding the licensing of inquiry 
and speech (Borenstein 2008; Dingwall 2008; Hamburger 2005; Kerr 2006; White 2007). 
Moreover, IRB guidelines allow interview subjects to withdraw their participation at any 
point in the research process, which can threaten critical inquiry by motivating 
researchers to avoid asking hard questions or engage in other activities that could offend 
interview subjects. The suggestion that interviewees, several months after being 
interviewed, could revoke permission for a writer to publish their comments would be an 
absurd, insulting proposition to most working journalists in the United States. Yet this is 
a reality that many journalism scholars must live with. 
Unfortunately, faculty and students who do not comply with IRB guidelines face 
stiff penalties; for PhD students, the situation is worse, because IRB compliance is 
mandatory to graduate. Thus, although Dr. de Uriarte and I contested the UT-Austin IRB 
oversight of doctoral dissertations rooted in journalistic practice, ultimately we gave in to 
institutional pressure. This means that, as part of the process of obtaining IRB approval 
for this study, I had to grant UT-Austin’s IRB final say over the interview script I used. I 
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was also prohibited from interviewing people who were not physically in Central Texas, 
even if those persons were involved in activist efforts in Austin. UT’s IRB also told me 
that I could not hire or recruit someone to help with transcription duties, because I would 
not be allowed to share the audio recordings. Whatever their intent, these IRB rules 
restrict inquiry. 
When it came to actually conducting interviews, moreover, I had to preface each 
one with a lengthy, canned description of informed consent, my responsibilities as a 
researcher, and my interview subjects’ rights as research participants. These presentations 
often prompted conversations regarding institutional policies that work to alienate activist 
researchers from the movements they seek to theorize about. An important point which 
emerged in these conversations is that although IRB guidelines serve to protect interview 
subjects from any misconduct on my part, these same provisions could also require me to 
hand over recordings or transcripts to the police or courts. Although this is unlikely to 
happen, this institutional threat represents a subtle form of state suppression and a 
corruption of informational power. It also undermines the ethical position of the press 
that off-the-record information provided by a source must be protected by the journalist 
as confidential. This position is protected by some states as well. 
 
SELECTING AND INTERVIEWING SUBJECTS 
While surveys and other quantitative research methods can provide useful pictures 
of trends in activists’ relationship with media (e.g., Harlow & Guo 2014; Harlow & Harp 
2012), these methods are also impersonal, tend only to scratch the surface, and are less 
than ideal for allowing respondents to freely communicate their ideas, beliefs, and 
experiences. Furthermore, when very little is known about a subject matter, fact-finding 
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missions based on qualitative methods are preferable, because they allow researchers to 
access underlying themes and ideas that quantitative studies tend to gloss over (Lindlof & 
Taylor 2002; Potter 1996). For this study, then, my investigative tool was the in-depth, 
ethnographic interview. According to David Fetterman (1989), “the [ethnographic] 
interview is not an excuse to interrogate an individual or criticize cultural practices. It is 
an opportunity to learn from the interviewee” (p. 55). “The qualitative interview is a 
remarkably adaptive method,” observe Thomas Lindlof and Bryan Taylor (2002), 
because interviews can be conducted nearly anywhere in relative privacy, the scope of 
topics which can be covered is limitless, and interviewers can adopt formal or informal 
stances (pp. 170-171). Face-to-face interviews, moreover, allow interviewers and 
interviewees to establish common ground, which helps to put both parties at ease. 
The research site I chose was Austin, Texas, which is often referred to as a “drop 
of blue” in an otherwise red state. This description obscures the fact that Austin is 
documented as s city segregated by race, ethnicity, and income. Moreover, it is 
thoroughly gentrified and there are deep divisions between the city’s liberals and radicals. 
Nevertheless, Austin is an ideal place to study activists’ beliefs about news media. Not 
only does the city feature a history of important, radical political activism (Dugger 1974; 
Rossinow 1998), but it is currently home to a large core of activists working on various 
leftwing and progressive causes and issues. Also of note, in Austin it is relatively easy for 
one to “tap into” the radical and/or left-progressive community through events such as 
talks, fundraisers, and protests. In addition, alternative media played an important role in 
Austin during the political struggles of 1960s and 1970s (McMillian 2011) and continue 
to do so. It bears mentioning that ‘radical’ is not a static term, because activist support for 
a cause defined as radical during the 1960s (or an earlier era) may now be considered a 
new norm. Many of the radicals of the 1960s and 1970s have mellowed to liberal 
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positions, moreover, which possibly makes it more difficult to identify anarchists or other 
radicals to interview.* In general, then, the question of whether someone or something is 
truly radical is an uninteresting question, similar to definitional disputes over whether 
certain kinds of news media could be considered alternative or activist. 
As Michael Albert (1998) observes, the U.S. left suffers from a “stickiness 
problem,” which is to say that, over the past several decades, the left has been able to 
retain only a small percentage of the millions of people who have come into contact with, 
worked with, or become part of the Civil Rights Movement, the anti-war movements, the 
feminist movement, and other notable causes. Due to the fractured nature of the U.S. left, 
as a result, today it is common to find that dedicated radical and left-progressive activists 
in various towns and cities drift in and out of groups and causes, and often know one 
another through informal or digital networks rather than membership-based 
organizations. According to Alberto Melucci (1996), 
Contemporary ‘movements’ assume the form of solidarity networks entrusted 
with potent cultural meanings, and it is precisely these meanings that distinguish 
them so sharply from political actors and formal organizations next to them. We 
have passed beyond the global and metaphysical conception of collective actors. 
Movements are not entities that move with the unity of goals attributed to them by 
ideologues. Movements are systems of action, complex networks among the 
different levels and meanings of social action. Collective identity allowing them 
to become actors is not a datum or an essence; it is the outcome of exchanges, 
negotiations, decisions, and conflicts among actors (p. 4). 
Of course, this is not to discount the fact that some activists have devoted themselves to 
specific causes, organizations, or groups in Austin – in some cases over periods of several 
years or even decades. Rather than construct case studies of specific causes or group, 
though, I investigated the ideas of members of a community or network of activists. This 
                                                 
* The obverse is true as well: Figures who pass for liberal Democrats in today’s political environment, such 
as Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, would be described as moderate Republicans a half-century ago. 
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approach recognizes the overlaps among activist groups and the “rhizomatic” or 
“submerged network” character of contemporary leftist formations (Day 2005; Deleuze 
& Guattari 1987; Funke 2012a; 2012b; Hardt & Negri 2004; Melluci 1989; 1996). 
Another important reason I decided against a case study approach is that I sought 
quality interviews with people who have long involvement in activism, on the assumption 
that these individuals had thought more about media power and media activism than 
movement newcomers had. Due to the “stickiness problem,” it can be hard to identify 
activists who fit this description; furthermore, activists often hold a low opinion of 
journalists and researchers who “parachute” into communities without giving anything in 
return. This methodological consideration, then, assumes the researcher possesses some 
familiarity with the community being studied, i.e., key groups and figures, local history, 
notable campaigns, triumphs and tragedies, and so on. Although I did not begin 
interviewing activists for this study until 2014, I had already familiarized myself with 
Austin’s activist scene, through my own activities as an anarchist activist and radical 
media maker, and by supporting various causes in Austin for well over a decade. It is fair 
to say that I shared, to a certain extent, an insider perspective with those I interviewed. 
My activist credentials also helped me secure more recommendations and contact 
information for possible interview subjects. 
A wide-ranging, in-depth investigation of how activists think about news media 
represents an undertaking far beyond the scope of this dissertation. My immediate, more 
modest aim is simply to initiate exploration in this area. Based on media reports of local 
activist groups, supportive contacts, and my familiarity with Austin’s activist scene, I was 
able to reach out to 30 different activists involved in diverse groups and causes, such as 
prison reform, death penalty abolition, transit activism, socialist organizing, and anti-
gentrification efforts. This number was restricted by IRB’s requirement that all 
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interviewees must be in Austin. Of these, about half either declined to be interviewed or 
failed to respond to my outreach. As a result, I conducted a series of in-depth, loosely 
structured, ethnographic interviews with 16 activists and organizers in Austin, Texas 
between August 2014 and January 2015. The interviewees included nine men, six 
women, and one gender non-conforming person. While I was able to interview women 
who identified as socialists, progressives, or radicals, none identified as anarchist. One 
woman mentioned during the interview that the term “anarchist” might characterize her 
politics, but she was not familiar with this tradition and her comments did not reflect an 
anarchist ethos or sensibility. From these interviews, five were selected to be examined in 
this dissertation, because the interviewees identified as anarchists or horizontalists,* or 
their comments reflected anarchistic ways of thinking about news media and digital 
technologies. The remaining eleven interviewees identified as leftists, progressives, 
democratic socialists, and Marxist-Leninists. These will be addressed in another work. 
According to W. James Potter (1996), in the ethnographic interview, the 
researcher “informs the interviewee of the purpose of the interview and then takes control 
by asking questions and probing the person’s responses. This type of interviewing is 
structured like survey interviewing; the key difference is that it is responsive to situations 
rather than standardized” (pp. 96-97). For instance, at certain points in interviews, I 
departed from my interview script in order to probe areas in which the interviewee had 
strong opinions. During other interviews, I skipped over questions when it became 
obvious that the person I was speaking to had very little to say on the topic. I allowed 
interviewees to speak their mind. One respondent, for example, devoted most of the 
interview to discussing his life history. As a result, interview lengths varied: In a little 
                                                 
* The terms ‘horizontalist’ and ‘horizontalism’ come from the anti-capitalist, directly democratic 
horizontalidad movements that emerged during Argentina’s December 2001 economic crisis (Sitrin 2006). 
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over 34 hours of interview audio, the shortest was approximately 50 minutes, and the 
longest clocked in at over 3 hours. Most interviews lasted about 2 hours each. I 
conducted and audio-recorded each interview in person, rather than by phone. While 
interviewing activists for this study, I made it a point to meet with them in places that 
were relatively free from distractions, but also places they felt comfortable. This means 
that 12 of the 16 people I spoke with invited me into their homes. Occasionally I had to 
pause recordings so that interviewees could speak with housemates, run errands, or tend 
to household affairs, such as cooking or feeding goats. 
 
CONDUCTING, TRANSCRIBING, AND PRESENTING INTERVIEWS 
After reviewing and obtaining informed consent, I asked each interviewee a series 
of questions based on a prepared interview script. The script, which can be found in this 
dissertation’s Appendix, included 33 questions, many of which I skipped over or tailored 
to each interview subject. Interview questions focused on the following five themes: 
 
 Background information. I asked each interviewee for basic personal and 
demographic information, such as the respondent’s name, preferred gender 
designation, brief personal history as an activist, and a summation of that person’s 
political beliefs. Due to the amount of work involved with with transcribing and 
analyzing interviews, these questions helped me at the outset to group or 
distinguish among activists based on their political orientations. 
 Media use. I also asked some basic questions about where interviewees receive 
their news, whether they typically consumed digital/online media versus more 
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traditional forms (print, television, and/or radio), and what types of news they 
consume (e.g., immigration, criminal justice, etc.). 
 Sense of theory. Several interview questions were designed to examine 
interviewees’ sense of theory – how they think about social reality, their ethical-
political commitments as activists, and how they view the relationship between 
means and ends, in particular whether means and ends should be consonant. 
These questions sought to arrive at a deeper theoretical understanding of how 
activists’ personal political beliefs relate to their views on media and activism. 
 Views on mainstream media. I asked several questions about how interviewees 
perceive the mass news media, what role(s), if any, they see for mainstream news 
media as it relates to activism and organizing, how interviewees make use of 
mainstream media in their own activism, and what influence they believe these 
activities have. For example, I asked interviewees to describe media activism they 
engaged in which they considered to be successful. 
 Views on alternative/activist media. Similarly, I asked several questions about 
what role(s), if any, interviewees see for alternative or activist media as it relates 
activism and organizing, how interviewees make use of alternative/activist media 
in their activism, and what influence these activities have. 
 
After recording interviews, I used Dragon NaturallySpeaking, a speech-to-text 
software that can be integrated into Microsoft Word, for transcription purposes. The act 
of transcription allowed for preliminary identification of common themes. Analysis of the 
interview content allowed comparison of perspectives, ideologies and motivation, as well 
as interviewees’ views on how mass news media relates to organizing and activism. The 
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findings from these in-depth, ethnographic interviews will be examined in the next 
chapter. 
Following feminist social science researchers, in presenting findings in the next 
chapter, I allow my interviewees to speak for themselves as much as possible, by 
providing portions of interview transcripts, rather than just snippets or summaries of 
interviewees’ comments. As feminist scholar Shulamit Reinharz (1992) observes, 
“Transcripts of the interviews … familiarize readers with the people who were studied 
and enable to the reader to ‘hear’ what the researcher heard” (p. 39). Moreover, including 
verbatim responses by those interviewed allows readers to examine the exchanges 
included without concern that those responses have been, however unwittingly, modified 
by interpretation or mediation. I have also included my side of these conversations where 
appropriate, so that readers can appreciate the multiple voices in each interview (Paget 
1981; Reinharz 1992). 
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Chapter 7: Ethnographic Interview Findings 
This chapter examines findings from the 34 hours of interview research conducted 
for this dissertation. 
 
BIOGRAPHIES AND PERSONAL POLITICAL BELIEFS 
Of the 16 activists who consented to be interviewed, three self-identified as 
anarchists and two others expressed personal political beliefs that could be characterized 
as consonant with anarchism. The other eleven interviewees explicitly distanced 
themselves from anarchism and libertarian socialism by identifying as Marxist-Leninists, 
democratic socialists, or simply as leftist or progressive activists. For each of the five 
selected interviewees, organized alphabetically by last name below, I provide first and 
last name, age at the time of being interviewed, preferred gender designation, activist 
background, and a general sense of that person’s political beliefs. All 16 interviewed 
lived in Austin, Texas at the time the interview research was conducted. 
  
scott crow, 47, male, who prefers that his name be spelled without capitalization, is a 
longtime anarchist activist, writer, and public speaker. For over 25 years, he has 
organized around animal liberation, radical environmentalism, and political prisoner 
issues. In 2005, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, crow helped 
organize Common Ground Collective, an anarchist relief organization based on a 
decentralized network of non-profit groups. In 2011, he published a book based on his 
experiences in New Orleans (crow 2011). More recently, he has appeared in national 
news media as a voice critical of government surveillance, due to his former relationship 
with Brandon Darby, an FBI informant and former Common Ground Collective member. 
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(For background and crow’s views on this issue, see Williams & crow 2015.) Based on 
hundreds of documents obtained via Freedom of Information Act requests, on May 28, 
2011, the New York Times published a front page story profiling crow, which described 
how counterterrorism agents had spent years surveilling him and other radical anti-
authoritarian activists.  
Unlike the other four interviewees in this chapter, who attended college, crow did 
not complete high school. Although most of the activists I spoke with treated theoretical 
concepts latently, crow brought several anarchist ideas into our discussion during our 
interview, such as prefigurative politics, the nature of power and oppression, and direct 
action. 
MT: Do you identify politically as anything? Where do you place yourself in the 
political spectrum? 
sc: I think if I had to throw on a label, that would be an anarchist, but I would 
only use that as a point of reference, as an identifier to move on from that. The 
kind of anarchism that I ascribe to is little ‘a’ anarchism, which is really anarchy, 
which is not an ‘ism’, which is just a set of liberatory ideas and practices rooted in 
history that came out of European tradition, influenced by indigenous cultures. 
MT: How does that shape the activities in which you engage? 
sc: I think some of the basic ideas are the ideas of direct action, the fact that we 
don’t have to wait on anybody else to make change, that we can do things 
ourselves if we see injustice, if we see things that are not right, that we can take 
action ourselves. So, that’s one of the ideas, direct action. The second one is the 
idea of total or collective liberation. The reason I identify with anarchy is that 
doesn’t look at a single issue like the natural world, or nonhuman animals, or 
prisons, or immigration, or transphobia. It looks at all of them as exploitative 
systems. So it kind of encompasses it. That’s the other thing that draws me to it. 
The third thing, besides collective and total liberation, is the fact that we can have 
autonomy, that we don’t have to be a part of political systems, we don’t have to 
be a part of communities that we choose not to be a part of. We as individuals and 
communities have a right to determine our own futures, and be autonomous in 
making those determinations. All of this is a framework that people have named 
as ‘anarchy’. I identify or affiliate much more with that. 
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MT: How would you say that those values that you just spoke about, though, how 
do you think those actually shape the activities? That’s the ‘why’. What’s the 
‘how’? 
sc: In a prefigurative sense, in the way that social organizations organize or 
businesses like worker co-ops organize, if you want to be liberatory, then an 
anarchist framework is, I think, a good way to do that. If I envision a greater 
world where we’re sharing power, that we are not exploiting each other, 
nonhuman animals, or the natural world, then I need to figure out how to do that 
on the smallest scale that I can today, as an individual, in the choices that I make. 
Part of that is being in organizations that try power-sharing, that recognize that we 
are not on equal footing, that some of us have been taught to talk faster or are 
encouraged to share our voices more than other people – all these different, subtle 
ways that are social cues, political cues, cultural cues, that I think are all-
encompassing. For me, anarchy is striving to form good social relationships with 
people, that are not about trying to have power over, but power with. 
Anarchists and other radical activists often draw the same distinction crow does 
between power over and power with (Gordon 2008, p. 49-55; Starhawk 1988). The 
expression “power over” refers to power that is used to compel a person or persons to 
comply with someone else’s will, against that person or persons’ will or interests. The 
expression “power with,” on the other hand, refers to power that people wield or exercise 
together, in order to accomplish tasks without there being a conflict of wills or interests 
(Gordon 2008, p. 50, 54). Crow said he receives his news from diverse sources, including 
old forms of corporate media such as television, but also newer forms of media such as 
online newspapers, news aggregators such as Google News, and partisan news media 
from various sources, such as Huffington Post and Nation, as well as anarchist websites 
such as Anarchist News*, Infoshop†, and the Center for a Stateless Society‡. Even so, he 
is far from a news junky. “A lot of times, with topical news, like what’s happening today, 
                                                 
* See http://www.anarchistnews.org/  
† See http://www.infoshop.org/  
‡ See https://c4ss.org/  
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I barely pay attention to it, especially electoral politics. … I read a lot of science, a lot of 
art, a lot of philosophy … just a lot of articles with these subject matters,” he says. 
 
Alyse Deller, 28, gender non-conforming (prefers gender-neutral pronouns*), is an 
anarchist who describes their politics as nihilistic. As an undergraduate at the University 
of Alabama, Deller joined Students for a Democratic Society after its re-founding in 
2006. In Austin, Deller volunteers at MonkeyWrench Books, an all-volunteer anarchist 
bookstore located in Central Austin, participates in anarchist study groups, and has 
worked with La Semilla (The Seed), a collective of activists who provide childcare at 
radical conferences. Deller’s view of anarchist nihilism rejects compromises with the 
status quo, such as liberal reformist activism, because of the risks associated with 
capitalist recuperation, i.e., the process by which radical ideas become coopted or 
commodified by capitalist society. 
MT: Do you identify politically as anything? 
AD: My politics now are fairly nihilistic. I don’t have any party affiliations. I 
don’t vote. 
MT: How would you describe nihilism in this sense? 
AD: I wish I had read more about nihilism. [laughs] … I just don’t have a desire 
to participate in any of the things that have been given to me as options for 
participation. I don’t feel like that this is the world that I want, and I didn’t ask for 
any of this. That’s really frustrating for me. Also, personally, I like to operate my 
life in a way that isn’t fearful. I feel like a lot of my life, I’m propelled by fear, 
like fear of not having a job, or not being able to pay rent, or not being able to get 
food, or whatever. I try to reject the notions of fear. I feel like, within that, there’s 
the idea that there’s nothing left to lose, which I feel is potentially a nihilist 
position. I’ve never read any Nietzsche. 
                                                 
* Due to the absence of intuitive, widely used gender-neutral pronouns, I have decided to refer to Deller 
with singular forms of ‘they’ and ‘their’. 
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MT: … I just want to come back to this: If people don’t have any control over 
their lives, as you said [earlier in this interview], does that mean you believe in 
autonomy, or you don’t? 
AD: I do. 
MT: It sounds like you don’t. 
AD: I understand. To clarify, I feel like people have control over their lives. 
However, I think that it takes a lot of work to recognize the power that one has, or 
the extent to one’s power. They’re granted capitalist options. I can go buy a car 
and pick the color that I want, or I can choose who I date or something. 
Sometimes, maybe. I feel like there’s minor concessions within the system, so I 
can make choices here and there. However, I think that for the most part, the 
extent of my power is being kept from me by the things that keep the system 
running. So, I do believe in autonomy and I feel like everyone can do their own 
thing, for sure. For me, it’s been really important to be very critical of why I make 
the decisions that I make, and be really conscious and aware of where those 
decision-making abilities and what decisions I made, where that comes from. 
Because a lot of it’s just learned by society and a lot of it is learned from my 
family, which is also affected by society. So there are legacies of choices that 
maybe I don’t want to make, but I feel compelled to for whatever reason. 
Deller says they do not consume much mainstream news media, preferring instead 
to read anarchist websites such as Anarchist News, radical blogs on the community 
blogging website Tumblr, and Black Girl Dangerous, a website that accepts submissions 
only from queer and transgender people of color.* 
 
Marcus Denton, 33, male, works as a Medicaid/CHIP policy analyst for the Texas 
Health and Human Services Commission. He has participated in various left-progressive 
activist groups and causes since 1999, including Palestine solidarity efforts, anti-war 
organizing, and the Austin Project for a Participatory Society, an organization he co-
founded, whose goal was “to find and build a community of people who shared a basic 
Left perspective that was radical, institutionally focused, broad in its perspective, 
                                                 
* See http://www.blackgirldangerous.org/ 
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inclusive in its makeup, and concerned with matters of vision and strategy” (Denton 
2008, p. 330). Denton says he cut his teeth as a student activist at Trinity University. 
Since moving to Austin, much of his activism has focused on “meta-activism,” which he 
describes as “activism about how our activism can be the best it can be.” More recently, 
he brought his radical left perspective to bear on public transportation issues, by 
participating in Austinites for Urban Rail Action (AURA), a group of community 
activists who helped defeat a proposed urban light rail line, which had regressive 
implications for working class and poor Austinites. 
Denton said he thinks of himself mainly as a leftist and anti-capitalist, and 
perhaps even as a socialist, although he feels that he has “been turned off by a lot of bad 
socialism.” His political trajectory, personal reflections, and interview responses suggest 
that the libertarian socialist tradition—which includes participatory economics, a vision 
he once actively promoted—has shaped his views in a significant way. 
MD: I have gone through various periods where I have identified strongly with 
certain strain of leftism. So, there were times when I thought of myself as an 
anarchist, when I thought of myself as — well, in sociology classes, which I 
majored in, I was always in the Marxian… you always get to choose your 
framework. But I never considered myself a Marxist or whatever. I was turned off 
by authoritarian socialism, which I identified with the International Socialist 
Organization. There were times where I was reading about feminism, and it 
seemed like, “Oh my God, this explains so much about everything. I really 
identify with this.” I’m totally a feminist, or a feminist ally, depending on if a guy 
can be a feminist. And I guess with the foreign policy stuff, like protesting the 
war in Iraq, that was just being on the left and being anti-imperialist. 
Now I just kind of think of myself as capital L-E-F-T. For me, that means the 
radical left includes… it’s anti-capitalist. I like the Zapatista definition, which is, 
you’re on the left if you’re against capitalism. Not to the exclusion of any form of 
other things we need to work on, whether that be racial and identity-based 
oppressions, or gender-based oppressions, or any other types of oppressions. I feel 
like all of those fit under the umbrella.… Trayvon Martin happens and it’s like, 
“This is within the umbrella; I’m going to those protests.” I don’t really have a 
name for any of the rest of it. I consider myself part of a left. 
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Denton says he receives his news media from diverse sources, both mainstream 
and alternative, that he reads a daily policy blog, and that he actively supports leftwing 
and progressive experiments to create alternative media institutions. For example, he 
donated money to The New Standard, a now-defunct radical online newspaper free of 
advertising, as well as the New York Times Examiner, a radical press criticism website 
that daily scrutinizes the “Paper of Record.” 
 
Bob Libal, 33, male, is the executive director of Grassroots Leadership, a national, 
multiracial social justice organization founded by veteran organizer Si Kahn in 1980. 
Since the 1990s, Grassroots Leadership has been active in national efforts to push back 
against prison privatization, end detention of undocumented immigrant families, and 
promote criminal justice reform. Libal is no stranger to the mass news media, having 
been interviewed dozens of times for a wide array of local and national publications, both 
mainstream and activist/alternative, including the New York Times, Huffington Post, 
Rolling Stone, The Nation, Z Magazine, and others. Prior to being interviewed for this 
study, Libal was also a collective member at MonkeyWrench Books, and before that he 
was a student organizer at the University of Texas at Austin during his years as an 
undergraduate. Like Denton, Libal does not label himself as an anarchist, even though his 
politics reflect an anarchist sensibility. 
MT: How would you describe your politics? Do you identify politically as 
anything?  
BL: I haven’t been asked that question in a long time. [laughs]  
MT: I ask because it’s sort of a demographic thing. 
BL: Yeah, I think that… I don’t know that I identify as any one sort of political 
ideology anymore. I think I believe in social movements and political decisions 
being driven by people who are most affected by the issues. I think I generally 
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believe in inclusivity in decision-making. I’m the executive director of a non-
horizontal organization, but I think that I believe in horizontal decision-making if 
not in sort of a very rigid sense, I believe in participatory decision-making. I think 
that those ideas are very much informed by the sort of anarchist organizing in the 
1990s and 2000s. But I don’t really identify as any political sort of belief 
anymore, I don’t think. 
Libal says he subscribes to the Austin American-Statesman and the weekend 
edition of the New York Times. He also listens to NPR, receives news on Facebook, 
subscribes to listservs, and regularly reads alternative media such as the Texas Observer 
and Colorlines. “I try to read everything about immigration and criminal justice,” he says, 
due to his position and activism. 
 
“Tommy,” 26, male, is an anarchist who declined to allow me to use his real name. He 
says that after growing up in England and moving to El Paso while in middle school, he 
experienced a “culture shock” that led him to question organized religion, capitalism, 
international politics, colonization, and neoliberalism. “I think I got a pretty intense dose 
of what the world looks like, just from being there,” he says. After studying philosophy at 
the University of Texas at El Paso, and traveling through Europe with queer anarchists in 
2009, he moved to Austin in 2011, where he volunteered with a number of smaller 
groups, such as a harm reduction group and a childcare collective. His view of 
insurrectionary anarchism places a premium on maintaining unpredictable, potentially 
explosive moments and increasing people’s capacity to revolt. Because his view of 
anarchism differs markedly from my own, I asked him several questions about his 
political beliefs and the process of intellectual self-discovery that led to them. He says 
that coming into contact with anarchists in California’s Bay Area, along with his 
participation in an anarchist study group in Austin, strongly influenced his current 
political views. 
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T: I met a person … who ended up being very influential and had a very different 
version of things. Not all theory is academic. 
MT: A lot of it is. 
T: But there is a particular version of theory that is produced by humans that 
concerns people’s everyday lives, and there’s a way to think about ideas that 
brings study into how we live. It broke down how I thought about politics 
entirely. Instead of it being this thing that I’m dedicated to, that I’m submitting 
myself to something that’s more important than me, study or theory is actually 
something that can enhance the way that I’m able to resist, personally. The thing 
that matters isn’t necessarily revolution or winning, because maybe that’s 
something that’s just out of my hands. But instead it’s, okay, how do I live my life 
in the most expansive of ways? How do I increase my capacity to revolt? How do 
I connect with other people and increase our collective capacity? How to maintain 
unpredictable moments? Just those sorts of questions. 
Maybe anarchy is more about living a principled life, or living a life that is 
grappling with the compromises that we’re forced to make living in society that 
we hate. Maybe that’s what anarchy is, not this sort of far off, utopian future 
that’s competing with all these other political philosophies for the right one. 
Instead, it’s more of a way to put your finger on what you’re against, and then a 
way to revisit that in every moment of your life, where you’re presented with any 
number of compromises and you have to decide which side you’re going to fall 
on, and to follow the path to the impossible, instead of the path back to society, 
which I think is the hand that’s constantly offered to you. … I began exploring a 
more anti-political anarchist trajectory. 
MT: When you say ‘anti-political’, you mean…? 
T: Basically, one that breaks with the historical left in a lot of ways. 
MT: In my mind, politics is much more inclusive, I guess, than a lot of people 
define it. 
T: Yeah, and I guess I’ve use the word sort of clumsily so far. Specifically, anti-
politics is a critique of representation and any structure or person that seeks to 
speak up for others. It’s a critique of a certain scale. It’s saying that, part of the 
way society manages to capture revolts is it gets us thinking on a totally inhuman 
scale. Most of the sort of traditional left anarchists’ framework is, “Okay, how do 
we change all of society?” That’s just far bigger than anyone can possibly decide. 
It’s highly unlikely that an entire society of people is going to consent to your 
plan. It sort of brings it back, and puts the focus on individual lives, and the 
connections between those individual lives, and how to weaponize those 
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individual lives, and how to put your finger on the way power control those lives, 
and how power might be interrupted in the context of those lives. That’s the 
center, instead of it being global revolution…. That’s still something that I desire, 
but it’s not something that I think I have the capacity to create. 
MT: To bring about. 
 T: Yeah, I think that if it happens, it will happen probably by accident. I’m 
interested in figuring out how to respond in such a moment, or how to be in a 
place to go as far, and as quickly, and with as many people as I can, but I don’t 
think that it will be that because a small minority of conscious radicals have the 
right ideas that capitalism crumbles. 
Tommy says he avoids consuming news media because of its routinized, 
uninteresting coverage of news and events, and that he prefers to read first person 
accounts posted online of important social-political events, e.g., the riots and 
demonstrations in Ferguson that occurred in 2014 and 2015. 
T: I was paying attention to Ferguson, one, because it’s inspiring—there are 
certain moments that become inspiring—but that’s less because of major news 
media and more because of actions on the ground. I made it a point to try to read 
only things written by people who were there, and usually not journalists. I 
usually don’t think they have very interesting things to say about it. I’m much 
more interested in what the random person on the street thought than someone 
who’s pretending to be objective. 
 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF MEANS/ENDS AND PREFIGURATIVE POLITICS 
In order to ascertain a deeper theoretical appreciation of how activists’ political 
ideologies relate to their views on news media and social transformation, I asked each 
interviewee whether the ends of activists and movements justify the means used to obtain 
those ends. The answers to this question pointed to diverse, ambivalent views about the 
nature, meaning, and significance of prefigurative politics. Only three of the five 
anarchists felt that means and ends should always be consonant. To begin, for crow, the 
means matter in and of themselves, because the ends may never be realized: 
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MT: Do the ends justify the means, just in general? 
sc: No. 
MT: Why not? 
SC: In my analysis, in my history, in my subjective perception of everything, is 
that when we get to that point, when we engage in that way, that we end up 
missing the nuances. We end up perpetuating the problems that we set out to 
solve. … We end up with a lot of unintended outcomes and consequences that we 
didn’t see, that are just as problematic as where we started. Because I’m not here 
to win, I don’t believe that we can win in politics, what I want to do is – I think 
my ethic is telling me that I want to, instead of saying, “I will wait until this 
revolution, or I will wait until this end goal for everything,” is that I want to figure 
out how we can engage today for those tomorrows that may never come. So, 
again, back to power-sharing, working collectively, collaboratively, maintaining 
our autonomy, knowing that we can take direct action whenever we need to. And 
direct action is not always civil disobedience, to me, or always doing illegal 
actions. It can be anything: We decide to build a community garden for ourselves. 
We said we wanted food security, so let’s do it. I think that the processes are 
absolutely as important as what comes out of it, and actually, sometimes the end 
goal doesn’t matter. 
As a nihilist, Deller indicated that means and ends do not always have to be 
consonant: 
MT: Do the ends justify the means? 
AD: Yes. I would say yes. 
MT: Can you elaborate on that? 
AD: I guess I can think of situations in which the answer would be no, but I think 
in general, for me personally the ends justify the means. 
Denton, who expressed some frustration over this debate within activist circles, 
also indicated that he felt the ends could justify the means. His comments reflect the fact 
that he and his group are grappling with urban transit, a citywide political issue in which 
activists cannot achieve important gains without also making certain compromises. 
During our interview, Denton mentioned that the group he worked with was by no means 
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radical, because it included perspectives opposed to urban transportation on fairly 
conservative grounds. 
MT: Do the ends justify the means? 
MD: You know, we’ve had some of this debate within AURA, within the rail 
campaign. There’s one guy in particular, who’s just puritanical about the means 
being pure. And other people are like, “look, it’s a campaign. It’s a political 
campaign. Sometimes you gotta fight a little dirty.” I don’t have a clear answer on 
that. I think sometimes the ends can sometimes justify the means. 
MT: Is that a different position than you might have had at another point in your 
life? Obviously, this question gets at prefigurative politics. Should our activism 
emulate the world we wish to see? Is that something you agree with? 
MD: I do agree with that. 
MT: But you think that there are exceptions. 
MD: Yeah, because we’re always taking shit, because… it’s like, “You want the 
Keystone pipeline shutdown, but you drive a car. You’re a human being, in 
America, and you’re a consumerist, and you buy things, so obviously you can’t 
have an opinion.” No, fuck that. We’re just doing the best we can, to try to change 
things for the better. The constraints of the world we live in don’t allow us, don’t 
allow the means, to be completely pure. … I probably default to Daoism, which is 
kind of the only other ethic, other than leftism, that I hold. Just follow the middle 
path, follow the middle way, and know that there are trade-offs, know that things 
have to be in balance. Don’t do anything crazy, but if you’ve got a victory within 
your grasp, then secure it. 
For Libal, the means and ends must not only be consonant, but this principle 
informs how his organization, Grassroots Leadership, engages in media activism. 
Whereas Denton considers it necessary, from a strategic/tactical perspective, for his 
group to sometimes use means that do not reflect its preferred ends, Libal considers it 
necessary, also from a strategic/tactical perspective, to engage in activism that is 
consonant with his group’s overarching goals. Moreover, his thoughtful, intelligent 
response directly relates to the anarchist critique of unequal participation in the process of 
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meaning making. Below, he evokes Brazilian philosopher Paulo Freire’s idea that 
activists must “make the road by walking”: 
MT: Do you think the ends justify the means? Or are ends and means the same? 
Just in a broad sense. 
BL: I think I want to say no. In some ways, you make the road by walking. I think 
that we have a duty to be principled in the way we organize, in many different 
respects. I think that that is true both strategically and in a principled kind of way. 
A very concrete example: Oftentimes, when we have fought the siting of a new 
prison or new a detention center, one of the loudest voices that we can amplify, if 
we choose to, is a NIMBY voice—a “not in my backyard” voice— that is anti-
immigrant or anti-prisoner. That are basically, “We don’t want these people 
anywhere near us.” 
MT: So, that’s one of the options you have. 
BL: That’s one of the options, and we choose not to do that. I think the reason we 
do that is both a principled reason—that we are in favor of the humanity of all 
people, including incarcerated people and immigrants who are detained, and that 
this is counter to our principle of that, to dehumanize people and say, “We don’t 
even want you near us.” Then I also think in the long term, it is not strategic to 
throw people under the bus to achieve a short-term aim. Because the more you 
demonize prisoners and immigrants, the more prisons and detention centers are 
likely to happen. There has to be a transformational component to the way that we 
work. I think that that’s true in smaller contexts, like this story, but I also think 
that’s true in the big picture. The failure of so many revolutionary governments 
and movements is often a failure to live up to their principles. 
Although Tommy agrees that means and ends should be consonant, he questions 
the idea of prefigurative politics as most anarchists conceptualize it: 
MT: Do the ends justify the means? 
T: I mean, no. I think that the problem arises when they’re separate. 
MT: So, are means and ends the same? 
T: They should be. 
MT: Do you believe in prefigurative politics? 
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T: No, not in the sense that it’s usually used. I don’t think that consensus 
decision-making is necessarily connected to some after-the-revolution condition, 
or that we can build the new world in the shell of the old. I’m skeptical of those 
attempts, but I do think that our activity ought to be measured by itself, or the 
immediate worth that it presents to our lives. If we’re doing something because 
we think that we’ll win in the end, it’s not for me the reason I struggle. I strive to 
find ways to push and to struggle that might contain possibility, but they’re just 
eminently obvious why it’s happening, for the moment. The activity is desirable 
in itself, regardless of any particular consequences. Which doesn’t mean that I 
don’t care about consequences at all, but it does mean that the primary goal is to 
be engaged in activity that, as you’re doing it, it makes you feel more powerful. 
As you’re doing it, it deepens your connection with others. As you’re doing it, it 
does all these things. As you’re doing it, it sort of interrupts the way power 
strangles you. 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF MASS NEWS MEDIA 
Four of the five interviewees proffered an adversarial conception of mass news 
media, as well as indicated that, on some level, they viewed the mass media’s 
constructions of social-political reality as representing a corruption of informational 
power. A recurring argument I heard from crow and others is that the mass news media 
serve as a conduit or megaphone for state-corporate constructions of reality.  
MT: What do you think of mass news media? 
sc: I think that it’s unengaging, often ill-informed. I think that also it pretends to 
be unbiased when it’s absolutely biased. It also creates false binaries — they 
always try to tell two sides to a story, when a story might have fourteen sides to it. 
It very rarely goes into depth with any substance. The other problem I have with it 
is, it’s a mouthpiece for the state and corporations, either intentionally or 
unintentionally. They either have access or they want access to power, or they are 
power. 
Deller expresses a cynical view that could be described as a dominant ideology 
thesis conceptualization of the mass news media. Echoing cynical critics such as 
Althusser (1971/2008), Deller argues that capitalism’s reach is inescapable. 
MT: In general, what do you think of mass news media, or mass media broadly? 
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AD: I think it’s really scary. It horrifies me. 
MT: Would you like to elaborate on that? What about it horrifies you? 
AD: I was reading about William Randolph Hearst earlier, because I went to 
Hearst Castle, and it was this empire built on making shit up, yellow journalism. 
He made a bunch of his money because he was the first to make the connection 
between media and the government. That’s really scary. I just feel like nothing is 
outside of the reaches of capital at this point, so I don’t trust the media. That’s 
why it scares me. It’s so widespread. If anyone can make news, then I don’t know 
what the truth is. 
MT: When you say nothing is outside the reaches of capital, what do you mean? 
AD: Well, people own news stations. People own newspapers. There’s that 
element of the subjective there. News cannot be objective, because it’s 
impossible. 
Denton also did not mince words when describing the mass news media, insisting 
that the mass media directly undermines activist attempts at fomenting change. 
MT: In general, what do you think of mass news media? 
MD: [Laughing] I think it’s worse than nothing. You’re talking about 
mainstream…? 
MT: Yeah, I’m talking about mainstream, mass news media. However you define 
that. 
MD: I think it’s absolutely awful. I think it is awful, awful, awful. I think it’s not 
just bad. I think it’s harmful. I think it’s actively harmful. It’s deluding people. I 
think it’s propaganda. It’s a corporate-state bias. It’s establishment bias. It 
excludes alternative viewpoints. It prevents the creation of social movements and 
movements toward a better world. So, yeah, I think it’s absolutely terrible. 
Although Libal was critical of the mass news media as well, his comments also 
reflect the fact that he is both an avid news consumer and activist who frequently relies 
on the mainstream media to further his group’s goals: 
MT: In general, as an activist, as an organizer, but also as a person who reads and 
consumes news media, what do you think of mass news media? 
BL: I think it can be good and I think it can be bad. 
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MT: How can it be good? Give us the good and the bad. 
BL: I only get the New York Times on weekends now – I used to get it every day. 
... I think there’s a breadth, if not a depth, to some coverage in, say, the New York 
Times or NPR or something like that, that I wouldn’t find otherwise, that 
wouldn’t just show up in my Facebook feed. I think there are very good 
journalists still, even despite the collapse of traditional journalism in some ways. 
There are very, very good journalists that do excellent reporting, for both 
mainstream and alternative publications. Bad, I think probably for institutional 
reasons, largely, there’s a lot of stuff that doesn’t get covered at all, particularly 
local stuff. And oftentimes the coverage is episodic, and not systemic. 
Unlike the other four anarchists, Tommy did not describe the mass media in terms 
of being either good or bad. In his view, the routinized character of the mass media news 
cycle renders it virtually irrelevant to radicals. His comments suggest that he appreciates, 
perhaps better than most activists, the difficulties associated with coverage of similarly 
routinized repertoires of contention, such as protests and demonstrations. 
MT: In general, what do you think of mass news media? 
T: I don’t pay attention to it. 
MT: Why? 
T: Generally, I feel like it’s totally irrelevant. 
MT: Irrelevant in what way? 
T: Things that happen on that sort of scale, I relate to similar to the weather. I 
want to know when it’s raining, because then I won’t ride my bike. But I’m not 
particularly interested in one outcome or another, that sets the tone for the world I 
live in, so the reporting on that I don’t take particularly seriously. There are rare 
moments when I feel like something changes. I’m interested when things aren’t 
predictable. Usually, wars, protests, elections, crime rates, and the happenings of 
celebrities — all of that stuff is just so on-script and so predictable that it doesn’t 
surprise me or enhance my life in any way to know it. My life hasn’t changed 
materially since ISIS has begun its invasion of the Middle East. I suppose it’s sort 
of interesting, but I think you can get caught up reading books by Chomsky about 
this or that, like the intricacies of foreign policy and how it’s so awful, and totally 
lose sight of your own life. I’m way more interested in people who are exploring, 
in super intense detail, what’s going on around them. I don’t necessarily mean 
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city politics. That’s on a scale that’s inhuman as well. But just the very real things 
that are happening in town that are motivating other humans in your space. 
 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF MEDIA EFFECTS ON AUDIENCES 
I also asked interviewees about what effects, if any, they thought the mass news 
media had on media audiences. In academic literature, this is referred to as the “third-
person effect,” which predicts that people perceive mass media as having a stronger 
influence on others than on themselves (Davison 1983). According to crow, the mass 
media—including both older forms of media as well as newer, digital media—“silos” 
people into insular worldviews. 
MT: What effect do you think mass news media has on people? 
sc: I think it has incredible influence. I think it’s a mixed bag. I think that all news 
media silos people. There’s people in a demographic who will watch Fox News 
and reinforce their worldview on things. The majority of the people who are 
watching Fox news are not watching Fox news, and then listening to NPR, or 
watching public television, and then going to something else. They’re only 
watching Fox News, and they may go to some website like Free Republic, that 
will reinforce Fox news, or Glenn Beck’s website or something, to reinforce that. 
So, I think that it’s an inoculator and a reinforcer of those ideas, but it doesn’t 
always give you breadth. 
Deller argues that the mainstream news media influences media audiences works 
to limit possibilities for resistance to capitalism.  
MT: What effect do you think that mass news media has on people? 
AD: I think that it has a range of effects. I don’t have TV, so I get my news from 
the Internet. And I get my news from only very small parts of the Internet. I don’t 
read, like, BBC necessarily. I read things that people share on Facebook. I read 
things that people are sharing on Tumblr. Other than that, I don’t really see the 
news. I think there are other people like that in the world, but there are also people 
who read the newspaper and those who watch TV. I think that based on however 
people receive the news, it has a different effect. … 
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MT: What effect, then, do you think mass media has on resistance or possibilities 
for it? 
AD: I think it varies across the globe. I think in North America it definitely limits 
the possibility for resistance in a lot of ways. And I feel like it definitely has a 
certain prescription. Liberal resistance, up to a point, I think is allowable. But 
that’s pretty much it. 
MT: Because of media, you say? 
AD: In part because of media. In part because of the fear associated with not 
playing the game of capitalism, because you will literally get murdered. 
MT: Do you think people are afraid not to play the game of capitalism? 
AD: Yeah, definitely. I mean, it’s really hard not to, and there’s very little show 
of people being able to pull it off. I think the conception of those who aren’t 
playing the capitalist game is one of young, white anarchists, or people in the 
woods, and this sort of thing. I think people are afraid they won’t have access to 
health care and all these other things, which is real and legitimate. Primarily, I 
think people are scared. It’s scary. 
Denton’s response was also couched in strong adversarial terms, appealing again 
to the idea that capitalism’s reach is inescapable.  
MT: What effect do you think mass news media has on people, just in general? 
MD: I think it distracts them from what’s really important. I think it makes people 
believe they’re not being deluded. I think it is such effective propaganda that it 
makes people think they are not being propagandized. So, it creates an illusion 
that we’re living in an open society, which is another reason I would say it’s 
worse than nothing. … I think it makes people think that we live in a free society, 
in a democracy. I think it just deludes people about the true nature of how the 
government works, how the market works, and how society is actually structured. 
Libal’s response was unique among the anarchists I spoke with, in that he 
suggested the mass news media can also be a possible inspiration for people to take 
action. 
MT: What effect do you think that media has on people? Especially mass news 
media? 
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BL: Well, I think it probably shapes the parameters of what we think is the 
debate, acceptability. It also informs what is the world outside of our immediate 
[space]—like, there is no Zambia, because who knows anything about Zambia? 
MT: So, in addition to maybe shaping the parameters, how people think about 
whatever, are there other influences or effects you think media has on people? 
BL: It can be a motivator to take action. I think that framing of stories is really 
important for that. Take the border crisis. The border crisis demands action, 
because it’s a crisis. How that action happens can be anything from opening 
shelters along the border to give people clothes to get where they’re going, to 
taking a gun and pointing it at a kid. 
Reiterating his criticisms of the scripted, routinized character of the news media, 
Tommy’s response challenged my question’s underlying logic. 
MT: What effect, if any, do you think mass news media has on people? You don’t 
pay attention to it, you say. 
T: I think paying attention to it is a weird thing to do. It does have its effects, and 
I think that, again, those effects are distracting people from their everyday lives, 
from their own imaginations, their own creativity, their own ability to push back 
against what’s happening in their own town. When they debate politics, it’s on a 
scale that has nothing to do with their lived experience. We argue about which 
president matters more, we argue about whether this country was justified in 
bombing this other country. It’s just totally irrelevant to the material lives of most 
of the people I know. For me, I’m interested in what’s happening here. When 
things affect what’s happening here, then it’s interesting, but generally it’s like 
sports or anything else. This is a thing we can pay attention to if that’s what we 
want to pay attention to, but it’s not particularly interesting. I don’t feel like it 
informs me. 
 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF STRATEGIC FRAMING AND MEDIA AS TOOLS/RESOURCES 
All five anarchists indicated that activists should not rule out mass media 
engagement completely. However, two expressed strong reservations about doing so, 
either because of the danger posed by capitalist recuperation (Deller) or because of the 
problems associated with routinized social protest (Tommy).   
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MT: Overall, do you think it’s worthwhile for activists to try to use, or harness, or 
approach mainstream media and work with them? 
AD: I think so. I think the multi-tiered approach is always good, like a diversity of 
tactics situation. Whatever gets the thing done, I think is totally fine, but I think 
that there’s always a risk of becoming commodified or rehabilitated by capitalism, 
which is the issue with the liberal position. How deeply can you get into the game 
without being changed by it? How can you approach the media and want real 
social change, and what will you accept? It’s a losing game. It’s a hostage 
situation, a “we’ll take what we can get” kind of thing, and I don’t want to feel 
like that. I don’t think that that does anything. 
Three of the anarchists—crow, Denton, and Libal—characterized the mass news 
media as a site of struggle, in which framing contests figure prominently. Their 
thoughtful, detailed replies to my questions suggest that, of the three theoretical 
perspectives examined in Chapter 5—framing theory, political economy, and media 
hegemony—the concept of media framing has had the strongest influence on how they 
think about news media power and media-movement interactions. During our interview, 
crow described at length how and why he approached the New York Times to cover his 
story of being surveilled by the FBI due to his political activities. 
sc: I was under surveillance by the FBI and joint terrorism task force, from at least 
about 1999 to 2008, which I still think is probably going on today. But an intense 
amount of that. A non-profit organized in Austin, Texas, called the Austin 
People’s Legal Collective, did a Freedom of Information Act request for me, to 
the agencies. They got back documents; I got hundreds of pages of documents. I 
couldn’t sue, because I was not denied employment or schooling. I couldn’t sue 
the FBI for actually really illegally being surveilled, because I did nothing. They 
tried to indict me three times. None of this important, but I want to give you 
context. So, what was a thing I could do? I could talk to the media. I could use the 
power of the media to tell a narrative. I approached somebody at the New York 
Times that I had built a rapport with, who had used me as a source. Not an 
anonymous source – they had quoted me before. I had built a relationship over 
four years as a reliable source to talk about anarchism. That doesn’t mean that we 
were friends, and we really were not. This was just somebody I had a contact 
with. But if they wanted to talk about anarchism, they could say, “Hey, what’s an 
anarchist take on this? Can I quote you on this” So, I would do that – not that I 
was ‘the’ anarchist voice. 
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I approached him and said, “Are you interested in doing this, to talk about the 
wider surveillance?” This was before Edward Snowden broke out, so this was 
2010. Nobody was talking about surveillance on the scale they were. There was a 
few articles that were coming out. But they saw the potential in this. In that, I 
said, “I want three things out of this piece: I want the ideas of anarchy to seem 
reasonable and rational. I want to seem reasonable and rational. And I want the 
FBI to look stupid, because they already look stupid.” Now, the New York Times 
is not my whipping post. They’re not my mouthpiece. They’re not going to do it 
that way. But because I had those three asks, we worked on this piece for nine 
months, and I was able to have influence in shaping that, as far as that was 
concerned, in my limited scope. Whereas before, they would just quote you and 
you have nothing to say with it. The article came out and I won on all three of 
those points – even as they got everything wrong. They didn’t represent anarchy 
the way I wanted it to be, but they didn’t make it sound like chaos and 
destruction, either. I came off as very reasonable and rational. And the FBI, due to 
their own maleficence, their own bad work, came off looking like jackasses. That 
article had a huge amount of influence in spreading the ideas of anarchy, of 
making people reassess the surveillance state that we are under, and that I was a 
rational person to talk about these ideas. 
MT: It was page A1. 
sc: Exactly. I mean, the New York Times put anarchy in a positive light on the 
front page. Now, they got kicked by the right-wing media for it, and again, they 
got a lot of things wrong. So that was an example of where I tried that. And yes, it 
was absolutely successful. … And not only was it [that] the Times wrote about it, 
it was internationally picked up. And then other people wrote articles around it, 
because of that article. At the time, Vice or the Huffington Post could never have 
that kind of reach. So it was a very powerful medium in that way. The way I 
treated that was a conscious effort. This was after twenty years of working with 
the media. There’s such a rudimentary misunderstanding about the way media 
works amongst activists, anarchists, and radicals. A lot of times we have these 
trainings where people get basic media skills, like flipping the script or having 
your talking points. But they never really develop an analysis about the power of 
media. Having gone through those things, I sort of developed this larger, deeper 
analysis about media and recognizing the power of the forms of media. A lot of 
radicals and activists don’t ever see it that way. A lot of anarchists are very 
combative to media unless they’re creating their own media, especially [to] 
corporate or mainstream media. They’re very combative. What I’m saying is, 
“Look, let’s use it to whatever advantage we can have, knowing that it has limits 
to it. And at the same time, tell our own stories our own way.” 
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Earlier in the same interview, crow also described a new organization, called 
Agency, which operates as an anarchist public relations firm.* According to crow, 
Agency works to promote anarchist framings of news stories within the mass media: 
sc: With a personal bias also, for the ideas of anarchy, I’ve really worked for the 
last 15 years, really seriously, to shape and influence the way that anarchism is 
talked about in mainstream, corporate, and new media in the United States. That’s 
a whole other thing. I do a lot of background, speaking to journalists. I’ve written 
books. I do interviews when people want to talk about these ideas. I speak at 
college campuses. Not because I’m tooting my own horn, but these are the ways 
to shift culture, to get people to talk differently about this. And I see that as very 
powerful – so powerful that some friends of mine started this thing called Agency, 
which is an anarchist PR firm. It’s not secret. We don’t represent all anarchists or 
all anarchist ideas. The idea is that mainstream civil society is talking about 
anarchy. So, are we going to let them control the narrative, or do we want to 
influence and have control over own narratives as best we can, recognizing that 
we will never have control over them? 
MT: That’s the question I was about to ask: Is it even worth doing that sort of 
thing? ‘Anarchy’ has always been sort of a bad word in the mouths of many 
people. 
sc: But ‘anarchism’ is just a word. It’s just a point of reference to a larger set of 
liberatory ideas. What I really want is for people to get past the word, to those 
ideas. Can I get those ideas talked about? I don’t give a shit if we call it ‘blue 
potato’ or we call it ‘horizontalism’, which is what they did in Argentina. They 
didn’t want to take the baggage of communism and anarchism. Or the Zapatistas – 
they didn’t want to take the ideas of socialism, communism, anarchism. They 
called it Zapatismo. I’m the same. I don’t care. But it’s a little harder in the 
United States to do that, to invent new words and make them have. What I’m 
interested in is, presenting those liberatory ideas. And that happens regularly. We 
have changed the dialogue in the last 15 years – not just myself, but all of us who 
have engaged with that media. It’s not just putting it into mainstream media, but 
also about building our own media, our own grassroots media, our counter-media, 
our alternative medias—which I don’t even look at as alternatives—to build the 
new media. And that, I feel, has been incredibly powerful. I think it’s totally 
worth it in those ways. 
                                                 
* At the time of this writing, Agency is still a fairly new political project. See 
http://www.anarchistagency.com/ 
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When I asked Denton to describe how the group he worked with, AURA, 
developed a successful media strategy, he also provided a lengthy, detailed answer in 
which the careful construction and promotion of a specific strategic collective action 
frame, as well as framing theory’s associated repertoires of contention (such as press 
releases, working with the media, etc.) were integral to his group’s success. 
MT: AURA is the name of the group that was opposing the rail line. So, the goal 
was to stop that, right. Can you talk about the strategy that that group used? How 
did they stop that? How did they fight back against that? 
MD: So, we got involved very early on in the process. The earlier attempts by the 
city to get the rail line on the ballot in 2012 had essentially been a city-only—like, 
it was just the Austin Transportation Department putting forward an idea, trying 
to get approval for it, and then just moving forward. And so, this time around we 
pushed strongly from the start to get involved in the planning process itself. So, 
every step of the way, whenever new data was put out, whenever each step of the 
process that was moving toward selecting which part of the city, where should the 
rail line go, that sort of thing, which was phase 1, we got very involved in the data 
of that. We were producing counter-narratives on social media saying, “No, 
they’re analyzing the data wrong. They’re choosing the wrong data to look at.” 
That kind of thing. I think that a conversation started much earlier than otherwise 
would have among people who are interested within the transportation 
community, the public transit community, about whether this is going in the right 
direction or the wrong direction. I think we started to stir up some controversy 
around it from the beginning, so it didn’t have the opportunity to move through 
kind of unfazed. It was a death by a thousand cuts in a way. When it moved to 
phase 2, which was after they had selected corridors, which were East Riverside 
and Highlands, in phase 2 they proposed where the actual route would run. … Our 
goal was to be a credible voice of information, an informational counter narrative 
to what they were putting forward. We were saying, even with these ridership 
numbers, this is going to be the trade-off in the bus lines. The operations and 
maintenance costs will result in, we projected, the equivalent was a ten percent 
permanent annual cut to the bus system instead of expanding it. We put forward 
alternatives: a better billion that could be spent to improve transportation and 
relieve congestion. 
There were a lot of different groups involved in defeating it. There were well-
funded anti-tax people on the right who were against it. But I think we played a 
really important role in muddying the waters for people who are generally 
supportive of public rail, light rail, public investments in transportation, that sort 
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of thing, and people who are just fed up with congestion and want to do anything. 
I think we were effective at kind of muddying that, with the message that this 
would be worse than nothing. Instead of having just a huge capture—like the 
2000 vote did, where inside the city, especially along the route that was proposed, 
you had really strong support, there was still support for it inside the city along 
the route itself, where people would benefit most directly, but even there it was at 
lower levels. They’re doing polling now to see what messages were the most 
effective, but the fact that it lost by fourteen points makes me think that it was a 
combination of a lot of things: being really expensive, being in the wrong place, 
being in a place this is just not intuitive for people. And then I think also we were 
able to peel off probably a few percentage points. It mostly occurred through 
social media, through press releases. We were trying to get interviews. We did get 
some interviews in mainstream media, that sort of thing. So, anyway, there was 
always an oppositional viewpoint. There’s always a counter in every story. There 
was plenty of opposition to go around, so there was never a news media story that 
was out there that didn’t have at least … we never had the full attention, but it was 
a least a soundbite from a detractor. And if it came from somebody who was pro-
public transit, that was even more effective, in our opinion. 
MT: How did you position yourselves as credible? 
MD: I think because our analysis was the best stuff that was out there. It was 
better than anything the city was putting out, it was better than what Project 
Connect was putting out, which is the partnership between the city and Capital 
Metro. Their campaign was terrible. It was like, “congestion is bad.” The 
arguments they were putting forward were terrible. They were saying, 
“Congestion’s bad. Vote for the rail line.”… We were saying, “It’s worse than 
nothing. It will not improve congestion. It will make congestion worse. It will hurt 
the bus line. People will take more cars.” … These weren’t just blogs ranting. We 
were putting forward solid analyses and coherent arguments. Even though we 
were just a grassroots organization… The media attention was definitely, the 
narrative was always established first. I feel like the credibility of our arguments 
and the seriousness of our arguments allowed us to position ourselves well within 
the different competing voices. Even though there was a real tendency to try to 
simplify it to the pro-rail, anti-rail people—like rail is good, rail is bad—our 
argument was, “Rail is sometimes good and sometimes bad, and this is where it’s 
bad.” 
MT: Did you think about framing as you worked on this issue? 
MD: Yeah, absolutely. We had our debates going on all the time between both 
within AURA and among AURA and the other pro-public transit, anti-prop 1 
groups, who were on the same page. 
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MT: About how to frame this? 
MD: About how to frame it. You know, our argument was, “Worse than nothing,” 
because their argument was, “Maybe it’s expensive, but it’s at least something. 
It’s a step in the right direction. It’s the first step in a larger system.” Any 
argument, any other kind of frame like, “wrong route,” or something, didn’t 
answer that. That was always their comeback, “look, it’s not perfect, but the 
perfect shouldn’t be the enemy of the good.” And so, any argument that said this 
isn’t a good route, didn’t answer that. So, we just constantly pounded on, “No, 
this is worse than nothing and here’s why: It ruins the system long-term. It will 
pull dollars from the bus system and hurt the bus system. It will increase 
congestion. And the road money will be a complete waste. It will probably 
actually induce congestion, because that’s what happens when you put more 
capacity on roads.” 
Libal also says that the concept of framing is essential for the activist work he and 
his group engage in. Here, again, he approaches important issues related to media 
activism with a strong anarchist sensibility, by connecting framing strategies with a 
concern for empowering future generations of activists. 
MT: You mention framing. Do you think about framing? 
BL: Yeah, definitely. All the time. 
MT: All the time. Really? Do you think about other issues like that? I mean, I 
really want to know how activists think about media. 
BL: Yeah, we do press work. We put out press releases. I think about framing, I 
think about who’s delivering the message. I think about, how do those sound 
bites, and who’s delivering them, how does it help our organizing efforts? For 
instance, there’s pros and cons for it always being the same person who’s 
delivering the message. People who get used to it, knowing who you are. Should 
it always be me who’s the author of an op-ed or a letter? Or should we be 
distributing within our organization who it is? I think there’s pros and cons. 
MT: Is that issue of distributing the work just getting back to this idea of 
horizontalism, and sharing the work and the credit? Or is it more of an issue of 
public perception? 
BL: I think it’s both, I think they’re interrelated, because if you share the work 
and you share the credit, that makes your organizing stronger, I think. You’re 
building new voices, you’re building new leaders. At the same time, it’s 
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confusing for the public to hear ten different articles with quotes from ten 
different people. There’s a continuity issue. 
 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF ADVERSARIAL FRAMING 
Although all five anarchists took a dim view of mass media’s influence on 
audiences, only two interviewees mentioned the mass media’s use of adversarial or 
suppressive framing techniques. 
sc: When I look at the media, I look at it with an anarchist lens. A lot of times, 
even when they’re talking about a problem, an issue, or problem solutions, it’s 
always within the capitalist framing or the state’s. What’s the government going 
to do about this? How’s the corporation going to deal with this? I ask the 
question, what are we going to do about it? How do we want to solve this 
problem? If I was in a community directly affected by this, what would I want to 
do about that, that doesn’t just involve engaging that way? 
Denton strongly criticized mass news media framing’s implications for activists 
and movements along anarchist lines, drawing attention, as noted above, to the media’s 
role in constructing realities that work to suppress movements.  
MT: How do you think [the mass news media] prevents the development of 
movements? 
MD: One, because it’s completely individualizing. It actually spends a decent 
amount of time focusing on individual things that people do that are inspiring. 
“Oh, this principal saved this school,” or something. But very little on the social 
context of that. So, very little about, why are all the schools there in such bad 
shape? What are the conditions of the kids coming into these schools? What 
[c]ould it really look like?… Another big thing is, they frame the political 
spectrum in such a way that anything left of neoliberal centrist Democrat 
liberalism, anything left of Obama, is literally not even conceivable. Not even 
conceivable, because it’s never portrayed. So, even in the run-up to a war or 
something, you have a small, small sampling of antiwar voices. I remember, 
during the Iraq war, this was pulling our hair out. The country’s evenly divided at 
this point, and they’re just giving all the air time to lies that are just being 
repeated ad nauseam by the administration, by their surrogates, by the people they 
don’t need to be their surrogates but who are going to carry water for them 
anyway. It was like five percent are just purely antiwar views, when that’s 
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actually a substantive portion of public opinion. We can only imagine what it 
would’ve been had there been an actual debate in the news media, or if the media 
had actually been critical, pointing out the lies that were being told, fact checking, 
that sort of thing. I think it’s destructive to movement building, because it never 
shows people organizing. That’s the other thing, it never shows people organizing 
communally. It never shows an alternative to getting help from established 
organizations. Or it’s individuals doing something great, but it’s never talking 
about the grassroots. 
 
VIEWS ON FRAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
I also asked interviewees to comment on media depictions of political violence 
committed by activists and movements. For crow, the mass media’s intense coverage of 
the property destruction committed by anarchists in Seattle in 1999 actually played an 
important role in breathing life into the global anarchist movement. 
MT: After Seattle, there was a lot of complaints—even among anarchists—about 
media depictions of Black Bloc protestors and others who were committing 
property destruction and things that. What do you think of those critiques of the 
Black Bloc? 
sc: The critiques? I don’t care about the critiques. They’re irrelevant. Think about 
this: Here’s the anarchist narrative of this: 50,000 people to 80,000 people 
gathered—one of the largest gatherings in the United States at that point—that 
was super diverse. Indigenous people, labor unions, environmentalists, anarchists, 
and NGOs. International, working together. And the corporate media didn’t even 
care. In the New York Times it might have been on page 30, if you were lucky. 
Anarchists smashed the windows of a Starbucks and NikeTown, and all the 
sudden it was front page news. All of a sudden, everybody wanted to know, 
“What’s this globalization thing? Why are people protesting?” Internationally, it 
made huge news. And, at the same time, no matter all the crappy things that 
people said, it was a coming-out party for anarchism in the United States. It was 
the single biggest thing, because people around the world, including myself, saw 
that and said, “That is the thing I want to be a part of.” Now, I was already 
leaning towards anarchism and already working on it, but that was the thing. “I’m 
going to go back and become an organizer again. I don’t want to work in a co-op. 
I want to be in the streets organizing again.” That was powerful. It was the 
linchpin for the coming-out party of anarchy in the United States in the twentieth 
and twenty-first century. 
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MT: So, because these protesters threw these bricks through the windows, that 
was in your mind not a bad thing? 
sc: In the framing of the media, no, it wasn’t a bad thing. Now, property 
destruction I totally agree with, especially corporate property destruction and no 
problems with, but I think there’s a right time and a right place for it. That 
conversation is a whole different conversation about Seattle. But for the media 
aspect of it, it was incredible. And that wasn’t even their intention. People who 
engaged in the property destruction were doing it for ethical reasons, you know, 
the symbolism of it all. It just was perfect. It was a perfect storm. Now, in the 
narrative of history, people may say terrible things about the Black Bloc and 
property destruction from that particular moment, but I can tell you it inspired 
thousands and thousands of people to recognize that they wanted to be anarchists, 
or that they were anarchists, or that they were going to start doing that stuff. Not 
just breaking things, but that anarchy was a thing. It was the death knell for the 
Socialists and Communists. That was way more powerful. That was a culture 
shift. 
Deller also argued that mass media coverage of political violence committed by 
anarchists could benefit anarchists and other radical anti-capitalists: 
MT: What do you want to say about violence in the media or depictions of 
violence? 
AD: I just think it’s really important to show, because no press is bad press. I 
think that’s the kind of thing that gets people galvanized to do more and move 
away from liberalism, which is what I’m into. It might be risky, because people 
might want to shy away from violence, or they may want to condemn violence 
whatever violence is happening. But I think that, for others, that it’s really 
important to see that shit can go down. For me, that was really formative. I read 
Pacifism as Pathology, by Ward Churchill, and I read How Nonviolence Protects 
the State, by Peter Gelderloos. Those things, as well as seeing how violence is 
portrayed versus how it actually happens – like, if I were at a protest and we were 
in a Black Bloc, versus how it was portrayed by the media the next day, having 
that experience and then seeing how violence is treated in a more global sense, I 
think it’s important to cover whatever violent resistance is happening. 
Although Denton does not use violent tactics in his activism, he also does not 
dismiss diversity of tactics out of hand. His comments reaffirm crow’s observation, 
above, that mass media coverage of Black Bloc anarchists in Seattle helped draw people 
into the movement. However, Denton does believe that activists must also consider 
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whether the use of violent tactics is consonant with the goal of building inclusive 
movements, echoing Brian Martin’s (2008) arguments that violent tactics conflict with 
anarchism’s emphasis on prefigurative politics. 
MT: Let’s talk about the Black Bloc, because the Black Bloc has been around 
since at least ‘99. So, in Seattle, when those Black Bloc protesters were throwing 
bricks through the windows of Starbucks or McDonald’s, or whatever it was, they 
caught flak from the corporate media on the one hand, but they also caught it from 
various people on the left. What do you think of that, the left giving them… 
MD: Giving them shit? 
MT: Were these critiques justified? 
MD: I do agree with … diversity of tactics. It sounds great. It sounds all positive. 
The problem is, though, some actions end up having an effect on more than that 
group. If you’ve organized a protest to show broad opposition to something, and 
you’re trying to attract families, and you’re trying to attract people of color, and 
then there’s a small group that’s going to act and use violence or use property 
destruction, and will predictably receive a strong police response, you are 
deciding for the rest of that march or the movement, that certain people aren’t 
going to be as safe there, that it’s going to be limited in scope. For me, it’s a 
question of representation and democracy, or self-management within the 
movement about whether or not certain groups can do certain things. I don’t 
oppose it, to answer your question specifically. 
MT: What effect do you think violence has on viewers, like when they see 
depictions of violence in the media? 
MD: To be honest, I think it is almost uniformly… I think it really excites people 
who want to stick it to the man. 
MT: I kind of think that, too, actually. 
MD: If you ask about, what’s your first experience with the left? I remember 
sitting in class and being like, “What’s going on in Seattle?” “Oh yeah, Seattle, 
there’s a riot there or something.” So, I went and looked it up. And it was like, 
“Oh, what is this anti-corporate globalization internationalist movement about?” 
That might have been my first exposure to the real left. So, I can’t say it’s all bad. 
But I will be honest, that I do really sympathize with… I think for most people, 
whether it’s because it’s portrayed this way or whether because they just think it’s 
not appropriate and it’s a bad tactic, it turns them off from participation. I don’t 
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know that it never has its place, but I can see it being pretty destructive. And I 
think that’s why the cops and the FBI, I think that’s why they use it, because it is 
so effective at deterring people from involvement most of the time. … 
MT: Or trapping people, ala Brandon Darby. 
MD: Exactly, which still kills me to think about. I think about the civil rights 
movement sometimes and none of the reforms, none of the gains, none of what 
was signed, implemented — not none of it, but a lot of it… 
MT: The gains of the movement. 
MD: The gains of the movement partially relied on the threat of violence. It didn’t 
exist in a vacuum. Martin wouldn’t have been as effective if Malcolm wasn’t on 
the wing, telling white America, “Look, this is an alternative. We’ve also got this, 
and we will defend ourselves.” And the Black Panthers, and that sort of thing. 
Again, it’s kind of conflicted. I generally find myself turned off by it, because I 
feel like it has a worse effect overall on the movement. I think it can theoretically 
be incorporated into movements. I think we should have militant opposition, and I 
think there are ways to incorporate that responsibly, in a way that can grow the 
movement. 
Libal also expressed concern over what he describes as the “nonconsensual 
element” associated with the use of political violent social protest tactics such as Black 
Blocs. Unlike Denton, though, he does not believe political violence has any place in the 
movements in which he participates.  
MT: What do you think of violence on television by protesters and activists? 
Going back to Seattle in ‘99, for instance. Do you think that was bad or good? 
BL: I think it was bad. 
MT: You do think it was bad. 
BL: It depends on what you mean by — yeah, I do. It’s interesting, because I feel 
like ten years ago I probably would have not made that argument. If somebody 
came to a protest we put on, and granted… It’s part of the beauty and the 
problems with anarchism, without structure. “It’s everyone’s protest!” I think that 
I kind of reject the whole argument now. I certainly think that there is a place for 
very confrontational protests. I also think that, now, if somebody showed up to a 
protest we were putting on and started breaking windows and stuff… 
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MT: You’d send them packing? 
BL: Yeah. I mean, it feels weird to say that. But I do think people have 
obligations to think about things. 
MT: Would that matter less, though, if you weren’t getting media coverage? 
BL: Yeah, totally. Yeah, absolutely. Sure. 
MT: Is there any room at all for violence being maybe a net good thing for 
movements and movement builders? Violence on television or in print or on 
YouTube? 
BL: I was going to say I think that the whole idea of diversity of tactics, which is 
the sort of mantra of anarchists in ‘99 and after — “you can’t tell me what to do, 
we have a diversity tactics” — I think there’s a very nonconsensual element to 
that. But, do we agree that in this space we’re going to do something together? I 
don’t want to be a part of something where my message, and my speech, is going 
to be conflated with something that I completely disagree with — or not, but I 
think it’s inappropriate in the moment. 
MT: Something that might overshadow what you’re doing. 
BL: Yeah, absolutely, which I think happened in Seattle, probably. At the same 
time, I feel like I’m not involved in that at all. I think that’s not happening 
anymore, really, that kind of anarchist-driven protest. For instance, I think that in 
a few places in some of the immigrants’ rights marches, there’s been Black Bloc 
anarchists who have broken windows during these protests. And I think that’s 
total bullshit. If you weren’t involved in the organizing of something at all, and 
you’re not affected by the policies that people are trying to change, and if you get 
arrested you’re not getting deported, but the person next to you is, you’re a dick. 
But I am more familiar with a spectrum of actions that are happening, and very 
radical actions that are meaningful, as in the immigrant rights movement, where 
they’re from legislative work that isn’t even protest-oriented, to legislative work 
that bleeds into protests, to mainstream symbolic civil disobedience, to people 
locking themselves in front of deportation buses and physically stopping 
deportations, to people purposefully getting arrested, infiltrating detention centers 
and organizing people inside of immigration detention, to people organizing 
people in Mexico to cross back into the United States as a form of civil 
disobedience, getting arrested at the border, facing criminal charges, and then 
making legal claims that they should be able to stay, and then getting all this 
media, this “bring them home campaign. That’s a gutsy, radical, political act to 
me. And it’s dependent on the media in some ways. People build media 
campaigns around these people’s stories. 
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Tommy also dismissed radical leftists’ criticisms of political violence, on the 
grounds that these critics seek to maintain order. However, he also believes that white 
radicals who use political violence run the risk of coopting the struggles of people of 
color, which carries racist implications. 
MT: When Black Bloc anarchists break windows or commit other acts of property 
destruction, they’re often painted in a bad light by the media. And often, there’s a 
response from the left, even from sort of Old Left orientation anarchists, that this 
is bad in some way. I probably don’t need to tell you what those critiques are, 
because I’m sure you’ve read them. What do you think of those responses? Like, 
the people who were down on the protesters in Seattle who threw bricks through 
the Starbucks windows? 
T: Fuck ‘em. All of those people. I think that’s where hostility towards journalists 
comes from, right, is because you know that when… 
MT: No, there were people on the left saying this, too. In anarchist journals and 
such. 
T: Okay, yeah. Anyone who seeks to put the brakes on something, anyone who 
has the correct way of acting, I think is totally on the side of maintaining order. … 
Generally, I think it’s the most reactionary bullshit. … Sometimes, there are 
critiques that I think are worth making. Sometimes it’s not appropriate. 
MT: Such as? When might it not be appropriate? 
T: I think if you and your crew of white anarchist kids roll on up to a Ferguson 
solidarity demo in your town, and you’re setting the tone for the demonstration, 
that’s probably inappropriate. 
MT: What about that makes it inappropriate? 
T: I think that everyone has super legitimate reasons to be against the police. But I 
think if you are white, your reasons to be against the police are usually a decision. 
You are not forced to revolt because of your material conditions. You do not walk 
through the world with the imminent threat of being murdered by the police. So, 
in a very real sense, it’s not about white kids. I think there are real ways that white 
anarchists can be in solidarity with black and brown youth, or black and brown 
folks generally who are against the police, but I think our reasons for being 
against the police are super different. They’re connected, but they’re different. I 
think that if you show up to a demo and are just trying to push your own agenda, I 
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think that’s making it about you and making it about your agenda, and it’s not 
connecting with other people in a genuine way around their struggle. It’s an 
attempt to co-opt their struggle and make it about your version of whatever 
anarchist politics you have. And I think that that’s racist. 
 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND MEDIA HEGEMONY 
Although it seems reasonably clear that critical political economy and framing 
theory inform how crow, Denton, and Libal think about the informational power of the 
mass news media, none of the anarchists I spoke with invoked Gramsci’s idea of 
hegemony or indicated any deep familiarity with this concept. Nevertheless, Tommy 
articulated an insightful, prescient, anti-vanguardist critique of hegemony during our 
interview, which dovetails with the arguments concerning hegemony articulated by 
Adam Przeworski (1986), James C. Scott (1985), and Richard Day (2005), discussed in 
Chapter 5, namely, that (1) there may be important material factors which explain why 
people choose not to engage in resistance efforts and (2) the idea of building a 
counterhegemonic mass movement is suspect, or at least from an anarchist strategic 
standpoint. Tommy began by noting that he had come to a realization that traditional, 
reformist methods were inadequate to the task of dismantling civilization itself. 
T: I read Derrick Jensen and people who, instead of naming capitalism, are 
naming civilization, this thing that has been around much longer, as the thing that 
needs to go, and feel like the traditional, reformist methods of activism just aren’t 
going to cut it for that.  
MT: Reformist methods such as? 
T: Just… movement building. Just mass movement building appealing to the 
radical as the person who views themselves as possessing a certain kind of 
consciousness that they are trying to spread to… 
MT: Like the agents of change? 
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T: Yeah, the specialists in social change. I’m sort of becoming a little bit 
dispelled, or feeling burned by that process, you know, trying to do these things 
and being confronted with a bunch of people who just don’t care. And being like, 
“Okay, that’s interesting.” 
MT: When you say ‘people’, what do you mean? 
T: The people that activists try to reach out to, or organize, or have participate in 
their thing, who just don’t care. 
MT: So, like a non-activist audience? 
T: Yeah, people who just live their lives, rather than try to confront power. Or not 
even confront power, but try to speak to it. Or whatever. 
MT: Why do you think it is that people don’t care, though? 
T: I mean, I don’t care. It’s usually not fun. It feels like a sacrificial thing to do. It 
takes effort. It’s not usually very rewarding. People don’t think it works, which it 
doesn’t, really. I feel like there’s a million reasons why generally people aren’t 
interested. Their everyday lives are so much more important, so unless you have 
really tangible ways in which your movement or whatever political project, unless 
you have a really tangible and obvious way that that can enhance somebody’s life, 
usually materially, people aren’t going to care. And I’m the same way. If 
something isn’t stimulating, if something isn’t up in the air, if it’s just the same 
predictable show up, speak truth to power, have power ignore you, go home, try 
harder next time, I’m not interested either, you know? And I feel like that’s 
generally the model of people who are trying to build these revolutionary 
movements from the ground up. They show up to different moments where 
people might be galvanized around a particular issue, and try to channel that 
energy into their own particular thing. The problem is that there’s like a million of 
those people, with different particular things. You have the ISO, and you have the 
anarchists, and it’s just like… If you’re normal person to might be motivated to 
leave their house for that one particular issue, and you show up, you’re just like, 
“Oh my God, I feel like I’m a buffet and everyone’s trying to capture my energy.” 
I think people are right to be suspicious of it. People are right to not care. You get 
burned enough, you try hard, and then it doesn’t work, and you do that enough 
times, and you sort of give up. You’re sort of like, “Okay, this isn’t working.” It 
doesn’t mean that I don’t still indict all of society as being terrible, but it does 
mean that we need to think about what we’re doing totally differently. 
MT: Do you have that same feeling, that attitude about the movements 
themselves, though? 
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T: I think movements are really interesting. 
MT: How hard are you on the movements? 
T: I’m less hard on the movements and more hard on the people who would 
manage them. I think that generally, radicals and politicians of all stripes seek to 
capture the unpredictable energy of moments. To take the recent wave of anti-
police demonstrations across the country, there’s this sort of unpredictable energy 
that a lot of people just have. It’s just antagonism toward the police. It seems like 
it’s always the radicals who show up and are like, “Cool, join my thing. This is 
how we have to do it.” It’s always telling people what to do. It’s always putting 
the brakes on, as opposed to trying to maintain that unpredictable space, trying to 
make it so that whoever can express themselves however it is that they are 
deciding to do it. It’s usually the movement builders and the radicals who 
[instead] are trying to channel that energy into their particular program, and that is 
what I am particularly hostile toward. 
 
VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF ALTERNATIVE MEDIA 
Four of the five anarchists I spoke with indicated that alternative media was 
important, but crow rejected the underlying assumption of an alternative/mainstream 
dichotomy. He believes activists should create their own media, but interprets this very 
broadly.  
MT: Broadly, what role do you see for alternative media? 
sc: I want you to clarify what is alternative media. 
MT: I will let you clarify that. 
sc: Well, I don’t think there is alternative media. It just is media. 
MT: When you say we create our own media, though… 
sc: Right, but what’s the ‘we’ in that? I think that we create our own media 
everywhere. If you’re into co-ops and communes, there’s a whole media world for 
you. If you’re anarchist identified, then there’s a whole world of media for you. If 
you’re a liberal lefty, then there’s a whole world of media for you. If you’re a 
right-wing conservative, there’s a whole media world for you. These are broad 
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strokes. I just want to clarify that. I don’t think there is alternative media. I think 
there is just media. 
The remaining four anarchists, who accepted the alternative/mainstream binary, 
offered opinions. Deller, for instance, cautioned that although alternative media can be 
important, some alternative media run the risk of capitalist recuperation. 
MT: How do you think about activist, or alternative, or radical media—however 
you want to think about it—as it relates to these issues we’re talking about? 
AD: When I think of more radical types of media, I think of Indymedia, Infoshop, 
people on Tumblr, people on Twitter, people who are on the ground or really in 
the thing. And I think of AnarchistNews.org. I think those outlets are great. I think 
they talk about the things I want to be hearing about, and they talk about things in 
a way that is less commodifiable. … 
MT: What role do you see for alternative media? 
AD: I don’t really know. For right now, I think it’s in a really cool position, where 
a lot can happen really quickly and I think it has the potential to keep doing that, 
and keep being the thing that keeps mass media in check. It’s so different from 
mass media that it’s providing something that is potentially more honest or 
truthful. But I also see it as being a thing that can still be assimilated or 
rehabilitated into capitalism. Everything is potentially commodifiable, and that’s 
the problem. 
Denton, as mentioned earlier, supports alternative media and believes it has an 
important role to play in social movements. For Denton, a vibrant alternative media and a 
strong, organized left presence in the United States have a shared fate. 
MT: What role do you see for alternative media? What role would you like it to 
have? This is a meta-activism question. 
MD: I think it’s indispensable for a better world. For movements, especially for 
long-term movements, if there’s going to be a left in the U.S., which there really 
isn’t right now, alternative media has to be part of that. There needs to be a left 
for there to be a vibrant alternative media. But I think just as much there needs to 
be a vibrant alternative media in order to have any sort of left that has any chance 
of winning, because we need a mass movement. So, we need sources where 
people can go and not be deluded, and not be disempowered, distracted, and 
individualized. And where people can find a different way of looking at the 
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world, compatible with the way we see the world, and how that informs why 
we’re building movements. 
For Libal, traditional forms of alternative media, such as magazines like Z 
Magazine and In These Times, do not carry the same significance as they used to. Online 
alternative media are more appealing to him. 
MT: … a question I’m interested in … is what role for alternative media for those 
of us who care about organizing and activism in the twenty-first century? 
BL: I actually think that there is more room, in some ways, because of — I think 
there’s less room in print, obviously. Left Turn doesn’t publish anymore, you 
know. But I think that, for instance, Colorlines is relevant and I actually actively 
reach out to them on some stories. A lot of – Latino Rebels, you know. And 
there’s even new cables, like Fusion, which is an ABC/Univision thing. There’s 
more niche media, and some of that is alternative and activist based. The 
Observer, I think, is actually – maybe it’s just because I know so many people 
who write there — but I think it’s transitioned in a way that it’s relevant. I see it. I 
see it on social media, and I see it in the world, whereas I don’t see things like Z 
Mag or In These Times. 
MT: As being relevant, or you just don’t see them? 
BL: I literally don’t see them. I literally don’t think I’ve seen anyone post an 
article from Z Mag on Facebook, and I don’t think MonkeyWrench gets Z Mag 
anymore. It doesn’t exist to me anymore. I don’t go to the website of my own. 
Tommy believes that most radical alternative media have hit an impasse, and that 
even the most adventurous publications “are scraping the barrel” in their attempts to 
share new ideas that can spur radical imaginaries. During our interview, I mentioned that 
over the past few years, I noticed MonkeyWrench Books, the anarchist bookstore he 
works with, has stopped carrying several prominent alternative publications, such as Z 
Magazine, Monthly Review, In These Times, and others. “No one reads them. They’re just 
not interesting,” he says. However, he spoke positively about the propaganda efforts of 
CrimethInc., which is an anarchist collective that has produced and distributed hundreds 
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of thousands of widely read books and pamphlets promoting anarchism over the past two 
decades.  
MT: It’s interesting that, when you talk about propaganda, there is no obvious 
goal for the propaganda. You’re just going to throw it out there and kind of see 
what happens. When I’ve talked to other anarchists who use the word 
‘propaganda’, they’re talking about it more in this “war of ideas” sense — media 
is a battleground or whatever. That’s not what you have in mind at all, right? 
T: No, no. 
MT: It’s not that. What about other alternative media? … What about stuff like Z 
Magazine, In These Times, or Left Turn? 
T: It might be interesting if those things had interesting politics, but they don’t, in 
my opinion. They’re wacky. 
MT: Are there publications or journals that actually craft arguments, that aren’t 
just propaganda, that resonate with you? That matter? Earlier, you mentioned 
CrimethInc. 
T: … The reason I mention CrimethInc. is they have a new project. They’re 
printing some enormous number of a new anarchist primer as this fucking global 
intervention. That’s really ambitious. They’re seeing what they’re doing as this 
thing that’s maybe similar to the battleground of ideas, but more in a sense they’re 
trying to — because I think that that is true. … I don’t know how much ideas 
matter compared to other things, but sometimes they do. Sometimes they do 
matter. I don’t know what material effect propaganda has. It is clear that it has 
some effect. It is unclear whether… 
MT: It seems like it’s hard to print thousands of copies of something, which is an 
investment of time and money and energy and all these things, without having any 
sense of what effect it will have, though, right? How does one commit to that? 
T: It’s an experiment. 
MT: But throwing that much spaghetti at the wall takes a lot of resources, right? 
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T: [Laughs] It does take a lot. CrimethInc just did a huge Kickstarter.* They have 
the resources. I think it’s fucking bold. For whatever you have to say about 
CrimethInc.’s politics, and I haven’t read the primer yet, but CrimethInc. has had 
a fucking material effect in the United States. 
MT: They’re probably the most visible anarchist presence in North America. 
T: Visible and consistent. Of course, I have my critiques, but they are refreshing. 
They do things in a way that I think is bold and new and in the spirit of 
experimentation. If you have the resources, then why the fuck not? Again, it’s that 
question of, “How do we push? How do we try harder? How do we try a new 
thing?” And your experiments fail, but it seems to me that they’re always worth it. 
Do something weird and see what happens. If you’re just trying the same thing 
that you tried forever, if you’re still screaming on that same soapbox and no one’s 
listening, they aren’t going to start listening.  
  
                                                 
* See http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/crimethinc/to-change-everything. In 2014, CrimethInc. raised 
over $22,000 on the crowdfunding website to produce and distribute their anarchist primer, To Change 
Everything: An Anarchist Appeal 
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Chapter 8: Discussion and Further Research 
This dissertation did not have a well-defined body of anarchist media studies to 
use as a foundation when I set out to answer, “What might an anarchist media theory look 
like?” This required me, in Chapter 2, to construct an account of news media power 
rooted in anarchist thought and practice, drawing inspiration from writings by anarchists 
and fellow travelers, critical media scholars, and writers working in science and 
technology studies. In Chapter 3, I critically examined the politics of academic 
communications research, in order to situate anarchist media theorizing and research 
within the field. Following this, in Chapter 4 I sketched three important conceptions of 
news media vis-à-vis activists and social movements—i.e., media as site of struggle, 
media as adversary to activists and movements, and media as tools and resources that 
activists can use or harness—to use as a backdrop for discussion in later chapters. In 
Chapter 5, in order to explore how anarchism challenges, modifies, and denaturalizes 
notable critical media theories—framing, the dominant ideology thesis, media hegemony, 
and political economy—I reconstructed these theories, teased out their strategic 
implications for activists and social movements, and assessed these perspectives and their 
strategic implications from an anarchist point of view. Finally, I conducted in-depth 
interviews with anarchists and other activists to gather their perspectives on these and 
other issues, covered in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Chapters 2 through 5 address this dissertation’s main research question in broad 
strokes, whereas the exploratory interview research component in Chapters 6 and 7 
represents a first step at putting descriptive meat on theoretical bones. The results of this 
theory-building project were startling: Where I expected to find that an anarchist account 
of news media might look something like an admixture of critical media concepts and 
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theories such as political economy, instead I found that anarchism offers a distinct 
alternative to popular, established critical media perspectives. Anarchist media theorizing 
is a useful way to generate low theoretical arguments or concepts related to news media 
power, media-movement interactions, and academic scholarship about these topics. This 
dissertation’s attempt to help close the gap between critical communications research and 
radical activist practice shows that there are indeed important features of an anarchist 
account of news media, discussed below. 
 
CRITIQUE OF CORRUPT INFORMATIONAL POWER 
The first—and arguably most important—defining feature of anarchist media 
theory is its critique of corruptions of information power, which is a logical extension of 
anarchism’s critique of various forms of domination, authority, and hierarchy. As noted 
in Chapter 2, anarchists tend to default to a critical political economy perspective such as 
Ed Herman and Noam Chomsky’s (1988/2002) propaganda model when critiquing the 
mass news media, as evidenced by the Anarchist FAQ (McKay 2008). And in fact, it 
could be argued that contemporary anarchism’s account of power and hierarchy is 
fundamentally in agreement with the critique of mass news media advanced by political 
economist theorists such as Chomsky, Herman, and Robert McChesney. However, this 
dissertation suggests that from an anarchist perspective, the political economy tradition 
offers at best a partial understanding of corruptions of informational power. For example, 
the propaganda model fails to capture or adequately explain how regimes of domination 
such as white supremacy and patriarchy work to corrupt the informational power of mass 
news media systems. This is because the critical political economy tradition is concerned, 
somewhat narrowly, with state-corporate corruptions of informational power. 
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Although the anarchist critique of corruptions of information power encompasses 
a critique of state-corporate influence, it also draws attention to other forms of power and 
realities of oppression. For anarchist media theory, then, state-corporate power should not 
be the main object of analysis; nor should culture, white supremacy, patriarchy, and so 
on. Rather, power itself is the focus of critique. This indicates room for analytical growth 
and suggests that anarchists and other, likeminded radicals ought to broaden their 
horizons when assessing the problem of mass news media power. 
 
CRITIQUE OF COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 
The second defining feature of anarchist media theory is that it challenges rather 
than uncritically accepts the influence of communications technologies as inevitable or 
natural, which also is consistent with the anarchist critique of domination and hierarchy. 
As argued in Chapter 2, communications technologies are hardly neutral; they can 
activate and spread resistance, but ultimately serve to reinforce or reproduce regimes of 
domination such as capitalism. This point is especially relevant in the context of 
advanced capitalist societies such as the United States, where activists and citizens rely 
heavily on digital communications technologies for outreach and engagement. This 
suggests that anarchists and other radicals should be sensitive to the dilemmas posed by 
activist use of these technologies, as well as look for ways to incorporate communications 
technologies into their activism in ways that subvert their social control functions. 
  
NON-HIERARCHICAL, WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNICATION 
A third defining feature of anarchist media theory is that it rejects the corporate 
structure of mass news media and values, instead, nonhierarchical media organizational 
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forms, as well as communications practices that enable direct information flows. An 
anarchist account of news media also places a premium on widespread participation in 
the process of making meaning. This reflects anarchism’s commitment to liberty, 
autonomy, and direct action as a form of prefigurative politics. From an anarchist 
perspective, not only should media organizations and practices be consistent with 
nonhierarchical modes of social organization, but these organizations and practices ought 
to be open to anyone who wishes to participate in communicative activity. This means 
that anarchist media theory challenges the current media system premised on the 
professionalization of journalists, which restricts participation in meaning making to a 
small handful of people, who typically report on events from the perspective of the state 
and capital. 
 
COMMITMENT TO RESISTANCE AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 
A fourth defining feature of an anarchist account of news media is that it draws 
attention to activists’ ethical-political commitments and how these influence or shape the 
ways in which activists approach questions related to media activism and social 
movement tactics and strategy. This includes issues related to activists’ engagement with 
the mass news media, issues related to the creation of alternative or activist media, and 
questions concerning how activist researchers ought to approach inquiry into these 
matters. Unlike some critical media perspectives, an anarchist account of news media 
places a premium on resistance and rejects theories which deny the possibility of 
resistance. In addition to emphasizing mass news media’s adversarial roles (e.g., its role 
in suppressing activists), an anarchist media theory also draws attention to two other 
important dimensions of news media: its role as a site of struggle and as tools or 
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resources that activists, dissidents, and radicals can use. That is, anarchist media theory 
does not simply offer a critique of news media power; it also carries radical political 
implications. 
Anarchist media theory considers it necessary to evaluate critical media theories 
according to how well they explain aspects of social-political reality, but also on the basis 
of their strategic implications. Theoretical ideas ought to be of interest to activists, 
instead of academic research divorced from struggle. This feature of anarchist media 
theory sets it apart from most other notable critical media perspectives. Critical media 
theories that admit of no strategic implications, such as the dominant ideology thesis, are 
of limited use to activists, and possibly worthless from an anarchist media theory 
perspective. Furthermore, strategic implications ought to be concomitant with anarchist 
thought and practice. It is clear, for instance, that anarchist media theory is deeply at odds 
with Marxist accounts of dominant ideology and hegemony; even though these 
perspectives draw attention to the corruptions of information power, their strategic 
implications and underlying ethical-political commitments to vanguardist solutions are 
out of step with anarchist thought and practice. This finding is especially notable, because 
it indicates that anarchist media theory very clearly offers an anti-Leninist, anti-Orthodox 
Marxist, but still radical anti-capitalist approach to theorizing about news media power 
and media-movement interactions. It also suggests that activists should pay close 
attention to critical media studies that actually do promote progressive policy changes, 
such as the work of political economists like Robert McChesney.   
Together, these features distinguish an anarchist account of news media from 
other critical media theoretical perspectives. If these features appear mundane, it is worth 
remembering that anarchism, again, does not lend itself to high theory, and that no other 
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study has explicitly connected these dots. Making these linkages is this dissertation’s 
main contribution. 
 
DISCUSSION OF INTERVIEW RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Although the findings from this study’s exploratory ethnographic interview 
research are not meant to represent all or most anarchists’ beliefs about news media, they 
do indicate that some of the major theoretical arguments contained in this dissertation 
accurately reflect how some anarchists think about news media. These interviews have 
important unifying themes. First, although anarchists hold differing views of news media 
power and appropriate media strategies and tactics, their views on these topics are all 
informed by a desire to live in a freer, less repressive world. 
Second, anarchists hold strong adversarial conceptions of news media, but 
generally speaking, do not believe activists should completely rule out mass media 
engagement. With the exception of Tommy, who generally found questions related to 
mass news media to be fairly uninteresting, the remaining four anarchists I interviewed 
expressed concern over what I describe as corruptions of information power. Although 
Alyse Deller’s views, which come very close to a dominant ideology thesis 
understanding of news media, could arguably be characterized as out of step with the 
anarchist account of news media sketched in this dissertation, it was clear that scott crow, 
Marcus Denton, and Bob Libal viewed news media in terms of a site of struggle and as 
tools or resources. The interviewees’ responses indicate that, in an important sense, 
contemporary anarchist activists are in fact organically pragmatic thinkers on the issue of 
activist engagement with the institutions of mass news media. 
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Third, some anarchists believe the image in which the press casts them is 
irrelevant as long as it provides visibility to radical political activity. This clicks with the 
theoretical argument that deprecatory media depictions of activists’ political violence 
can, somewhat paradoxically, actually benefit activist groups and movements.  
However, I did find it odd that most of the anarchists I spoke with believed the 
mass media exerted an especially strong influence on media audiences, a view which I 
consider to be out of step with an anarchist understanding of news media, as well as most 
academic research on this topic. I believe there are two reasons for this. One, my view of 
anarchism is idiosyncratic, because it is influenced in some important degree by 
autonomist Marxism and a familiarity with audience reception theory. As noted in 
Chapter 2, though, this idiosyncrasy is unavoidable. Second, it is possible that anarchists 
and other activists hold such beliefs about news media, simply because most activist 
literature on media has hit a creative plateau by not engaging with academic writings on 
this subject. Yet, as I have argued, academic writings on mass media and 
communications challenge several assumptions activists may hold. The range of opinions 
I encountered also indicates that there is a fairly blurred line separating anarchists from 
other radical leftists. This hints at the possibility that anarchistic ideas about media may 
have wide influence in left-progressive circles – a topic I intend to explore in the future, 
by examining the transcripts of the remaining eleven interviews. 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This dissertation contributes to the burgeoning field of anarchist studies by 
opening the door to several lines of inquiry. Like Marxism, anarchism can bring to 
critical media studies “a ruthless criticism of everything existing, ruthless in two senses: 
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The criticism must not be afraid of its own conclusions, nor of conflict with the powers 
that be” (Marx 1843/1978, p. 13; emphasis in original). At the same time, this work has 
important limitations. For example, even though about a third of the activists I reached 
out to for interviews were people of color, most of those who consented to be 
interviewed—14 of 16—were white. An important next step to expand inquiry and 
theorizing on this topic is simply to include diverse views from anarchists and other 
radicals. Such a project ought to gather perspectives from anarchists in different 
geographic regions, because different anarchist tendencies are better represented in 
different states. For example, arguably anarcho-communists hold more sway in 
northeastern states, whereas insurrectionist anarchists are more commonly found in the 
Bay Area of California.  
In addition, writing a doctoral dissertation or any other major academic work 
requires the researcher to commit a significant amount of time and resources in order to 
see it through to completion. For the PhD student in the neoliberal university, with few 
resources to support its graduate students, there is intense pressure to finish quickly and 
graduate. In the process of formulating, researching, and writing this manuscript, I 
reluctantly had to scale back my original, more ambitious proposal, which included, 
among other things, an in-depth examination of each ethnographic interview. Another 
important limitation, arguably, is that this dissertation is written primarily for an 
academic audience. Although it is reflexive in the sense that it assesses its ethical-
political bases, it also fails to be reflexive in the sense that I did not ask my interview 
subjects to read over chapter drafts during the initial research and writing process, which 
I probably would have done were this not a doctoral dissertation. 
The next step in my research process will be to reorganize this dissertation’s 
contents into journal articles, examine theoretical perspectives I could not cover—such as 
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agenda-setting theory, feminist studies, and critical race theory—and delve deeper into 
the interview data that I collected for this study. I intend to add another dimension of 
reflexivity to this work, by soliciting feedback from my interview subjects and other 
activists as part of the process. 
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Appendix: Interview Script 
Background 
1. What is your name? Can you please spell it? May I ask for your contact 
information, in case I have follow up questions? (Identify age/gender as well.) 
2. Can you describe what brought you to activism? Do you identify politically as 
anything? 
3. What groups or causes do you work with? 
4. Can you talk about their goals and strategies? 
5. Do you think they reach those goals? Are their strategies successful? 
 
Sense of theory 
1. Do the ends justify the means? (Are the means and ends the same?) 
2. Do you think people basically make their own decisions about how to live their 
lives? Why do you think people do what they do? 
3. Do you think people are partly responsible for their own problems? 
4. Do you and your friends (comrades, allies) share the same values? Where do you 
think those values come from? 
5. In general, what do you think of mass news media? 
6. What effect do you think mass news media has on people? 
 
Media use 
1. Where do you get your news? 
2. What kinds of news do you typically watch or read? 
3. Do you use any digital technologies (cell phones, Twitter, etc.) in your activism? 
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Working with mass news media 
1. How do you think about commercial/mainstream media as it relates to activism 
and/or social change? How do you approach it? 
2. Does your group use mainstream media in its strategies? In what way(s)? 
3. If you’re trying to reach an audience through your activism, what kind of 
audience do you have in mind? 
4. How do you know whether you’ve reached that audience? 
5. Can you describe a successful media strategy or campaign your organization 
used? 
6. What about an unsuccessful one? 
7. What influence do these activities have? 
8. Do you think it is worthwhile for activists to use mainstream media? 
9. What role do you see for mainstream media? 
 
Working with activist/alternative media 
1. How do you think about activist or alternative media as it relates to activism 
and/or social change? 
2. Does your group use alternative or activist media in its strategies? In what ways? 
3. If you’re trying to reach an audience, what kind of audience is it? 
4. How do you know whether you’ve reached that audience? 
5. Can you describe a successful media strategy or campaign your organization 
used? 
6. What about an unsuccessful one? 
7. What influence do these activities have? 
8. Do you think it is worthwhile for activists to use activist or alternative media? 
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9. What role do you see for alternative media? 
10. If you read or create alternative media, how do you think about mainstream 
media’s influence on alternative media?. 
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